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GOVERNMENTS  AND  PARTIES 

IN  CONTINENTAL 

EUROPE 


BY 


A.  LAWRENCE    LOWELL 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.  I 


^^H^^SM 


BOSTON   AND   NEW   YORK 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

<3T6e  IftftWi&e  $reM  Camfcriboe 

1897 


7  3  06     4 


Copyright,  1896, 
By  ABBOTT  LAWRENCE  LOWELL. 

All  rights  reserved. 


SECOND    EDITION. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  V.  S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  and  Company. 


. 


To  the  memory  of 

EDWARD  JACKSON  LOWELL 

whose  sympathy  and  wise  counsel 

were  an  invaluable  help  in  the 

preparation  of  these  pages 


PREFACE. 


J         The  State   has   been   represented   at   sundry  times 
^i     under  different  figures.     In  the  frontispiece  to  Hobbes' 
v     Leviathan,  in  the  edition  of  1651,  it  is  given  the  form 
of  a  gigantic  prince  whose  body  is  composed  of  minute 
human  beings  of  every  kind.     A  more  common  symbol 
^     is  that  of  a  ship  sailing  the  trackless  ocean,  with   a 
venerable  pilot  at  the  helm,  steering  by  the  light  of  the 
^     everlasting  stars.     To  the  writer  the  State  sometimes 
v     presents  itself  under  the  figure  of  a  stage-coach  with 
the  horses  running  away.     On  the  front  a  number  of 
fa     eager  men  are  urging  the  most  contrary  advice  on  the 
driver,  whose  chief  object  is  to  keep  his  seat;    while 
at  the  back  a  couple  of  old  gentlemen  with  spy-glasses 
are    carefully    surveying    the   road   already   traversed. 
s^    Now,  useful  as  all  these  persons  undoubtedly  are,  there 
^  ought  to   be  room  also  for  the   quiet   observers,  who 
watch  the  movements  of  the  horses,  and  note  the  strain 
on  the  wheels,  axles,  and  bolts ;  who  listen  to  the  hub- 
bub on  the  front  seat,  and  the  grave  conversation  at 
the  rear.     To  drop  the  simile  and  speak  directly,  there 
is  a  real  need  to-day  of  a  thorough  examination  into 
the  actual  working  of  modern  governments,  and  in  one 


vi  PREFACE. 

direction  at  least  that  need  is  still  imperfectly  satisfied. 
I  refer  to  the  activity  of  the  parties,  which  furnish  the 
main  motive  power  in  public  life. 

A  oreat  deal  of  discussion  has  taken  place  of  late 
over  the  question  whether  political  parties  are  a  good  or 
an  evil,  but  from  a  scientific  point  of  view  this  seems 
very  like  making  the  same  inquiry  about  the  winds  and 
the  tides.  In  reality  parties  are  a  fact,  and  as  such 
their  manifestations  ought  to  be  studied.  Moreover,  it 
is  impossible  to  say  that  parties  in  the  abstract  are  a 
good  or  an  evil,  because  the  result  depends  on  the  circum- 
stances under  which  they  act.  In  Venice,  for  example, 
the  absence  of  parties,  or  factions,  prevented  the  State 
from  falling  into  anarchy  and  despotism  like  the  other 
Italian  republics.  In  England  the  existence  of  two 
strong  parties  enabled  the  people  to  control  the  crown, 
and  made  parliamentary  government  possible.  In 
France  the  subdivision  of  parties  has  prevented  the 
parliamentary  system  from  being  a  success,  and  both 
there  and  in  Germany  it  has  been  a  constant  obstacle 
to  popular  government ;  while  in  Switzerland  the  sub- 
division and  low  development  of  parties  has  enabled 
the  people  to  maintain  one  of  the  most  perfect  democra- 
cies the  world  has  ever  seen. 

The  phenomena  of  parties  considered  as  a  fact  have 
been  examined  much  less  than  they  deserve.  Perhaps 
the  best  work  in  this  line  is  that  of  Dupriez,  whose 
book,  "  Les  Ministres  dans  les  Principaux  Pays 
d'Europe  et  d'Amerique,"  appeared  while  the  following 


PREFACE.  vii 

pages  were  in  preparation,  and  with  whose  conclusions 
the  writer  agrees  in  the  main.  Dupriez  approaches  the 
subject,  however,  from  a  somewhat  different  direction, 
for  he  deals  primarily  with  the  minister  and  treats  of 
the  parties  so  far  as  they  affect  his  authority ;  while  the 
writer  was  interested  first  in  the  parties  themselves,  and 
considered  the  position  of  the  cabinet  from  its  bearing 
on  their  condition. 

The  present  work  deals  only  with  a  very  small  part 
of  the  great  subject  of  political  parties.  It  is  simply  an 
attempt  to  study  the  relation  between  the  development 
of  parties  and  the  mechanism  of  modern  government, 
and  other  questions  are  referred  to  only  so  far  as  they 
have  a  bearing  on  the  main  theme.  In  carrying  out 
this  object,  a  systematic  order  of  arrangement  has  been 
followed  so  far  as  practicable.  The  treatment  of  each 
country  begins  with  a  description  of  its  chief  institu- 
tions, or  political  organization ;  this  is  followed  by  a 
sketch  of  its  recent  history,  in  order  to  show  how  the 
parties  actually  work ;  and,  finally,  an  attempt  is  made 
to  find  the  causes  of  the  condition  of  party  life.  The 
investigation  is  limited  to  the  principal  countries  where 
a  division  into  two  great  parties  does  not  prevail,  and 
where  there  usually  exists  in  its  place  a  division  into  a 
number  of  more  or  less  sharply  defined  political  groups. 
This  department  of  the  subject  seemed  to  separate  itself 
naturally  from  the  rest,  and  was  selected  mainly  because 
it  had  been  far  less  studied  than  the  growth  and  in- 
fluence of  the  by-party  system  that  prevails  generally 
in  Anglo-Saxon  countries. 


viii  PREFACE. 

For  the  convenience  of  students,  the  constitutions  of 
all  the  nations  dealt  with  that  have  written  constitutions 
have  been  added  in  an  appendix ;  and  they  have  been 
given  in  their  original  languages,  because  they  are 
more  valuable  in  this  form  than  in  a  translation.  In 
the  case  of  Switzerland,  where  the  constitution  is 
officially  printed  in  German,  French,  and  Italian,  the 
French  text  has  been  selected. 

Boston,  September  4,  1896. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

FRANCE  :   INSTITUTIONS. 

PAGE 

Origin  and  nature  of  parliamentary  government  in  England      .         .  2 

The  system  imperfectly  copied  on  the  Continent      ...  6 

The  Freuch  constitutional  laws            .......  7 

History  of  their  creation           .......  8 

The  method  of  amendment          .......  12 

Their  legal  and  moral  effect    .......  13 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  .........  14 

The  method  of  election,  scrutin  de  liste  and  scrutin  d'arrondisse- 

ment     ...........  15 

The  Chamber  a  tumultuous  body         ......  18 

The  Senate 19 

Its  functions  and  actual  influence         ......  21 

The  ministers  as  a  rule  not  responsible  to  it     .         .         .         .  22 

The  National  Assembly 26 

The  President  of  the  Republic 26 

His  functions       ..........  27 

His  powers  really  exercised  by  responsible  ministers        .         .  28 

The  Council  of  State 30 

The  ministers 32 

Their  responsibility  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies          .         .         .33 
Their  enormous  power  (which  is  due  to  the  four  following  mat- 
ters)       33 

The  paternal  nature  of  the  government       ......  34 

The  centralization  of  local  government  ......  36 

The  department,  with  its  prefect  and  general  council          .         .  36 

The  arrondissement  and  the  canton          .....  40 

The  commune,  with  its  mayor  and  communal  council          .         .  40 

Paris  and  Lyons       .........  42 

The  legislative  powers  of  the  executive 43 

Ordinances  and  appropriations 44 


CONTENTS. 


The  judicial  powers  of  the  executive 47 

Difference  hetween  English  and  French  history       ...  47 
In  England  the  royal  power  grew  early  and  took  a  judicial 

form          ..........  48 

In  France  it  developed  late  and  took  an  administrative 

form      ..........  51 

Effect  of  the  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  powers       .         .         .54 
Questions  of  the  legality  of  official  acts  withdrawn  from  the 

ordinary  courts      ........  55 

The  administrative  courts  and  the  court  of  conflicts     .         .  57 

The  state  of  siege     .........  63 

Effect  of  the  French  system  on  the  position  of  the  ministers       .         .  64 

Note  on  Gneist's  views  on  English  and  French  history   ...  65 


CHAPTER  II. 


FRANCE  :     PARTIES. 

The  influence  of  parties  in  popular  government 

The  parliamentary  system  normally  produces  two  parties 

It  cannot  work  well  otherwise     .... 
In  France  there  are  many  parties  or  groups 
History  of  parties  under  the  Third  Republic 

The  presidency  of  Thiers 

The  presidency  of  MacMahon 

His  struggle  with  the  Republicans  . 

The  progress  towards  the  Left    . 

The  growth  of  personal  politics 

The  career  of  Boulanger 

Its  effect  on  the  Right     . 

The  Church  accepts  the  Republic         .... 

The  policy  of  Republican  concentration  and  its  failure 

The  cabinet  of  Casimir-Perier     ..... 

His  presidency  ....... 

The  breaking  up  of  the  Conservative  majority    . 

Bourgeois'  Radical  cabinet       ..... 

The  Conservative  cabinet  of  Me"line     .... 
Causes  of  the  subdivision  of  parties         .... 

Lack  of  a  political  consensus        ..... 

Theoretical  character  of  French  political  opinions    . 

Lack  of  the  habit  of  political  organization  . 

The  election  of  the  deputies  by  majority  vote 


69 

70 

72 

74 

75 

76 

77 

79 

80 

83 

85 

87 

89 

91 

94 

95 

96 

98 

99 

101 

101 

105 

106 

108 


CONTENTS.  xi 

The  system  of  committees  in  the  Chambers        ....  Ill 
This  undermines  the  authority  of  the  cabinet  and  its  ability 
to  hold  the  majority  together         .....       114 
The  use  of  interpellations    ........  117 

This  has  a  similar  effect 118 

It  is  due  to  jealousy  of  the  ministers   .....  124 

Results  of  the  subdivision  of  parties 127 

A  change  of  ministry  does  not  mean  change  of  party  .         .  127 

The  cabinets  short  lived  ........       128 

As  a  rule  they  are  coalitions  and  therefore  weak  .         .         .  129 

They  must  confer  favors  on  the  deputies  to  win  votes      .         .       130 
The  deputies  in  turn  must  curry  favor  with  the  local  nominating 
committees  and  the  constituents       ......  132 

Prospects  of  the  Republic        ........       137 

Since  the  Revolution  there  has  been  no  change  of  the  party  in 
power  without  a  revolution      .......  138 

Financial  dangers     .........       142 

Possible  organic  changes     ........  144 


CHAPTER  III. 

ITALY  :    INSTITUTIONS. 

The  formation  of  the  kingdom 146 

The  Statuto 150 

The  King 152 

The  ministers      .         . 153 

The  Senate      ...........       154 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  ........  156 

The  franchise,  the  method  of  election,  etc 157 

The  administrative  system  ........  161 

The  ordinance  power        ........       165 

The  civil  service  .........  166 

Local  government  ..........       168 

The  judicial  system 170 

The  courts  and  the  officials 171 

Administrative  law  and  the  administrative  courts        .         .         .  173 

Weakness  of  the  judicial  system 176 

The  church  ...........  178 

The  doctrine  of  a  free  church  in  a  free  state   .        .         .        .179 

The  monastic  orders    .........  181 

The  Pope,  and  the  law  of  the  Papal  Guarantees      .         .         .       182 
Embarrassing  situation  of  the  Vatican 186 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ITALY  :    PARTIES. 

History  of  parties 189 

Cavour's  relation  to  parties  .......  189 

Government  by  the  Right 190 

Effect  of  the  advent  to  power  of  the  Left  in  1876       .         .         .191 
The  Depretis-Nicotera  cabinet         ......       193 

The  Cairoli-Zauardelli  cabinet    .......  195 

The  Cairoli-Depretis  coalition  ......       197 

Successive  cabinets  of  Depretis,  and  the  Transformismo       .         .  198 

The  cabinets  of  Crispi  and  his  fall 200 

The  bank  scandals,  the  Sicilian  insurrection,  the  restoration  of 
Crispi  and  his  defeat        ........  201 

Causes  of  the  condition  of  parties  .......       204 

The  attitude  of  the  Clericals 205 

The  system  of  committees       .......       206 

Interpellations     ..........  210 

The  political  character  of  the  people  as  shown  in  the  lack  of 
unity  in  the  cabinets     ........       212 

The  prominence  of  the  personal  element     .....  214 

The  social  disorganization  in  the  south     .....       215 

The  political  cliques     .........  216 

And  their  relation  to  the  deputies    ......       218 

The  connection  between  national  and  local  parties  in  France  and 

Italy 220 

Autocratic  power  inconsistent  with  a  parliamentary  system    .         .       226 

The  need  of  a  stronger  judiciary         .......  228 

Outlook  for  the  future 230 

)»1 

CHAPTER  V. 

GERMANY  :    THE    STRUCTURE   OF   THE   EMPIRE. 

The  Holy  Roman  Empire 232 

The  growth  of  Prussia 233 

The  Germanic  Confederation  and  the  Diet 234 

The  failure  of  the  Liberal  attempt  at  union  in  1848-49  .         .       236 

Bismarck  and  the  war  of  1866 237 

7he  North  German  Confederation  and  the  Empire         .         .         .       240 

["he  constitution 241 

[Nature  of  the  federal  union 243 

Legislative  centralization  and  executive  decentralization     .         .  243 


CONTENTS. 


xm 


Inequality  of  rights  among  the  members         ....      246 

The  privileges  of  Prussia 246 

The  privileges  of  the  other  states     .....      249 

The  Reichstag  :  its  composition 252 

Its  powers 256 

The  Bundesrath  :  its  composition 259 

Its  character  and  the  position  of  the  members         .         .        .      262 
Its  internal  organization      ........  265 

Its  powers  and  privileges         .......       267 

Its  actual  influence 272 

The  Emperor  ..........       273 

Interlacing  of  his  powers  as  Emperor  and  as  King  of  Prussia     .  274 

The  Chancellor 276 

He  is  not  responsible  to  the  Reichstag 278 

His  functions  and  substitutes  .......       279 

The  judicial  system:  The  Reichsgericht 281 

Power  of  the  courts  to  hold  statutes  unconstitutional       .         .       282 

General  character  of  the  federal  system 284 


CHAPTER  VI. 


GERMANY  :    PRUSSIA   AND   THE   SMALLER   STATES 


courts 


Prussia  :  The  constitution        .... 

The  King    ...... 

The  ministers  responsible  only  to  him 

Their  independence  of  each  other 

The  bureaucracy 

Administrative  justice,  and  the  administrative 
The  Landtag  :  its  powers  and  procedure 
The  House  of  Peers    .... 
The  House  of  Representatives 

The  three-class  system  of  election,  and  its  effects 
The  new  local  government 

The  objects  of  the  reform    . 

The  principles  of  the  system     . 

The  province  and  its  organs 

Berlin        ...... 

The  Regierungsbezirk 

The  Kreis  ..... 

The  rural  commune,  and  the  manor 

The  city 

Actual  working  of  the  system 


286 
288 
288 
290 
293 
294 
297 
301 
303 
303 
308 
310 
311 
314 
318 
318 
321 
325 
327 
331 


xiv  CONTENTS. 

Saxony 334 

Bavaria  :  Institutions 337 

Parties 338 

Wurtemberg  :  Institutions 340 

Parties 343 

Baden  :  Institutions 344 

Parties 345 

Hesse 347 

Oldenburg 348 

Brunswick •  350 

Anhalt 351 

Waldeck 353 

Lippe-Detmold 354 

Schaumburg-Lippe •  *  •  355 

Saxe-Weimar  ..........       356 

Saxe-Meiningen 357 

Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 358 

Saxe-Altenburg 359 

Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt 361 

Schwarzburg-Sondersbausen       ........  361 

Reuss-Scbleiz  ..........       362 

Reuss-Greiz        ...........  363 

The  two  Mecklenburgs 364 

Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck         .......  368 

Alsace-Lorraine      .         .........       372 

The  vitality  of  monarchy  in  Germany 376 


GOVERNMENTS  AND  PARTIES  IN 
CONTINENTAL  EUROPE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FRANCE  :    INSTITUTIONS. 


In  order  to  understand  the  government  of  a  country 
it  is  not  enough  to  know  the  bare  structure  of  its  insti- 
tutions. It  is  necessary  to  follow  the  course  of  politics ; 
to  inquire  how  far  the  various  public  bodies  exercise  the 
authority  legally  vested  in  them  ;  and  to  try  to  discover 
the  real  sources  of  power.  It  is  necessary,  in  short,  to 
study  the  actual  working  of  the  system  ;  and  although 
this  depends  chiefly  upon  the  character,  the  habits,  and 
the  traditions  of  the  people,  it  is  also  influenced  in  no 
small  measure  by  details,  like  the  method  of  voting,  the 
procedure  in  the  legislative  chambers,  and  other  mat- 
ters, that  are  too  often  overlooked  on  account  of  their 
apparent  insignificance.  Now  in  several  of  the  states 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe  the  main  features  of  repre- 
sentative government  have  been  copied  directly  or  indi- 
rectly from  English  models,  while  the  details  have  grown 
up  of  themselves,  or  are  a  survival  from  earlier  tradi- 
tion.    It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  two  are 


2  FRANCE. 

more  or  less  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  that  this 
want  of  harmony  has  had  a  pronounced  effect  on  public 

life. 

Although  most  people  to-day  are  familiar  with  the 
Parliament-  parliamentary  system  of  government  as  it  has 
i'lrnf  in  r"  developed  in  England,  it  may  not  be  out  of 
England.  place  to  give  a  brief  description  of  it  here  on 
account  of  the  profound  influence  it  has  had  in  other 
countries. 

The  Middle  Ages  gave  birth  to  two  political  ideas. 
The  first  of  these  was  a  division  of  the  people  into 
separate  classes  or  estates,  each  of  which  had  independ- 
ent political  functions  of  its  own.  The  second  was 
representative  government,  or  the  election  —  by  those 
estates  whose  members  were  too  numerous  to  assemble 
in  a  body  —  of  deputies  authorized  to  meet  together 
and  act  for  the  whole  estate.  The  number  of  these 
estates,  and  the  number  of  separate  chambers  in  which 
their  representatives  sat,  varied  in  the  different  coun- 
tries of  Europe ; l  but  it  so  happened  that  in  England 
all  the  political  power  of  the  estates  became  in  time 
vested  in  two  chambers.2  One  of  them,  the  House  of 
Lords,  contained  the  whole  body  of  peers,  who  were  the 

1  Thus  in  France,  and  in  most  continental  countries,  there  were  three, 
while  in  Sweden  there  were  four  :  the  clergy,  the  nobles,  the  cities,  and 
the  peasants.  The  existence  of  only  two  Houses  in  England  might  almost 
be  called  an  accident.  (Cf .  Freeman,  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution, 
p.  93.) 

2  In  1064  Convocation,  which  was  the  ecclesiastical  chamber,  discon- 
tinued the  practice  of  voting  separate  taxes  on  the  clergy,  and  thus  the 
clergy  definitely  ceased  to  be  an  estate  of  the  realm.  (See  Hallam, 
Const.  Hist,  of  England,  chap,  xvi.) 


ORIGIN  OF  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT.  3 

successors  of  the  great  feudal  vassals  of  the  Crown  ; 
while  the  other,  the  House  of  Commons,  was  composed 
of  the  deputies  from  the  towns  and  counties,  who  had 
gradually  consolidated  into  a  single  house,  and  might 
be  said  to  represent  all  the  people  who  were  not  peers. 

By  degrees  the  House  of  Commons  acquired  the 
right  of  originating  all  bills  for  raising  or  spending 
money,  and  hence  its  support  became  essential  to  the 
Crown.  But  its  members  were  independent,  and  on 
the  whole  less  open  to  court  influence  than  the  peers. 
They  felt  under  no  obligation  to  support  the  policy  of 
the  government,  or  to  vote  an  appropriation  unless  they 
understood  and  approved  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
to  be  used;  and  King  William  III.,  during  his  wars 
with  France,  found  them  by  no  means  as  easy  to  man- 
age as  he  could  wish.  Hitherto  his  ministers  had  been 
selected  from  both  political  parties,  and  hence  were  not 
in  harmony  with  each  other,  and  were  unable  to  exert 
an  effective  influence  in  Parliament ;  but  between  1693 
and  1696  he  dismissed  the  Tories,  and  confided  all  the 
great  offices  of  state  to  the  Whigs,  who  had  a  majority 
in  the  Commons.  The  result  was  that  the  House  which 
had  been  turbulent  became  docile ;  and  the  ministers 
by  winning  its  confidence  were  able  to  guide  it,  and 
obtain  the  appropriations  that  were  required.  This  was 
the  origin  of  the  practice  of  selecting  the  ministers  from 
the  leaders  of  the  majority  in  Parliament,  —  a  practice 
which  at  a  later  time  crystallized  into  a  principle  of  the 
British  Constitution.1  But  of  course  men  who  held 
the  most  important  offices,  and  at  the  same  time  led  the 

1  Macaulay,  History  of  England,  chap.  xx. 


4  FRANCE. 

House  of  Commons,  were  certain  not  to  be  mere  tools 
in  the  hands  of  the  King.  They  were  sure  to  try  to 
carry  out  their  own  policy,  and  when  the  sceptre  of 
William  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  first  two 
Georges,  who  were  foreigners  and  took  little  interest  in 
English  politics,  the  ministers  exercised  the  royal  power 
as  they  pleased,  and  became  in  fact  the  custodians  of 
the  prerogatives  of  the  Crown.  The  subordination  of 
the  King  to  his  ministers  is,  indeed,  the  inevitable  re- 
sult of  the  system ;  for  so  long  as  the  latter  retain -their 
influence  over  the  House,  and  can  direct  its  votes,  they 
can  hold  their  offices  and  administer  them  according:  to 
their  own  views.  If  the  King  attempts  to  dismiss  them 
they  can  block  the  wheels  of  government,  by  inducing 
Parliament  to  withhold  supplies ;  and  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  cease  to  be  the  leaders  of  the  House,  and 
a  different  party  with  new  leaders  gets  a  majority,  the 
King  finds  himself  obliged  to  send  for  these  and  intrust 
the  government  to  them.  The  system  which  had  been 
devised  in  order  that  the  King  might  control  the  House 
of  Commons  became,  therefore,  the  means  by  which  the 
House  of  Commons,  through  its  leaders,  controlled  the 
King,  and  thus  all  the  power  of  the  House  of  Commons 
and  of  the  Crown  became  vested  in  the  same  men,  who 
guided  legislation  and  took  charge  of  the  administration 
at  the  same  time. 

The  House  of  Lords,  meanwhile,  was  losing  ground. 
It  had  no  right  to  initiate  or  amend  money  bills,  and, 
what  was  far  more  important,  it  had  no  influence  on  the 
formation  or  the  policy  of  the  cabinet.  The  ministers 
were,  indeed,  often  peers,  but  they  were  not  selected 


NATURE  OF  PARLIAMENTARY   GOVERNMENT.  5 

because  they  belonged  to  the  majority  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  nor  did  they  resign  when  that  body  voted  against 
them.  Like  their  colleagues  from  the  other  House,  they 
represented  the  majority  in  the  Commons,  and  were 
solidly  in  accord  with  it.  The  House  of  Lords,  there- 
fore, found  itself  confronted  by  the  combined  power  of 
the  Crown  and  the  House  of  Commons,  and  this  it  was 
unable  to  resist.  In  fact  the  power  to  create  new  peers 
furnished  the  Crown,  or  rather  the  ministers  acting  in 
its  name,  with  a  weapon  always  ready  to  break  an 
obstinate  resistance,  and  at  the  time  of  the  Reform  Bill 
of  1832  a  threat  of  this  kind  was  enough  to  compel 
submission.  The  Upper  House  has  thus  gradually  lost 
authority,  until  now  it  does  not  venture  to  reject  any 
measure  on  which  the  cabinet  is  really  in  earnest,  — 
unless  perchance,  as  in  the  case  of  the  recent  Home 
Rule  bill,  it  is  convinced  that  the  House  of  Commons 
does  not  fairly  represent  the  people,  and  that  a  new 
election  would  result  in  a  victory  for  the  party  in  oppo- 
sition. In  such  a  case  the  refusal  to  pass  the  measure 
is  tantamount  to  a  demand  for  a  Referendum.1 

The  ministers  remain  in  office  only  so  long  as  they 
continue  to  be  the  leaders  of  the  Lower  House  and  are 
able  to  control  the  majority.  When  this  condition  has 
changed,  a  vote  is  sometimes  passed  to  the  effect  that 
the  ministers  have  ceased  to  possess  the  confidence  of 
the  House  ;  but  such  an  express  declaration  is  rarely  used 

1  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  Premier  of  New  South  Wales  lias  recently 
proposed  to  prevent  deadlocks  between  the  Houses  by  providing  that 
after  a  bill  has  been  rejected  once  by  the  Legislative  Council  and  again 
passed  by  the  Assembly,  the  Council  shall  not  have  power  to  reject  it  a 
second  time,  but  may  require  it  to  be  submitted  to  popular  vote.  A  sim- 
ilar proposal  has  been  discussed  in  Belgium. 


6  FRANCE. 

at  the  present  day,  and  a  hostile  vote  on  any  matter  of 
considerable  importance  is  treated  as  a  proof  that  the 
government  has  no  longer  the  support  of  a  majority. 
After  such  a  vote,  therefore,  the  ministers  resign,  and 
if  there  is  a  normal  division  into  two  parties  the  Crown 
sends  for  the  leader  of  the  opposition,  and  intrusts  him 
with  the  formation  of  a  cabinet.  The  defeated  minis- 
ters have,  however,  one  other  alternative.  If  they  think 
that  the  House  of  Commons  has  ceased  to  be  in  har- 
mony with  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  they  can  dissolve 
Parliament  in  the  name  of  the  Crown,  and  try  the 
chance  of  a  new  election.  Thus  in  the  English  parlia- 
mentary system  the  direction  of  the  legislature,  and  the 
control  of  the  executive,  is  in  the  hands  of  the  leaders 
of  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  For"  their 
exercise  of  power  these  leaders  are  directly  responsi- 
ble to  the  House  of  Commons,  which  can  call  them  to 
account  at  any  time ;  while  the  House  itself  is  responsi- 
ble to  the  people,  which  gives  its  verdict  whenever  the 
end  of  the  term  of  Parliament  or  a  dissolution  brings 
about  a  general  election. 

Turning  now  from  the  consideration  of  English  forms 
Parliament-  °^  government  to  those  in  use  on  the  Con- 
ment°on  the  tinent,  we  find  that  the  main  features  of  the 
British  Constitution  have  been  very  generally 
imitated.  In  fact,  the  plan  of  two  chambers,  one  of 
which  issues  from  an  extended  suffrage  and  has  the 
primary  control  of  the  purse,  and  of  a  cabinet  whose 
members  appear  in  the  chambers  and  are  jointly  respon- 
sible to  the  more  popular  one,  so  that  all  the  ministers 
resign  on  an  adverse  vote  of  that  chamber,  is  of  Eng- 


ENGLISH  SYSTEM  IMPERFECTLY  COPIED. 

lish  origin,  and  has  spread  widely  over  Europe.     Tl 
features  of  the  parliamentary  system  are  striking, 
have  become  famous,  while  the  procedure  in  the  H 
of  Commons,  which  enables  the  system  to  work  smoo    i 
has  attracted  far  less  attention,  and  has  been  foil 
very  little.     This  is  peculiarly  true  of  France,  whei 
principle  of  cabinet  responsibility  has  been  adop 
the  fullest  extent,  but  where  there  exist  at  the  same 
time  several  practices  that  help  to  twist  parliamentary 
government  out  of  the  normal  form.    More  curious  still 
is  the  fact  that  these  very  practices  have  been  blindly 
copied  by  other  countries  which  intended  to  imitate  the 
English  system. 

A  description  of  the  French  government  must  begin 
with  its  structure,  with  the  legal  composition  Outline  of 
and  powers  of  the  different  political  bodies,  secoudtha^ 
This  will  occupy  the  present  chapter.  In  the,  ters' 
next,  the  actual  working  of  the  system  will  be  consid- 
ered, especially  in  regard  to  the  character  of  political 
parties ;  and  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  explain  the 
peculiarities  that  are  found  by  a  reference  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  people,  and  to  those  parts  of  the  political 
machinery  that  seem  to  have  a  marked  effect.  In  other 
words,  we  shall  begin  with  the  skeleton,  and  then  take 
up  the  muscles  and  nerves. 

The  first  thing  one  looks  for  in  a  modern  government 
is  the  constitution ;  but  although  the  French 

.  The  French 

Republic  has  a  constitution,  it  differs  in  two   Constitu- 
very  important  respects  from  those  to  which 
we  are  accustomed.     It  is  not   comprised  in  any  one 
document,   but   in    a    series    of  distinct  laws,   and   it 


fl  FRANCE. 

contains  few  provisions  limiting  the  functions  of  the 
different  bodies,  or  prescribing  fundamental  rights 
which  the  state  is  enjoined  to  respect.  This  is  a  depart- 
ure not  only  from  American,  but  also  from  the  earlier 
French  usage,  for  previous  constitutions  in  France  have 
been  long  documents  and  have  contained  elaborate 
bills  of  rights ;  although  the  absence  of  practical  guar- 
antees has  made  their  effectiveness  depend  upon  the 
o-ood  pleasure  of  the  government.  The  present  consti- 
tution is  very  different,  and  barely  provides  for  the 
organization  of  the  powers  of  the  state,  without  even 
speaking  of  such  important  matters  as  a  yearly  budget 
or  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  judges.  It  does  little 
more  than  establish  the  main  framework  of  the  govern- 
ment by  declaring  what  the  chief  organs  of  public  life 
shall  be,  leaving  them  almost  entirely  free  to  exercise 
their  authority  as  they  see  fit.  The  reason  for  such  a 
departure  from  French  traditions  is  to  be  found  in  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  earlier  constitutions  in 
France  were  attempts  to  frame  an  ideal  system,  but  the 
present  one  resulted  from  an  immediate  need  of  pro- 
viding a  regular  government  of  some  sort  that  could 
rule  the  country  for  the  time,  and  was  drawn  up  by 
men  who  had  no  belief  in  its  inherent  perfection.  To 
understand  this  it  is  necessary  to  glance  at  the  history 
of  the  period. 

The  rapid  series  of  defeats  suffered  by  the  French 
History  ef  armies  at  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  in  1870, 
it,  c, a, ion.    destrove(i     tiie    tottering     authority   of    the 

empire,  and  as  soon  as  the  news  of  the  surrender  of 
Napoleon  III.  at  Sedan  reached  Paris  an  insurrection 


THE  CONSTITUTION.  9 

broke  out  on  the  fourth  of  September.  The  republic 
was  at  once  proclaimed,  but  this  was  no  time  to  debate 
plans  for  a  constitution,  and  so  long  as  the  war  lasted 
the  country  was  ruled  by  the  self-elected  Government 
of  the  National  Defense.  When  the  war  was  over,  a 
National  Assembly  with  indefinite  powers  was  chosen 
by  universal  suffrage.  The  member  of  this  body  who 
commanded  the  most  general  public  confidence  was 
Thiers,  the  historian,  and  former  minister  of  Louis 
Philippe.  To  him  the  Assembly  intrusted  the  execu- 
tive power,  and  in  August,  1871,  it  gave  him  the  title 
of  President,  without,  however,  fixing  any  term  for  the 
duration  of  the  office.  Thiers  was  constantly  urged 
to  introduce  the  parliamentary  system  by  allowing  his 
ministers  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  his  acts,  but 
this  he  refused  to  do,  saying  that  the  position  in  which 
it  would  place  him,  although  perfectly  consistent  with 
the  dignity  of  an  hereditary  king,  was  for  him,  a  little 
bourgeois,  entirely  out  of  the  question.1  He  held  him- 
self, however,  personally  responsible  to  the  Assembly 
for  the  conduct  of  his  government,  took  part  in  the 
debates  on  the  measures  he  proposed,  and  declared  that 
he  was  ready  to  resign  at  any  time,  if  the  majority 
wanted  him  to  do  so.2     This  state  of  things  continued 

1  The  law  of  Aug.  31,1871,  declared  that  the  President  as  well  as  the 
ministers  should  he  responsible  to  the  Assembly.  See  Dupriez,  Les  Mi- 
nistres  dans  les  Principaux  Pays  d' 'Europe  et  d' Amerique,  vol.  ii.  p.  320. 

2  The  law  of  March  13,  1873,  abolished  the  right  of  the  President  to 
take  part  in  debate,  and  while  allowing  him  to  address  the  Assembly, 
ordered  the  sitting  to  be  suspended  immediately  after  his  speech.  This 
was,  of  course,  an  attempt  to  reduce  the  personal  influence  of  Thiers. 
(Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  321-22.) 


10  FRANCE. 

for  nearly  two  years,  when  a  hostile  vote  forced  Thiers 
to  retire.  His  successor,  Marshal  MacMahon,  was 
elected  for  a  term  of  seven  years,  and  as  the  new 
President  was  not  a  member  of  the  Assembly,  his  cabi- 
net became  responsible  in  the  parliamentary  sense. 
But  although  the  chief  magistrate  now  held  office  for 
a  fixed  period,  and  was  freed  from  the  caprices  of  an 
uncertain  majority,  still  there  was  no  constitution  and 
no  permanent  organization  of  the  government.  The 
situation  was,  in  fact,  a  provisional  one,  prolonged  ab- 
normally by  the  strange  condition  of  politics.  The 
monarchists  formed  a  majority  of  the  Assembly,  but 
they  were  hopelessly  divided  into  two  sections,  —  the 
Legitimists,  whose  candidate  was  the  Comte  de  Cham- 
bord,  and  the  Orleanists,  who  followed  the  Comte  de 
Paris.  At  one  moment  it  seemed  not  impossible  that 
the  Comte  de  Chambord  might  become  king,  and  some 
of  his  supporters  opened  negotiations  for  the  purpose ; 
but  these  were  brought  to  nothing  by  obstinacy  of  the 
Prince  himself,  who  was  a  true  scion  of  his  race,  and 
would  not  yield  one  jot  of  his  pretensions.  He  even 
refused  to  accept  the  tricolor  flag  that  means  so  much 
to  Frenchmen,  and  clung  doggedly  to  the  ancient  white 
standard  of  his  house.  Under  such  circumstances,  a 
monarchy  was  out  of  the  question,  and  so  this  assembly 
TheConstita-  °^  monarchists  at  last  set  to  work  to  organize 
tionai  Laws.  a  republic ;  or  rather  a  sufficient  number  of 
monarchists,  feeling  that  a  republic  was,  for  the  time 
at  least,  inevitable,  joined  with  the  minority  to  estab- 
hsh  a  government  on   the  only  basis  possible.1     But 

1  Very  good  brief  descriptions  of  the  formation  of  the  Constitution 


THE  CONSTITUTION.  11 

although  the  republican  form  was  adopted,  the  institu- 
tions that  were  set  up  departed  essentially  from  the 
ideas  which  the  French  had  been  accustomed  to  asso- 
ciate with  that  term.  The  present  government,  like 
all  political  systems  that  have  been  created  suddenly 
and  have  proved  lasting,  was  essentially  a  compromise. 
From  the  French  republican  principles  there  was  bor- 
rowed, besides  the  name,  little  more  than  the  election  of 
the  chief  magistrate,  while  from  the  traditions  of  con- 
stitutional monarchy  were  taken  the  irresponsibility  of 
the  head  of  the  state,  and  the  existence  of  a  second 
legislative  chamber.1  Now  it  was  natural  that  no  one 
should  feel  inclined  to  construct  an  ideal  system  on  a 
hybrid  foundation  of  this  kind.  Moreover  none  of  the 
parties  regarded  the  work  of  the  Assembly  as  final,  for 
the  monarchists  looked  forward  to  a  future  restoration 
of  the  throne,  while  their  adversaries  hoped  to  place 
the  republic  before  long  on  a  more  secure  and  perma- 
nent footing.  Hence  the  Assembly  did  no  more  than 
provide  for  the  immediate  organization  of  the  govern- 
ment in  as  brief  and  practical  a  manner  as  possible.  It 
passed  three  constitutional  laws,  as  they  are  called, 
which  are  in  the  form  of  ordinary  statutes,  and  very 

may  be  found  in  Bozerian's  Etude  sur  la  Revision  de  la  Constitution,  and 
in  Professor  Currier's  Constitutional  and  Organic  Laws  of  France.  The 
latter,  published  as  a  supplement  to  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy 
of  Political  Science  (March,  1893),  gives  a  translation  into  English  of  all 
these  laws.  See  also  an  article  by  Saleilles  on  the  "  Development  of  the 
Present  Constitution  of  France."  (Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  Sci.,  July, 
1895.) 

1  Lebon,   Frankreich   (in   Marquardsen's  Handbuch   des    Oeffentlichen 
Rechts),  p.  19. 


12  FRANCE. 

short  and  concise.  One  of  them,  that  of  February  25, 
1875,  provides  for  the  organization  of  the  powers  of 
the  state.  Another,  that  of  February  24,  1875,  deals  in 
•neater  detail  with  the  organization  of  the  Senate.  And 
the  third,  dated  July  16,  1875,  fixes  the  relations  of 
the  powers  of  the  state  among  themselves. 

The  provisional  character  of  the  constitution  is  clearly 
Amend-  seen  in  the  method  of  amendment.  It  has 
merits.  been  the  habit  in  France  to  make  a  sharp  dis- 

tinction between  the  constituent  and  legislative  powers, 
the  former  being  withdrawn  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
from  the  control  of  the  Parliament.  But  in  this  in- 
stance both  of  the  great  parties  wanted  to  facilitate 
changes  in  the  fundamental  laws,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
carry  out  their  own  plans  whenever  a  favorable  occasion 
might  present  itself.1  A  departure  from  tradition  was 
therefore  made,  and  it  was  provided  that  the  constitu- 
tional laws  could  be  amended  by  a  National  Assembly, 
or  Congress,  composed  of  the  two  branches  of  Parlia- 
ment sitting  together,  which  should  meet  for  this  pur- 
pose whenever  both  chambers  on  their  own  motion,  or 
on  that  of  the  President  of  the  Republic,  declared  the 
need  of  revision.2     The  constitutional  laws  have  been 


1  Cf.  Borgeaud,  Elablissement  et  Revision  des  Constitutions,  pt.  iii.  liv.  ii. 
ch.  viii. 

2  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  8.  It  is  not  provided  whether  the 
Chambers  shall  declare  in  general  terms  that  there  is  a  need  of  revision, 
or  whether  they  shall  specify  the  revision  to  be  made,  and  this  point  has 
given  rise  to  lively  debates;  but  on  the  two  occasions  when  a  revision  was 
actually  undertaken,  the  Chambers  passed  identical  resolutions  specifying 
the  articles  to  be  amended.  (Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  74,  75  ;  Saleilles,  op. 
cii.  pp.  G,  7,  9.) 


THE  CONSTITUTION,  13 

twice  amended  in  this  way.  On  the  first  occasion 
(June  21,  1879),  the  provision  making  Versailles  the 
capital  was  repealed,  and  thereupon  a  statute  was 
passed  transferring  the  seat  of  government  to  Paris.1 
On  the  second  occasion  (August  14,  1884),  several 
amendments  were  made.  Among  these  one  of  the 
most  notable  changed  the  provisions  relating  to  the 
mode  of  electing  senators,  and  another  declared  that 
the  republican  form  of  government  cannot  be  made  the 
subject  of  proposal  for  revision,  —  the  object  of  the 
latter  being  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  Republic 
by  constitutional  means.  The  device  of  providing  that 
a  law  shall  never  be  repealed  is  an  old  one,  but  I  am 
not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  of  any  avail. 

This  method  of  amendment  has  virtually  rendered 
the  Parliament  omnipotent,  for  excepting  the  provision 
about  changing  the  republican  form  of  government, 
there  is  no  restriction  on  its  authority.  The  Chambers 
cannot,  it  is  true,  pass  an  amendment  to  the  consti- 
tutional laws  in  the  form  of  an  ordinary  statute,  but 
if  they  are  agreed  they  can  pass  it  by  meeting  as  a 
National  Assembly.  The  power  of  the  Chambers  is 
therefore  nearly  as  absolute  as  that  of  the  British  Par- 
liament.2 The  principle,  moreover,  that  the  funda- 
mental law  cannot  be  changed  by  ordinary  statute  is 
devoid  of  legal  sanction,  for  if  the  Chambers  should 
choose  to  pass  an  act  of  this  kind,  no  court  or  official 
could  legally  prevent  its  application.3     But  while   the 

1  Law  of  July  22,  1879.    This  act  provides,  however,  that  the  National 
Assembly  shall  meet  at  Versailles. 

2  Cf.  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  p.  11. 

8  Cf .  Laferriere,  Traite  de  la  Jurisdiction  Administrative,  vol.  ii.  p.  5. 


14  FRANCE. 

constitution  imposes  no  legal  restraint  on  the  Parlia- 
ment, it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  it 
had  no  effect.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  such  moral  force 
that  any  attempt  to  pass  a  statute  that  clearly  violated 
its  terms  would  awake  a  strong  repugnance  ;  and  indeed 
a  suggestion  by  the  president  of  one  or  other  of  the 
Chambers  that  a  bill  would  be  unconstitutional  has  more 
than  once  sufficed  to  prevent  its  introduction.1  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  formal  amendments  can  be 
made  only  in  joint  session,  and  only  after  both  Chambers 
have  resolved  that  there  is  a  need  of  revision,  has  some 
influence  in  preventing  changes  in  the  text  of  the 
constitutional  laws,  because  the  Senate,  being  the  more 
conservative  body,  and  only  half  as  large  as  the  other 
House,  is  timid  about  going  into  joint  session,  not 
knowing  what  radical  amendments  may  be  proposed 
there,  and  fearing  to  be  swamped  by  the  votes  of  the 
deputies. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  organs  of  the  state  in 
succession,  taking  up  first  the  Parliament  with  its  two 
branches,  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies ; 
then  turning  to  the  President  as  the  chief  magistrate  of 
the  Republic,  and  finally  passing  to  the  ministers  as  the 
connecting  link  between  the  Parliament  and  the  Presi- 
dent, and  the  controlling  factor  in  the  machinery  of  the 
state. 

The  composition  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  left  to 
ordinary  legislation,  except  that  the  constitu- 
tor of  Depu-  tional  law  of  February  25,  1875,  Art.  1,  pro- 
vides for  its  election  by  universal  suffrage.    By 

1  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  23. 


THE  CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES.  15 

statute  the  ballot  is  secret,  and  the  franchise  extends  to 
all  men  over  twenty-one  years  of  age  who  have  not  been 
deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  in  consequence  of  a  con- 
viction for  crime,  and  who  are  not  bankrupts,  under 
guardianship,  or  in  active  military  or  naval  service.1  To 
be  eligible  a  candidate  must  be  twenty-five  years  old 
and  not  disqualified  from  being  a  voter.2  Members  of 
families  that  have  ever  reigned  in  France  are,  however, 
excluded ; 3  and  in  order  to  prevent  as  far  as  possible 
the  use  of  pressure  the  law  forbids  almost  every  state 
official  to  be  a  candidate  in  a  district  where  his  position 
might  enable  him  to  influence  the  election.4  As  a  fur- 
ther safeguard  against  the  power  of  the  administration, 
which  is  justly  dreaded  by  the  French  Liberals,  it  is 
provided  that  all  public  servants  who  receive  salaries, 
except  a  few  of  the  highest  in  rank,  shall  lose  their 
offices  if  they  accept  an  election  to  Parliament,  and  that 
a  deputy  who  is  appointed  even  to  one  of  these  highest 
offices,  unless  it  be  that  of  minister  or  under-secretary, 
shall  lose  his  seat.5 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  elected  for  four  years, 
and  consists  at  present  of  five  hundred  and  The  method 
seventy-six  members ;  ten  of  the  seats  'being  of  electlon- 
distributed  among  the  various  colonies,  and  six  allotted 
to  Algiers,  while  the  remaining  deputies  are  chosen  in 

1  Arts.  1,  2,  and  5  of  the  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875.     Poudra  et  Pierre, 
Droit  Parlemenlaire,  sects.  482-84,  498-514. 

2  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875,  Arts.  6,  7. 

3  Law  of  June  16,  1885,  Art.  4. 

4  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875,  Art.  12. 

5  Id.,  Arts.  8,  9,  and  11.     A  deputy  appointed  to  one  of  these  offices 
may,  however,  be  reelected  (Art.  11). 


16  FRANCE. 

France.  The  method  of  election  has  varied  from  time 
to  time  between  that  of  single  electoral  dis- 
£.v!mde  tricts,  a  system  called  the  scrutin  d'arron- 
s<Farror>-  dissement,  and  that  of  the  scrutin  de  liste, 
which  consists  in  the  choice  of  all  the  deputies 
from  each  department  on  a  general  ticket,  the  difference 
beinjr  the  same  that  exists  between  our  method  of  elect- 
ing  congressmen  each  in  a  separate  district,  and  our 
method  of  choosing  presidential  electors  on  a  single  ticket 
for  the  whole  State.  The  scrutin  d,arrondisseme?it  or 
single  district  system  prevailed  from  1876  to  1885,  when 
the  scrutin  de  liste  was  revived  ; *  partly,  no  doubt,  in 
order  to  swamp  the  reactionary  minority,  but  also  with 
the  hope  of  withdrawing  the  deputies  from  the  pressure 
of  petty  local  interests,  which  had  become  lamentably 
strong,  of  getting  a  Chamber  of  broader  and  more 
national  views,  and  of  forming  a  Republican  majority 
that  would  be  more  truly  a  great  and  united  party. 
The  experiment  did  not  last  long  enough  to  produce 
any  sensible  effect  of  this  kind ;  and  indeed  the  change 
seems,  on  the  whole,  to  have  resulted  in  an  increase  of 
the  power  of  the  local  politicians,  who  formed  themselves 
into  nominating  and  electoral  committees  for  the  depart- 
ment. At  the  general  elections  of  1885  the  Reaction- 
aries gained  rather  than  lost  seats  in  spite  of  the  scrutin 
de  liste;  and  the  disgust  of  the  Republicans  with  the 
device  from  which  they  had  hoped  so  much  was  brought 
to  its  height  two  or  three  years  later,  by  General  Bou- 
langer.  This  singular  man,  who,  after  enjoying  a  mar- 
velous popularity,  became  in  a  short  time  an  object  of 

1  Law  of  June  16, 1885. 


THE   CHAMBER   OF   DEPUTIES.  17 

contempt,  if  not  of  ridicule,  had  been  minister  of  war  in 
one  of  the  recent  Republican  cabinets.  He  was  forced 
to  resign  on  account  of  his  enormous  expenditure  on 
the  army,  and  the  fear  that  he  would  plunge  the  nation 
into  a  war  with  Germany.  He  then  posed  as  the  saviour 
of  the  country,  and  being  at  the  height  of  his  reputa- 
tion he  made  use  of  the  scrutin  de  liste  to  hold  a 
plebiscite  or  popular  vote  of  France  piecemeal.  When- 
ever a  seat  became  vacant  in  a  department  he  stood  as 
a  candidate,  and  if  elected  he  held  the  seat  only  until 
a  vacancy  occurred  in  another  department,  when  he 
resigned  to  appear  as  a  candidate  again.  After  doing 
this  in  several  large  departments  he  was  able  to  declare 
that  a  considerable  part  of  the  French  people  had  pro- 
nounced themselves  on  his  side  —  a  proceeding  which 
would  have  been  impossible  if  the  deputies  had  been 
elected  in  five  hundred  and  seventy-six  separate  dis- 
tricts. He  threatened  to  carry  the  plan  out  completely 
at  the  general  elections,  by  standing  as  a  candidate 
in  all  the  departments  at  once,  hoping  in  this  way  to 
get  a  popular  vote  of  the  whole  country  in  his  favor ; 
but  his  success  at  the  by-elections  had  so  frightened 
the  Republicans  that  they  restored  the  scrutin  d'arron- 
dissement  or  single  electoral  districts  before  the  general 
election  of  1889  took  place.1 

Every  large  body  of  men,  not  under  strict  military 
discipline,  has  lurking  in  it  the  traits  of  a  mob,  and 

1  Law  of  Feb.  13,  1889.  In  order  to  frustrate  more  effectually  Bou- 
langer's  scheme,  a  law  of  July  17,  1889,  provided  that  no  one  should  be 
candidate  in  more  than  one  district.  The  meaning  and  effects  of  these 
laws  is  discussed  by  Saleilles  (Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.,  July,  1895,  pp. 
19-37). 

VOL.  I. 


18  FRANCE. 

is  liable  to  occasional  outbreaks  when  the  spirit  of  dis- 
The  Cham-  or(^er  becomes  epidemic ;  but  the  French 
muituous  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  especially  tumultuous, 
body-  and,  in  times  of  great  excitement,  sometimes 

breaks  into  a  veritable  uproar.  Even  the  method  of 
preserving  order  lacks  the  decorum  and  dignity  that 
one  expects  in  a  legislative  assembly.  The  President 
has  power  to  call  a  refractory  member  to  order  and 
impose  a  penalty  in  case  he  persists ;  but  instead  of 
relying  on  this  alone,  he  often  tries  to  enforce  silence 
by  caustic  remarks.  The  writer  remembers  being  in 
the  Chamber  a  few  years  ago  when  M.  Floquet  was 
presiding,  —  the  same  man  who  fought  a  duel  with 
General  Boulano^er  and  wounded  him  in  the  throat. 
A  deputy  who  had  just  been  speaking  kept  interrupt- 
ing the  member  who  was  addressing  the  Chamber,  and 
when  called  to  order  made  some  remark  about  parlia- 
mentary practice.  The  President  cried  out,  "  It  is  not 
according  to  parliamentary  practice  for  one  man  to 
speak  all  the  time."  "  I  am  not  speaking  all  the  time," 
said  the  deputy.  "  At  this  moment  you  are  overbear- 
ing everybody,"  answered  the  President.  This  incident 
is  related,  not  as  being  unusual  or  humorous,  but  as 
a  fair  sample  of  what  is  constantly  occurring  in  the 
Chamber.  Even  real  sarcasm  does  not  seem  to  be 
thought  improper.  Thus  in  a  recent  debate  a  deputy, 
in  the  midst  of  an  unusually  long  speech,  was  con- 
tinually interrupted,  when  the  President,  Floquet,  ex- 
claimed, "Pray  be  silent,  gentlemen.  The  member 
who  is  speaking  has  never  before  approached  so  near 
to  the  question."1     These  sallies  from  the  chair  are  an 

1  Journal  Officiel  of  Nov.  18,  1892. 


THE  SENATE.  19 

old  tradition  in  France,  although,  of  course,  their  use 
depends  on  the  personal  character  of  the  President. 
One  does  not,  for  example,  find  them  at  all  in  the 
reports  of  debates  during  the  time  Casimir-Perier  was 
presiding  over  the  Chamber.  When  the  confusion  gets 
beyond  all  control,  and  the  President  is  at  his  wits' 
end,  he  puts  on  his  hat,  and  if  this  does  not  quell  the 
disturbance,  he  suspends  the  sitting  for  an  hour  in 
order  to  give  time  for  the  excitement  to  subside. 

The  French  Senate  consists  of  three  hundred  mem- 
bers, and  by  the  constitutional  law  of  Feb- 
ruary 24,  1875,  two  hundred  and  twenty-five 
of  these  were  to  be  elected  for  nine  years  by  the  depart- 
ments, while  seventy-five  were  appointed  for  life  by  the 
same  National  Assembly  that  framed  that  law.  The 
life  senators  were  intended  to  be  a  permanent  feature  of 
the  Senate,  and  it  was  provided  that  when  any  of  them 
died  his  successor  should  be  elected  for  life  by  the  Sen- 
ate itself.  A  few  years  later,  however,  the  Republi- 
cans, thinking  such  an  institution  inconsistent  with 
democracy,  passed  the  amendment  to  the  constitutional 
laws,  to  which  a  reference  has  already  been  made.1 
This,  while  leaving  untouched  the  provisions  relating 
to  the  existence  and  powers  of  the  Senate,  took  away  the 
constitutional  character  from  those  regulating  the  elec- 
tion of  senators,  which  thus  became  subject  to  change 
by  ordinary  legislation.  A  statute  was  then  passed 
(December  9,  1884)  providing  that  as  fast  as  the  life 
senators  died  their  seats  should  be  distributed  among 
the  departments,  and  thus  eventually  all  the  senators 

1  Const.  Law  of  Aug.  14,  1884. 


20  FRANCE. 

alike  will  be  elected  in  the  same  way.  There  are  eighty- 
six  departments  in  Fiance,  and  the  senators  are  appor- 
tioned by  the  act  among  them  according  to  population, 
so  that  when  the  life  senators  have  disappeared  the 
number  of  seats  belonging  to  a  department  will  vary 
from  two  up  to  ten,  while  the  territory  of  Belfort,  each 
of  the  three  departments  of  Algiers,  and  several  of  the 
colonies  are  represented  by  one  senator  apiece.1  The 
senators  so  elected  hold  office  for  nine  years,  one  third 
retiring  every  three  years.2  They  are  chosen  -in  each 
department  of  France  by  an  electoral  college  composed 
of  the  deputies,  of  the  members  of  the  general  council, 
of  the  members  of  the  councils  of  the  arrondissements, 
and  of  delegates  chosen  by  the  municipal  councils  of 
the  communes  of  towns.3  Before  1884  each  commune 
elected  only  one  delegate,4  but  by  the  law  of  that  year 
the  number  of  delegates  increases  with  the  size  of  the 
communes,  though  much  less  than  in  proportion  to  the 
population.  These  communal  delegates  form  a  large 
majority  of  the  electoral  college,  and  hence  the  Senate 
was  called  by  Gambetta  the  Great  Council  of  the  Com- 
munes of  France.5 

A  senator  must  be  forty  years  old  ;  and  since  the  law 
of  1884  the  disqualifications  for  this  office  have  been 
the  same  as  for  that  of  member  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.6 

1  Law  of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Art.  2. 

2  Id.,  Art.  7. 

3  Id.,  Art.  6. 

4  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  4. 
6  Saleilles,  op.  tit.,  p.  41. 

6  Law  of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Arts.  4,  5,  and  Provisions  Temporaires.     Law 
of  Dec.  26,  1887.     Lebon,  Frankreick,  pp.  63,  64,  67. 


THE  SENATE.  21 

The  legislative  power  of  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  is  the  same,  except  that  financial  Its  func 
bills  must  originate  in  the  latter ; 1  but  while  tions> 
it  is  admitted  that  the  Senate  may  reduce  proposals  for 
taxes  and  appropriations,  there  is  a  dispute  whether  it 
can  increase  them  or  not,  and  debates  on  this  point  are 
constantly  recurring.  In  practice  the  Chamber  has  some- 
times accepted  augmentations  thus  introduced,  but  more 
frequently  the  Senate  has  abandoned  them.2  The  Senate 
has  two  peculiar  functions.  First,  its  consent  is  neces- 
sary for  a  dissolution  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,3  a 
provision  designed  as  a  safeguard  against  the  President, 
who  might  otherwise  dissolve  the  Chamber  in  order  to 
attempt  a  coup  d'etat  during  its  absence ;  and,  second, 
the  President  is  authorized,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers,  to  constitute  the  Senate  a  high 
court  tojry  any  one  for  an  attempt  on  the  safety  of  the 
state.4  This  power  was  used  in  the  case  of  General 
Boulanger,  who  failed  to  appear  for  trial,  and  was  con- 
demned in  his  absence. 

With  such  an  organization  and  powers,  an  American 
might  suppose  that   the  Senate  would  be  a   Its  actual 
more  influential  body  than  the  Chamber  of   mflueuce- 

1  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  8. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  430-32. 

8  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  5. 

4  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  73,  Const.  Laws  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  9,  and 
July  10,  1875,  Art.  12.  The  procedure  was  regulated  by  a  law  of  Aug. 
10,  1889.  By  the  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  12,  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  can  impeach  the  ministers,  and  in  case  of  high  treason  the 
President  of  the  Republic.  The  impeachments  are  tried  by  the  Senate. 
For  the  interpretation  put  upon  this  clause,  see  Lebon,  Frankreich. 
pp.  55-58. 


22  FRANCE. 

Deputies ;  but  in  reality  it  is  by  far  the  weaker  body 
of  the  two,  although  it  contains  at  least  as  much  po- 
litical ability  and  experience  as  the  other  House,  and, 
indeed,  has  as  much  dignity,  and  is  composed  of  as 
impressive  a  body  of  men  as  can  be  found  in  any 
legislative  chamber  the  world  over.  The  fact  is  that 
according  to  the  traditions  of  the  parliamentary  system 
the  cabinet  is  responsible  only  to  the  more  popular 
branch  of  the  legislature,  and  in  all  but  one  of  the 
instances  where  a  cabinet  in  France  has  resigned  on  an 
adverse  vote  of  the  Senate,  the  vote  was  rather  an 
excuse  for  the  withdrawal  of  a  discredited  ministry  than 
the  cause  of  its  resignation.1  The  remaining  case, 
which  occurred  during  the  present  year,  is  the  only  one 
where  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers  to  the  Senate 
was  fairly  raised,  and  where  anything  like  a  real  contest 
took  place  between  the  chambers.  On  this  occasion  the 
Senate  did  certainly  force  a  united  and  vigorous  cabinet 
to  resign,  but  it  was  enabled  to  do  so  only  because  the 

1  Dupriez  (vol.  ii.  pp.  453-54)  mentions  two  such  cases.  One  in  1876, 
when  the  cabinet,  disliking  a  bill  for  an  amnesty  passed  by  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  proposed  in  the  Senate  a  compromise,  which  the  latter, 
averse  to  any  amnesty,  rejected.  The  ministers  thereupon  resigned,  but 
they  had  really  been  beaten  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  their  only 
hope  of  restoring  their  prestige  lay  in  forcing  through  the  compromise. 
The  other  case  was  in  1890,  when  the  Senate  by  a  vote  condemning  the 
economic  policy  of  the  government,  brought  about  a  cabinet  crisis.  But 
the  ministry  was  already  divided  within  itself,  and  had  almost  broken  in 
pieces  a  few  days  before.  There  appears  to  have  been  a  third  instance  of 
the  same  kind  in  1883.  In  that  case  the  Fallieres  ministry  resigned 
because  the  Senate  rejected  a  bill  on  the  expulsion  of  members  of  families 
that  had  reigned  in  France,  but  here  again  the  cabinet  was  disunited  and 
in  a  feeble  condition  before  the  vote  in  the  Senate  took  place.  (Journal 
Officiel,  Feb.  18  and  19,  1883.) 


THE  SENATE.  23 

majority  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  highly  pre- 
carious, for  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  the  cabinet 
could  have  relied  on  the  hearty  support  of  the  Chamber 
it  would  have  defied  the  Senate  as  it  had  already  done 
two  months  before.1     It  has  been  only  in  very  excep- 

1  The  history  of  this  ease  is  as  follows  :  The  present  Chamber  of 
Deputies  wheu  elected  contained  a  decided  majority  of  Conservative 
Republicans,  and  for  two  years  the  successive  cabinets  represented  their 
views,  but  by  degrees  the  party  became  disintegrated,  and  in  October, 
1895,  a  Radical  cabinet  was  formed,  which  succeeded  in  obtaining  the 
support  of  a  majority.  Early  in  the  new  year  the  Minister  of  Justice, 
not  being  satisfied  that  the  Juge  a" 'Instruction,  who  was  holding  the  inquest 
on  the  southern  railroad  frauds,  was  sufficiently  zealous  in  discovering 
the  offenders,  took  the  case  out  of  his  hands  and  intrusted  it  to  another 
magistrate.  On  February  11,  the  Senate,  which  was  strongly  conserva- 
tive, passed  a  vote  censuring  this  act  as  an  interference  with  the  course 
of  justice.  Two  days  later,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  expressed  its  con^ 
fidence  in  the  government  ;  whereupon  the  Senate,  on  February  15, 
repeated  its  former  vote.  On  the  20th,  the  matter  was  again  brought  up 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  M.  Bourgeois,  the  head  of  the  cabinet, 
declared  that  he  should  not  resign  so  long  as  he  was  upheld  by  the 
Chamber,  which  proceeded  to  reaffirm  its  vote  of  the  week  before.  A 
number  of  the  senators  who  had  been  opposed  to  the  cabinet,  finding 
that  it  would  not  yield,  read  in  the  Senate  next  day  a  declaration  protest- 
ing against  the  refusal  of  the  ministers  to  hold  themselves  responsible  to 
the  Senate  as  a  violation  of  the  Constitution,  but  saying  that  while  as 
senators  they  reserved  their  constitutional  right,  they  did  not  wish  to 
suspend  the  legislative  life  of  the  country.  The  Senate  thereupon  adopted 
an  order  of  the  day  approving  this  declaration,  and  thus  virtually  gave 
up  for  a  time  the  .attempt  to  make  the  ministers  responsible  to  itself. 
{Journal  Officiel,  Feb.  12,  14,  16,  21,  and  22,  1896.) 

A  little  later  the  cabinet  brought  forward  a  bill  for  a  progressive  in- 
come tax,  and  succeeded  on  March  26  in  getting  the  Chamber  to  adopt  an 
order  of  the  day  approving  of  the  general  principal  involved.  The  order, 
however,  which  was  somewhat  equivocal,  was  only  carried  by  sixteen 
votes,  and  more  than  half  of  the  deputies  were  believed  to  be  opposed  in 
their  hearts  to  the  tax.  The  Senate  thought  its  opportunity  had  come, 
and  again  passed  a  vote  of  lack  of  confidence  in  the  ministry,  this  time 
on  the  subject  of  foreign  affairs.     {Journal  Officiel,  April  4.)     The  result 


24  FRANCE. 

tional  cases,  therefore,  when  the  Chamber  was  not 
firmly  opposed,  that  the  Upper  House  has  upset  the 
ministry.  Moreover  the  question  at  issue  in  the  recent 
struggle  was  not  whether  the  cabinet  is  responsible  to 
the  Senate  to  the  same  extent  that  it  is  to  the  Chamber, 
but  simply  whether  the  Senate  can  insist  on  the  removal 
of  a  ministry  to  which  it  is  peculiarly  hostile,  and  which 
it  is  absolutely  unwilling  to  trust.  No  one  has  ever 
doubted  that  under  ordinary  circumstances  the  minis- 
ters are  responsible  only  to  the  Chamber.  The  majority 
in  that  body  alone  is  considered  in  the  formation  of  a 
cabinet,  and  an  unfavorable  vote  there  on  any  current 
matter  of  importance  is  followed  by  a  change  of  min- 
isters, while  a  similar  vote  in  the  Senate  is  not  regarded 
as  a  reason  for  resignation. 

was  no  better  than  before,  but  the  Senate  felt  the  strength  of  its  position, 
and  was  not  to  be  ignored.  On  April  21,  therefore,  it  took  a  bolder  step 
by  a  resolution  to  postpone  the  vote  on  the  credits  asked  for  Madagascar 
"until  it  had  before  it  a  constitutional  ministry  having  the  confidence  of 
the  two  Chambers."  Instead  of  trying  to  continue  the  fight  Bourgeois 
resigned,  declaring  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  that  as  the  representa- 
tive of  universal  suffrage  it  ought  to  be  supreme,  but  that,  owing  to  the 
impossibility  of  insuring  proper  military  service  in  Madagascar  after  the 
vote  of  the  Senate,  patriotism  obliged  him  to  withdraw.  The  Radicals 
in  the  Chamber  succeeded  in  carrying  a  vote  affirming  once  more  the 
preponderance  of  the  elect  of  universal  suffrage,  and  urging  the  need  of 
democratic  reforms  ;  but  a  few  days  later  a  purely  Conservative  cabinet 
presented  itself  to  the  Chamber,  and  obtained  a  vote  of  confidence  by  a 
majority  of  forty-three.     {Journal  Officiel,  April  22,  24,  and  May  1.) 

The  outcome  of  the  affair  justified  the  belief  that  the  Chamber  would 
not  engage  in  a  prolonged  struggle  to  support  the  cabinet  ;  that  while 
unwilling  to  turn  the  ministers  out  itself,  it  would  not  be  sorry  to 
have  the  Senate  do  so.  Had  the  deputies  been  so  thoroughly  in 
earnest  as  to  force  a  deadlock  between  the  Chambers,  the  Senate  could 
not  have  refused  its  consent  to  a  dissolution,  and  would  certainly  have 
been  obliged  to  give  way  if  the  elections  had  resulted  in  a  victory  for  the 
cabinet. 


THE  SENATE.  25 

As  a  rule  the  Senate  does  not  decide  the  fate  of  the 
ministries,  and  hence  cannot  control  their  policy.  The 
result  is  that  without  sinking  to  the  helplessness  of  the 
English  House  of  Lords,  it  has  become  a  body  of  sec- 
ondary importance.1  At  one  time  it  stood  very  low 
in  public  esteem,  on  account  of  its  origin  ;  for  it  was 
created  by  the  Reactionaries  in  the  National  Assembly, 
and  was  regarded  as  a  monarchical  institution  ;  and  even 
after  the  greater  part  of  its  seats  were  occupied  by  Re- 
publicans, it  was  suspected  of  being  only  half-heartedly 
in  favor  of  the  republican  form  of  government.  Its 
condemnation  of  Boulanger  increased  its  popularity  by 
making  it  appear  a  real  bulwark  of  the  Republic  against 
the  would-be  dictator;  but  the  prejudice  against  it  has 
by  no  means  disappeared,  and  the  extreme  Radicals  have 
never  ceased  to  demand  its  abolition,  although  conser- 
vative feeling  in  France  will  doubtless  remain  strong 
enough  to  prevent  such  a  step.  How  great  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Senate  will  be  in  the  future  is  not  easy 
to  foretell.  Some  people  are  of  opinion  that  when  the 
life  members  are  gone,  many  of  whom  have  been  dis- 
tinguished in  letters,  in  science,  or  in  war,  it  will  lose 
a  good  deal  of  the  prestige  that  it  retains  to-day.2  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  men  of  mark  are  still  elected,  and 
now  that  the  Senate  is  not  afraid  of  being  thought 
lukewarm  or  hostile  to  the  Republic,  and  does  not  feel 

1  In  his  Essays  on  Government  (chap,  i.)  the  writer  has  tried  to  prove 
that  this  must  necessarily  he  the  condition  of  one  of  two  chamhers  wher- 
ever the  cahinet  is  responsible  to  the  other  ;  and  that  the  cabinet  cannot 
in  the  long  run  be  responsible  to  both. 

2  About  half  of  them  have  already  died.  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  374, 
:)ote. 


26  FRANCE. 

its  existence  seriously  threatened,  it  has  acquired  more 
boldness  and  energy.1  It  is  highly  improbable,  more- 
over, that  it  will  become  utterly  powerless,  so  long  as 
the  deputies  are  divided  into  a  number  of  political 
groups,  and  the  ministers  are  not  able  to  speak  with 
authority  as  the  leaders  of  a  great  and  united  party. 

Although  the  Senate  has  little  or  no  share  in  directing 
the  policy  of  the  cabinet,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that 
it  is  a  useless  body.  On  the  contrary,  it  does  very  valua- 
ble work  in  correcting  the  over-hasty  legislation  •  of  the 
other  Chamber,  and  in  case  of  disagreement  often  has 
its  own  way  or  effects  a  compromise.2 

The  two  Chambers  meeting  in  joint  session  form 
what  is  called  the  National  Assembly,  which, 

TheNa-  •         , 

tionai  as  we  have  seen,  has  power  to  revise  the  con- 

Assenibly. 

stitutional  laws.  It  has  one  other  function, 
that  of  electing  the  President  of  the  Republic.     This 

officer  is  chosen  for  seven  years,  and  is  re- 
dent  of  the     eligible ; 3  the  only  limit  on  the  choice  of  a 

Republic.  ,.,  1     •  i  1     •  ,  ■         • 

candidate  being  round  in  the  constitutional 
law  of  August  14,  1884,  which  excludes  all  members 
of  families  that  have  ever  reigned  in  France, — a  pro- 
vision dictated  by  the  fear  that,  like  Napoleon  III.,  a 
prince  might  use  the  presidency  as  a  step  to  the  throne. 
The  President  is  at  the  head  of  the  Republic,  but  he 
lives  and  travels  in  a  style  that  is  almost  regal,  for  the 
conception  of  a  republic  as  severe,  simple,  and  econom- 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  382-S3.  The  present  position  and  the  probable 
future  of  the  Senate  are  discussed  by  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-52. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  413-15. 

8  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  2. 


THE  PRESIDENT.  27 

ical  has  changed  very  much  in  France  since  the  second 
Empire  taught  the  nation  extravagance.1 

The  duties  of  the  President,  like  those  of  every  chief 
magistrate,  are  manifold.  He  is  the  executive  Hisfunc_ 
head  of  the  nation,  and  as  such  executes  the  tlons' 
laws,  issues  ordinances,2  and  appoints  all  the  officers  of 
the  government.3  He  has  also  certain  functions  of  a 
legislative  character,  but,  except  for  the  right  of  initi- 
ative in  legislation,  these  are  not  in  fact  very  exten- 
sive. He  has  no  veto  upon  the  laws,  and  although 
he  may  require  the  Chambers  to  reconsider  a  bill,  the 
right  has  never  been  exercised.4  With  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  he  can  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,5 
but  this  power  has  also  fallen  into  disuse,  because  the 
members  of  his  cabinet  are  very  much  under  the  control 
of  the  deputies,  who  dread  the  risk  and  expense  of  an 
election  ;  and,  in  fact,  a  dissolution  has  not  taken  place 
since  President  MacMahon's  unsuccessful  attempt  to  use 
it  in  1877  as  a  means  of  getting  a  Chamber  in  sym- 
pathy with  his  views.  The  President  has  power  to  make 
treaties ;  but  treaties  of  peace,  of  commerce,  those  which 
burden  the  finances,  affect  the  persons  or  property  of 
French  citizens  in  foreign  countries,  or  which  change 
the  territory  of  France  (in  other  words,  all  the  more  im- 

1  Cf.  G.  Channes,  Nos  Fautes,  Letter  of  Jan.,  1885  ;  Theodore  Stan- 
ton in  the  Arena,  Oct.,  1891. 

2  For  the  nature  of  this  power,  see  pp.  42-44,  infra. 
8  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  3. 

4  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  7  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  369.  It 
is  not  likely  to  be  used  unless  after  the  bill  has  passed  the  cabinet  that 
favored  it  has  resigned,  and  another  hostile  to  it  has  come  in. 

6  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  5. 


28  FRANCE. 

portant  ones),  require  the  ratification  of  the  Chambers.1 
A  declaration  of  war  also  requires  their  consent ; 2  but 
as  a  matter  of  fact  the  government  managed  to  wage 
war  in  Tunis  and  Tonquin  without  any  such  consent, 
alleging  at  first  that  the  affair  was  not  a  war,  and 
afterwards  defending  itself  on  the  ground  that  the  Par- 
liament by  voting  credits  had  virtually  sanctioned  its 
course.3 
.Unlike  the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  French 
President  is  not  free  to  use  his  powers  accord- 

His  Powers  .  .  .      ,  „  , 

are  really      ing  to   his  own    judgment,  lor  in   order  to 

exercised  fov 

the  ministers  make  him  independent  of  the  fate  of  cabi- 

in  his  name. 

nets,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  his 
personal  power  from  becoming  too  great,  the  constitu- 
tional laws  declare  that  he  shall  not  be  responsible  for 
his  official  conduct,  except  in  case  of  high  treason,  and 
that  all  his  acts  of  every  kind,  to  be  valid,  must  be 
countersigned  by  one  of  the  ministers ;  and  thus,  like 
the  British  monarch,  he  has  been  put  under  guardian- 
ship and  can  do  no  wrong.4  When,  therefore,  we  speak 
of  the  powers  of  the  President,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  these  are  really  exercised  by  the  ministers,  who  are 
responsible  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  Presi- 
dent, indeed,  is  not  usually  present  at  the  cabinet  con- 
sultations (conseils  de  cabinet)  in  which  the  real  policy 
of  the  government  is  discussed,  and  as  a  rule  he  pre- 
sides only  over  the  formal  meetings  [conseils  des  mi- 

1  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  8. 

2  Id.,  Art.  9. 

8  See  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  46,  47. 

4  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Arts.  3  and  6. 


THE  PRESIDENT.  29 

nistres)  held  for  certain  purposes  specified  by  law.1  He 
has  power,  it  is  true,  to  select  the.  ministers,  and  in  this 
matter  he  can  use  his  own  discretion  to  some  extent,  but 
in  fact  he  generally  intrusts  some  one  with  the  forma- 
tion of  a  cabinet,  and  appoints  the  ministers  this  man 
suggests.2  His  duty  in  these  cases  is  not,  however,  as 
simple  as  that  of  the  English  Queen,  because,  for  reasons 
that  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  there  is  usually 
on  the  fall  of  a  cabinet  no  leader  of  a  victorious  oppo- 
sition to  whom  he  can  turn.  A  good  deal  of  tact  and 
skill  is  sometimes  required  at  cabinet  crises,  and  it  is  said 
that  on  a  recent  occasion  the  formation  of  a  ministry 
was  due  to  the  personal  influence  of  President  Carnot.3 

Sir  Henry  Maine  makes  merry  over  the  exalted  office 
and  lack .  of  power  of  the  President.  "  There  is,"  he 
says,  "  no  living  functionary  who  occupies  a  more  pitia- 
ble position  than  a  French  President.  The  old  kings 
of  France  reigned  and  governed.  The  Constitutional 
King,  according  to  M.  Thiers,  reigns,  but  does  not 
govern.  The  President  of  the  United  States  gov- 
erns, but  he  does  not  reign.  It  has  been  reserved  for 
the  President  of  the  French  Republic  neither  to  reign 
nor  yet  to  govern."4 

At  first  sight  the  situation  does,  indeed,  appear  some- 
what irrational.     When  the  head  of  the  state  is  desig- 

1  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  53  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  350-51  and  367- 
68,  states  that  the  President  is  often  present  when  important  matters  are 
discussed,  but  cannot  influence  the  decision. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  340. 

8  See  "France  under  M.  Constans,"  in  Murray's  Magazine  for  May, 
1890. 

4  Popular  Government,  p.  250. 


30  FRANCE. 

nated  by  the  accident  of  birth  it  is  not  unnatural  to 
make  of  him  an  idol,  and  appoint  a  high  priest  to 
speak  in  his  name ;  but  when  he  is  carefully  selected 
as  the  man  most  fit  for  the  place,  it  seems  a  trifle  illo- 
gical to  intrust  the  duties  of  the  office  to  some  one  else. 
By  the  constitution  of  Sieyes  an  ornamental  post  of  a 
similar  character  was  prepared  for  the  First  Consul,  but 
Napoleon  said  he  had  no  mind  to  play  the  part  of  a 
pig  kept  to  fatten.  In  government,  however,  the  most 
logical  system  is  not  always  the  best,  and  the  anoma- 
lous position  of  the  President  has  saved  France  from 
the  danger  of  his  trying  to  make  himself  a  dictator, 
while  the  fact  that  he  is  independent  of  the  changing 
moods  of  the  Chambers  has  given  to  the  Republic  a 
dignity  and  stability  it  had  never  enjoyed  before.  It 
is  a  curious  commentary  on  the  nature  of  human  am- 
bition, that  in  sj3ite  of  the  small  power  actually  wielded 
by  the  President  in  France,  the  presidential  fever  seems 
to  have  nearly  as  strong  a  hold  on  public  men  as  in  this 
country. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  ministers,  there  is 

The  Conseil    one  other  institution  which  claims  attention 

on  account  of  its  past  rather  than  its  present 

position.      This  is  the   Conseil  d'Etat  or  Council  of 

State,1  a  body  whose  importance  has  varied  a  great  deal 

i  Aucoc,  Conferences  sur  le  Droit  Adm.,  liv.  ii.  ch.  i.  §-3;  Ducrocq, 
Cours  de  Droit  Adm.,  tit.  i.  ch.  i.  sec.  i.  §  iii.  ;  Bceuf,  Resume'  sur  le  Droit 
Adm.,  ed.  of  1895,  p.  32  et  seq.  ;  cf.  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  96-98;  Du- 
priez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  285-316,  passim,  and  pp.  481-92  ;  Goodnow,  Comparative 
Administrative  Law,  vol.  i.  pp.  107-13.  See  also  articles  entitled  "  Le 
Conseil  d'Etat  et  les  Projets  de  Rdforme,"  by  Varagnac,  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  Aug.  15  and  Sept.  15,  1892. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  STATE.  31 

at  different  times.  Under  Napoleon  L,  and  again  dur- 
ing the  second  Empire,  in  addition  to  the  possession  of 
executive  functions,  it  was  a  real  source  of  legislation ; 
while  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration  and  the  Monarchy 
of  July  it  became  what  it  is  to-day,  a  council  with  high 
attributes,  but  very  little  authority.  Except  as  a  court 
of  administrative  justice,1  it  has  now  lost  most  of  its 
influence ;  for  although  it  must  be  consulted  before 
certain  classes  of  ordinances  can  be  issued,  and  may  be 
consulted  on  other  administrative  matters,  its  advice 
need  never  be  followed ;  and  in  fact  the  habit  of  con- 
sulting it  is  said  to  have  become  little  more  than  a  mere 
form.2  The  legislative  functions  of  the  Council  have 
faded  even  more  completely  to  a  shadow,  as  is  proved 
by  the  fact  that  while  the  Government  or  either  of  the 
Chambers  may  seek  its  aid  in  the  framing  of  statutes, 
the  privilege  is  rarely  exercised  by  the  ministers,  scarcely 
at  all  by  the  Senate,  and  never  by  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies. 

The  members  of  the  Council  are  divided  into  several 
classes,  but  those  belonging  to  the  most  important  class, 
and  the  only  ones  who  can  vote  when  the  Council  sits 
as  a  court,  are  appointed  and  dismissed  at  will  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic.3 

1  For  its  functions  of  this  nature,  see  pp.  55-61,  infra. 

2  "La  Re" forme  Administrative — La  Justice,"  by  Vicomte  d'Avenel, 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June  1,  1889,  pp.  597-98. 

3  The  other  members  are  also  appointed  by  the  President  subject  to 
certain  conditions,  but  as  he  can  dismiss  any  of  them,  their  tenure  of  office 
depends  on  the  pleasure  of  the  cabinet,  and  in  fact  by  means  of  resigna- 
tions or  removals,  most  of  the  councilors  were  changed  in  1879  in  order 
to  make  the  council  Republican.  —  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat,"  Varagnac, 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Sept.  15,  1892,  p.  295. 


32  FRANCE. 

In   a  parliamentary  system   the  ministers  have  two 
rp,      .  •       distinct  functions.     One  of  these  is  the  same 

Ihe  nuiiis- 

ters"  as  that  of  the  members   of  the  President's 

Cabinet  in  the  United  States,  and  consists  of  the  man- 
agement of  the  departments  of  the  administration. 
The  other  is  the  duty  of  representing  the  government  in 
the  Chambers,  urging  the  adoption  of  its  measures,  and 
defending  its  policy  against  the  attacks  of  its  adversa- 
ries. These  two  functions  are  not  necessarily  united, 
and  in  fact  it  has  been  a  common  habit  in  some  coun- 
tries to  appoint  ministers  without  portfolios,  as  it  is 
called,  that  is,  without  any  executive  duties  at  all,  in 
order  that  they  may  devote  their  whole  energy  to  the 
battles  in  Parliament.1  Although  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  such  a  practice  in  France,  it  is  not  followed 
to-day,  each  minister  being  at  the  head  of  a  particular 
branch  of  the  administration.  The  number  of  depart- 
ments, however,  and  the  distribution  of  the  public  busi- 
ness among  them  is  not  fixed  by  law,  but  is  regulated 
from  time  to  time  by  decree  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic.  The  number  of  ministers  is,  therefore,  con- 
stantly liable  to  change  according  to  the  immediate 
needs  of  the  public  service.  At  present  there  are  eleven 
departments  or  ministries  :  those  of  the  Interior  and 
Religion  ;  of  Justice  ;  of  Foreign  Affairs  ;  of  Finance ; 
of  War ;  of  the  Navy ;  of  Education  and  the  Fine 
Arts ;  of  Public  Works ;   of  Commerce,  Industry,  and 

1  This  practice  virtually  exists  .cause  some  of  the  offices 

held  by  the  ministers,  such  a  ,  ■  *  ■  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury,  aud 
that  of  Chancellor  of  the  P  ;,\  (.  Lancaster,  involve  no  administrative 
duties. 


THE  MINISTERS.  33 

Posts  and  Telegraphs ;    of  Agriculture ;   and   of   the 
Colonies.1 

The  constitutional  law  of  February  25,  1875  (Art. 
6),  declares  that  the  ministers  are  collectively  Their  re- 
responsible  to  the  Chambers  for  the  general  to°thebility 
policy  of  the  government,  and  individually  for  Chambers- 
their  personal  acts.  The  object  of  this  clause  was,  of 
course,  to  establish  the  parliamentary  system,  and  in 
fact  the  French  ministry  is  responsible  to  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  as  the  English  is  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  resigns  on  a  hostile  vote  on  any  matter  of 
importance.  Except,  indeed,  for  the  Ministers  of  War 
and  of  the  Navy,  who  are  usually  military  men,  the 
cabinet  officers  are  almost  always  selected  from  among 
the  members  of  Parliament,2  although  the  reason  for 
this  practice  in  England  does  not  apply  in  France, 
because  the  ministers  have  a  right  to  be  present  and 
speak  in  either  Chamber,  whether  members  of  it  or  not.3 

But  in  order  to  understand  fully  the  position  of  the 
French  ministers,   and  their   relation   to  the   r™  . 

1  heir  enor- 

Parliament,    it   is    necessary  to   realize   their  SS1tB0wer 
enormous  power,  and  this  is  due  largely  to  causes- 
three  causes,  —  the  paternal  nature  of  the  government, 
the  centralization  of  the  state,  and  the  possession  by 
the    executive    of  authority    that    in   an    Anglo-Saxon 

1  Boeuf,  Resume,  ed.  of  1895,  pp.  22,  23.  The  last  ministry,  that  of 
the  Colonies,  was,  however,  created  by  statute  in  1894,  and  as  Boeuf 
remarks,  the  Chambers  can  always  prevent  the  creation  of  a  ministry  by 
refusing  to  make  the  necessary  appropriations. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  336. 

3  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  6.  In  practice  this  privilege  is  also, 
accorded  to  their  under-secretaries.     Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  52. 

VOL.  I. 


34  FRANCE. 

country  would  be  lodged  with  the  legislature  or  the 
courts  of  law. 

On  the  first  of  these  matters,  the  paternal  nature  of 
the  government,  there  is  no  need  to  dwell 
tureof  the  at  length.  All  governments  are  growing 
more  paternal  at  the  present  day,  for  a  re- 
action has  set  in  against  the  extreme  laissez-faire 
doctrines  preached  by  Adam  Smith,  John  Stuart  Mill, 
and  the  English  political  economists  of  the  earlier 
school.  There  is  a  general  tendency  to  restrain  the 
liberty  of  the  individual  and  subject  him  to  govern- 
mental supervision  and  control.  Such  control  and 
supervision  are  traditional  in  France,  and  far  exceed 
anything  to  which  we  are  accustomed  in  this  country. 
All  trades  and  occupations  are  there  subject  to  a  great 
deal  more  police  inspection  than  with  us.  They  require 
more  generally  to  be  licensed,  and  are  regulated  and 
prohibited  by  the  administrative  officials  with  a  much 
freer  hand.  And  although  the  liberty  of  the  press  and 
the  right  of  holding  public  meetings  are  now  sub- 
stantially realized,  the  right  of  association  is  still  very 
limited,  for  no  society  of  more  than  twenty  persons, 
except  business  companies,  and  associations  of  persojjl 
pursuing  the  same  profession  or  trade,  can  be  formed 
without  the  permission  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
or  the  prefect  of  the  department.1  It  is  easy  to  see 
how  much  power  all  this  paternalism  places  in  the 
hands  of  the  administration. 

An  explanation  of  the  centralization  of  the  state 
entails  a  brief  survey  of  local  government;  and  here 

1  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  32-39  ;  Ducrocq,  tit.  ii.  ch.  iii.  ;  ch.  iv.  sec.  iii. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  35 

we  meet  with  a  deeply  rooted  French  tradition,  for  cen- 
tralization was  already  great  under  the  old  re-  Centraiiza- 
gime,  and  although  the  first  effect  of  the  Rev-  tl0IU 
olution  was  to  j)lace  the  administration  of  local  affairs 
under  the  control  of  independent  elected  bodies,  the 
pressure  of  foreign  war,  and  the  necessity  of  maintain- 
ing order  at  home,  soon  threw  despotic  power  into  the 
hands  of  the  national  government.  Under  Napoleon 
this  power  became  crystallized  in  a  permanent  form,  and 
an  administrative  system  was  established,  more  perfect, 
more  effective,  and  at  the  same  time  more  centralized 
than  that  which  had  existed  under  the  monarchy.1 
The  outward  form  of  the  Napoleonic  system  has  been 
continuously  preserved  with  surprisingly  little  change, 
but  since  1830  its  spirit  has  been  modified  in  two  dis- 
tinct ways :  first,  by  means  of  what  the  French  call 
deconcentration,  that  is,  by  giving  to  the  local  agents 
of  the  central  government  a  greater  right  of  independ- 
ent action,  §o  that  they  are  more  free  from  the  direct 
tutelage  of  the  ministers ;  second,  by  a  process  of  true 
decentralization,  or  the  introduction  of  the  elective 
principle  into  local  government,  and  the  extension  of 
the  powers  of  the  local  representative  bodies.  But 
although  the  successive  rulers  of  France  have  pursued 
this  policy  pretty  steadily,  the  progress  of  local  self- 
government  has  been  far  from  rapid.2     One  reason  for 

1  For  a  short  but  vigorous  comment  on  Napoleon's  system,  see  G.  L. 
Dickinson,  Revolution  and  Reaction  in  Modern  France,  cli.  ii. 

2  On  the  subject  of  local  government,  I  have  used  Aucoc,  Conferences, 
3d  ed.  ;  Bceuf ,  Resume,  ed.  of  1895  ;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  A  dm.  Locale  en 
France  et  en  A  ngleterre  ;  Lebon's  two  works  on  France  ;  Goodnow,  Comp. 
Adm.  Law.  There  is  a  popular  account  in  Block,  Entretiens  familiers 
sur  VAdm.  de  notre  pays. 


36  FRANCE. 

this  is  the  habit  of  looking  to  the  central  authorities  for 
o-uiclance  in  all  matters.  Another  is  a  fear  on  the  part 
of  the  government  of  furnishing  its  enemies  with 
rallying-points  which  might  be  used  to  organize  an  op- 
position, —  a  fear  that  takes  shape  to-day  in  provisions 
forbidding  the  local  elected  councils  to  express  any 
opinions  on  general  politics,  or  to  communicate  with 
each  other  except  about  certain  matters  specified  by 
law.  A  third  cause  of  the  feeble  state  of  local  self- 
government  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  Revolu- 
tion of  1789  destroyed  all  the  existing  local  divisions 
except  the  commune,  and  replaced  them  by  artificial 
districts  which  have  never  developed  any  real  vitality, 
so  that  the  commune  is  the  only  true  centre  of  local  life 
in  the  republic.1  A  fourth,  and  perhaps  the  most 
potent  cause  of  all,  is  the  dread  of  disorder  which  is 
constantly  present  in  the  minds  of  Frenchmen,  and 
makes  them  crave  a  master  strong  enough  to  cope  with 
any  outbreak. 

France  is  divided  into  eighty-six  departments,  at  the 
Local  gov-     head  of  each  of  which  is  a  prefect,  appointed 

eminent.  —  ,  ,  .  , 

The  depart-  and  removed  at  pleasure  by  the  President  of 

ment  and  ,  m       J 

the  prefect,  the  Republic,  but  in  reality  nominated  by  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  office  is,  indeed,  regarded 
as  distinctly  political,  and  the  incumbent  is  often  re- 
placed when  the  minister  changes.  The  prefect,  who 
is  by  far  the  most  important  of  the  local  officials,  occu- 
pies a  double  position,  for  he  is  the  agent  of  the 
central  government  in  regard  to  those  matters  of 
general  administration  which  are  thought  to  concern 

1  Most  of  the  existing  communes  were  in  fact  created  in  1789. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  37 

the  whole  country,  and  at  the  same  time  he  is  the 
executive  officer  of  the  department  for  local  affairs. 
In  the  former  capacity  he  is  in  theory  the  immediate 
subordinate  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  but  since 
his  duties  extend  to  all  branches  of  the  administration, 
he  corresponds  in  practice  directly  with  any  minister  in 
whose  sphere  of  action  the  matter  with  which  he  is 
called  upon  to  deal  may  lie.  His  authority  as  the 
agent  of  the  central  government  is  not,  however,  the 
same  in  all  cases.  Sometimes  he  is  absolutely  subject 
to  the  orders  of  the  ministers.  This  is  true  when  he 
executes  general  laws  and  ordinances  ;  but  when,  for 
example,  he  directs  the  police  of  the  department,  or 
supervises  the  subordinate  local  bodies,  he  proceeds 
on  his  own  responsibility,  and  his  acts  can  be  overruled 
by  the  central  government  only  in  case  they  are  con- 
trary to  law,  or  give  rise  to  complaints  on  the  part  of 
the  persons  affected  by  them.  In  pursuance  of  the 
policy  of  deconcentration,  the  prefect  has  been  given 
an  independent  authority  of  this  kind  over  a  large 
number  of  subjects,  and  he  was  intended  to  exercise  his 
own  judgment  in  regard  to  them,  but  the  influence 
and  pressure  of  the  deputies  has,  it  is  said,  induced 
him  to  shirk  responsibility  as  much  as  possible  by  refer- 
ring doubtful  questions  to  the  ministers,  and  hence  the 
centralization  has  not  been  diminished  as  much  as  was 
expected.1  In  matters  of  general  administration,  the 
prefect  is  assisted  by  a  prefectoral  council  of  three  or 
four  members  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public ;  but,  except  when  it  sits  as  an  administrative 

1  Channes,  Letter  of  October  1,  1884. 

4  7  7 ; 


38  FRANCE. 

court,  the  functions  of  this  body  are  almost  altogether 
advisory,  and  their  use  has  become  scarcely  more  than 
a  form.1 

As  the  executive  officer  for  local  affairs,  the  prefect 
The  General  can>ies  out  the  resolutions  of  the  General 
Council.  Council.  This  is  the  representative  assembly 
of  the  department,  and  is  elected  by  universal  suffrage, 
one  of  the  members  beino;  chosen  in  each  canton  for 
six  years,  and  half  of  them  being  renewed  every  three 
years.  The  authority  of  the  body  is  jealously  limited. 
Its  competence  is  almost  entirely  confined  to  affairs 
that  are  deemed  to  have  a  strictly  local  interest,2  and 
even  in  regard  to  these  its  powers  are  not  absolute,  for 
its  votes  on  certain  matters  can  be  annulled  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  and  its  budget,  that  is  the 
annual  tax  levy  and  list  of  appropriations,  is  not  valid 
without  his  approval.  Although  the  Council  has  the 
right  of  final  decision  in  a  considerable  class  of  sub- 
jects, its  actual  power  over  them  is  curtailed  in  a  variety 
of  ways.  In  the  first  place  it  does  not  carry  out  its 
own  votes,  but  their  execution  is  intrusted  to  an  aerent 
of  the  central  government,  the  prefect,  who  appoints 
all  the  officials,  manages  the  public  institutions,  and 
signs  the  orders  for  all  payments  of  money ;  the  direct 
control  of  the  council  over  his  performance  of  these 
duties  extending  only  to  the  election  of  a  standing 
commission  which  has  little  more  than  a  right  of  inspec- 

1  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "La  Re"fornie  Administrative,"  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  June  1,  1889,  p.  596. 

2  Its  functions  in  relation  to  the  general  administration  consist  in  ap- 
portioning certain  direct  taxes,  in  giving  its  advice  when  asked,  and  in 
expressing  its  wishes  on  matters  not  connected  with  general  politics. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  39 

tion.1  In  the  second  place,  the  prefect  has  an  opportu- 
nity to  exert  a  great  deal  of  influence  over  the  action 
of  the  Council,  for  not  only  has  he  a  right  to  address 
it,  but  he  prepares  the  budget  and  all  other  business, 
and  in  fact  it  is  not  allowed  to  act  on  any  matter  until 
it  has  heard  his  report.2  Moreover  the  Council  is  only 
permitted  to  sit  a  very  short  time.  It  has  two  regular 
sessions  a  year,  whose  duration  is  limited  one  to  a 
month,  the  other  to  a  fortnight,  and  although  extra 
sessions  can  be  held  they  must  not  exceed  one  week 
apiece.  Finally  its  very  existence  is  insecure,  for  it  can 
be  dissolved  by  the  chief  of  the  state.  In  general  it 
may  be  said  that  in  matters  falling  within  its  province 
the  General  Council  cannot  do  everything  it  wants,  but 
can  prevent  almost  anything  it  does  not  want.  Its 
financial  resources  are  not  large,3  and  its  attention  is 
confined  for  the  most  part  to  the  construction  of  roads, 
subventions  to  railroads,  and  the  care  of  schools,  insane 
asylums,  and  other  institutions  of  a  similar  character. 

At  one  time  a  hope  was  entertained  that  politics 
might  be  kept  out  of  the  general  councils,  but  it  has 
not  been  fulfilled,  the  departmental  elections  being 
regularly  conducted  on  party  lines.4     It  has  therefore 

1  The  Council  can  delegate  to  the  commission  a  somewhat  indefinite 
class  of  functions,  but  it  is  not  in  fact  a  body  of  much  importance.  Du- 
priez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  467-68. 

2  Aucoc,  p.  282. 

8  Almost  its  only  source  of  revenue  is  the  addition  of  a  limited  sum  to 
the  direct  state  taxes. 

4  Bozdrian,  in  his  Etude  sur  la  Revision  de  la  Constitution  (pp.  89-90), 
attributes  this  to  the  fact  that  the  local  assemblies  take  part  in  the  elec- 
tion of  senators. 


40  FRANCE. 

been  thought  best  to  intrust  the  supervision  of  the 
communes  largely  to  the  central  government  and  its 
representative  the  prefect,  rather  than  to  the  councils 
with  their  partisan  bias,  and  this,  of  course,  deprives 
the  latter  of  a  part  of  the  importance  they  would  other- 
wise possess.1 

The  next  local  division  is  the  arrondissement.  This 
-,  is  a  mere  administrative  district  without  cor- 

Ine  arron- 
dissement.     p0rate  personality,  with  no  property,  revenues, 

or  expenses  of  its  own,  and  although  it  has  a  sub-pre- 
fect and  an  elected  council,  neither  of  them  has  much 
power.  In  fact  it  has  been  proposed  to  abolish  the 
arrondissement  altogether. 

The  canton,  which  is  the  next  subdivision,  is  really  a 
The  can-  judicial  and  military  rather  than  an  admin- 
ton"  istrative  district,  and  therefore  does  not  con- 

cern us  here. 

We  now  come  to  the  communes,  which  are  the  small- 
Thecom-  es^  local  entities,  but  differ  enormously  in 
area  and  population.  They  vary  in  size  from 
twenty  acres  to  over  a  quarter  of  a  million,  and  they 
run  all  the  way  from  a  hamlet  with  a  dozen  inhabitants 
to  large  cities ;  yet  with  the  exception  of  Paris  and 
Lyons  they  are  all  governed  on  one  plan.  The  officer 
in  the  commune  whose  position  corresponds 

The  mayor.  .  „  .. 

to  that  ot  the  prefect  in  the  department  is 
the  mayor.  He  acts  in  the  same  way  both  as  agent  of 
the  central  government,  and  as  the  executive  head  of  the 

1  By  the  law  of  1884  on  municipalities,  part  of  the  supervision  over  these 
bodies,  which  had  previously  been  in  the  hands  of  the  general  councils, 
was  withdrawn  and  given  to  the  prefect. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  41 

district,  but  whereas  in  the  prefect  the  former  character 
predominates,  the  mayor  is  chiefly  occupied  with  local 
matters.  It  is  largely  for  this  reason  that,  unlike  the 
prefect,  he  is  not  appointed  by  the  President,  but  of 
late  years  has  been  elected  by  and  from  the  communal 
council  for  the  length  of  its  own  term.1  The  mayor  is, 
however,  by  no  means  free  from  control.  So  far  as  he 
acts  as  agent  of  the  central  government,  he  is  abso- 
lutely under  the  orders  of  the  prefect.  Nor  is  this  all. 
The  subject  of  communal  police,  which  includes  the 
public  health  and  other  matters  of  a  kindred  nature,  is 
considered  a  part  of  the  local  administration,  but  the 
acts  of  the  mayor  in  regard  to  it  can  be  annulled  by 
the  prefect,  who  has  also  power  in  many  cases  to  issue 
direct  orders  of  his  own.  Moreover  the  police  officials 
require  to  be  confirmed  by  the  prefect,2  and  can  be 
removed  only  by  him.3  But  even  these  extensive  pow- 
ers of  control  are  not  deemed  enough,  and  it  is  provided 
that  the  mayor  can  be  suspended  from  office  for  a 
month  by  the  prefect,  or  for  three  months  by  the  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior,  and  can  be  removed  altogether  by 
the  President  of  the  Republic. 

The  deliberative  organ  of  the  commune  is  the  com- 
munal council,  which  varies  in  size  from  ten  to  thirty- 
six  members,  and  is  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for 
four   years.     Its   authority   extends   to    all    communal 

1  The  office  is  an  libnorary  one,  as  the  mayor  receives  no  salary. 

2  Or  sub-prefect. 

3  The  mayor  is  not  free  from  control  in  regard  to  other  matters  of 
local  interest,  for  his  accounts  must  be  submitted  for  approval  to  the  pre- 
fect, who  can  order  the  payment  of  any  expense  properly  authorized  if 
the  mayor  neglects  to  make  it. 


42  FRANCE. 

affairs,  except  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  broad 
subject  of  police,  although  that  is  regarded  for  other 
purposes  as  a  local  matter.  The  recent  statute  on 
municipal  government  lays  down  the  general  princi- 
ple that  the  decisions  of  the  council  on  local  affairs, 
when  legally  made,  are  conclusive  without  the  approval 
of  any  superior  administrative  official,  but  in  a  subse- 
quent section  all  the  most  important  matters  are  spe- 
cially excepted  from  the  rule.  The  list  of  exceptions 
includes  almost  every  financial  measure,  the  construction 
of  roads  and  buildings,  and  the  sale  of  communal  prop- 
erty.1 The  council  has,  therefore,  very  much  less  power 
than  might  at  first  sight  be  supposed ;  and  in  order  to 
guard  against  any  attempt  on  its  part  to  exceed  these 
slender  privileges,  the  prefect  is  given  a  discretionary 
authority  to  suspend  it  for  a  month,  while  the  President 
of  the  Republic  can  dissolve  it  entirely,  and  appoint  a 
commission  with  limited  powers  to  rule  the  commune 
for  two  months,  when  a  new  election  must  take  place. 
The  general  laws  of  local  government  already  de- 
scribed   do    not,    however,    cover   the  whole 

Paris.  '  ' 

field,  because  a  dread  of  the  explosive  char- 
acter and  communistic  tendencies  of  the  democracy  of 
Paris  has  prevented  the  capital  from  enjoying  even  the 
measure  of  liberty  granted  to  other  towns.  The  city 
has,  indeed,  a  municipal  council  composed  of  eighty 
elected  members  and  endowed  with  most  of  the  usual 
powers,  and  a  general  council  for  the  department  with 
limited  powers,  composed   of  these   same  eighty  rein- 

1  The  official  who  has  power  to  approve  the  budget  can  also  inscribe 
therein  certain  obligatory  expenses. 


PARIS.  43 

forced  by  eight  suburban  members ;  but  the  executive 
authority  is  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  central  govern- 
ment. It  is  lodged  in  part  with  the  mayors  of  the 
twenty  arrondissenients,  who  are  appointed  directly  by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  ;  but  chiefly  with  two 
prefects  appointed  in  the  same  way.  One  of  these, 
the  Prefect  of  the  Seine,  has  most  of  the  functions  of 
the  ordinary  prefect,  together  with  those  of  a  central 
mayor;  while  the  other,  the  Prefect  of  Police,  has 
charge  of  the  police,  and  is  directly  responsible  to  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior.1 

This  sketch  of  local  government  in  France  shows 
how  centralized  the  state  still  remains,  what  extensive 
supervision  and  control  the  administration  keeps  in  its 
own  hands,  and  how  slight  is  the  measure  of  real  local 
autonomy  if  measured  by  an  Anglo-Saxon  standard. 
In  fact,  the  central  government  still  makes  itself  contin- 
ually and  actively  felt  in  local  affairs,  and  this  is  for 
the  ministers  a  great  source  of  power,  but  also,  as  we 
shall  see  later,  a  cause  of  weakness. 

A  third  source  of  the  enormous  power  of  the  minis- 
ters in  France  is  the  possession  by  the  execu- 
tive   of   authority    that   in    an   Anglo-Saxon  and  judicial 
country  would  be  lodged  with  the  legislature  the  exeeu- 
or  the  courts  of  law.     This  requires  an  expla- 
nation, for  it  involves  some  of  the  most  strange  and 


1  Until  1881,  the  city  of  Lyons  was  governed  in  the  same  way,  and  the 
control  of  the  police  is  still  intrusted  to  the  Prefect  of  the  Rhone.  In  all 
cities  of  over  40,000  people  the  organization  of  the  police  is  fixed  by 
decree  of  the  chief  of  the  state,  although  the  members  of  the  force  are 
appointed  as  in  other  communes. 


44  FRANCE. 

interesting  peculiarities  of  French,  and,  indeed,  of  con- 
tinental political  ideas. 

Let  us  take  first  the  legislative  authority  of  the  execu- 
tive in  France.  When  an  English  or  an  Ameri- 
decrees  Lid  can  legislator  drafts  a  statute  he  tries  to  cover 
all  questions  that  can  possibly  arise.  He  goes 
into  details  and  describes  minutely  the  operation  of 
the  act,  in  order  that  every  conceivable  case  may  be 
expressly  and  distinctly  provided  for.  He  does  this 
because  there  is  no  one  who  has  power  to  remedy 
defects  that  may  subsequently  appear.  If  the  law  is 
vaome  or  obscure,  it  can  receive  an  authoritative  inter- 
pretation  only  from  the  courts  by  the  slow  process  of 
litigation.  If  it  is  incomplete,  it  must  remain  so  until 
amended  by  a  subsequent  enactment.  In  some  cases,  it 
is  true,  an  officer  or  board  is  given  by  statute  power 
to  make  regulations.  The  boards  of  health  furnish  an 
example  of  this ;  but  such  cases  are  exceptional,  and 
every  Anglo-Saxon  feels  that  a  power  so  indefinite  is 
in  its  nature  arbitrary,  and  ought  not  to  be  extended 
any  farther  than  is  absolutely  necessary.  And  here  it 
is  important  to  distinguish  between  rules  issued  by  the 
head  of  a  department  for  the  guidance  of  his  subordi- 
nates and  the  regulations  of  which  we  are  speaking. 
The  former  are  merely  directions  given  to  the  officials 
for  the  purpose  of  instructing  them  in  their  duties,  and 
are  binding  on  no  one  else.  The  right  to  issue  them 
must  belong,  to  some  extent,  to  every  one  who  has  other 
persons  under  his  orders,  although  they  are  used  much 
more  systematically  in  France  than  in  the  United  States. 
The  regulations  with  which  we  are  concerned  here  are 


THE  ORDINANCE  POWER.  45 

of  quite  a  different  kind,  for  they  are  binding  on  all 
citizens  who  may  be  affected  by  them,  and  have,  in  fact, 
the  character  of  laws. 

In  England  and  America  the  authority  to  make  them 
is  delegated  by  the  legislature  very  sparingly,  and  apart 
from  such  an  express  delegation  no  officer  of  the  gov- 
ernment has  power  to  issue  any  ordinances  with  the 
force  of  law.  But  in  France  all  this  is  very  different. 
Statutes  that  do  not  concern  the  rights  of  a  man  against 
his  neighbor,  that  do  not,  in  other  words,  form  a  part 
of  the  Civil  Code,  are  often  couched  in  general  terms, 
and  enunciate  a  principle  which  the  Executive  is  to 
carry  out  in  detail.1  Sometimes  the  President  of  the 
Republic  is  expressly  given  power  to  make  regulations, 
but  even  without  any  special  authority  he  has  a  general 
power  to  make  them  for  the  purpose  of  completing  the 
statutes,  by  virtue  of  his  general  duty  to  execute  the 
laws.2  Such  regulations  in  France  are  called  acts  of 
secondary  legislation,  and  the  ordinances  of  the  Presi- 
dent in  which  they  are  contained  are  termed  decrets. 
The  power  to  make  them  is  not,  however,  confined  to 
the  chief  of  the  state.  For  matters  of  inferior  grav- 
ity  the  laws  often  confer  a  similar  authority  on  the  min- 
isters, the  prefects,  and   even  the  mayors,  and  in  this 

1  Dupriez  (vol.  ii.  p.  377),  after  remarking  this  difference  between 
English  and  French  legislation,  expresses  a  regret  that  the  French  Parlia- 
ment has  shown  a  tendency  of  late  years  to  go  more  into  details. 

2  On  the  power  to  issue  ordinances  in  France,  see  Aucoc,  Conferences, 
§§  52-57,  66,  91,  170  ;  Ducrocq,  Cours,  §§  61-66,  72-73,  109-10,  210-14  ; 
Goodnow,  vol.  i.  pp.  85-87. 

Before  issuing  certain  classes  of  ordinances  the  President  must  consult 
the  Council  of  State,  but  he  is  not  obliged  to  follow  its  advice. 


46  FRANCE. 

case  the  edicts  are  termed  arretes,  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  more  solemn  ordinances  of  the  President.1 
The  regulations  cannot,  of  course,  be  contrary  to  law, 
or  in  excess  of  the  authority  of  the  official  who  issues 
them.  If  they  are  so  and  infringe  private  rights,  a 
process  to  have  them  annulled  may  be  instituted  before 
the  administrative  courts,  and  in  certain  limited  cases 
the  ordinary  courts  can  also  refuse  to  apply  them.2 

So  much  for  the  power  of  the  executive  to  make  law, 
a  ~  ™.-a      but  this  does  not  exhaust  its  encroachments 

Appropria- 
tions. on   wnat  we  nave  learned  to  regard   as  the 

province  of  the  legislature,  for  it  is  less  strictly  held  to 
the  appropriations  voted  by  the  Chambers  than  is  the 
case  with  us.  The  virements  (that  is  to  say,  the  use  for 
one  purpose  of  appropriations  voted  for  another),  which 
were  an  abuse  under  the  Empire,  have,  indeed,  been 
abolished,  except  as  between  different  items  in  the  same 
chapter  of  the  annual  budget ;  but  certain  chapters 
are  designated  each  year  to  which  additions  can  be 
made  by  decree  of  the  President  issued  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  council  of  ministers.  Moreover,  in  urgent 
and  unforeseen  cases  arising  when  Parliament  is  not  in 
session,  the  government  has  power  by  means  of  such  a 
decree,  not  only  to  incur  the  expenses  called  for  by  the 
emergency,  but  also  to  open  an  extraordinary  credit  on 
its  own  authority  and  borrow  the  money  that  it  needs.3 

1  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  23  ;  Aucoc,  Ducrocq,  ubi  cit. 

2  Laferriere,  Traile  de  la  Jur.  Adm.,  liv.  iii.  ch.  i.  see.  n.  ;  liv.  vi.  ;  liv. 
vii.  ch.  i.  sec.  iv. 

3  In  both  cases  notice  of  the  decree  must  be  laid  before  the  Chambers 
within  fourteen  days  from  their  next  meeting.  (Lebon,  Frankreich,  p. 
162.)     It  is  worth  while,   moreover,  to  note  in  passing  that  there  is 


ENGLISH   AND   FRENCH   HISTORY.  47 

One  may,  perhaps,  be  pardoned  for  dwelling  at  some- 
what greater  length  on  the  judicial  powers  of   judicial 
the   executive  in  France,  both  because   they  thiTexecu- 
are  so  little  understood  by  English-speaking  tlve" 
people,  and  because  their  origin   may  be  traced  to  a 
tradition  which  has  its  roots  far  back  in  the  past. 

The  characteristic  difference  between  the  political 
history  of  England  and  that  of  France  is  to  character- 
be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  English,  though  encebefween 
influenced  by  each  new  spirit  of  the  age,  fl-eK  hTs- 
have  never  yielded  entirely  to  its  guidance,  tory' 
while  the  French  have  always  thrown  themselves  into 
the  current,  and,  adopting  completely  the  dominant 
ideas  of  the  time,  have  carried  them  to  their  logical 
results.  Thus,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  feudal  system 
never  became  fully  developed  in  England  as  it  did  in 
France.  Again,  when  absolute  monarchy  came  into 
vogue,  the  British  sovereign  was  not  able  to  acquire 
the  arbitrary  power  of  the  Bourbons.  And,  lastly, 
democracy  made  its  way  neither  so  rapidly  nor  so 
thoroughly  on  the  north  as  on  the  south  of  the  Chan- 
nel. The  result  is  that  in  France  the  institutions  of 
any  period  have  been  adapted  almost  exclusively  to 
the  wants  of  the  time  in  which  they  were  produced, 
and  in  the  succeeding  age  it  has  been  thought  necessary 
to  destroy  them  and  devise  new  ones  more  in  harmony 

no  effective  process  for  bringing  to  account  a  minister  who  exceeds  the 
appropriations.  lie  can,  indeed,  be  impeached,  but  except  in  times  of 
great  excitement  this  would  not  be  done  if  the  money  had  been  expended 
for  public  purposes  ;  and  as  regards  civil  liability,  there  is  no  court  that 
has  power  to  compel  him  to  refund  the  suras  which  he  has  spent  illegally. 


48  FRANCE. 

with  the  new  conditions  ; 1  whereas  in  England  there 
has  been  no  need  of  such  sweeping  changes,  and  it  has 
been  possible  to  preserve  in  a  modified  form  many  of 
the  most  important  features  of  the  government.  Hence 
the  permanence  and  continuity  of  the  political  system.2 
Let  us  inquire  how  these  facts  have  affected  the  devel- 
opment of  judicial  and  administrative  institutions  in 
the  two  countries. 

The  Norman  kings  of  England  strove  deliberately  to 
check  the  growth  of  the  feudal  system,  and 
vaiopment  their  successors  constantly  followed  the  same 
power  in  policy.  Now  the  essence  of  the  feudal  sys- 
tem consisted  in  the  blending  of  public  and 
private  law  by  making  all  political  relations  depend  on 
the  tenure  of  land ;  and,  in  fact,  according  to  the  strict 
feudal  theory,  no  man  had  direct  relations  with  any 
superior  except  his  immediate  overlord.  Every  great 
vassal  of  the  crown,  therefore,  had  jurisdiction  over  all 
the  tenants  on  his  estate,  which  he  exercised  by  holding 
a  court  of  his  own  for  the  administration  of  justice 
among  them.  The  English  kings  resisted  this  principle, 
and  tried  to  bring  their  power  to  bear  directly  on  all 
The  judicial  tne  People  oi  the  realm.  For  this  purpose 
system.  sheriffs  were  appointed  to  represent  the  crown 
in  the  counties,  and  what  was  of  more  permanent  im- 
portance, the  gravest  crimes,  actions  for  the  possession 

1  This  is  the  more  striking  because  the  French  are  in  some  ways  more 
conservative  than  the  English,  as,  for  example,  in  their  retention  to  the 
present  day  of  public  executions.  M.  Lebon  truly  remarks  (France  as 
It  Is,  p.  86)  :  "  People  have  no  idea  of  the  spirit  of  routine  and  conser- 
vatism which  prevails  in  France." 

%  Cf.  Freeman,  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,  pp.  63-66. 


ENGLISH   CENTRALIZATION  JUDICIAL.  49 

of  land,  and  subsequently  other  matters,  were  brought 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Curia  Regis.1  As  early 
as  the  reign  of  Henry  I.,  moreover,  royal  officers  were 
commissioned  to  travel  about  the  country  holding  court, 
a  practice  which  was  renewed  in  a  more  systematic 
form  by  Henry  II.,  and  has  continued  with  short  in- 
terruptions to  the  present  day.2  The  chief  object  of 
the  early  kings  in  sending  out  the  itinerant  justices,  as 
they  were  called,  was  no  doubt  financial;  for  their 
duties  consisted  in  assessing  taxes,  collecting  fines  for 
violation  of  the  law,  and  administering  justice,  which 
was  in  itself  a  source  of  no  small  profit  in  the  Middle 
Ages.3  The  functions  of  the  justices  in  the  collection 
of  revenue  grew,  however,  less  and  less  prominent,  but 
their  administration  of  justice  became  of  permanent 
importance,  and  in  regard  to  this  two  tendencies  were 
at  work.  In  the  first  place,  the  royal  judges  adopted 
new  methods  of  procedure  and  gradually  developed  the 
trial  by  jury,  while  the  baronial  courts  clung  to  the 
ordeal  and  other  barbaric  forms  of  trial.4  "  The  glad- 
some light  of  jurisprudence,"  as  Coke  called  it,  came 

1  See  Pollock  &  Maitland,  History  of  English  Law,  vol.  i.  pp.  85-87  and 
chs.  v.  and  vi. 

2  The  institution  of  traveling  judges  was  not  new.  It  had  been  used 
by  Charlemagne  (Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ch.  ii.  part  ii.  5),  and  a  similar 
practice  was  employed  by  Alfred,  Edgar,  and  Canute  (Stubbs,  History 
of  England,  xi.  §§  127,  134).  On  the  itinerant  justices,  see  Stubbs,  lb. 
xi.  127  ;  xii.  141,  145,  150  ;  xiii.  163  ;  xv.  235  ;  Gneist,  Englische  Ver- 
fassungsgeschichte,  pp.  148,  224-28,  305  (note),  318-19,  447.  Pollock  & 
Maitland,  vol.  i.  pp.  134,  149,  179  ;  Franqueville,  Le  Systeme  Judiciaire 
de  la  Grande  Bretagne,  vol.  i.  pp.  149  et  seq.  The  royal  duty  of  sending 
the  justices  in  eyre  is  one  of  those  insisted  upon  in  Magna  Charta,  §  18. 

3  Stubbs,  lb.  xi.  127. 

4  Cf .  Stubbs,  lb.  xiii.  164  ;  Gneist,  lb.  p.  142. 

VOL.   I. 


50  FRANCE. 

with  the  king's  courts,  and  hence  it  is  not  surprising 
that  they  supplanted  the  baronial  courts,  and  in  time 
drew  before  themselves  all  the  important  lawsuits.  In 
the  second  place,  the  commissions  which  had  at  first 
been  issued  to  high  officials,  barons,  and  knights,  be- 
came confined  to  regular  judges,  and  about  the  time  of 
Edward  I.  were  given  only  to  the  members  of  the  royal 
courts  at  Westminster.1  The  same  body  of  judges, 
therefore,  expounded  the  law  in  all  parts  of  the  realm, 
and  hence  England,  alone  among  the  countries  of 
Europe,  developed  a  uniform  national  justice  called  the 
common  law.2  The  people  naturally  became  attached 
to  this  law  and  boasted  of  the  rights  of  Englishmen, 
while  the  courts  that  were  the  creators  and  guardians 
of  the  law  became  strong  and  respected. 

The  very  fact  that  the  judicial  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment became  so  highly  developed  made  the 
istrative        centralization  of  the  administration  unneces- 

system.  a         i  •  1  1       •   ■  • 

sary.  At  the  time  when  the  itinerant  justices 
first  went  on  circuit,  administration  in  the  modern 
sense  was  of  course  unknown,  and  such  local  affairs  as 
needed  attention  were  regulated  by  the  shire  moots 
and  other  local  meetings.3  The  sheriff,  indeed,  repre- 
sented the  crown,  but  his  powers  were  curtailed  more 
and  more,  until,  apart  from  his  command  of  the  mili- 
tary forces  of  the  county,  he  became  little  more  than 
an  officer  of  the  courts.4     When  the  local  administra- 

1  Gneist,  Englische  Verfassungsgeschichte,  p.   318  ;  Stubbs,  History  of 
England,  xv.  235. 

2  Cf.  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ch.  viii.  part  ii.  3. 

3  Stubbs,  lb.  xv.  205. 

4  On   the   powers  of  the  sheriff,  see  Stubbs,  lb.  xiii.  163,  xv.  204-7 ; 
Gneist,  lb.  pp.  115-20,  297. 


FRANCE  CENTRALIZED  LATER.  51 

tion  grew  more  important,  it  was  confided  not  to  him, 
but  to  justices  of  the  peace,  who,  though  nominally 
selected  by  the  king,  were  never  strictly  under  his 
orders,  and  in  time  became  almost  completely  inde- 
pendent, except  for  the  purely  judicial  control  exercised 
by  the  Court  of  King's  Bench.1 

In  England,  therefore,  the  royal  power  came  early 
into    contact   with    the    people   all    over  the 
kingdom    by   means    of   the    courts    of   law,   mentor  the 

ii  t    •  l  I'll  direct  royal 

and  the  judicial  system  became  highly  cen-  power  in 
tralized ;  while  the  local  administrative  insti- 
tutions developed  slowly,  and  through  them  the  king's 
authority  was  little  felt.  In  France,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  course  of  events  was  very  different,  for  the  royal 
power  came  into  direct  contact  with  the  people  at  a  much 
later  date,  and  therefore  in  quite  another  form.  When 
the  feudal  system  became  established,  the  The  judicial 
great  vassals  set  up  their  own  courts  and  sue-  system- 
ceeded  in  excluding  the  royal  judges  from  their  fiefs, 
so  that  the  direct  jurisdiction  of  the  crown  became 
confined  to  the  comparatively  small  part  of  the  country 
which  was  included  in  the  royal  domain.  Gradually, 
indeed,  as  the  feudal  system  began  to  lose  its  strength, 
the  king's  jurisdiction  encroached  upon  that  of  the 
vassals,  —  a  process  which  was  carried  on  both  by 
insisting  on  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  royal  tribu- 
nals, and  by  reserving  for  the  exclusive  cognizance  of 
the  kind's  courts  a  somewhat  indefinite  class  of  cases 


■& 


1  Gneist,  Englvtche  Verfassungsgeschichte,  pp.  298  et  seq.,  468  et  seq.  ; 
and  see  the  note  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 


52  FRANCE. 

known  by  the  name  of  cas  royanx.1  But  this  process 
aroused  serious  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  territorial 
lords,  and  it  was  not  until  the  sixteenth  century  that 
the  crown  judges  possessed  the  universal  authority  they 
had  obtained  in  England  more  than  three  hundred 
years  earlier.  So  strong,  in  fact,  did  the  local  jealousy 
of  the  Parliament  of  Paris  (the  king's  high  court  of 
justice)  remain,  that  after  the  great  fiefs  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  crown,  they  were  not  placed  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  that  tribunal,  but  were  given  independ- 
ent parliaments  of  their  own.2  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution  there  were  thirteen  separate  parliaments,  so 
that  every  considerable  province  had  a  distinct  body 
of  magistrates.3  Under  these  circumstances,  the  courts 
could  not  create  a  uniform  national  justice  like  the 
English  common  law,  and  although  since  the  revolution 
such  a  uniform  system  has  been  provided  by  the  Code, 
this  does  not  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  judges,  but 
has  rather  the  opposite  tendency.  In  the  first  place,  it 
is  not  their  work,  and  hence  does  not  redound  to  their 
glory;  and  secondly,  by  weakening  the  force  of  prece- 
dent, it  diminishes  the  importance  of  judicial  decisions. 
This  review  of  the  history  of  the  courts  of  law  shows 

1  Aubert,  Le  Parlement  de  Paris  de  Phillippe  le  Bel  a  Charles  VII., 
ch.  i.  sec.  I.  ;  Hist,  du  Pari,  de  Paris,  1250-1515,  liv.  ii.  ch.  i.;  Du  Bois, 
Hist,  du  Droit  Criminel  de  la  France,  part  i.  ch.  i. ;  Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit 
Francois,  part  i.  tit.  ii.  ch.  i.;  Hist,  de  la  Proc.  Crim.,  part  i.  tit.  i.  ch.  i. 
sec.  n.;  ch.  ii.  sec.  I.;  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ch.  ii.  part  ii.  5. 

2  Du  Bois,  part  i.  ch.  ii.  §  2  ;  Bastard  d'Estang,  Les  Parlements  de  France, 
vol.  i.  pp.  36-38  ;  Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit  Francois,  tit.  ii.  ch.  i.  sec.  I.  §  2,  v. 

8  For  the  dates  of  the  creation  of  the  provincial  parliaments,  which 
run  from  1444  to  1775,  see  Bastard  d'Estang,  vol.  i.  p.  189,  note,  and 
Esmein,  ubi  supra. 


HER  CENTRALIZATION  ADMINISTRATIVE.  53 

clearly  why  they  have  not  attained  in  France  the  same 
power  and  authority  as  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries.1 

The  French  courts  of  law  were  weak  because  the 
royal  authority  did  not  come  into  direct  con- 
tact with  the  people  at  the  time  when  public  istrative 
and  private  law  were  everywhere  blended, 
when  the  tone  of  thought  was  peculiarly  legal,  and 
when  political  power  was  chiefly  exercised  in  a  judicial 
or  semi-judicial  form.2  It  made  itself  felt  at  a  later 
date,  and  especially  as  the  restorer  of  order  after  the 
anarchy  caused  by  the  hundred  years'  war.  Its  presence 
brought  peace  and  prosperity,  and  naturally  enough 
the  organs  which  it  employed  acquired  a  high  degree 
of  vigor.  Now,  at  this  period,  administration,  in  the 
modern  sense,  was  becoming  important,  and  as  the 
royal  authority  came  to  be  exercised  by  commissioners 
or  intendants  who  had,  indeed,  certain  judicial  flowers, 
but  whose  functions  were  .chiefly  administrative,3  the 
administration  developed  ail  influence  and  a  strength 
which  the  courts  have  never  attained.  The  administra- 
tive system  became  centralized,  and  grew  to  be  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  government.4  All  classes  of 
the  people  looked  to  it  for  protection ; 5  in  fact,  it  took, 

1  Since  the  Revolution,  the  courts  have,  of  course,  been  reorganized  on 
a  centralized  basis. 

2  On  the  relative  importance  attributed  to  law  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
in  later  times,  see  Stubbs's  chapters  on  the  Characteristic  Differences 
between  Mediaeval  and  Modern  History,  in  his  Lectures  on  Med.  and 
Mod.  Hist. 

3  Che'ruel,  Die.  des  Inst,  de  la  France,  "  Intendants  des  Provinces  ; " 
Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit  Francois,  tit.  ii.  ch.  v.  §  2. 

4  Cf.  De  Tocqueville,  An.  Reg.  et  la  Rev.,  liv.  ii.  chs.  ii.  iii. 

6  De  Tocqueville  speaks  of  all  classes  as  looking  on  the  government  as 
a  special  providence.     Id.,  ch.  vi.  (7th  ed.  pp.  100-103) . 


54  FRANCE. 

to  a  oreat  extent,  the  place  which  the  judiciary  filled  in 
England,  and  in  those  countries  which  had  inherited 
the  English  principles. 

This  difference  in  the  relative  authority  of  the  courts 

and  the  administration  was  intensified,  so  far  as 
doetriiTe  of e  the  United  States  and  France  were  concerned, 
tion  of   '       by  the  political  philosophy  of  the  last  century. 

Montesquieu,  in  his  "  Spirit  of  the  Laws,"  pro- 
claimed the  importance  of  separating  the  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  powers,  and  the  maxim  was 
eagerly  accepted  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  though 
in  very  different  senses.  Our  ancestors,  anxious  to 
maintain  the  independence  of  the  courts  and  the  sacred- 
ness  of  private  rights,  took  the  principle  to  signify  the 
necessity  of  so  protecting  the  courts  from  the  control  or 
influence  of  the  other  branches  of  the  government  that 
they  might  be  free  to  administer  justice  without  regard 
to  the  official  position  of  the  litigants  or  the  nature  of 
the  questions  involved.  They  meant  to  preserve  the 
English  tradition  that  there  is  only  one  law  of  the  land 
to  which  every  one  is  subject,  from  the  humblest  citizen 
to  the  highest  officer.  The  French,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  acquired  no  great  passion  for  law,  or  for  the  rights 
of  the  individual,  and  did  not  admit  a  claim  on  the  part 
of  any  one  to  delay  or  overturn  the  public  interests  in 
order  to  get  his  own  grievances  redressed.  Moreover, 
they  had  seen  the  Parliament  of  Paris  interfere  with 
the  government  by  refusing  to  register  the  edicts  of  the 
King ;  for  although  this  tribunal  had  failed  to  acquire 
judicial  supremacy,  it  had  retained  a  good  deal  of  politi- 
cal power,  which  it  used  during  the  years  preceding  the 


THE  SEPARATION   OF  POWERS.  55 

Revolution  to  resist  innovations.1  Such  a  power  might 
not  be  disliked  as  a  means  of  opposing  an  unpopular 
court  party,  but  it  could  not  be  tolerated  for  a  moment 
when  the  reins  of  government  were  seized  by  men  who 
believed  themselves  commissioned  to  reform  the  world. 
The  French  statesmen,  therefore,  took  Montesquieu's 
doctrine  in  the  sense  that  the  administration  ouofht  to 
be  free  to  act  for  the  public  weal  without  let  or  hin- 
drance from  the  courts  of  law.  The  Declaration  of  the 
Rights  of  Man  proclaimed  in  1789  that  a  community  in 
which  the  separation  of  powers  was  not  established  had 
no  constitution ;  and  a  statute  of  the  next  year,  on  the 
organization  of  the  tribunals,  gave  effect  to  the  maxim 
as  it  was  understood  in  France  by  providing  that  the 
judges  should  not  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  work 
of  administrative  authorities,  or  proceed  against  the 
officers  of  the  government  on  account  of  their  official 
acts.2  The  American  and  French  applications  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  separation  of  powers  are  both  per- 
fectly logical,  but  are  based  on  different  conceptions  of 
the  nature  of  law.  The  An^lo-Saxon  draws  no  distinc- 
tion  between  public  and  private  law.  To  him  all  legal 
rights  and  duties  of  every  kind  form  part  of  one  univer- 
sal system  of  positive  law,  and  so  far  as  the  functions 
of  public  officials  are  not  regulated  by  that  law,  they  are 
purely  matters  of  discretion.  It  follows  that  every  legal 
question,  whether  it  involves  the  power  of  a  public 
officer  or  the  construction  of  a  private  contract,  comes 

1  Cf.  Edward  J.  Lowell,  The  Eve  of  the  French  Revolution,  p.  105. 

2  Aucoc,  Conferences,  part  i.  liv.  i.  ch.  i. ;   Bceuf,  Resume,   part   iv. 
sec.  n. 


56  FRANCE. 

before  the  ordinary  courts.1  In  France,  on  the  other 
hand,  private  law,  or  the  regulation  of  the  rights  and 
duties  of  individuals  among  themselves,  is  treated  as 
only  one  branch  of  jurisprudence ;  while  public  law, 
which  deals  with  the  principles  of  government  and  the 
relations  of  individuals  to  the  state,  is  regarded  as 
something  of  an  entirely  different  kind.  Of  course 
every  civilized  government  must  strive  to  treat  all  its 
subjects  fairly,  and  hence,  in  the  course  of  administra- 
tion, questions  of  justice  must  arise  ;  but  as  these  do 
not  concern  the  rights  of  a  man  against  his  neighbor, 
they  are  not  classed  in  France  with  private  law.  It  is 
felt  that,  unlike  questions  of  private  law,  they  ought 
not  to  be  decided  solely  by  the  application  of  abstract 
principles  of  justice  between  man  and  man,  but  must  be 
considered  from  the  broad  standpoint  of  public  policy. 
Now  the  domain  of  the  ordinary  French  courts  is  pri- 
vate law  alone,  and  it  is  quite  logical  to  regard  any 
attempt  on  their  part  to  judge  administrative  acts  and 
thus  pass  on  questions  of  public  policy,  as  an  attempt 
to  go  beyond  their  proper  sphere  of  action  and  invade 
the  province  of  the  executive.2 

The  principle  of  withdrawing  questions  of  public  law 
from  the  ordinary  courts  was  not  new.      It  existed  in 

1  This  principle,  like  all  others  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  is  not  carried 
out  with  absolute  consistency.  Thus  the  various  commissions  in  America 
on  railroads,  interstate  commerce,  etc.,  partake  of  the  nature  of  the 
French  administrative  tribunals. 

2  The  French,  like  the  Americans,  have  not  applied  their  principles 
quite  strictly,  for  Criminal  Law  ought  to  be  a  branch  of  Public  Law 
(Aucoc,  Introd.  §  1),  but  it  has  been  put  into  the  charge  of  the  ordinary 
courts. 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE   COURTS.  57 

practice  under  the  old  regime,1  but  was  extended  and 
systematized  after  the  Revolution.  The  protection  of 
officials  from  suit  or  prosecution  was  formally  incorpo- 
rated into  the  Constitution  of  the  year  VIII.  (1799), 
and  remained  in  force  until  after  the  fall  of  Napo- 
leon III.,  when  it  was  repealed  by  a  decree  of  the 
Government  of  the  National  Defense.2  This  decree 
was  intended  to  remove  all  hindrances  in  the  way 
of  bringing  government  officials  before  the  ordinary 
courts,  but  it  had  very  little  effect,  because  the  Tri- 
bunal of  Conflicts  held  that  it  applied  only  to  the 
personal  protection  of  officials,  and  did  not  affect  the 
principle  of  the  separation  of  powers,  which,  as  un- 
derstood in  France,  forbids  the  ordinary  judges  to 
pass  upon  the  legality  of  official  acts.3  Ques- 
tions of  this  kind,  therefore,  are  still  reserved  istrative 
exclusively  for  the  administrative  courts, — 
tribunals  created  especially  for  this  purpose,  and  com- 
posed of  officials  in  the  service  of  the  government. 
Criminal  cases  are,  indeed,  an  exception  to  the  rule,4  but 
this  is  of  no  great  practical  importance,  because  as  force 
is  pretty  sure  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  police,  it  is  no 
real  protection  to  the  individual  to  know  that  he  can- 

1  See  Laferriere,  Traite,  liv.  i.  ;  De  Tocqueville,  An.  Reg.  et  la  Rev., 
book  ii.  ch.  iv.  ;  Varagnac,  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
Aug.  15,  1892. 

2  Decree  of  Sept.  19,  1870. 

3  Arret,  .30  Juillet,  1873,  «  Affaire  Pe-bitier,"  Dalloz,  Jur.  Gen.,  1874, 
part  iii.  p.  5  ;  Leferricre,  Traite,  liv.  iii.  ch.  vii.  ;  Aucoc,  Con/.,  liv.  v.  ch. 
ii.  ;  Goodnow,  Comp.  Adm.  Law,  vol.  ii.  pp.  172-76. 

4  Laferriere,  Traite,  liv.  iii.  ch.  vi.  But  even  this  exception  is  not 
absolute.  See,  also,  a  discussion  of  the  subject  in  Dalloz,  1881,  part  iii. 
p.  17,  note. 


58  FRANCE. 

not  be  condemned  for  resistance ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  officials  concerned  run  no  risk  of  punishment  for 
illegal  acts  committed  in  obedience  to  orders,  because 
the  government  can  easily  manage  to  prevent  their 
being  brought  to  trial,  and  can  pardon  them  if  con- 
victed. In  France,  therefore,  there  is  one  law  for  the 
citizen  and  another  for  the  public  official,  and  thus 
the  executive  is  really  independent  of  the  judiciary, 
for  the  government  has  always  a  free  hand,  and  can 
violate  the  law  if  it  wants  to  do  so  without  having  any- 
thing to  fear  from  the  ordinary  courts.  Nor  is  the 
danger  of  interference  on  the  part  of  the  administrative 
tribunals  as  great  as  it  would  be  in  the  case  of  the 
ordinary  judges,  because  the  former  can  be  controlled 
absolutely  in  case  of  necessity ;  and,  in  fact,  they  are 
so  much  a  part  of  the  administration  itself  that  they 
fall  into  the  province  of  the  Interior  and  not  that  of 
Justice.1  The  independence  of  the  ordinary  judges  is 
secured  by  a  provision  which  prevents  their  removal  or 
transfer  to  another  court,  without  the  approval  of  the 
Court  of  Cassation,  the  final  court  of  error.2     But  the 

1  It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  tbat  tbe  government  always  extorts 
a  favorable  judgment.  This  was  clearly  shown  about  a  year  ago  in  a 
famous  case,  which  illustrates  at  the  same  time  the  degree  of  respect 
entertained  for  the  decisions  of  the  administrative  courts.  The  Minister 
of  the  Interior  and  the  railroads  disagreed  about  the  interpretation  of  a 
statute  relating  to  the  state  guarantee  of  interest  on  the  securities  of  the 
roads.  The  matter  was  brought  before  the  Council  of  State,  which 
decided  in  favor  of  the  railroad.  Thereupon  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
resigned,  but  the  rest  of  the  cabinet  felt  bound  to  abide  by  the  decision. 
A  discussion  was,  however,  raised  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  in 
effect  censured  the  ministers  for  submitting  the  matter  to  the  Council  of 
State,  and  thereby  caused  the  cabinet  to  resign. 

2  This  provision  was  suspended  by  statute  for  three  months  in  1883, 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE   COURTS.  59 

judges  of  the  administrative  courts  enjoy  no  such  pro- 
tection, and  can  be  removed  by  the  President  at  any 
time.1  The  result  is  that,  although  a  great  mass  of 
administrative  law  has  slowly  grown  up  from  the  deci- 
sions of  these  courts,2  and  personal  liberty  is  much 
more  respected  than  under  the  Empire,  yet  the  courts 
themselves  cannot  be  considered  entirely  judicial  bodies, 
and  are  far  from  providing  the  rights  of  the  citizen  with 
a  complete  guarantee,  at  least  where  political  questions 
are  involved.3 

on  the  ground  —  which  seems  to  have  had  at  least  some  justification  — 
that  the  existing  judges  were  partisan  and  influenced  by  anti-republican 
opinions.  The  suspension  and  the  removals  made  in  pursuance  of  it 
struck  a  severe  blow  at  the  independence  of  the  judiciary,  for  the  judges 
learned  that  their  function  was  to  render  service  rather  than  to  administer 
justice,  and  it  was  some  time  before  the  bench  began  to  recover  its  judicial 
tone.  (For  the  causes  and  effects  of  this  action,  see  J.  Reinach,  La  Poli- 
tique Opportuniste,  pp.  269-70  ;  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  Rdforme  Adminis- 
trative—  La  Justice,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June  1,  1889,  pp.  582-83; 
Jules  Simon,  "The  Stability  of  the  French  Republic,"  Forum,  10,  p.  383; 
Comte  de  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  36,  and  a  somewhat  violent 
article  by  Hurlbert  on  "  The  Outlook  in  France,"  Fortnightly  Review,  55,  p. 
347.)  Saleilles  (Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.,  July,  1895,  p.  16,  note)  remarks 
that  the  consequences  of  this  law  still  weigh  heavily  on  the  country. 

1  Aucoc,  Con/.,  vol.  i.  pp.  156-57  ;  Bceuf,  Resume,  pp.  39-40.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  Council  of  State  who  are  qualified  to  sit  as  administrative 
judges  are  said  to  be  always  selected  from  the  political  friends  of  the 
government  (Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  vol.  ii.  pp.  482-83). 

2  Unlike  the  civil  law,  the  administrative  law  has  never  been  codified, 
and  indeed  it  could  not  be  without  destroying  the  element  of  discretion 
which  is  the  reason  for  its  existence.  So  far  as  it  is  not  contained  in 
statutes  and  ordinances,  it  has  developed,  like  the  English  Common  Law, 
by  decision  and  precedent,  and  hence  the  sources  for  studying  it  are  the 
reported  cases  and  the  writings  of  jurists  such  as  those  heretofore  cited. 

8  Lebon,  France  as  h  Is,  pp.  101-2  ;  Goodnow  (Comp.  Administrative 
Law,  vol.  ii.  pp.  220-21,  231)  remarks  that  the  administrative  courts  have 
shown  themselves  more  favorable  to  private  rights  than,  the  ordinary 


60  FRANCE. 

It  is  evident  that  with  two  sets  of  courts,  neither  of 
The  Court      which  is  superior  to  the  other,  disputes  about 


of  Conflicts. 


jurisdiction  must  constantly  arise.    Such  is  in 


courts,  and  he  cites  a  celebrated  instance  where  the  former  set  aside  an 
obnoxious  ordinance  of  a  prefect  which  the  latter  had  held  valid.  But  in 
the  first  place,  this  proves  rather  the  timidity  of  the  ordinary  courts  as  at 
pi'esent  organized,  than  the  eagerness  of  the  administrative  courts  to 
guard  personal  rights  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  to  set  aside  an  ordinance 
which  has  no  political  significance  is  a  very  different  thing  from  protect- 
ing an  individual  against  a  deliberate  attack  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 
ment. Mr.  Goodnow  himself  points  out  (vol.  ii.  pp.  226-27)  that  the 
administrative  courts  have  decided  that  they  will  not  interfere  with  acts 
of  a  political  character,  and  have  held  that  the  illegal  destruction  of  a 
newspaper  in  a  time  of  public  disturbance  was  an  act  of  this  kind.  The 
cases  referred  to  occurred,  it  is  true,  during  the  second  Empire,  but  it 
is  not  improbable  that  these  precedents  would  be  followed  to-day  in  any 
period  of  popular  excitement.  The  practice  of  arbitrary  arrest  and  the 
impossibility  of  getting  redress  has  often  been  a  grievance  in  France  ; 
and  it  may  be  noticed  that  the  guarantees  of  personal  liberty  and  private 
right  are  in  general  the  same  to-day  that  they  were  at  the  time  of 
Napoleon  III. 

In  regard  to  the  relative  merits  of  the  English  and  French  methods 
of  dealing  with  public  officials,  the  former  gives  to  the  citizen  a  better 
protection  against  oppression,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  latter 
has  certain  advantages  f^om  the  point  of  view  of  administrative  efficiency. 
Mr.  Goodnow  discusses  the  various  aspects  of  the  question  in  his  Compara- 
tive Administrative  Law,  a  book  which  is  not  only  an  admirable  treatise, 
but  has  a  peculiar  value  for  Americans,  because  the  author  is  completely 
imbued  with  continental  ideas.  He  has,  indeed,  so  little  sympathy  with 
Anglo-Saxon  legal  principles  that  he  thinks  the  ordinary  courts  ought 
not  to  be  allowed  to  decide  questions  of  public  law,  because  they  have 
a  tendency  to  apply  to  them  the  principles  of  private  law  (vol.  i. 
p.  13). 

It  is  somewhat  curious  in  this  connection  to  observe  that  French 
writers  often  assert  the  inability  of  an  ordinary  court  to  protect  the  pub- 
lic against  illegal  ordinances,  because  it  can  only  decide  the  case  at  bar, 
whereas  an  administrative  court  has  power  to  annul  the  ordinance  alto- 
gether ;  a  remark  which  shows  an  entire  failure  to  comprehend  the  force 
of  precedent  in  a  judicial  system  like  that  of  England.  (See,  for  example, 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS.  61 

fact  the  case,  and  a  special  tribunal  has  been  appointed 
to  determine  these  disputes,  or  conflicts  as  they  are 
called.1  It  is  composed  of  the  Minister  of  Justice,  of 
three  members  of  the  highest  court  of  law,  the  Court  of 
Cassation,  of  three  members  of  the  highest  administra- 
tive court,  the  Council  of  State  (each  of  these  sets  being 
selected  by  their  own  court),  and  of  two  other  persons 
elected  by  the  foregoing  seven.  All  the  members  are 
chosen  for  three  years,  except  the  Minister  of  Interior. 
This  officer  has  the  right  to  preside,  and  thus  his  pres- 
ence gives  to  the  administration  a  majority  in  the  tri- 
bunal. A  striking  example  of  the  working  of  the  sys- 
tem was  presented  in  1880,  when  the  government  issued 
decrees  for  the  suppression  of  all  monastic  orders  not 
authorized  by  law.  There  seems  to  have  been  grave 
doubt  about  the  legality  of  the  decrees,  and  the  victims 
brought  suits  in  the  ordinary  courts  in  several  parts  of 
France.  Most  of  these  courts  held  that  they  were 
authorized  to  entertain  the  suits,  and  in  some  cases  they 
went  so  far  as  to  order  the  persons  who  had  been  ex- 
pelled from  their  establishments  to  be  restored  to  pos- 
session pending  the  trial ; 2  but  the  government  raised 
the  question  of  jurisdiction,  and  the  Tribunal  of  Con- 

Varagnac,  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Sept.  15,  1892, 
pp.  290-91.) 

An  admirable  comparison  of  the  English  and  French  systems  may  be 
found  in  Professor  Dicey's  Law  of  the  Constitution,  and  especially  in 
chapter  xii. 

1  Aucoc,  Con/.,  vol.  i.  §  406;  Bceuf,  Resume,  15th  ed.  pp.  542-43. 

2  Some  of  the  decisions  to  this  effect  may  be  found  in  Dalloz,  Jurispru- 
dence Generate,  1880,  part  iii.  pp.  57-02,  and  80.  In  the  note  to  page  57 
there  is  a  list  of  some  of  the  other  similar  decisions  and  a  discussion  of 
the  law. 


62  FRANCE. 

flicts  decided  that  the  ordinary  courts  were  not  compe- 
tent to  deal  with  the  matter.1  It  is  a  significant  fact, 
which  seems  to  show  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  impar- 
tiality of  the  administrative  courts,  that  the  persons 
injured  did  not  bring  the  question  of  the  legality  of 
the  decrees  before  the  Council  of  State.2 

When  an  ordinary  court  has  assumed  jurisdiction  of 
a  case,  the  question  of  competence  can  be  raised  only 
by  the  prefect,  and  not  by  a  party,  for  the  principle 
that  the  ordinary  courts  cannot  determine  the  legality 
of  official  acts  is  intended  solely  as  a  protection  to  the 
administration.3 

It  is  not  quite  accurate  to  say  that  the  ordinary 
jurisdiction  coul>ts  can  consider  the  validity  of  no  official 
^Idstrative  act,  and,  indeed,  the  line  between  the  juris- 
diction of  the  ordinary  and  the  administrative 
courts  does  not  follow  any  strictly  logical  principle.4 
Questions  of  indirect  taxes,  for  example,  and  those 
relating  to  the  lesser  highways  {petite  voirie),  come 
before  the  ordinary  courts,  while  those  arising  under 
the  direct  taxes,  or  relating  to  the  greater  highways 
(grcmde  voirie),  come  before  the  administrative  tribu- 
nals.     The  competence  of   the  various  administrative 

1  Arrets  de  Nov.  4,  5,  13,  17,  and  20  ;  Dalloz,  1880,  part  iii.  pp.  121- 
32.    These  eases  are  reported  with  unusual  fullness. 

2  At  least  I  can  find  no  decision  on  the  subject  by  the  Council  of  State 
reported  in  Dalloz.  For  criticisms  on  the  conduct  of  the  government, 
see  Jules  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  ch.  vi.  ;  and  Channes,  Nos  Fautes, 
letters  of  July  12  and  Oct.  27,  1880. 

8  Aucoc,  Conf.,  vol.  i.  §  404;  Bceuf,  Resume,  15th  ed.  p.  547. 
4  On  this  subject,  see  Laferriere's  great  work,  Traite  de  la  Jurisdiction 
Administrative. 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS.  63 

courts  is  no  less  complicated.  The  prefect  and  the 
mayor  have  each  a  very  limited  jurisdiction.  That  of 
the  prefectorial  councils,  on  the  other  hand,  is  very  con- 
siderable, although  as  a  matter  of  fact  these  councils 
are  occupied  almost  altogether  with  questions  of  taxes, 
and  in  these,  as  a  rule,  they  follow  the  advice  of  the 
assessors.1  But  by  far  the  most  important  administra- 
tive court  is  the  Council  of  State,  which  has  a  special 
section  or  committee  to  attend  to  the  contentieux,  as 
this  class  of  litigation  is  called.  The  Council  not  only 
hears  appeals  from  the  lower  administrative  tribunals, 
but  has  also  original  jurisdiction  in  many  important 
cases,  and  in  fact  recent  practice  is  tending  to  establish 
the  principle  that  the  Council  of  State  is  the  judge  of 
all  administrative  matters  in  the  absence  of  special  pro- 
visions of  law.  The  number  of  cases  brought  before 
it  is  very  large,  and  has  increased  so  rapidly  that  the 
section  for  the  contentieux  is  badly  in  arrears,  and  it 
has  been  proposed  to  create  a  second  section  to  relieve 
the  pressure.2 

Such  is  the  legal  position  of  the  administration  in 
ordinary  times,  but  in  case  of  war  or  insurrec-  The  state  of 
tion  it  can  be  given  far  greater  powers,  by  a  siege" 
proclamation  of  the  state  of  siege.  This  can  be  made 
by  statute,  or  if  Parliament  is  not  in  session,  it  can  be 
made  by  the  President ;  but  in  that  case,  in  order  to 
meet  the  danger  of  a  coup  d'etat,  which  is  ever  present 

1  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  Rdforme  Administrative  —  La  Justice,"  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes,  June  1,  1889,  p.  596. 

2  For  the  number  of  cases  decided  by  the  administrative  courts,  see 
the  tables  (through  1886)  in  Laferriere,  liv.  i.  ch.  v. 


64  FRANCE. 

to  the  eyes  of  Frenchmen,  it  is  provided  that  the  Cham- 
bers shall  meet  as  of  right  in  two  days.1  Within  the 
district  covered  by  the  state  of  siege,  the  military  courts 
can  be  given  criminal  jurisdiction,  and  can  punish  any 
offenses  against  the  safety  of  the  Republic  or  the  general 
peace.  They  can  search  houses  by  day  or  night,  expel 
from  the  district  any  non-residents,  seize  all  arms,  and 
forbid  any  publications  or  meetings  which  are  liable  to 
disturb  the  public  order.2 

I  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  what,  from  an 
Effect  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  point  of  view,  may  well  be  called 
femonthe"  the  legislative  and  judicial  powers  of  the 
thTexecu-  executive  in  France,  because  these  things  are 
entirely  foreign  to  our  own  political  ideas  and 
experience,  and  because  they  exist  in  some  form  in 
almost  every  country  on  the  continent  of  Europe. 

When  we  consider  the  paternal  character  of  the 
government,  the  centralization  of  the  state,  and  the 
large  share  of  authority  vested  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment, we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  ministers  in  whose 
hands  this  vast  power  is  lodged  must  be  either  very 
strong  or  very  weak.  If  they  are  able  to  wield  it  as 
they  please,  and  are  really  free  to  carry  out  their  own 
policy,  they  must  be  far  stronger  than  any  officer  or 
body  in  Great  Britain,  and  immeasurably  stronger  than 
any  in  our  federal  republic.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  very  immensity  and  pervasiveness  of  their  power, 
the  fact  that  it  touches  closely  every  interest  in  the 
country,  renders  them  liable  to  pressure  from  all  sides. 

1  Law  of  April  3,  1878,  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  79. 

2  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  76,  gives  the  text  of  the  law. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  FRENCH  SYSTEM.  65 

It  becomes  important  for  every  one  to  influence  their 
action,  provided  he  can  get  a  standpoint  from  which 
to  bring  a  pressure  to  bear.  This  standpoint  is  fur- 
nished by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  for  the  existence 
of  the  ministry  depends  on  the  votes  of  that  body. 
The  greater,  therefore,  the  power  of  the  minister,  and 
the  more  numerous  the  favors  he  is  able  to  bestow,  the 
fiercer  will  be  the  struggle  for  them,  and  the  less  will 
he  be  free  to  pursue  his  own  policy,  untrammeled  by 
deputies,  whose  votes  he  must  win  if  he  would  remain 
in  office.  A  Frenchman,  who  is  eminent  as  a  student 
of  political  philosophy,  and  has  at  the  same  time  great 
practical  experience  in  politics,  once  remarked  to  the 
author,  "  We  have  the  organization  of  an  empire  with 
the  forms  of  a  republic."  !  The  French  administrative 
system  is,  indeed,  designed  for  an  empire,  and  would 
work  admirably  in  the  hands  of  a  wise  and  benevolent 
autocrat  who  had  no  motive  but  the  common  weal ;  but 
when  arbitrary  power  falls  under  the  control  of  popular 
leaders,  it  can  hardly  fail  to  be  used  for  personal  and 
party  ends ;  for,  as  a  keen  observer  has  truly  said,  the 
defect  of  democracy  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  nobody's 
business  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  public.2 

1  Gneist  expresses  the  same  idea  :  "  Es  entsteht  der  unvermittelte  Gegen- 
satz  einer  republikanisch  gedachten  Verfassung  mit  einer  absolutistisch  orga- 
nisirten  Verwaltung."     (Die  Preussische  Kreisordnung,  p.  7.) 

2  The  late  Professor  Gneist,  perhaps  the  most  profound  student  of  the 
comparative  history  of  England  and  the  continent,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  working  of  parliamentary  government,  demonstrated  that  the 
success  of  the  system  in  England  has  been  due  to  certain  underlying 
institutions  which  have  made  that  country  a  commonwealth  based  upon 
law  (Rechtsstaat).  His  chief  works  on  the  subject  are  bis  Englische 
Verwaltungsrecht ;  Self-government,  etc.,  in  England;  Der  Rechtsstaat,  and 

VOL.    I. 


66  FRANCE. 

Verwaltung,  Justiz,  Rechtsweg.  In  the  opening  words  of  the  preface  to 
the  last  of  these,  the  keynote  of  the  whole  theory  is  struck  when  he  says, 
"  Die  parlamentarische  Regierung  Englands  ist  eine  Regierung  nach  Gesetzen 
und  durch  Gesetze." 

His  views  may  he  briefly  summarized  as  follows  :  In  England  alone, 
amon"-  the  countries  of  Europe,  the  royal  power  became  consolidated 
early,  for  the  Norman  kings  broke  down  the  resistance  of  the  great 
vassals  and  made  their  authority  effective  over  the  whole  realm,  drawing 
military,  judicial,  and  police  matters  into  their  own  hands.  By  this 
process,  the  antagonism  and  jealousy  of  the  different  classes  was  crushed  ; 
while  the  land-owning  nobility  found  their  only  chance  of  political  activity 
in  exerting  a  restraint  upon  the  crown  by  means  of  judicial  action  and 
statutes.  Their  first  great  achievement  was  Magna  Charta,  with  which  the 
parliamentary  era  begins.  The  struggle  was  continued  in  the  Barons' 
war,  and  resulted  in  the  evolution  of  the  House  of  Commons. 

From  time  to  time  Parliament  enacted  statutes  which  supplemented 
the  customary  law,  and  furnished  a  solid  basis  for  the  decisions  of  the 
courts.  The  existence  of  permanent  statutes,  as  distinguished  from  royal 
edicts  in  their  nature  changeable,  is  one  of  the  chief  foundations  of  the 
reign  of  law  in  England,  for  the  statutes  in  ever  increasing  quantity  regu- 
lated the  administration  rigorously  and  uniformly  throughout  the  land. 

Another  factor  that  contributed  to  the  same  result  was  the  method  in 
which  the  statutes  were  executed,  and  this  in  turn  may  be  traced  to  the 
early  extension  of  the  royal  power.  The  administrative  laws  were 
carried  out  by  means  of  a  large  number  of  officers,  of  whom  the  most 
important  were  the  justices  of  the  peace.  These  were  appointed  by  the 
king,  and  hence  acted  in  behalf  of  the  state  instead  of  local  or  class 
interests  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  were  in  fact  the  greater  land- 
owners of  the  county,  not  professional  officials  bound  to  do  the  bidding  of 
the  court.  They  conducted  the  local  administration  according  to  judicial 
forms,  subject  on  purely  legal  questions  to  the  control  of  the  King's 
Bench  by  means  of  writs  of  Certiorari,  Mandamus,  etc.,  the  effect  being  to 
prevent  arbitrary  abuse  of  power,  and  to  insure  legality  in  the  execution 
of  the  law.  In  short,  as  Gneist  expresses  it,  the  English  developed  an 
elaborate  and  effective  system  of  administrative  justice. 

The  method  of  administration  also  produced  self-government,  by  which 
Gneist  means  not  the  control  of  local  matters  by  bodies  elected  to  repre- 
sent local  interests,  but  an  organization  of  the  whole  community  for  the 
service  of  the  state,  so  arranged  that  the  classes  most  capable  by  their 
wealth  and  position  for  government  bore  the  burdens  and  administered 
the  affairs  of  their  neighborhood.     The   result   was   brought   about   in 


NOTE  OF  THE  VIEWS   OF  GNEIST.  67 

England  chiefly  by  means  of  the  office  of  justice  of  the  peace,  which 
gradually  became  both  an  honor  and  a  duty  attached  to  the  ownership  of 
land.  Thus  the  gentry  carried  on  the  local  government  ;  but  this  was 
n6  mere  privilege  which  they  enjoyed  for  their  own  benefit,  because  they 
also  paid  the  taxes  and  ruled,  not  for  the  profit  of  their  own  class,  but  as 
officers  of  the  state  for  the  common  good  and  in  strict  accordance  with 
fixed  laws.  Hence,  instead  of  the  hostility  of  classes  that  existed  all  over 
the  continent,  there  developed  harmonious  local  communities  with  true 
public  opinions  on  political  questions.  Moreover,  the  habit  of  sitting  as 
justices  gave  to  the  gentry  a  sense  of  public  duty  and  a  love  for  law. 
Now  the  House  of  Commons  was  virtually  composed  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  gentry,  who  carried  into  it  their  sentiments.  The  members 
of  Parliament,  therefore,  understood  law,  and  had  a  deep  sense  of  its 
importance,  while  their  training  caused  them  to  act  for  the  good  of  the 
whole  state  rather  than  the  benefit  of  their  own  class.  This  rendered 
possible  the  formation  of  real  national  parties,  based  on  differences  of 
opinion,  not  on  class  interests  ;  parties  whose  action  in  Parliament  was 
restricted  by  a  respect  for  law. 

Gneist  points  out  how  different  has  been  the  history  of  France. 
Feudalism  there  was  at  first  too  strong  for  the  royal  power  to  overcome, 
and  hence  the  community,  instead  of  being  consolidated,  split  into  hostile 
classes.  The  king  found  himself  at  the  head  of  a  state  whose  organiza- 
tion was  so  loose  and  inefficient  as  to  be  incapable  of  natural  develop- 
ment. As  soon  as  he  was  able,  he  began  to  create  in  the  royal  domains 
better  military,  financial,  police,  and  judicial  systems.  The  old  institutions 
having  gained  no  strength  in  the  mean  while  were  unable  to  stand  against 
the  new  and  more  effective  ones,  which  gradually  spread  over  the  whole 
of  France.  The  new  ones,  however,  were  not  combined  with  the  old,  but 
substituted  for  them  ;  and  thus  the  power  both  of  the  vassals  and  of  the 
estates  was  crushed  by  the  royal  supremacy.  In  fact,  the  political  and 
social  organization  of  the  country  became  entirely  unlike.  Socially, 
the  nation  was  still  divided  into  the  classes  whose  selfish  antagonism  had 
made  possible  the  triumph  of  the  crown.  Politically,  absolute  power 
had  become  vested  in  the  king,  who  ruled  by  means  of  a  paid  corps  of 
officials  without  ties  with  the  local  communities,  unrestrained  by  perma- 
nent statutes,  and  dependent  solely  on  his  pleasure.  The  French  Revolu- 
tion did  not  essentially  change  this  state  of  things.  It  did  not  create  a 
new  organic  political  structure  of  the  community,  but  merely  transferred 
the  royal  power  to  the  people,  or  rather  to  those  particular  interests 
among  the  people  that  were  able  to  acquire  ascendency  for  the  moment, 
and  these  were  no  more  inclined  to  place  restraints  on  their  own  omnipo- 


68  FRANCE. 

tence  than  the  king  had  been  before.  While,  therefore,  private  law  was 
just  and  strong,  public  law  was  weak  and  unstable  ;  and  as  public  law  is 
the  foundation  of  political  society,  Gneist  regards  France  as  the  very 
negation  of  a  commonwealth  based  upon  law. 

German  history  followed  very  much  the  same  course  during  the 
Middle  Ages,  but  at  their  close  the  central  power  was  not  strong  enough 
to  enforce  obedience  and  consolidate  the  empire.  Hence  the  supremacy 
of  the  crown  developed  at  a  still  later  time,  after  the  centrifugal  forces 
had  grown  so  powerful  that  the  principalities  had  become  well-nigh 
independent.  Then  the  princes  overcame  within  their  territories  the 
resistance  of  the  estates  as  the  king  had  done  in  France.  In  Germany, 
however,  and  especially  in  Prussia,  the  bureaucracy  was  so  ordered  as  to 
furnish  a  better  protection  to  individual  rights  and  a  firmer  maintenance 
of  law.  But  this  broke  down  with  the  spread  of  French  ideas  after  1848, 
when  the  antagonistic  interests  in  the  state,  taking  advantage  of  the 
parliamentary  system,  abused  the  administrative  power  and  introduced 
a  veritable  party  tyranny. 

Gneist  considered  the  subsidiary  framework  of  the  English  institutions, 
and  especially  the  justices  of  the  peace,  as  the  foundation  of  the  legal 
character  of  the  government,  and  hence  of  the  success  of  the  parlia- 
mentary system.  But  he  did  not  realize  that  the  keystone  of  the  whole 
structure  is  the  ultimate  decision  by  the  courts  at  Westminster  of  all 
questions  of  law  that  arise  in  the  course  of  the  administration.  He  did 
not  see  that  the  legal  spirit  pervading  the  system  is  the  result  of  giving 
to  public  law  the  sacredness  and  inflexibility  that  pertains  to  private  law, 
and  that  this  end  is  reached  by  fusing  the  two  together,  and  confiding 
them  both  in  the  last  resort  to  the  same  courts.  On  the  contrary,  he 
believed  that  public  and  private  law  ought  to  be  kept  distinct,  and  he 
approved  of  the  practice  of  placing  the  former  in  the  hands  of  special 
administrative  tribunals.  The  germs  of  such  a  system  appeared  for  a 
moment  in  England  when  the  Star  Chamber  began  to  act  as  a  supreme 
administrative  court  ;  but  one  cannot  help  feeling  that  if  this  procedure 
had  become  permanent,  public  law  would  have  been  much  less  rigidly 
interpreted  than  it  was  by  the  King's  Bench,  that  the  administration 
would  have  become  more  discretionary,  and  that  the  strict,  rigorous, 
legal  spirit  of  the  system  would  have  been  lost. 

It  may  be  added  that  Gneist  considered  the  English  government  at 
its  highest  perfection  under  George  III.  In  his  opinion,  the  reform  bill 
of  1832,  the  extension  of  the  franchise  in  1867,  and  still  more  the  recent 
changes  in  local  government,  have  been  a  departure  from  historic  prin- 
ciples, and  have  tended  by  disorganizing  the  state  to  bring  about  a  strife 
of  parties  and  reduce  England  to  the  condition  of  other  nations. 


CHAPTER  n. 

FRANCE  :     PARTIES. 

For  more  than  a  hundred  years  it  has  been  the  habit 
to  talk  of  government  by  the  people,  and  the 

.  n        i  i  1  The  influ- 

expression  is,  perhaps,  more  freely  used  to-day  enceof  par- 
than  ever  before,  yet  a  superficial  glance  at  largovem- 
the  history  of  democracy  ought  to  be  enough 
to  convince  us  that  in  a  great  nation  the  people  as  a 
whole  do  not  and  cannot  really  govern.     The  fact  is 
that  we  are  ruled  by  parties,  whose  action  is  more  or 
less  modified,  but  never  completely  directed,  by  public 
opinion.     Rousseau,  indeed,  shadowed   forth    a   great 
truth,  when  he  declared  that  no  community  could  be 
capable  of  a  general  will  —  or  as  we  should  express  it, 
of  a  true  public  opinion  —  where  parties  or  sects  pre- 
vailed;1 and  our  own  experience  of  popular  government 
will  quite  justify  us  in  saying  that  public  opinion  is 
always  more  or  less  warped  by  the  existence  of  party 
ties.    A  study  of  the  nature  and  development  of  parties 
is,  therefore,  the  most  important  one  that  can  occupy 
the    student    of   political    philosophy   to-day.   Asa  rule 
Among  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  who  have  had  onfytw'c? 
a  far  longer  experience    in   self-government  Angled m 

■  1  i        ,i  ,i  n       .  Saxon  coun- 

than  most  other  races,  there  are  usually  two  tries,  but 

.  ..  v  •   i     j •   '       .       n  .  ..,         several  else- 

great  parties  which  dispute  tor  mastery  m  the  where. 

1  Control  Social,  liv.  ii.  ch.  iii. 


70  FRANCE. 

state.  But  in  the  countries  on  the  continent  of  Europe 
this  is  not  usually  true.  We  there  find  a  number  of 
parties  or  groups  which  are  independent  of  each  other 
to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  and  form  coalitions,  some- 
times of  a  most  unnatural  kind,  to  support  or  oppose 
the  government  of  the  hour.  Now  the  existence  of 
several  distinct  political  groups  has  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  working  of  the  parliamentary  system.  Let  us 
consider  this  question  a  moment. 

When  a  country  with  a  parliamentary  form  of  gov- 
ernment is  divided  into  two   hostile  parties, 
parliament-    the  ministers  who  lead  the  majority  of   the 
there  are       popular  chamber  must  of  course  belong  all  to 

normally  »      1  •  n  i  i  i 

only  two        one  of  those  parties,  or  all  to  the  other,  and 

parties.  x 

they  are  forced  by  circumstances  to  work  in 
harmony.  But  even  when  party  strife  is  less  bitter, 
and  parties  have  begun  to  break  up,  experience  has 
proved  that  the  best  policy  for  the  ministers  is  to  sup- 
port each  other  and  stand  or  fall  together.  Lord  Mel- 
bourne is  reported  to  have  exclaimed  at  a  cabinet  meet- 
ing, after  a  discussion  on  the  question  of  changing  the 
duty  on  corn,  "  Now  is  it  to  lower  the  price  of  corn,  or 
is  n't  it  ?  It  is  not  much  matter  which  we  say,  but 
mind,  we  must  all  say  the  same."  1  The  statesmanship 
implied  by  this  remark  may  not  have  been  of  the  high- 
est kind,  but  the  politics  were  sound,  and  showed  a 
knowledge  of  the  great  secret  of  success.  It  is,  indeed, 
an  axiom  in  politics  that,  except  under  very  peculiar 
circumstances,  coalition  ministries  are  short-lived  com- 
pared with  homogeneous  ones,  whose  members  are  in 

1  Bagehot,  English  Constitution,  p.  16,  note. 


PARTIES   IN  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM.         71 

cordial  sympathy  with  each  other.  Now  so  long  as  the 
ministers  cling  together,  every  member  of  the  House 
must  consider  the  cabinet  and  its  policy  as  a  whole,  and 
make  up  his  mind  whether  he  will  support  it,  or  help 
to  turn  it  out  and  put  in  an  entirely  different  set  of 
ministers  with  another  policy.  He  cannot  support  the 
cabinet  on  certain  questions  and  oppose  it  on  others. 
He  must  sacrifice  details  to  the  general  question.  The 
result  is  that  the  members  either  group  themselves 
about  the  ministers,  and  vote  with  them  through  thick 
and  thin,  or  else  they  attach  themselves  to  an  opposi- 
tion party,  whose  object  is  to  turn  out  the  cabinet,  and 
then  take  office  itself  and  carry  on  a  different  policy. 
The  normal  condition  of  the  parliamentary  system, 
therefore,  among  a  people  sufficiently  free  from  preju- 
dices to  group  themselves  naturally,  and  possessing 
enough  experience  to  know  that  the  practical  and 
attainable,  and  not  the  ideal,  is  the  true  aim  in  politics, 
is  a  division  into  two  parties,  each  of  which  is  ready  to 
take  office  ^lienever  the  other  loses  its  majority.  This 
has  been  true  in  England  in  ordinary  times,  and 
although  of  late  years  it  has  been  frequently  asserted 
that  the  two  great  parties  in  the  House  of  Commons 
are  destined  to  come  to  an  end,  and  be  replaced  by  a 
number  of  independent  groups,  the  prophecy  does  not 
accord  with  experience.  It  is  based  on  the  state  of  the 
Parliament  of  1892,  and  seems  to  arise  from  mistaking 
a  temporary  political  condition  for  a  permanent  one.  The 
sudden  interjection  of  the  question  of  Home  Rule  into 
English  politics  caused  a  new  party  division  on  fresh 
lines,  which  necessarily  broke  up  the  traditional  associ- 


72  FRANCE. 

ations  of  public  life,  and  threw  both  parties  into  a  state 
of  confusion  that  has  not  yet  disappeared.  On  one 
side,  the  opponents  of  the  measure  were  composed  of 
men  whose  habits  of  thought  had  been  most  diverse ; 
while  the  followers  of  Mr.  Gladstone,  on  the  other  side, 
included  many  Liberals  who  were  forced,  against  their 
will,  to  subordinate  to  Home  Rule  other  matters  which 
they  deemed  more  important.  In  short,  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  new  issue  shattered  the  old  basis  of  cleavage, 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  new,  solidified  parties  were 
not  formed  in  an  instant.  Moreover  it  may  be  noticed 
that  although  the  Liberal  groups  in  the  late  House  of 
Commons  talked  freely  of  their  dissensions,  they  acted 
as  a  single  party,  and  supported  the  cabinet  by  their 
votes  with  astonishing  fidelity. 

A  division  into  two  parties  is  not  only  the  normal 
result  of  the  parliamentary  system,  but  also 

It  cannot  .    .  ...  „     .  „, 

work  well      an   essential   condition  or   its   success,     oup- 

otherwise.  „  ..  . 

pose,  tor  example,  that  a  third  party,  like  that 
of  the  Irish  Home  Rulers  under  Parnell,  is  formed,  and 
places  some  one  specific  issue  above  all  others,  with  the 
determination  of  voting  against  any  cabinet  that  does 
not  yield  to  its  demands  on  that  point ;  and  suppose 
this  body  becomes  large  enough  to  hold  the  balance 
of  power.  If,  in  such  a  case,  the  two  old  parties  do 
not  makg  a  coalition,  or  one  of  them  does  not  absorb 
the  new  group  by  making  concessions,  no  ministry  will 
be  able  to  secure  a  majority.  Every  cabinet  will  be 
overthrown  as  soon  as  it  is  formed,  and  parliamentary 
government  will  be  an  impossibility.  Now  suppose  that 
the  third  party,  instead  of  being  implacably  hostile  to 


TWO   PARTIES   ESSENTIAL.  73 

both  the  others,  is  willing  for  a  time  to  tolerate  a  cabi- 
net from  one  of  them,  —  is  willing,  in  short,  to  allow  the 
ministers  to  retain  office  provided  they  give  no  offense. 
Under  these  circumstances  parliamentary  government 
is  not  impossible,  but  it  is  extremely  difficult.  The 
ministers  are  compelled  to  ride  two  horses  at  once. 
They  must  try  to  conciliate  two  inharmonious  bodies  of 
men,  on  pain  of  defeat  if  either  of  them  becomes  hos- 
tile ;  and  hence  their  tenure  is  unstable  and  their  course 
necessarily  timid.  Now  the  larger  the  number  of  dis- 
cordant groups  that  form  the  majority,  the  harder  the 
task  of  pleasing  them  all,  and  the  more  feeble  and 
unstable  the  position  of  the  cabinet.  Nor  is  the  diffi- 
culty removed  by  giving  portfolios  to  the  members  of 
the  several  groups  ;  for  even  if  this  reduces  the  labor  of 
satisfying  the  parties,  it  adds  that  of  maintaining  an 
accord  among  the  ministers  themselves,  and  entails  the 
proverbial  weakness  of  coalition  governments.  A  cab- 
inet which  depends  for  its  existence  on  the  votes  of 
the  Chamber  can  pursue  a  consistent  policy  with  firm- 
ness and  effect  only  when  it  can  rely  for  support  on  a 
compact  and  faithful  majority;  and  therefore  the  par- 
liamentary system  will  give  the  country  a  strong  and 
efficient  government  only  in  case  the  majority  consists 
of  a  single  party.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  opposition 
must  also  be  united.  So  long  as  the  ministiy  stands, 
the  composition  of  the  minority  is,  indeed,  of  little  con- 
sequence ;  but  when  that  minority  becomes  a  majority, 
it  must  in  turn  be  a  single  party,  or  the  weakness  of  a 
coalition  ministry  cannot  be  avoided.  It  follows  that  a 
division  of  the  Chamber  into  two  parties,  and  two  par- 


74  FRANCE. 

ties  only,  is  necessary  in  order  that  the  parliamentary 
form  of  government  should  permanently  produce  good 
results. 

In  France  the  parliamentary  system  has  not  worked 

well,  because  this  condition  has  not  been  ful- 

tiouhasnot    filled.1     The  various  groups  of   Monarchists 

been  ful-  .  in  • 

filled  in         and  ±>onapartists  have  together  tormed  m  the 

Chambers  the  party  of  the  Reactionaries,  or 

as  it  is  more  commonly  called,  the  Right.2     The  rest  of 

1  This  is  recognized  by  many  French  writers,  e.  g.,  Lamy,  La  Re'pub- 
lique  en  1883  •  Paul  Laffitte,  Le  Suffrage  Universel  et  la  Regime  Parlementaire, 
pt.  i.  ch.  iii.  ;  Saleilles,  in  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political 
Science,  July,  1895,  pp.  57,  64,  65.  But  the  reason  for  the  existence  of  a 
number  of  groups  in  France  seems  to  be  only  partially  understood.  The 
most  clear-sighted  writer  on  this  subject  is  Dupriez.  (See  Les  Ministres, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  363-65,  370-71,  and  386-95.) 

2  For  readers  unfamiliar  with  European  politics  it  may  perhaps  be 
necessary  to  explain  the  meaning  of  the  terms  Right  and  Left,  as  they 
are  used  all  over  the  Continent.  In  England  a  broad  aisle  runs  from  the 
Speaker's  desk  through  the  middle  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  the  main 
entrance  opposite,  and  the  benches  of  the  members  are  arranged  parallel 
to  this  aisle  and  facing  it.  The  Ministry  sit  on  the  front  bench  at  the 
right  of  the  Speaker  (the  so-called  Treasury  Bench),  their  supporters 
taking  seats  behind  and  alongside  of  them,  Avhile  the  opposition  sit  on  the 
left  side  of  the  House.  The  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  therefore,  are 
each  to  be  found  sometimes  on  one  side  of  the  House  and  sometimes  on 
the  other,  according  as  their  party  is  in  power  or  not.  But  on  the  Conti- 
nent the  seats  are  arranged,  as  a  rule,  like  those  of  a  theatre,  as  in  our 
legislative  bodies,  the  ministers  usually  sitting  immediately  in  front  of 
the  Speaker  or  President,  on  a  bench  which  sometimes  faces  him  and 
sometimes  looks  the  other  way,  while  the  conservative  members  sit  on 
the  President's  right,  the  more  liberal  next  to  these,  and  the  radical  on 
his  left.  As  this  arrangement  is  permanent,  the  words  Right  and  Left 
have  come  to  be  generally  used  for  Conservative  and  Liberal ;  and  the 
different  groups  are  often  designated  by  their  position  in  the  Chamber, 
as  the  Right,  the  Centre,  and  the  Left  Centre,  the  Left,  or  the  Extreme 
Left. 


MANY  GROUPS  IN  FRANCE.  75 

the  members  have  been  supporters  of  the  Republic,  and 
have  formed  nominally  a  single  party,  but  they  have 
really  been  held  together  only  by  a  desire  to  maintain 
the  existing  form  of  government,  and  have  seldom 
acted  in  concert  except  when  they  thought  that  threat- 
ened. They  have  always  comprised  men  of  every  shade 
of  opinion,  from  conservatives  to  radicals  and  even 
socialists,  and  would  speedily  have  broken  up  into  com- 
pletely hostile  parties,  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  fear 
of  the  Reactionaries.  Even  under  the  pressure  of  this 
fear  their  cohesion  has  been  very  slight,  for  they  have 
been  divided  into  a  number  of  groups  with  organiza- 
tions which,  though  never  either  complete  or  durable, 
have  been  quite  separate ;  and  again,  these  groups  have 
often  been  subdivided  into  still  smaller  groups,  whose 
members  were  loosely  held  together  by  similarity  of 
opinions  or  desire  for  advancement,  usually  under  the 
standard  of  some  chief,  who  held,  or  hoped  to  win,  a 
place  in  the  cabinet.  In  fact,  the  parties  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  have  presented  such  a  series  of  dissolv- 
ing views  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  draw  an  intelligible 
picture  of  them. 

A    short   history    of   the   parties    under   the    Third 
Republic  will  help  to  make  their  nature  and 
position    clear.1     In    the  National  Assembly,  parties 
elected  at  the  close  of  the  war  with  Germany,   Third  Re- 
the  Right,  consisting  of  Monarchists  and  a 
few  Bonapartists,  had  at  first  a  majority,  although  the 

1  A  list  of  the  cabinets,  with  the  causes  of  their  fall,  may  be  found  in 
Muel,  Gouvernements,  Ministeres  et  Constitutions  de  la  France,  and  Hau- 
cour,  Gouvernements  et  Ministeres  de  la  III™  Eepublique  Francaise. 


76  FRANCE. 

subsequent  course  of  events  proved  that  it  had  no 
chance  of  carrying  out  its  own  opinions.  The  members 
openly  in  favor  of  a  Republic  were  in  the  minority, 
and  were,  moreover,  divided  into  three  groups :  the 
Extreme  Left,  with  few  seats  in  the  Assembly,  but 
many  active  and  enthusiastic  partisans  outside ;  the 
Left  proper,  at  first  the  largest  of  the  three  groups; 
and  the  Left  Centre,  which  was  not  strong  at  the  out- 
set, but  grew  rapidly  by  the  adhesion  of  many  former 
Monarchists.     A  regular  government  of -some 

TilG  T)rGSl~ 

dencyof        kind  had  to  be  established  at  once,  and  the 

Thiers 

Feb.,  1871-    first  act  of  the  Assembly  was  to  elect  as  Chief 

May,  1873.  J 

of  the  Executive,  by  an  almost  unanimous 
vote,  the  former  minister  of  Louis  Philippe,  Adolphe 
Thiers,  whose  personal  inclinations  were  in  favor  of 
constitutional  monarchy,  but  who  saw  that  in  the  exist- 
ing condition  of  things  a  Republic  was  the  only  form 
of  government  possible  in  France.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances Thiers  selected  his  ministers  among  the 
moderate  elements  in  the  Assembly,  chiefly  from  the 
Left  Centre,  and  although  his  views  were  by  no  means 
in  entire  accord  with  those  of  the  Right,  he  was  sup- 
ported by  the  great  majority  of  the  Assembly  until  the 
treaty  of  peace  had  been  made  and  the  country  almost 
entirely  evacuated  by  the  German  troops.  The  intense 
dread  of  radicalism  on  the  part  of  the  Right,  and  the 
decided  stand  of  the  President  in  favor  of  the  Repub- 
lic, had  already  begun,  however,  to  make  a  breach 
between  them,  and  a  conflict  was  soon  precipitated.    In 

1  This  title  was  changed  on  Aug.  31,  1871,  to  that  of  President  of  the 
French  Republic. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  77 

the  spring  of  1873  a  number  of  Radicals  won  seats  at 
by-elections,  and  this  was  followed  by  the  resignation 
of  the  most  conservative  of  the  ministers,  and  a  partial 
reconstruction  of  the  cabinet.  Thiers  himself  was  a 
strong  Conservative,  but  he  did  not  believe  in  the  pol- 
icy of  active  resistance  to  the  Radicals  urged  by  the 
Right,  and  hence  the  latter,  on  May  24,  carried  an 
order  of  the  day  censuring  the  recent  changes  in  the 
ministry.  Thiers  at  once  resigned,  and  the  Right  elected 
Marshal  MacMahon  in  his  stead. 

The  new  President  appointed  a  cabinet  of  a  more 
strictly  conservative  character,  and  placed  at  Thepresi- 
its  head  the  Due  de  Broglie,  who  had  led  the  MacMahon. 
attack  against  Thiers.     But  this  ministry  also  Theremain- 

°  .  J  derofthe 

did  not  represent  any  united  party,  and,  in-  term  of  the 

XN  3X1  Oil  til 

deed,  it  would  not  have  been  possible  for  it  Assembly. 
to  do  so,  because  the  parties  had  become  so  broken  up 
that  no  single  group  controlled  a  majority  of  the  Assem- 
bly. In  fact,  a  year  had  hardly  passed  when  the  cabinet 
was  defeated  by  the  votes  of  the  Extreme  Right,  the 
Left  Centre,  and  the  Left,  on  a  question  of  the  order 
in  which  the  Constitutional  Laws  should  be  considered. 
Before  those  laws  were  completed  two  more  ministries 
had  come  in,  each  a  trifle  more  liberal  in  composition 
than  the  last,  but  neither  of  them  able  to  command  the 
allegiance  of  a  compact  majority. 

At  last  the   constitution  was  adopted,  and  early  in 
1876  the  first  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Depu-  The  first 
ties    were    elected;1    the    former   being    still  ^colt" 
controlled  by  the  Right,  while  in  the  latter  tutlon' 

1  The  seventy-five  life  senators  had  been  chosen  in  December,  1875. 


78  FRANCE. 

the  majority  was  Republican  by  more  than  two  to  one. 
The  strength  and  character  of  the  various  Republican 
groups  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was,  however,  very 
different  from  what  it  had  been  in  the  Assembly,  for 
the  Extreme  Left,  which  had  controlled  only  a  few  seats 
there,  had  grown  very  much  in  size,  and  took  the  name 
of  "  Republican  Union  "  to  distinguish  it  from  a  new 
group  that  had  been  formed  still  farther  to  the  Left. 
Gambetta,  indeed,  the  hero  of  the  final  struggle  against 
Germany,  and  the  leading  spirit  of  the  Union,  had 
formerly  passed  for  an  extremist,  but  was  now  accused 
by  the  theoretical  Radicals  of  adapting  his  policy  to 
circumstances,  and  striving  for  what  was  attainable 
rather  than  for  the  ideal  principles  of  the  Republic. 
For  this  reason  they  styled  him  an  "  Opportunist,"  a 
name  that  was  soon  applied  to  the  party  of  which  he 
was  the  chief.  During  the  period  that  now  began, 
the  most  important  of  the  Republican  groups  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  were  the  Left  Centre,  the  Repub- 
lican Left,  the  Republican  Union,  the  Radical  Left, 
and  the  Extreme  Left ;  and  each  of  these,  like  the 
fractions  into  which  the  Right  was  split,  was  organized 
with  a  president,  secretary,  and  executive  committee  of 
its  own ;  although  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  remark 
that  no  one  of  them  comprised  by  itself  a  majority  of 
the  members  of  the  Chamber.  In  the  Senate  the  Re- 
publicans were  similarly  divided  into  the  Left  Centre, 
the  Republican  Left,  and  the  Republican  Union. 

President  MacMahon,  as  the  head  of  a  parliamentary 
government,  felt  obliged  to  select  his  ministers  from 
the  Republican  majority  in  the  Chamber,  and  shortly 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  79 

after  the  election  lie  appointed  a  new  cabinet  drawn 
entirely  from  the  Left  Centre.  This  ministry  was  cer- 
tainly homogeneous,  but  as  its  immediate  followers  in 
the  Left  Centre  were  a  small  fraction  of  the  Deputies, 
it  could  not  count  on  the  support  of  a  majority;  and 
finding  itself  beaten  by  the  Left  in  the  Chamber  and 
by  the  Right  in  the  Senate,  it  resigned  in  less  than  a 
year.  The  cabinet  was  reconstructed  on  the  same  lines 
under  Jules  Simon,  who  might  have  stood  a  better 
chance  had  not  MacMahon  himself  become  alarmed  at 
the  spread  of  radical  opinions.  The  President  re- 
proached his  minister  with  lack  of  firmness  about  the 
proposed  laws  on  the  press,  and  on  his  resignation 
appointed  a  new  cabinet,  composed  largely  of  Monarch- 
ists, with  the  Due  de  Broglie  at  their  head. 

This  was   clearly  a   violation   of   the  parliamentary 
principle,  and  the  members  of  the  Republi- 

...  .         MacMahon's 

can  groups  at  once  joined  in  a  protest,  which  strife  with 

i    •       t  -t  or-rr     i  t        i  the  Repiibli- 

was  answered  in  June,  lew  7,  by  a  dissolution  cans,  and  his 

fall. 

of  the  Chamber.  By  his  course  the  Presi- 
dent had  opened  a  wide  gulf  between  the  Monarchists 
and  the  Republicans.  He  had  made  it  impossible  for 
the  men  of  moderate  views  in  the  two  parties  to  unite, 
and  had  precipitated  a  struggle  between  the  extreme 
elements  in  the  state.  The  conflict  was  passionate  on 
both  sides,  for  the  Republicans  were  firmly  convinced 
that  the  President  intended  to  restore  the  monarchy, 
and  he  on  his  part  believed  equally  strongly  that  the 
success  of  his  opponents  meant  the  triumph  of  radical- 
ism and  the  ruin  of  the  country.  Nor  were  any  efforts 
spared  to  carry  the  elections.     The  cabinet  replaced 


80  FRANCE. 

most  of  the  prefects,  and  many  other  officials,  by  its 
own  friends,  and  brought  to  bear  the  immense  power 
of  the  administration.  The  Marshal  himself  threw 
his  personal  influence  into  the  scale,  and  the  bishops 
helped  him  by  ordering  a  supplication  for  a  favorable 
vote.  But  in  spite  of  every  exertion,  the  elections 
in  October  resulted  in  a  victory  for  the  Republicans. 
MacMahon,  however,  was  not  yet  willing  to  submit, 
and  when  the  ministers  resigned,  he  appointed  others 
who  were  not  in  active  politics  and  had  no-  seats 
in  Parliament.  The  Chamber,  regarding:  this  as  an 
attempt  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  nation,  refused  to 
enter  into  any  relations  with  the  cabinet,  and  at  last 
the  President  found  himself  obliged  to  give  way.  In 
December  he  constructed  a  purely  Republican  ministry, 
most  of  whose  members  were  taken  from  the  Left 
Centre ;  but  it  was  now  impossible  for  him  to  keep  the 
Moderates  in  power.  He  had  brought  about  precisely 
the  result  he  meant  to  avoid,  for  he  had  thrown  the 
Republican  party  into  the  hands  of  its  less  conservative 
wins'.  Gambetta  had  been  the  leader  in  the  late  cam- 
paign.  The  victory  had  been  his  victory,  and  had 
made  him  for  the  moment  almost  omnipotent  in  the 
Chamber.  The  only  obstacle  in  his  way  was  presented 
by  the  Senate,  and  when  the  elections  of  January  5, 
1879,  gave  a  majority  in  that  body  also  to  the  Repub- 
licans, they  assumed  a  more  aggressive  tone.  They 
began  by  demanding  the  removal  of  several  Bonapartist 
generals ;  and  Marshal  MacMahon,  who  felt  that  such 
a  policy  would  injure  the  army,  and  who  could  not  bear 
to  dismiss  his  old  companions  in  arms,  saw  no  course 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  81 

open  to  him  but  resignation.  He  therefore  withdrew 
from  public  life,  and  on  January  30,  1879,  was  re- 
placed by  Grevy,  a  Republican  of  Gambetta's  school. 

After  the  fall  of   MacMahon,  the   Opportunists  re- 
mained for  many  years  the  dominant  fraction 
in  the  Republican  party,  but  as  they  did  not  ress  towards 

„     1        ,-<■.  -,  -,  .  the  Left. 

comprise  a  majority  ot  the  Chamber,  the  min- 
isters were  drawn  from  more  than  one  group.  The 
combinations  were,  of  course,  constantly  changing,  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  successive  cabinets  became  less 
and  less  conservative,  and  yielded  more  and  more  to  the 
demands  of  the  Extreme  Left.  First  the  communists 
were  pardoned,  then  religious  teaching  was  abolished  in 
the  public  schools,  and  this  was  followed  by  the  forci- 
ble breaking  up  of  the  so-called  unauthorized  religious 
orders.  Meanwhile  a  host  of  officials  were  discharged, 
and  replaced  by  men  of  more  advanced  views ;  and 
finally  even  the  law  protecting  judges  from  removal  was 
suspended,  in  order,  as  it  was  said,  to  purify  the  bench 
from  the  enemies  of  the  Republic.  In  short,  the  policy 
of  the  government  was  dictated  more  and  more  com- 
pletely by  the  Radicals.1  The  reason  for  such  a  state 
of  things  is  simple.  A  body  of  men  that  has  the 
enthusiasm  and  energy  of  fanaticism  always  possesses  a 
greater  momentum  than  its  mere  numbers  would  give 
it,2  and  in  France  by  far  the  most  determined  and 
energetic  parties  are  the  Clericals,  or  ardent  supporters 

1  G.  Channes,  Nos  Fautes,  passim  •  Jules  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat, 
ch.  vii.  sec.  I. 

2  The  Comte  de  Chaudordy  keenly  remarks  :  "  Beaucoup  d'audace,  un 
peu  de  savoir-faire,  et  on  parvient  a  gouverner  la  France."  (La  France 
en  1889,  p.  75.) 

VOL.    I. 


82  FRANCE. 

of  the  church,  on  the  Right,  and  the  Radicals  on  the 
Left ;  the  people  of  less  extreme  views  not  having  the 
same  passionate  convictions.1  The  Radicals  were,  in 
fact,  far  more  tenacious  than  the  other  Republicans. 
The  latter  preferred  to  sacrifice  their  opinions  rather 
than  precipitate  any  crisis  which  might  endanger  the 
Republic,  and,  believing  that  they  could  not  resist  the 
Right  and  secure  the  necessary  majority  in  the  Chamber 
without  the  help  of  the  Radicals,  tried  to  conciliate 
them.2  The  result  was  that  the  Radicals,  through 
their  influence  in  the  cabinet,  wielded  great  power, 
without  feeling  the  restraint  that  comes  from  a  sense 
of  responsibility.3 

During  the  struggle  with  MacMahon,  the  Republi- 
cans had  been  solidly  united,  but  the  danger  had  not 
passed  very  long  before  the  Radicals  began  to  show 
themselves  independent.  They  soon  became  quite 
ready  to  upset  any  ministry  that  offended  them,  and 
in  fact  cabinet  after  cabinet  was  overthrown  by  the 
votes  of  the  Ri^ht  and  the  Extreme  Left.  Even 
Gambetta,  who  had  striven  to  keep  the  Republicans 
together,  did  not  escape  this  fate,  in  spite  of  his  im- 
mense popularity  both  in  the  country  and  in  the  Parlia- 
ment. He  did  not  consent  to  form  a  ministry  until 
November,  1881  ;  and  after  holding  office  only  two 
months  and  a  half,  he  was  forced  to  resign  by  the 
refusal  of  the  Chamber  to  introduce  the  scrutin  de  lisle 
for  the   election  of    deputies.     He  lived  only  till  the 

1  Channes,  Letter  of  Sept.  5,  1885. 

2  Cf.  Channes,  pp.  334-35. 

8  Cf.  Pressense",  La  France,  les  Partis  et  les  Elections,  p.  51. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  83 

end  of  the  year,  and  his  death  deprived  France  of  her 
only  great  popular  leader.  After  his  fall,  politics  fol- 
lowed the  old  course,  and  there  passed  across  the  stage 
a  series  of  short-lived  ministries,  none  of  which  lasted 
more  than  a  year,  except  one  formed  by  Ferry  in 
February,  1883.  Ferry  had  formerly  been  very  active 
in  suppressing  the  religious  orders,  but  he  now  declared 
himself  opposed  to  the  Radicals ;  and  in  spite  of  their 
hostility  and  his  own  lack  of  popularity,  he  succeeded 
by  his  personal  force  and  ability  in  so  managing  the 
deputies  as  to  keep  himself  in  office  for  more  than  two 
years.  He  was  even  able  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the 
scrutin  de  liste  which  had  wrecked  Gambetta.  But 
his  long  tenure  of  power  awoke  jealousy  and  resent- 
ment, and  when  his  expedition  to  Tonquin  met  with 
reverses,  the  Chamber  turned  against  him.  A  credit 
he  asked  for  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  more  than  two 
to  one,  and  he  resigned,  never  to  hold  office  again. 
His  is  not,  indeed,  the  only  case  in  which  the  Republic 
has  discarded  a  politician  because  he  was  too  strong. 

About  this  time  a  change  began  to  come  over  the 
condition    of   the    parties.1     Their   discipline 

li  i  "piiii         The  growth 

had    never    been    strict,    tor    although    the  of  personal 

i         ii*  c    i      i  t  politics. 

various  groups  were  in  the  habit  or  holding 
caucuses  to  decide  upon  their  attitude  in  regard  to 
questions  pending  in  the  Chambers,  such  determina- 
tions had  not  been  absolutely  binding,  and  the  members 
of  a  group  rarely  voted  as  a  unit.  But  of  late  years 
the  lack  of  discipline  had  been  increasing.  Moreover, 
the  groups  themselves  had  been  subdividing  and  mul- 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  386-95. 


84  FRANCE. 

tiplying  until  they  ceased  so  thoroughly  to  represent 
intelligible  principles  that  personal  interest  became  the 
real  basis  of  union.  At  the  same  time  a  feeling  began 
to  arise  that  the  groups  were  responsible  for  the  bad 
working  of  parliamentary  government,  and  after  the 
elections  of  1885  many  deputies  refused  to  join  any 
organization  at  all.  The  breaking  up  of  the  groups 
was  followed,  not  by  the  formation  of  great  parties,  but 
by  the  growth  of  innumerable  personal  cliques  whose 
political  opinions  were  often  ill-defined.  The  result 
was  that  the  cabinets  had  no  policy,  and  were  drawn 
now  a  little  more  from  the  Left  and  now  a  little  more 
from  the  Centre,  according  to  the  opportunity  of 
making  a  workable  combination.  The  deputies  were 
naturally  in  a  state  of  political  anarchy,  while  the 
Chamber,  without  the  guidance  of  responsible  leaders, 
did  not  know  its  own  mind.  In  March,  1888,  it  over- 
threw one  set  of  ministers  because  they  refused  to 
consider  the  revision  of  the  constitution,  and  within  a 
year  it  upset  the  next  because  they  wanted  to  consider 
it.  Politics  were  truly  in  what  a  friend  of  the  writer 
described  as  a  condition  of  permanent  instability.  To 
how  great  an  extent  this  is  true  may  be  judged  from 
the  fact  that  in  the  ten  years  following  the  resignation 
of  President  MacMahon  there  were  fourteen  different 
cabinets.1 

Meanwhile,  the  most  conservative  class  of  Repub- 

1  It  was  during  this  period,  on  Dec.  2,  1887,  that  President  Gre*vy  was 
forced  to  resign  on  accouut  of  the  scandal  arising  from  his  son-in-law 
Wilson's  traffic  in  decorations.  On  the  next  day  Carnot  was  elected  in 
his  stead. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  85 

licans,  finding  their  opinions  disregarded,  had  become 
discouraged,  and  abstained  to  a  great  extent 
from  going  to  the  polls.1  Thus  it  happened  General 
that  at  the  election  of  1881  the  Left  Centre 
almost  disappeared  from  tlje  Chamber.  But  while  the 
Parliament  and  the  cabinets  became  continually  more 
radical,  the  people  at  large  were  really  getting  more 
conservative.2  The  government  failed,  therefore,  to 
represent  the  true  sentiments  of  the  country,  which 
grew  weary,  moreover,  of  the  incessant  change  of  min- 
istries, and  of  the  intriguing  and  wrangling  in  the 
Chamber.  It  felt  that  the  best  men  were  not  at  the 
head  of  the  state,  and  it  conceived  a  profound  disgust 
for  parliamentary  government,  and  a  good  deal  of 
contempt  for  politicians,3  —  a  feeling  justified  by  the 
fact  that  one  of  the  greatest  merits  of  the  parlia- 
mentary system,  that  of  sifting  the  public  men  and 
bringing  the  greatest  to  the  top,  had  certainly  not 
been  realized  in  France.  The  people  showed  their  dis- 
content at  the  general  election  of  1885  by  returning  an 
increased  number  of  Monarchists ;  but  the  Republicans 
did  not  take  warning,  and  pursued  their  old  tactics. 
At  this  time  General  Boulanger  came  forward  and 
promised  reform.     He  had  become  prominent  as  Min- 

1  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  pp.  330,  374  ;  Nos  Hommes  (VEtat,  p. 
116  ;  Souviens-toi  du  Deux-De'cembre,  pp.  90,  349,  et  seq.  ;  Laffitte,  op. 
cit.,  p.  75. 

2  Channes,  Nos  Fautes,  passim  ;  Simon,  Souviens-toi,  p.  146. 

3  Channes,  Letter  of  Aug.  22,  1885  ;  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  pp. 
374-75  ;  Souviens-toi,  p.  140.  For  recent  popular  expressions  of  disgust 
for  the  parliamentary  system  and  the  intrigues  of  politicians,  see,  for 
example,  the  Petit  Journal,  Dec.  7,  1892,  Feb.  18,  1893  ;  Le  Figaro, 
Dec.  22,  1892  ;  Le  Matin,  Feb.  15,  1893. 


86  FRANCE. 

ister  of  War  from  January,  1886,  to  May,  1887,  when 
his  heavy  expenditures  on  the  army,  and  his  aggressive 
hostility  towards  Germany,  had  caused  the  fall  of  the 
last  cabinet  to  which  he  belonged.  Always  classed  as 
a  Radical,  he  now  proposed  revision  of  the  constitu- 
tion, although  precisely  what  that  revision  was  to  be  he 
refused  to  say.  The  Bonapartists,  who  hoped  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  Republic  and  cared  little  what  the 
name  of  the  next  Emperor  might  be,  trooped  after  him 
almost  to  a  man.  A  considerable  part  of  the  Monarch- 
ists, also,  were  glad  to  fish  in  troubled  waters,  and 
followed  him ; 1  and  he  secured,  besides,  the  support 
of  a  good  many  Radicals,  because  in  spite  of  their 
success  they  were  dissatisfied.  They  had  failed  to 
attain  their  ideal,2  for  the  ideal  of  the  extreme  French 
Radicals  is  so  far  removed  from  actuality  as  to  be  unat- 
tainable, and  hence  they  are  never  satisfied  with  any- 
thing that  exists,  their  constant  desire  being  for  change, 
not  to  say  destruction.  For  a  moment  the 
danger  was  great,  and,  indeed,  had  a  war 
broken  out,  or  had  Boulanger  himself  been  a  man  of 
real  capacity,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  Republic 
might  have  been  brought  to  an  untimely  end.  But  the 
Republicans  who  remained  faithful  realized  the  gravity 
of  the  crisis.  They  drew  together,  and  Boulanger  was 
heavily  beaten  at  the  general  election  of  1889.3 

1  See  the  Comte  deChaudordy,Za  France  en  1889,  p.  73  ;  Jules  Simon, 
Souviens-toi,  pp.  153-59  ;  "  The  Stability  of  the  French  Republic,"  Forum, 
vol.  10,  p.  383. 

2  Channes,  Letter  of  Oct.  1,  1883. 

8  For  a  discussion  of  Boidanger's  defeat  and  its  effect  on  parties,  see 
articles  by  G.  Monod,  Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  58,  p.  19,  and  vol.  60,  p.  911. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  87 

The  storm  had  passed,  but  it  left  a  marked,  perhaps 
a  permanent,  change  in  the  political  atmos- 

„  „  r^  p    •  •  Its  effect 

phere  oi  r  ranee.  One  01  its  most  important  on  the 
effects  was  on  the  attitude  of  the  Right.  By 
following  Boulanger,  the  Bonapartists  and  many  of  the 
Monarchists  put  themselves  in  a  totally  false  position, 
and  learned  their  own  weakness  and  the  vitality  of  the 
Republic.  Their  situation,  indeed,  had  been  none  too 
strong  before,  because  they  never  had  anything  in 
common  but  their  hatred  of  the  existing  government, 
so  that  their  triumph  at  any  moment  would  have  been 
a  signal  for  their  quarrel.  Each  of  these  two  groups, 
moreover,  had  long  been  hopelessly  divided  within 
itself.1  Their  real  bond  of  union,  or  perhaps  it  would 
be  better  to  say  their  real  basis  of  strength,  was  the 
Catholic  church,  of  which  they  tried  to  be  the  support 
and  the  shield  ; 2  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
France,  church  and  state  are  not  separated,  the  rela- 
tions between  the  two  still  resting,  so  far  as  the 
Catholics  are  concerned,  on  the  Concordat  between 
Napoleon  I.  and  the  Pope.  The  bishops  are  nominated 
by  the  government,  and  the  appointments  to  all  the 
higher  ecclesiastical  offices  require  its  approval.  No 
papal  bull  can  be  published  in  France,  nor  can  a  Nuntio 
exercise  any  functions  there  without  its  consent ;  and 
the  existence  of  most  of  the  monastic  and  other  re- 
ligious communities  is  dependent  upon  its  permission. 
On  the  other   hand,   the  clergy  receive  their   salaries 

1  Comte  de  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  74. 

2  Cf .  Channes,  Letters  of  Sept.  17,  1883,  and  Oct.  27, 1884  ;  G.  Monod, 
"  French  Affairs,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  60,  p.  911. 


88  FRANCE. 

from  the  state.1  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is 
inevitable  that  religious  matters  should  be  constantly 
prominent  in  politics,  to  say  nothing  of  the  question 
of  the  connection  of  the  church  with  education,  which 
has  been  a  fruitful  source  of  strife.2  Gambetta  early 
saw  that  the  strength  of  the  Reactionaries  was  based 
upon  their  alliance  with  the  church,  and  sought  to  cut 
the  ground  from  under  their  feet  by  breaking  down 
the  power  of  the  priests.  Hence  his  cry,  "  Le  clerical- 
ism voila  Venn&mi"  and  hence  the  series  of  measures 
directed  at  the  influence  of  the  clergy  and  even  at 
religion.3  In  justification  of  his  course,  it  must  be  said 
that  the  political  activity  of  the  French  priesthood  is 
commonly  believed  to  prevent  a  free  expression  of 
public  opinion,  and  that  the  church  by  its  alliance  with 
Napoleon  III.,  and  afterwards  with  MacMahon  in  1877, 
took  up  a  position  of  real  hostility  to  the  Republic.4 
But  Gambetta  did  not  realize  the  magnitude  of  the  power 

1  See  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  ch.  vi.  The  Protestant  churches  (Calvin- 
ist  and  Lutheran),  the  Jewish,  and  in  Algiers  the  Mohammedan,  are  also 
supported  by  the  state.  In  France,  religion,  strictly  speaking,  is  not 
free,  for  except  in  the  case  of  the  forms  of  worship  which  are  recognized 
and  supported  by  the  state,  all  meetings  and  associations  for  religious 
purposes  are  subject  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  law,  by  which  no  meeting  can 
be  held  without  giving  the  authorities  notice  twenty-four  hours  before- 
hand, and  no  association  of  more  than  twenty  persons  cau  be  formed 
without  a  permission  from  the  government  which  may  be  revoked  at  any 
time  ;  Lebon,  lb.,  pp.  87,  127. 

2  See  Lebon,  lb.,  p.  142  et  seq. 

3  For  a  description  of  some  of  these  measures,  see  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie, 
Liberie.. 

4  See  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "La  Retorme  Administrative  —  Les  Cultes," 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  May  15,  1890,  pp.  352-53  ;  Chaunes,  Letter  of 
Oct.  27,  1884  ;  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  193  et  seq. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  89 

he  attacked.  He  did  not  see  that  love  and  reverence 
for  the  church  cannot  be  stamped  out  in  France,  and 
that  any  attempt  at  persecution  only  intensifies  them.1 
So  long  as  the  church  was  hostile  to  the  Republic,  the 
men  who  defended  her  were  sure  to  have  a  considerable 
following ;  but  the  Boulanger  episode  led  her  to  doubt 
the  wisdom  of  allying  herself  with  a  discredited  party 
against  a  powerful  republic.  In  November,  change  in 
1890,  Cardinal  Lavigerie,  one  of  the  most  2ft£titude 
influential  of  the  French  prelates,  declared  ^l"dcs  t^ 
that  the  church  was  not  necessarily  opposed  epu 
to  the  republican  form  of  government  in  France,  and 
several  of  the  other  bishops  immediately  followed  his 
example.  In  the  spring  of  1892  the  Pope  himself 
issued  an  encyclical  letter  to  the  same  effect,  —  a 
policy  which  he  had  the  courage  and  wisdom  to  re- 
iterate in  the  midst  of  the  Panama  scandals,  in  the 
following  winter,  in  spite  of  the  discredit  those  scandals 
threw  upon  a  number  of  leading  Republican  politicians, 
and  incidentally  upon  the  Republic  itself.  The  change 
in  the  attitude  of  the  church  naturally  shook  a  good 
deal  the  position  of  the  Reactionaries,  many  of  whom, 
under  the  name  of  Rallies,  now  prepared  to  accept 
the  Republic.2  In  fact,  before  Cardinal  Lavigerie  had 
spoken,  party  lines  had  become  softened  and  blurred, 
and  a  group  calling  itself  the  Constitutional  Right, 
with  conservatism  under  the  Republic  as  a  programme, 
had  already  been  formed,  and  had  tried  to  ally  itself 

1  On  the  unpopularity  of  the  crusade  against  the  church,  see  Chaunes, 
Nos  Fautes,  passim. 

2  G.  Monod,  "French  Affairs,"  Conlemp.  Rev.,  vol.  GO,  p.  911. 


90  FRANCE. 

with  the  Moderate  Republicans.  Whether  the  Right 
will  definitely  abandon  all  hostility  to  the  form  of 
government  or  not  depends  very  much  on  the  action  of 
the  Republicans  themselves.  That  every  true  Repub- 
lican in  France  ought  to  wish  to  make  the  acceptance 
of  the  Republic  as  universal  as  possible  would  hardly 
seem  to  admit  of  a  doubt,  but  to  the  Radicals  such  a 
prospect  is  by  no  means  wholly  agreeable.  The  chief 
weakness  in  the  position  of  the  Reactionaries  has  lain 
in  the  fact  that  they  have  stood  for  revolution,  .which 
France  has  learned  to  abhor ; *  and  if  they  were  to 
abandon  all  idea  of  changing  the  form  of  government, 
their  strength  would  no  doubt  increase.  Moreover,  on 
the  practical  questions  of  the  day,  those  Republicans 
who  are  by  nature  conservative  are  really  closer  to 
the  Right  than  to  the  Radicals;2  and  although  the 
men  of  conservative  views  have  hitherto  been  unable 
to  unite,  because  some  of  them  were  Republicans  and 
some  were  not,  and  hence  have  failed  to  exert  their 
full  influence  in  politics,  yet  it  is  probable  that  to- 
gether they  form  a  decided  majority  of  the  people.3 
If,  therefore,  the  Right,  as  a  whole,  were  to  accept  the 
Republic  without  reserve,  thereby  freeing  the  Mod- 
erates from  their  dependence  on  the  Radicals,  the  con- 
servative elements  in  France  would  be  likely  to  draw 
together  and  get  control  of  the  state.4  Now,  much  as 
the  Radicals  are  attached  to  the  Republic,  they  have 

1  See  an  article  on  "Provincial  France,"  Quart.  Rev.,  Oct.,  1890. 

2  Cf.  Le  Figaro,  Feb.  9,  1893. 
8  Channes,  p.  335. 

4  Comte  de  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  73  ;  G.  Monod,  "  French 
Affairs,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  58,  p.  19. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  91 

no  desire  to  have  it  conservative,  or  to  see  their  own 
influence  curtailed;  and  they  cannot  fail  to  perceive 
that  their  interests  and  opinions  would  suffer  a  severe 
check  if  the  Right  were  to  become  Republican.1  It  is 
not  unnatural,  therefore,  that  they  should  have  tried  to 
keep  the  Right  and  the  conservative  Republicans  apart, 
by  urging  the  government  into  a  renewal  of  the  anti- 
clerical policy.2 

Another  result  of  the  contest  with  Boulanger,  though 
a  less  permanent  one,  was  a  closer  union  of  gtru   le 
all  the  Republicans,  caused  by  the  impend-  ^J3™". 
ing  danger  and  the  need  of  united  action   to  p"ficy  of6 
which  it  gave  rise.     Thus  was  developed  the  ^nPcen£aa-n 
policy  of   the  Republican  concentration,  as  it  tlon' 
is  called ;    that  is,  the  attempt  to    hold  all    the  vary- 
ing shades  of  Republicans  together  as  a  single  party. 
This  had  always  been  the  practice  of  the  Opportunists, 
but  now  it  grew  more  systematic.     The  different  organ- 
ized groups  dissolved,  or  became  less  prominent  and 
less  active  ;3i  but  the  happy  family  so  created  could  not 
possibly  live  in  peace  very  long.     For  a  time,  indeed, 
everything  went  smoothly.     Neither  the  Right  nor  the 
Radicals  were  at  first  in  a  condition  for  battle,  because 
the  Right  had  been   disorganized  and  beaten,  and  the 
Radicals  had  lost  power  by  the  defection  of  some  of 
their  members,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  revision  of  the 

1  G.  Monod,  Contemp.  Rev.,  vol.  58,  p.  19. 

2  "  La  pacification  rdligieuse,"  George  Picot,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
July  1,  1892.  This  has  always  been  the  Radical  device  for  keeping  the 
Republicans  together.  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  348  ;  Simon,  Nos  Hommes 
d'Etat,  p.  146. 

3  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  392. 


92  FRANCE. 

constitution,  which  had  long  been  a  cardinal  point  in 
their  programme,  had  been  discredited  by  Boulanger's 
adoption  of  it.  Party  strife  was,  therefore,  thrown 
temporarily  into  the  background  by  economic  ques- 
tions which  divided  the  deputies  on  new  lines ;  the 
protective  tariff,  for  example,  drawing  its  supporters 
from  all  parts  of  the  Chamber.  The  result  was  that  the 
colorless  cabinet  of  Freycinet,  formed  in  March,  1890, 
was  able  to  prolong  its  existence  more  than  two  years. 
The  views  of  the  different  Republican  elements,  were, 
however,  too  far  apart  to  allow  them  to  work  together 
in  real  harmony,  and  after  the  suicide  of  Boulanger  had 
taken  away  the  chief  motive  for  union  the  old  antago- 
nism revived,  and  the  efforts  of  the  successive  cabinets 
to  treat  the  Republicans  as  a  single  party  only  con- 
cealed the  differences  they  were  unable  to  suppress. 
Such  a  policy  could  be  assumed  with  success  only  by 
ministers  of  great  personal  force  and  influence,  who 
could  govern  their  followers  and  compel  obedience  ;  but 
as  the  French  cabinets  were  not  strong,  their  object 
was  to  avoid  offending  any  of  the  groups  of  the  Left, 
and  their  course  was  weak  and  vacillating.  While  the 
ministers  were  thus  trying  to  keep  the  Republicans 
together,1  the  conservative  and  radical  wings  each 
strove  to  exclude  the  other  from  the  control  of  the 
party,  and  force  the  adoption  of  its  own  views.2    It  was 

1  See  Ribot's  declaration  of  his  policy  on  this  point  on  Jan.  12,  1893, 
Journal  Officiel,  Jan.  13. 

2  See,  for  example,  the  debate  in  the  Chamber  on  an  interpellation  on 
Feb.  16,  1893,  Le  Matin,  Feb.  17,  and  the  Report  in  the  Journal  Officiel 
of  the  same  day.  The  Radicals,  being  weak,  urged  at  this  time  the 
policy  of  concentration,  which  the  Conservative  Republicans  did  not  want. 
See  Le  Matin,  Feb.  9  and  12, 1893,  and  Le  Figaro,  Feb.  18. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  93 

clear,  therefore,  that  the  policy  of  the  concentration  was 
a  failure,1  and,  indeed,  it  had  so  enfeebled  the  govern- 
ment, and  deprived  it  of  the  power  to  follow  any  steady 
policy,  that  some  of  the  Republicans  proposed  to  restore 
the  habit  of  holding  caucuses  of  the  groups,  in  order 
that  these  might  discuss  and  settle  all  questions  as  they 
arose,  and  thus  supply  the  lack  of  guidance  on  the  part 
of  the  cabinet.2 

The  elections  of  1893  made  a  great  change  in  the 
political  situation,  for  in  spite  of  the  Panama 
scandals  of  the  preceding  winter,  which  the  mentofthat 
Right  had  tried  to  use  as  a  means  of  dis- 
crediting the  Republic,  and  the  Radicals  as  a  means 
of  discrediting  their  more  conservative  allies,  these  last 
gained  a  large  majority  of  seats.  The  people  either 
did  not  believe  the  stories  of  wholesale  corruption,  or 
else  thought  all  politicians  equally  bad.  At  all  events 
they  disappointed  the  hopes  of  the  extremists.  The 
Radicals  and  the  Extreme  Left  gained,  indeed,  a  few 
members,  but  several  of  their  chiefs  failed  to  be  elected, 
and  among  them  Clemenceau,  who  had  upset  more 
ministries  than  any  other  man  in  France.  The  Right, 
moreover,  both  in  the  part  that  accepted  the  Republic 
and  in  that  which  opposed  it,  lost  so  heavily  in  favor 
of  the  Conservative  Republicans  that  the  latter,  who 
were  henceforth  known  as  the  Moderates  or  Republi- 
cans of  Government,  had  an  absolute  majority  in  the 

1  See  Le  Temps,  Jan.  8  ;  Le  Figaro,  Feb.  9,  1893  ;  and  a  letter  of  the 
former  date  from  M.  Piou  to  Le  Figaro.  On  the  evils  of  the  policy,  see 
Lamy,  La  Republique  en  1893  ;  Pressense',  Les  Partis  et  les  Elections. 

2  Le  Matin,  Dec.  14,  1892. 


94  FRANCE. 

Chamber.1  At  last  it  was  plain  that  the  policy  of  the 
concentration  must  be  given  up,  and  on  December  3, 
shortly  after  the  opening  of  the  session,  a  min- 
of  Casimir-  istry  of  Moderates  was  appointed  with  Casimir- 
Perier  at  its  head.  For  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  the  Republic  a  homogeneous  cabinet  was 
supported  by  a  homogeneous  majority.  The  system 
of  groups,  however,  was  by  no  means  abandoned,  for 
besides  the  Republicans  of  Government,  who  formed 
a  single  body,  the  Republican  part  of  the  Chamber  con- 
tained a  number  of  factions,  of  which  the  most  impor- 
tant were  that  of  the  Radicals,  surnamed  at  this  time 
the  Progressive  Left,  and  that  of  the  Socialists,  who 
organized  under  the  name  of  the  Extreme  Left,  but 
were  divided  into  several  subordinate  groups.2  The 
new  cabinet  pursued  a  thoroughly  conservative  policy, 
maintaining  the  authority  of  the  government  against 
socialistic  agitation,  and  adopting  a  conciliatory  tone 
towards  the  church ;  but  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  a 
decided  majority  of  the  Chamber  was  heartily  in  sym- 
pathy with  its  general  course,  it  was  upset 
in  May,  1894,  by  one  of  those  unexpected 
crises  that  often  occur  in  France.  The  ministers  were 
suddenly  asked  in  the  Chamber  whether  they  intended 

1  Daniel,  V Annie  Politique  for  1893,  p.  281,  gives  the  results  of  the 
election  as  follows  :  — 

Republicans  of  Government 311 

Radicals 122 

Right 58 

Socialists    ..........  49 

Rallies 35 

2  Daniel,  L'Annee  Politique,  1893,  p.  331. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  95 

to  allow  the  employees  of  the  state  roads  to  attend 
a  national  congress  of  railroad  men ;  and  when  they 
replied  in  the  negative  a  motion  expressing  disapproval 
was  made.  To  the  surprise  of  everybody  it  was  carried, 
and  the  ministers  resigned.  The  Radical  and  Socialist 
groups  were  elated,  and  each  of  them  passed  a  resolution 
to  the  effect  that  the  next  cabinet  ought  to  lean  more 
to  the  Left.  The  Republicans  of  Government,  on  the 
other  hand,  voted  that  they  would  not  support  any 
ministry  that  did  not  adopt  the  same  principles  as 
Casimir-Perier,1  and  in  fact  it  was  evident  that  no  other 
course  could  be  pursued ;  but  the  former  ministers  hav- 
ing agreed  to  stand  or  fall  together,2  a  cabinet  of  "new 
men  was  appointed,  who  carried  on  the  old  policy.3 
The  whole  occurrence  illustrates  the  irrational  working 
of  the  parliamentary  system  in  France. 

A  month  later  President  Carnot  was  murdered  by  an 
anarchist  at  Lyons.  Such  a  terrible  event  rrhe  mur(jer 
naturally  strengthened  the  party  that  upheld  of  Carnot- 
the  authority  of  the  government;  and  the  Conservatives 
had  no  difficulty  in  electing  Casimir-Perier  to  the  vacant 
post,  and  in  passing  a  law  concerning  the  offense  of 
inciting  to  crime,  which  increased  the  penalty,  took 
away  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  forbade  publication 
of  the  proceedings.  The  Extreme  Left,  however,  was 
neither  awed  nor  silenced.  Not  only  did  it  continue  to 
attack  the  cabinet,  but  it  kept  up  in  the  newspapers  a 

1  L'Annee  Politique,  1894,  pp.  142,  143. 

2  Muel,  Gouv.  Min.  et  Const.  Supp.,  p.  73.     Only  one  of  the  old  minis- 
ters sat  in  the  new  cahinet. 

8  L'Annee  Politique,  1894,  p.  145  et  seq. 


96  FRANCE. 

constant  stream  of  personal  abuse  against  the  new  Pres- 
ident. With  the  Conservatives,  moreover,  the  impulse 
to  rally  round  the  government  was  of  such  short  dura- 
tion, that  in  less  than  seven  months  the  cabinet  was 
overthrown.  It  happened  in  this  way.  A  difference 
of  opinion  arose  between  the  Minister  of  Public  Works 
and  certain  railroad  companies  over  the  interpretation 
of  a  statute  guaranteeing  interest  on  the  securities  of 
the  roads.  The  matter  was  brought  before  the  Council 
of  State,  and  when  it  decided  against  the  government 
the  minister  threw  up  his  position.  His  colleagues 
felt  bound  by  the  decision  of  the  tribunal,  but  the 
Chamber  censured  their  course  and  thus  forced  them  to 
resign.  The  President  suddenly  announced 
of  Casimir-     that  he  should  follow  then*  example.     He  had 

P  cri6r. 

passed  seven  unhappy  months  in  office,  a  con- 
stant target  for  slander  and  insult,  with  a  feeling  that 
the  cabinet  did  not  support  and  protect  him  as  it 
should,  and  he  could  bear  it  no  longer.  The  provoca- 
tion was  no  doubt  great,  but  one  cannot  help  thinking 
that  if  Dante  had  lived  at  the  present  day  he  would 
have  placed  Casimir-Perier  with  Celestine  V.,  — 

"  Che  fece  per  viltate  il  gran  refiuto." 

Felix  Faure,  the  new  President,  appointed  another 
cabinet  of  Moderates,  who  followed  nominally 
big  up  of  the  the  old  policy,  but  were  really  more  compli- 
ant towards  the  Radicals  than  then*  predeces- 
sors had  been.  They  passed  an  amnesty  for  political 
offenses,  and  imposed  a  tax  on  the  religious  orders; 
and  in  fact  the  rigidly  conservative  principles  adopted 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  97 

by  the  ministry  of  Casimir-Perier  had  been  maintained 
with  less  and  less  firmness  ever  since  its  fall  in  May, 
1894.  Meanwhile,  under  the  lack  of  parliamentary  dis- 
cipline, the  majority  in  the  Chamber  was  slowly  going 
to  pieces.  Instead  of  being  a  compact  party  that  could 
be  relied  upon,  it  became  a  feebler  and  feebler  support, 
until  at  the  meeting  of  the  Chambers  in  the  autumn  of 
1895  it  had  ceased  to  be  a  real  majority  at  all.  The 
cabinet  had  a  heavy  burden  to  carry,  and  would  proba- 
bly not  have  survived  a  debate  on  the  expedition  to 
Madagascar,  for  although  the  campaign  against  the 
Hovas  had  ended  in  victory,  some  serious  mismanage- 
ment had  no  doubt  taken  place.  The  final  struggle 
turned,  however,  on  the  chronic  charge  of  corruption. 
There  had  been  bribery  in  connection  with  one  of 
the  railroads,  and  the  ministers,  while  known  to  be  per- 
fectly innocent  themselves,  were  accused  of  trying  to 
shield  guilty  politicians.  They  refused  to  interfere 
with  the  inquest  of  the  magistrates,  which  in  France  is 
considered  the  province  of  the  courts,  but  the  Chamber, 
on  October  28,  voted  by  a  large  majority  that  all  the 
persons  implicated  ought  to  be  brought  to  trial  and  the 
documents  laid  on  the  table  of  the  House.  The  min- 
isters, regarding  this  as  a  censure,  resigned ;  and  so 
impotent  had  the  Moderates  become,  that  a  Radical 
cabinet  was  formed,  and  declared  its  intention  of  pursu- 
ing a  truly  Radical  policy.  Thus  the  Chamber,  which, 
for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  Republic,  had 
begun  its  career  with  a  homogeneous  ministry  supported 
by  a  homogeneous  majority,  had  degenerated  in  two 
years  into  a  state  of  political  confusion,  and  found  itself 

VOL.   I. 


98  FRANCE. 

led  by  a  homogeneous  cabinet  of  an  entirely  different 
party. 

An  English  premier  placed  in  the  position  of  Bour- 
geois, the  head  of  the  new  ministry,  would 
Radical  have  insisted  on  a  dissolution,  and  refused  to 
accept  office  on  any  other  terms ;  but  the 
condition  of  the  French  Chamber  is  so  fluid,  and  the 
subdivision  into  groups  gives  such  an  opportunity  for 
political  combinations,  that  he  was  able  to  accept  office 
with  the  existing  Parliament.  Out  of  the  unpropitious 
elements  of  the  Chamber  he  contrived  by  dexterity  and 
determination  to  manufacture  for  himself  a  tolerably 
efficient  majority.  The  use  of  patronage  doubtless  pro- 
cured some  adherents,  while  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  the 
charges  of  corruption  brought  over  to  his  side  a  certain 
number  of  men  who  were  afraid  of  the  suspicion  of 
trying  to  smother  investigation.  After  consolidating 
his  followers,  he  brought  forward,  to  the  delight  of 
the  Radicals,  a  proposal  for  a  progressive  income  tax. 
It  is  probable  that  far  more  than  half  of  the  deputies 
disliked  the  measure,  and  the  committee  on  the  budget 
was  decidedly  hostile  to  it ;  but  the  influence  of  the 
cabinet  had  become  so  great  that,  on  March  26,  1896, 
the  Chamber  adopted  an  order  of  the  day  approving 
the  general  principle  involved.  The. order,  it  is  true, 
was  only  carried  by  sixteen  votes,  and  left  undecided 
some  of  the  most  important  points  in  dispute,  but  the 
fact  that  Bourgeois  was  able  to  maintain  himself  at  all, 
and  to  wring  a  sanction  of  a  Radical  policy  from  a 
Chamber  composed  chiefly  of  men  elected  as  Conserva- 
tives, shows  how  little  the  French  groups  furnish  a  basis 
for  a  true  party  life. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  99 

The  Conservatives  looked  upon  the  proposed  income 
tax  as  an  exceedingly  dangerous  measure,  and 
were  determined  to  exhaust  every  means  in  thrown  by 
their  power  to  prevent  its  enactment.  It  was 
quite  probable  that  when  it  came  to  an  actual  vote  the 
Chamber  would  not  pass  the  bill,  but  the  Conservatives 
preferred  not  to  run  the  risk.  They  controlled  the 
Senate,  and  made  up  their  minds  to  use  that  body  as  a 
lever  to  pry  the  cabinet  out  of  office.  Twice  the  Senate 
passed  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence  in  the  ministry, 
and  twice  the  ministers  refused  to  consider  this  a 
ground  for  resignation,  declaring  that  they  would  re- 
main so  long  as  they  had  the  support  of  the  Chamber. 
A  mere  expression  of  opinion  being  ineffectual,  the 
Senate  adopted,  on  April  21,  a  proposal  to  refuse  the 
credits  demanded  for  Madagascar  until  a  change  of 
ministry  took  place,  thereby  proclaiming  that  it  was 
ready  to  stop  the  wheels  of  government  rather  than 
tolerate  the  cabinet.  Bourgeois  was  thus  put  in  a 
position  in  which  he  could  only  remain  in  power  at  the 
cost  of  a  prolonged  struggle  between  the  two  Chambers, 
with  a  strong  chance  of  losing  at  any  time  his  majority 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Under  these  circum- 
stances he  thought  it  better  to  withdraw.1 

His   successor,  Meline,  professed  a  desire  to  return 
to  the  policy  of  concentration,  and  tried  to  TheConser- 
induce  some  of  the  Radicals  to  come  into  his  ™£}liaJar 
cabinet  on  the  basis  of  eliminating  all  ques- 
tions that  divided  the  Republicans.     As  this  meant  in 

1  For  a  description  of  the  struggle  between  the  cabinet  and  the  Senate, 
see  p.  23,  note  1,  supra. 


100  FRANCE. 

reality  a  surrender  of  their  programme,  the  Radicals 
not  unnaturally  declined.  Meline,  therefore,  selected 
his  colleagues  entirely  from  the  Conservatives,  and  in 
the  statement  of  his  policy  read  before  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  on  April  30,  the  income  tax  was  definitely 
abandoned. 

Here  was  a  most  excellent  chance  for  the  majority  in 
the  Chamber  to  show  how  much  it  was  in  earnest  in 
supporting  Bourgeois,  and  how  much  it  cared  for  the 
Radical  programme.  On  the  very  day  of  his  fall,  and 
after  his  resignation  had  been  announced,  the  Radicals 
had  succeeded  in  carrying  the  resolutions  they  proposed, 
in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Conservatives ;  but 
when  Meline  read  his  declaration  of  policy  two  days 
later,  the  Chamber  adopted  an  order  of  the  day  express- 
ing its  approval  by  a  majority  of  forty-three,  so  weak 
was  party  discipline,  or  rather  so  weak  was  the  tie  that 
bound  the  various  groups  together. 

The  policy  of  Republican  concentration  has  been 
replaced  by  the  practice  of  selecting  the  ministers 
only  from  one  wing  of  the  Republican  party,  but  the 
Chamber  has  shown  itself  incapable  of  furnishing  a 
stable  majority  for  either  wing. 

During  the  last  three  years  there  has  indeed  been 
a  nearer  approach  to  a  division  of  the  deputies  into 
two  great  parties  —  one  Conservative  and  the  other 
Radical  —  than  at  any  other  time  since  the  birth  of  the 
Republic ;  and  yet  the  history  of  the  successive  min- 
istries during  the  life  of  the  present  Chamber  makes 
it  clear  with  how  little  sharpness  the  lines  are  drawn, 
and  how  little  the  members  of  the  various  groups  that 


CAUSES   OF  THE  STATE  OF  PARTIES.  101 

compose  the  majority  can  be  relied  upon  to  be  faithful 
to  the  cabinet.  In  short,  there  has  been  an  approach 
to  the  system  of  two  parties,  but  as  yet  not  a  very 
near  approach,  and  the  numerous  detached  groups  still 
remain  the  basis  of  parliamentary  life. 

So  much  for  the  actual  state  of  parties  in  France. 
Let  us  now  consider  the  reasons  for  the  sub-  Causeg  of 
divisions  of  the  Chamber  into  a  number  of  enceofSl> 
groups.     And  first  we  must  look  at  a  source  tiesuiPai" 
of  political  dissensions  with  which  we  are  not     rance' 
familiar  at  home,  but  which  is  to  be  found  in  almost 
every  nation  in  Europe. 

Few  persons  ever  ask  themselves  why  the  bodies  of 
men  who  assemble  every  year  at  the  State 

The  lack  of 

House  or  the  Capitol  have  power  to  make  apolitical 

.  .  consensus. 

laws.  It  is  not  because  they  have  more  per- 
sonal force  or  wisdom  or  virtue  than  any  one  else.  A 
congress  of  scientific  men  may  contain  all  these  quali- 
ties in  greater  abundance,  but  it  cannot  change  a  single 
line  in  the  statute-book.  Is  it  because  they  represent 
the  people?  But  we  all  know  that  they  occasionally 
pass  laws  which  the  people  do  not  want,  and  yet  we 
obey  those  laws  without  hesitation.  Moreover,  this 
answer  only  pushes  the  question  one  step  further  back, 
for  why  should  we  obey  the  people  ?  A  few  centuries 
ago  nobody  recognized  any  right  on  the  part  of  the 
people  to  govern  or  misgovern  themselves  as  they  chose, 
or  rather  on  the  part  of  the  majority  to  impose  their 
will  on  the  minority  ;  and  in  many  countries  of  the 
world  no  such  right  is  recognized  to-day.  How  does  it 
happen  that  there  is  not  a  class  of  men  among  us  who 


102  FRANCE. 

think  that  the  legislature  does  not  fairly  represent  the 
people,  or  who  think  that  the  right  to  vote  ought  to  be 
limited  by  a  certain  educational  or  property  qualifica- 
tion, or  by  the  profession  of  a  certain  creed ;  and  why 
does  not  some  such  class  of  men  get  up  a  rival  legisla- 
ture ?  The  fact  is  that,  while  we  may  differ  in  regard 
to  the  ideal  form  of  government,  we  are  all  of  one  mind 
on  the  question  of  what  government  is  entitled  to  our 
actual  allegiance,  and  we  are  all  determined  to  yield  to 
that  government  our  obedience  and  support.  In  short, 
a  common  understanding  or  consensus  in  regard  to  the 
basis  and  form  of  the  government  is  so  universal  here 
that  we  feel  as  if  it  were  natural  and  inevitable;  but 
in  all  countries  this  is  not  so.  Such  a  consensus  is  the 
foundation  of  all  political  authority,  of  all  law  and 
order ;  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  if  it  were  seriously 
questioned,  the  position  of  the  government  would  be 
shaken,  that  if  it  were  destroyed,  the  country  would 
be  plunged  into  a  state  of  anarchy.  Now  persons  who 
do  not  accept  the  consensus  on  which  the  political 
authority  of  the  day  is  based  are  termed  in  France 
Irreconcilables.  Men  of  this  sort  do  not  admit  the 
rightfulness  of  the  existing  government,  and  although 
they  may  submit  to  it  for  the  moment,  their  object 
is  to  effect  a  revolution  by  peaceful  if  not  by  violent 
means.  Hence  their  position  is  essentially  different 
from  that  of  all  other  parties,  for  these  aim  only  at 
directing  the  policy  of  the  government  within  constitu- 
tional limits,  and  can  be  intrusted  with  power  without 
danger  to  the  fundamental  institutions  of  the  nation, 
while  the  Irreconcilables,  on  the  contrary,  would  use 


LACK  OF  A  CONSENSUS.  103 

their  power  to  upset  those  institutions,  and  therefore 
cannot  be  suffered  to  get  control  of  the  state.  They 
form  an  opposition  that  is  incapable  of  taking  office, 
and  so  present  a  disturbing  element,  which  in  a  parlia- 
mentary form  of  government  throws  the  whole  system 
out  of  gear.1 

Another  thing:  to  be  noticed  about  a  consensus  is 
that  it  cannot  be  created  artificially,  but  must  A  consensus 
be  the  result  of  a  slow  growth  and  long  tra-  JSJja* 
ditions.     Its  essence  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  rapidly- 
unconscious.     The   people    of   the  United    States,  for 
example,  could  not,  by  agreement,  give  to  a  dictator  the 
power  the  Czar  wields  in  Russia,  for  except  in  the  pres- 
ence of  imminent  danger  he  would  have  no  authority 
unless  the  people  believed  in  his  inherent  right  to  rule, 
and  the  people  cannot  make  themselves  believe  in  any 
such  right  simply  by  agreeing  to  do  so.     The  The  French 
foundation  of  government  is  faith,  not  rea-  destroyed11 
son,  and  the  faith   of  a  people  is   not  vital  cafcoasen^" 
unless  they  have  been  born  with  it.2     Now,   sus" 

1  It  is  impossible  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between  what  is  revolutionary 
and  what  is  not ;  or  to  define  exactly  an  Irreconcilable.  The  matter 
depends  in  fact  upon  the  opinion  of  the  community.  Thus,  before  1886, 
Home  Rule  might  fairly  be  said  to  have  been  revolutionary,  and  the 
Irish  Home  Rulers  to  have  been  Irreconcilables ;  but  after  Mr.  Gladstone 
made  Home  Rule  a  practical  question  in  English  politics,  it  would  have 
been  absurd  to  call  Parnell's  followers  Irreconcilables. 

2  Curiously  enough  an  exception  to  this  principle,  and  almost  a  solitary 
one,  is  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  United  States.  The  generation 
that  framed  the  Constitution  looked  upon  that  document  as  very  imper- 
fect, but  they  clung  to  it  tenaciously  as  the  only  defense  against  national 
dismemberment,  and  in  order  to  make  it  popular,  they  praised  it  beyond 
their  own  belief  in  its  merits.  This  effort  to  force  themselves  to  ad- 
mire the  Constitution  was  marvelously  successful,  and  resulted,  in  the 


104  FRANCE. 

in  France,  the  Kevolution  of  1789  destroyed  all  faith  in 
the  political  institutions  of  the  past,  and  was  unable  to 
substitute  anything  else.  It  did,  indeed,  give  birth  to 
a  code  of  law,  and  to  an  administrative  system,  both  of 
which  have  taken  a  strong  hold  on  the  nation,  and  have 
survived  every  change  in  the  government.  These  are 
the  permanent  elements  in  France,  and  the  only  ones 
that  have  acquired  the  blind  force  of  tradition.  They 
supply  a  machinery  that  is  unshaken  by  political  up- 
heavals, and  it  is  this  that  has  made  it  possible  for  the 
country  to  pass  through  so  many  revolutions  without 
falling  into  a  state  of  anarchy.1  But  in  regard  to  in- 
stitutions of  a  purely  political  character,  the  nation 
has  not  been  so  fortunate,  for  the  governments  that 
followed  the  Revolution  were  not  sufficiently  durable 
to  lay  even  a  foundation  for  a  general  consensus,  and 
the  lack  of  continuity  has  so  thoroughly  prevented  the 
steady  growth  of  opinion  that  the  people  have  not 
succeeded  in  acquiring  a  political  creed.    The 

The  effect  ox 

of  this  on      result  is  that  every  form  of  government  that 

parties.  J  . 

has  existed  in  France  has  its  partisans,  who 
are  irreconcilable  under  every  other ;  while  the  great 
mass  of  the  middle  classes  and  the  peasants  have  no 
strong  political  convictions,  and  are  ready  to  support 
any  government  that  maintains  order.  Thus  the  two 
Empires  bequeathed  to  the  Republic  the  group  of  Bona- 
partists,  while  the  Monarchists  are  a  legacy  from  the 
old  regime  and  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe.     At  pres- 

next  generation,  in  a  worship  of  the  Constitution,  of  which  its  framers 
never  dreamed. 

1  Cf .  Laffitte,  pp.  208,  209. 


POLITICAL  OPINIONS  THEORETICAL.  105 

ent  it  seems  altogether  probable  that,  if  no  great 
European  crisis  occurs,  the  Right  will  end  by  accept- 
ing the  Republic,  and  if  so  the  irreconcilable  elements 
will  disappear  or  become  insignificant,  and  one  of 
the  chief  obstacles  to  the  formation  of  two  great 
parties,  one  Conservative  and  the  other  Radical,  will  be 
removed. 

But  this  is  only  one  of  several  obstacles,  and   the 
others  are  so  great  that  it  will  probably  be  a  other  causes 
long  time  before  the  system  of  groups  breaks  dLtsfonUof 
down  in  France,  or  is  replaced  by  that  of  two  parties- 
political  parties. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Frenchman  is  theoretical  rather 
than  practical  in  politics.     He  is  inclined  to 

.  ..       ,  .    .  , .        ,  .  Theoretical 

pursue  an  ideal,  striving  to  realize  his  concep-  character  of 

•  p  p  •  French 

tion  of  a  perfect  form  ot  society,  and  is  re-  political 

.  n         opinions. 

luctant  to  give  up  any  part  of  it  for  the  sake 
of  attaining  so  much  as  lies  within  his  reach.  Such 
a  tendency  naturally  gives  rise  to  a  number  of  groups, 
each  with  a  separate  ideal,  and  each  unwilling  to  make 
the  sacrifice  that  is  necessary  for  a  fusion  into  a  great 
party.  In  short,  the  intensity  of  political  sentiment 
prevents  the  development  of  real  political  issues.  To 
the  Frenchman,  public  questions  have  an  absolute 
rather  than  a  relative  or  practical  bearing,  and  there- 
fore he  cares  more  for  principles  and  opinions  than 
for  facts.  This  tendency  is  shown  in  the  programmes 
of  the  candidates,  which  are  apt  to  be  philosophic  docu- 
ments instead  of  statements  of  concrete  policy,  and, 
although  published  at  great  length,  often  give  a  com- 
paratively small  idea  of  the  position  of  the  author  on 


106  FRANCE. 

the  immediate  questions  of  the  day.1  It  is  shown  also 
in  the  newspapers,  and  the  use  that  is  made  of  them. 
An  Ano-lo-Saxon  reads  the  newspapers  chiefly  for  infor- 
mation about  current  events,  and  as  all  the  papers 
contain  very  much  the  same  news,  he  habitually  reads 
only  one.  But  the  French  papers  contain  far  less 
news,  and  as  the  Frenchman  reads  them  largely  for  the 
sake  of  the  editorials,  he  commonly  reads  several  in 
order  to  compare  the  opinions  they  express. 

It  is  partly  on  account  of  this  mental  attitude,  and 

partly  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  habit  of 
donotreI  self-government,  and  the  lack  of  sympathy 
readily  in      between  different  parts  of  the  country,  that 

the  French  do  not  organize  readily  in  politics. 
This  is  the  more  curious  because  in  military  matters 
they  organize  more  easily  than  any  other  people  in  the 
world ;  and  it  is  no  doubt  the  military  instinct,  as  well 
as  the  want  of  confidence  in  their  own  power  of  po- 
litical organization,  that  disposes  them  to  seek  a  leader 
and  follow  him  blindly  after  he  has  won   their  confi- 

1  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  85. 

Abstracts  of  all  the  electoral  programmes  issued  by  tbe  successful 
candidates  for  tbe  Chamber  of  Deputies  at  tbe  elections  of  1889  and 
1893,  together  with  the  results  of  the  ballots,  have  been  published 
by  Duguet,  under  the  title  Les  Deputes  et  les  Cahiers  Electoraux.  These 
volumes  are  very  instructive  ;  and  a  perusal  of  them  shows  that  the 
programmes  of  the  Radicals  are  much  longer  and  less  vague  than 
the  others,  but  often  demand  measures  which  lie  out  of  the  domain 
of  practical  politics,  such  as  revision  of  the  Constitution,  abolition  of 
the  Senate,  abolition  of  state  aid  to  the  churches,  confiscation  of  all 
ecclesiastical  property,  elective  judiciary,  etc.  The  programmes  give  a 
very  good  idea  of  the  candidate's  general  turn  of  mind  ;  and  those  of 
the  Radicals  may  be  said  to  contain  their  conception  of  the  ideal  state 
of  politics  or  of  society.     The  Radicals  are,  indeed,  the  only  group  among 


PARTIES  LITTLE  ORGANIZED.  107 

dence.1  The  inability  to  organize  readily  in  politics 
has  this  striking  result,  that  vehement  as  some  of  the 
groups  are,  and  passionate  as  is  their  attachment  to 
their  creeds,  they  make  little  effort  to  realize  their  aims, 
by  associating  together  their  supporters  in  all  parts  of 
the  country  for  concerted  action.  In  fact,  there  may 
be  said  to  be  no  national  party  organizations  in  France.2 
The  various  groups  into  which  the  deputies  are  divided 
have,  as  a  rule,  no  existence  whatever  outside  of  Par- 
liament, the  candidates  for  seats  merely  calling  them- 
selves in  general  terms,  Moderates,  Radicals,  Socialists, 
or  simply  Republicans  without  further  qualification,  and 
attaching  themselves  to  a  particular  group  after  the 
Chamber  has  met.  Moreover,  the  programmes,  which 
are  drawn  up  by  each  candidate  for  himself,  are  only 
individual  confessions  of  faith,  and  are  all  different,  so 
that  there  is  no  policy  which  any  party  as  a  whole  is 
pledged  to  support.  Before  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, indeed,  party  gatherings  or  banquets  take  place, 
and  speeches  are  made,  but  at  the  last  general  election, 
for  example,  no  common  platform  of  principles  was 
issued  except  by  the  Socialists.3  It  is  after  the  cam- 
paign has  begun,  however,  that  the  absence  of  party 
organization  is  most  clearly  seen.     Then  the  struggle 

the  Republicans  that  can  be  said  to  have  anything  like  a  positive  pro- 
gramme, and  this  is  the  source  both  of  their  strength  and  their  weakness. 

1  Cf.  Channes,  Letter  of  Aug.  22,  1885. 

2  Cf.  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  75  ;  Theodore  Stanton  in  the  North 
American  Rev.,  vol.  155,  p.  471.  This  contrasts  strangely  with  the  United 
States,  where  the  machinery  of  a  party  has  sometimes  shown  more 
vitality  than  its  principles. 

8  Daniel,  L'Anne'e  Politique,  1893,  pp.  254-80. 


108  FRANCE. 

is  conducted  in  each  electoral  district  with  very  little 
regard  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  and  in  fact  each 
district  appears  like  a  separate  nation  engaged  in  a 
distinct  contest  of  its  own.1  Political  effort  becomes 
localized,  and  except  for  the  candidates  themselves,  who 
confine  their  labors  to  their  constituencies,  scarcely  a 
_man  of  prominence  opens  his  mouth.2 

One    might    suppose    that,    under   a   parliamentary 
form  of  government,  party  organization  would 
French         hardly  be  required,  and  that,  as  in  England, 

political  J  l  .  '  .    '  & 

mechanism     the  need  ot  political  cohesion  would  be  to  a 

in  splitting  *■  #     m 

up  the  great  extent  supplied    by  a  strong   ministry 

parties.  °  rr  j  &  J 

that  really  led  Parliament  and  the  nation. 
But  here  we  meet  with  some  of  the  other  causes  that 
tend  to  produce  a  multiplicity  of  groups,  —  causes 
that  spring  from  certain  of  the  minor  French  institu- 
tions which  were  referred  to  in  the  beginning  of  the 
first  chapter  as  inconsistent  with  the  parliamentary 
system.  Three  of  these  are  especially  important,  —  the 
method  of  electing  deputies,  the  system  of  committees 
in  the  Chambers,  and  the  practice  of  interpellations. 
In  France  the  scruthi  de  liste,  or  the  election  of  all 

the  deputies  from  a  department  on  one  ticket, 
of  electing     and  the  scruthi  d'arrondissement,  or  the  use 

of  single  electoral  districts,  have  prevailed 
alternately,  the  latter  being  in  force  at  the  present  day. 
But  mider  both  systems  an  absolute  majority  of  all  the 
votes  cast  is  required  for  election.  If  there  are  more 
than  two  candidates  in  the  field,  and  no  one  of  them 

1  Comte  de  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  89. 

2  Theodore  Stanton,  North  Am.  Rev.,  vol.  155,  p.  473. 


METHOD   OF  CHOOSING  DEPUTIES.  109 

gets  such  a  majority,  a  second  vote,  called  the  ballotage, 
is  taken  two  weeks  later,  and  at  this  a  plurality  is 
enough  to  elect.1  Now  it  is  clear  that  such  a  procedure 
encourages  each  political  group  to  nominate  a  separate 
candidate  for  the  first  ballot.  Suppose,  for  example, 
that  there  are  Reactionary  and  Moderate  Republican 
candidates  in  the  field,  and  that  the  Radicals  prefer  the 
Republican  to  the  Reactionary,  still  they  have  nothing 
to  lose  by  running  a  candidate  of  their  own  on  the  first 
ballot,  for  if  the  Reactionary  can  poll  more  votes  than 
both  his  rivals  combined,  he  will  be  elected  in  any 
event ;  if  he  cannot,  he  will  not  be  elected  whether  the 
Radicals  put  up  a  candidate  of  their  own  or  not.  In 
this  last  case,  the  first  ballot  will  have  counted  for 
nothing,  and  the  Radicals  will  be  able  to  vote  for  the 
Moderate  Republican  at  the  ballotage,  and  elect  him 
then.  They  are  likely,  indeed,  to  gain  a  positive  advan- 
tage by  nominating  a  separate  candidate,  for  if  they 
succeed  in  polling  a  large  vote  on  the  first  ballot,  they 
are  in  an  excellent  position  to  wring  concessions  from 
the  Moderates  as  a  price  of  their  support. 

1  Law  of  June  16,  1885,  Art.  5.  (This  article  was  not  repealed  by  the 
Law  of  Feb.  13,  1889.)  By  the  same  article  a  quarter  as  many  votes  as 
there  are  voters  registered  is  required  for  election  on  the  first  ballot. 

According  to  strict  parliamentary  usage,  the  term  ballotage  is  applied 
only  to  cases  where,  at  the  final  trial,  the  voting  is  confined  by  law  to  the 
two  names  highest  on  the  poll  at  the  preceding  ballot,  but  the  word  is 
popularly  used  for  any  final  ballot  where  a  plurality  is  decisive. 

For  the  choice  of  a  senator  by  the  electoral  college  of  a  department, 
the  votes  of  a  quarter  of  the  college,  and  a  majority  of  all  the  votes 
actually  cast,  are  required  on  the  first  two  ballots,  while  on  the  third  a 
plurality  is  enough.  Law  of  August  2,  1875,  Art.  15.  The  election  of 
delegates  to  the  college  by  the  municipal  councils  is  conducted  in  the 
same  manner.    Law  of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Art.  8. 


110  FRANCE. 

Cumbrous  as  it  is,  this  system  of  voting  dates  back 
to  the  election  of  the  States  General  in  1789,  and, 
with  a  couple  of  short  breaks,  has  been  maintained  in 
France  ever  since.1  The  idea  that  a  representative 
ought  to  be  the  choice  of  a  majority  of  the  people 
seems,  indeed,  to  be  natural  in  democracies,  for  we 
find  it  put  in  practice  elsewhere.  Thus,  in  the  United 
States,  a  majority  vote  was  formerly  very  commonly 
required  for  election,  but  it  is  instructive  to  notice  that 
it  was  found  to  hinder  the  smooth  working  of  two 
political  parties,  and  has  been  generally  though  not 
quite  universally  abandoned.'2  The  fact  that  election  by 
majority  did  not  give  rise  to  a  multiplicity  of  parties  in 
America  shows  that  by  itself  it  does  not  produce  that 
result,  where  the  other  influences  favor  the  development 
of  two  parties  ;  but  it  is  nevertheless  clear  that  where 
a  number  of  groups  exist,  it  tends  to  foster  them,  and 
prevent  their  fusing  into  larger  bodies.3  The  French 
system  has  been  praised  on  the  ground  that  it  saves 
the  people  from  the  yoke  of  huge  party  machines,  and 

1  Poudra  et  Pierre,  liv.  ii.  ch.  vii. 

3  Stimson,  Am.  Statute  Law,  §  232.  In  Massachusetts,  election  by  plu- 
rality was  introduced  in  1855.  Const,  of  Mass.,  Amendments,  Art.  xiv. 
For  the  previous  law,  see  Const,  pt.  ii.  ch.  i.  sec.  n.  Art.  iv.  ;  ch.  ii.  sec.  I. 
Art.  iii.  ;  sec.  n.  Art.  i.  ;  Rev.  Stats,  ch.  iv.  sec.  xni. 

3  At  the  elections  of  1885,  which  were  held  under  the  system  of 
scrulin  de  liste,  there  were  two  Republican  lists  of  candidates  in  almost  all 
the  departments.  G.  Channes,  Letter  of  Oct.  30,  1S85.  At  the  elections 
of  1889  and  1893,  held  under  the  scrutin  d'arrondissement,  there  were  two 
Republican  candidates  in  a  large  proportion  of  the  districts,  the  total 
number  of  candidates  for  a  single  seat  running  as  high  as  ten.  Dugnet, 
Les  Deputes  et  les  Cahiers  Electoraux  en  1889  ;  Id.,  1893.  And  see  Tableau 
des  Elections  a  la  Chambre  des  Deputes,  dresse  aux  Archives  de  la  Chambre. 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  COMMITTEES.  Ill 

enables  them  to  select  their  candidates  more  freely.1 
This  is  true,  and  it  is  a  great  advantage.  But  the 
converse  is  also  true ;  the  system  tends  to  prevent  the 
formation  of  great  consolidated  parties,  and  that  is 
the  evil  from  which  parliamentary  government  suffers 
in  France  to-day.2 

The  system  of  committees  in  the  Chambers  is  a  still 
more  important  matter.     Each  of  the  French  The  system 
chambers  is  divided  into  sections  called  Bit-  tfes°mThe 
reaux,  of  which  there  are  nine  in  the  Senate  Chambers- 
and  eleven  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.3    The  Bureaux 
are  of  equal   size,  and  every  member  of  the  Chamber 
belongs  to  one  and  only  one  of  them,  the  division  being 
made  afresh  every  month  by  lot.     This  is   a  very  old 
institution  in  France,  a  relic  of  a  time  before  parliament- 
ary government  had  been  thought  of ;  for  not  only  do 
we  find  it  in  the  Assembly  of  Notables  and  the  States 
General  that  met  on  the  eve  of  the  Revolution,4  but  it 

1  Alfred  Naquet,  "The  French  Electoral  System,"  in  the  North  Am. 
Rev.,  vol.  155,  pp.  467-68. 

2  It  is  not  a  little  curious  that  just  at  this  time,  when  the  English  system 
of  two  parties  is  thought  by  many  people  to  be  in  danger  of  breaking  up, 
a  motion  should  be  made  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  introduce  election 
by  majority  vote  and  second  ballot.  Such  a  motion  was  made  by  Mr. 
Dalziel  on  April  5,  1895. 

3  For  the  constitution  of  the  Bureaux  and  the  election  of  the  commit- 
tees, see  Poudra  et  Pierre,  liv.  v.  chs.  ii.  and  iii.  ;  Reginald  Dickinson, 
Summary  of  the  Constitution  and  Procedure  of  Foreign  Parliaments,  2d 
ed.  pp.  363-66. 

These  Bureaux  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  Bureau  of  the  Cham- 
ber, which  consists  of  the  President,  the  Vice-Presidents,  and  the  Sec- 
retaries. The  habit  in  France  of  using  the  same  word  with  different 
meanings  is  liable  to  be  the  source  of  no  little  confusion  to  the  students 
of  her  institutions. 

4  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  976. 


112  FRANCE. 

existed  in  the  ecclesiastical  assemblies,  and  to  some 
extent  in  the  States  General,  at  a  much  earlier  date.1 
The  use  of  the  lot  is,  indeed,  a  survival  from  the  Mid- 
dle Ages,  when  it  was  a  common  method  of  selecting 
officials.2  The  Bureaux  meet  separately  and  have  three 
functions.  The  first  is  that  of  making  a  preliminary 
examination  of  the  credentials  of  members  of  the  Cham- 
ber, which  are  divided  among  them  for  the  purpose. 
The  second  is  that  of  holding  a  preliminary  discussion 
on  bills  brought  into  the  Chamber,  before  they  are 
referred  to  a  committee ;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  this 
discussion  is  perfunctory,  and  is  limited  to  finding  out 
in  a  general  way  what  members  of  the  Bureau  favor 
or  oppose  the  bill.3  The  third  and  most  important 
function  of  the  Bureaux  is  the  election  of  committees, 
for  with  rare  exceptions  all  the  committees  of  both 
Chambers  are  selected  in  the  same  way.  Each  of  the 
Bureaux  chooses  one  of  its  own  members,  and  the  per- 
sons so  elected  together  constitute  the  committee.  In 
the  case  of  the  more  important  committees  it  is  some- 
times desirable  to  have  a  larger  number  of  members, 
and  if  so  the  Bureaux  choose  in  like  manner  two  or 
even  three  members  apiece,  —  the  Chamber  in  each  case 

1  Sciout,  Histoire  de  la  Constitution  Civile  du  Clerge,  p.  36.  While 
writing,  a  friend  has  pointed  out  to  me  that  the  States  General  which  met 
at  Tours  in  1484  was  divided  into  six  sections  by  provinces.  See  a  jour- 
nal of  this  body  by  Jehan  Masselin,  in  the  Collection  de  Documents  inedits 
sur  V Histoire  de  France  publies  par  ordre  du  Roi,  Paris,  1835,  pp.  66-73. 

2  The  chief  relic  of  the  lot  left  in  Anglo-Saxon  institutions  is,  of  course, 
its  use  in  the  selection  of  the  jury,  —  a  survival  which  is  due  to  the  fact 
already  pointed  out,  that  the  English  royal  justice  developed  at  an  early 
period. 

8  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  p.  404. 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  COMMITTEES.  113 

directing,  by  its  rules  or  by  special  vote,  the  number  of 
members  to  be  elected.  Thus  the  committee  on  the 
budget,  which  is  the  most  important  one  of  the  year, 
consists  of  three  members  chosen  by  each  of  the 
Bureaux  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  contains, 
therefore,  thirty-three  members ;  while  the  correspond- 
ing committee  in  the  Senate  contains  eighteen  members, 
or  two  from  each  Bureau. 

The  committee  on  the  budget  and  the  one  appointed 
to  audit  the  accounts  of  the  government  are  permanent, 
and  remain  unchanged  for  a  year.  A  few  of  the  others 
(those  on  local  affairs,  on  petitions,  on  leave  of  absence, 
and  on  granting  permission  to  members  of  parliament 
to  introduce  bills)  serve  for  a  month  and  then  are 
chosen  afresh.  With  these  exceptions  every  measure 
is  in  theory  referred  to  a  special  committee  elected  by 
the  Bureaux  for  the  purpose ;  but  as  there  are  certain 
to  be  in  every  session  a  number  of  bills  that  cover 
very  much  the  same  ground,  a  rigid  application  of  this 
principle  would  result  in  inconsistent  reports  on  the 
same  matter  by  different  committees,  and  would  throw 
the  work  of  the  Chamber  into  utter  confusion.  A  prac- 
tice has,  therefore,  grown  up  of  treating  certain  com- 
mittees —  such  as  those  on  the  army,  on  labor,  and  on 
railroads  —  as  virtually  permanent,  and  referring  to 
them  all  bills  on  their  respective  subjects.1 

We  have  seen  that  with  rare  exceptions  all  committees, 
whether  permanent,  temporary,  or  special,  are  elected  by 
the  Bureaux,  but  these  last,  being  created  anew  every 
month,  acquire  no  corporate  feeling,  and  hence  have 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  385-86. 


114  FRANCE. 

no  real  leaders.  Owing  partly  to  this  fact  they  do  not 
choose  freely,  and  the  chief  of  the  parliamentary  groups 
meet  and  barter  away  the  places  on  the  important  com- 
mittees, which  are  thus  cut  and  dried  beforehand.1  But 
whether  the  choice  of  committee-men  is  really  made  by 
the  Bureaux  or  dictated  by  the  chiefs  of  the  groups, 
the  main  point  to  notice  is  that  the  system  is  entirely 
inconsistent  with  the  parliamentary  form  of  government. 
The  cabinet  cannot  exert  the  same  influence  over  an 
election  conducted  in  this  way  that  it  could  over  one 
made  by  the  Chamber  in  open  session.  In  the  latter 
case  it  might  insist  on  the  choice  of  a  majority  of  the 
committee  from  among  its  own  friends,  and  make  of 
the  matter  a  cabinet  question ;  but  it  cannot  treat  the 
failure  of  several  irresponsible  sections  of  the  Chamber 
to  act  in  accordance  with  its  wishes  as  an  expression  of 
want  of  confidence  by  the  Chamber  as  a  whole.  The 
result  is  that  the  committees  are  not  nominated  by  the 
cabinet,  or  necessarily  in  sympathy  with  it ;  and  yet  all 
measures,  including  those  proposed  by  the  government, 
are  referred  to  them  to  revise  as  they  think  best.  Now 
if  the  ministers  are  to  be  responsible  for  directing  the 
work  of  the  Chamber,  they  ought  to  have  a  policy  of 
their  own  and  stand  or  fall  on  that.  They  ought  to  be 
at  liberty  to  determine  their  own  course  of  action,  and 
to  present  their  measures  to  Parliament  in  a  form  that 
they  entirely  approve.  But  if  a  committee  has  power 
to  amend  government  bills,  the  ministers  must  either 
assume  the  burden  of  trying  to  persuade  the  Chamber 
to  reverse  the  amendments,  with  all  the  influence  of  the 

1  Cf.  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  pp.  41,  241. 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  COMMITTEES.  115 

committee  against  them;  or  they  must  take  the  risk 
of  opposing  the  bill  as  reported,  although  they  still 
approve  of  many  of  its  features ;  or  finally  they  must 
accept  the  bill  as  it  stands,  and  become  responsible  for 
a  measure  with  which  they  are  not  themselves  fully 
satisfied.  The  committees  in  fact  use  their  power  with- 
out shrinking,  and  the  annual  budget,  for  example,  has 
been  compared  to  a  tennis-ball  sent  backward  and 
forward  between  the  minister  and  the  committee  until 
a  compromise  can  be  reached.1 

M.  Dupriez,  in  his  excellent  work  on  the  ministers 
in  the  principal  countries  of  Europe  and  America, 
paints  in  very  strong  colors  the  evils  of  the  French 
committee  system.  He  points  out  how  little  influence 
the  ministers  have  with  the  committees,  who  often 
regard  them  almost  as  the  representatives  of  a  hos- 
tile power  in  the  state.2  He  shows  that  while  the 
ministers  have  no  right  to  be  present  at  committee 
meetings,  and  are  invited  to  attend  only  when  they 
wish  to  express  their  views,  the  committees  claim  a 
right  to  examine  the  administrative  offices,  insist  on 
seeing  books  and  papers,  and  volunteer  advice.3  So 
little  respect,  indeed,  do  the  committees  pay  to  the 
opinions  of  the  cabinet,  and  so  freely  do  they  amend 
its  bills,  that,  as  M.  Dupriez  sarcastically  remarks,  the 
government  and  the  committee  are  never  in  perfect 
accord  except  when  the  former  submits  to  the  latter.4 
He    says,  moreover,  that   when    a   bill   comes  up  for 

1  Simon,  Souviens  toi  du  Deux  Decembre,  p.  314. 

2  Vol.  ii.  pp.  40G-7.  8  Id.,  pp.  395,  405,  423-24,  438-39. 
4  Id.,  pp.  405-6,  412. 


116  FRANCE. 

debate  the  reporter  of  the  committee  is  a  rival  who 
has  great  influence  with  the  Chamber,  while  the  depu- 
ties are  inclined  to  regard  the  ministers  with  jealousy 
and  defiance.1  Nor  do  the  woes  of  the  cabinet  end 
here,  for  its  authority  is  reduced  to  so  low  a  point  that 
its  bills  are  quite  freely  amended  during  the  debate  on 
the  motion  of  individual  deputies.2 

Of  all  the  committees,  the  most  domineering  and  vex- 
atious is  that  on  the  budget.  This  committee  seems  to 
take  pride  in  criticising  the  estimates  and  making  them 
over,  both  as  regards  income  and  expenditures,  while 
each  member  exerts  himself  to  add  appropriations  for 
the  benefit  of  his  own  constituents,  so  that  when  the 
report  is  finally  made  the  government  can  hardly  recog- 
nize its  own  work.3  In  strong  contrast  with  all  this 
is  Dupriez's  description  of  the  procedure  on  the  budget 
in  England.4  There  the  authority  of  the  ministers  is 
expressly  protected  by  a  standing  order  of  the  House  of 
Commons  to  the  effect  that  no  petition  or  motion  for 
the  expenditure  of  the  public  revenue  shall  be  enter- 
tained except  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Crown ; 
and  in  accordance  with  a  firmly  established  practice 
proposals  for  national  taxes  originate  only  with  the 
government.  In  regard  to  amendments  of  the  budget, 
members  of  the  House  may  move  to  diminish,  but 
not  to  increase  an  appropriation,  and  as  a  matter  of 
fact  the  budget  is  rarely  amended  by  the  House  at  all. 
The  comparison  of  the  English  and  French  methods  of 
dealing  with  the  budget  goes  far  to  explain  the  differ- 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.,  p.  411.  s  /^  pp.  425-26. 

2  Id.,  p.  412.  4  Id>  vol<  L  pp<  iio_12. 


INTERPELLATIONS.  117 

ence  in  the  position  of  the  two  cabinets.  Such  a  state 
of  things  as  exists  in  France  cannot  fail  to  lessen  the 
authority  and  dignity  of  the  ministers,  and  place  them 
at  the  mercy  of  the  committees.  It  prevents  them 
from  framing  their  own  programme,  and  insisting  that 
the  deputies  shall  accept  or  reject  it  as  it  stands ; 
and  thus,  instead  of  compelling  the  majority  to  act 
solidly  together  under  the  leadership  of  the  cabinet,  it 
allows  any  deputy  to  use  his  place  on  a  committee  as  a 
means  of  urging  his  own  personal  views.  Hence  it 
tends  to  dislocate  the  majority  and  break  it  into  sec- 
tions, with  policies  more  or  less  out  of  harmony  with 
each  other.  While,  therefore,  the  French  scheme  of  com- 
mittees has  good  points,  and  some  features  that  might 
be  very  valuable  under  another  form  of  government,  it 
is  clearly  incompatible  with  the  parliamentary  system.1 

The  habit  of  addressing  interpellations  to  the  min- 
isters has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  stability  of  interpella. 
the  cabinet  and  the  subdivision  of  parties ;  tlons' 
for  it  cannot  be  repeated  too  often  that  these  things 
are  inseparable.  The  existence  of  the  ministry  depends 
on  the  support  of  the  majority,  and  if  that  is  compact 
and  harmonious,  the  ministry  will  be  strong  and 
durable  ;  if  not,  it  will  be  feeble  and  short-lived.  The 
converse  is  also  true.  The  cohesive  force  that  unites 
the  majority  is  loyalty  to  the  cabinet  and  submission 
to  its  guidance,  but  if  the  cabinets  are  weak,  or  are 
constantly  overthrown  at  short  intervals,  they  cannot 

1  Lebon,  V ' Allemagne,  p.  88,  remarks  that  the  Bureaux  in  the  French 
Chamber  were  intended  to  subdivide  the  factions,  and  accomplish  this 
only  too  well. 


118  FRANCE. 

acquire  the  authority  that  is  necessary  to  lead  the 
majority  and  weld  it  into  a  single  party.  This  is 
especially  the  case  when  the  crises  occur  over  matters 
which  are  not  of  vital  consequence  to  the  bulk  of  the 
followers  of  the  government,  and  yet  that  is  precisely 
the  state  of  things  that  interpellations  tend  to  create. 

It  is  of  the  essence  of  parliamentary  government 
that  the  majority  should  support  the  ministers  so  long, 
and  only  so  long,  as  it  approves  of  their  course,  and  this 
means  their  course  as  a  whole,  in  administration  as  well 
as  in  legislation ;  for  parliament,  having  the  fate  of  the 
ministers  in  its  hands,  holds  them  responsible  for  all 
their  acts,  and  has  gradually  extended  its  supervision 
over  the  whole  field  of  government.  Now  a  parliament 
can  judge  of  the  legislative  policy  of  -tlie  cabinet  by 
the  bills  it  introduces,  but  it  is  not  so  easy  to  get 
the  information  necessary  for  a  sound  opinion  on  the 
efficiency  of  the  administration.  It  is  largely  to  satisfy 
this  need  that  a  practice  has  grown  up  in  the  House  of 
Commons  of  asking  the  ministers  questions,  which 
may  relate  to  any  conceivable  subject,  and  afford  a 
means  of  putting  the  cabinet  through  a  very  searching 
examination.  Of  course  the  privilege  is  freely  used  to 
harass  the  government,  but  the  answer  is  not  followed 
by  a  general  debate,  or  by  a  vote,  except  in  the  un- 
usual case  where  a  motion  to  adjourn  is  made  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  the  matter  under  discussion.1 

1  The  motion  to  adjourn  is  the  only  one  that  is  in  order,  and  since 
1882  its  use  has  heen  carefully  limited.  May,  Pari.  Practice,  10th  ed. 
p.  240  et  seq.  In  this  form  or  some  other  a  vote  is  occasionally  taken 
on  a  single  detail  of  administration.  The  most  famous  instances  of  late 
years  have   been  the  affair  of  Miss  Cass  in  1887,  where  the  House  of 


INTERPELLATIONS.  119 

A  similar  practice  has  been  adopted  in  France,  and 
questions  are  addressed  to  the  ministers  by  members 
who  really  want  information.  But  another  kind  of 
question  has  also  developed,  which  is  used  not  to  get 
information,  but  to  call  the  cabinet  to  account,  and 
force  the  Chamber  to  pass  judgment  upon  its  con- 
duct. This  is  the  interpellation.1  In  form  it  is  similar 
to  the  question,  but  the  procedure  in  the  two  cases 
is  quite  different.  A  question  can  be  addressed  to  a 
minister  only  with  his  consent,  whereas  the  interpel- 
lation is  a  matter  of  right,  which  any  deputy  may 
exercise,  without  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  cabinet. 
The  time,  moreover,  when  it  shall  be  made  is  fixed  by 
the  Chamber  itself,  and  except  in  matters  relating  to 
foreign  affairs,  the  date  cannot  be  set  more  than  a 
month  ahead.  But  by  far  the  most  important  differ- 
ence consists  in  the  fact  that  the  author  of  the  question 
can  alone  reply  to  the  minister,  no  further  discussion 
being  permitted,  and  no  motion  being  in  order ;  while 
the  interpellation  is  followed  both  by  a  general  debate 
and  by  motions.     These  are  in  the  form  of  motions  to 

Commons  expressed  its  disapproval  of  the  government's  refusal  to  make 
an  inquiry  by  voting  to  adjourn,  but  where  no  member  of  the  cabinet  felt 
obliged  to  resign  ;  and  the  recent  defeat  of  Lord  Rosebery's  ministry. 
In  the  last  case  a  motion  was  made  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  the  lack  of  a  sufficient 
supply  of  ammunition,  and  the  motion  was  carried  ;  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  cabinet  would  not  have  resigned  if  its  position  had  not 
already  been  hopeless. 

In  the  House  of  Lords  questions  can  always  be  debated.     May,  p.  206. 

1  For  the  rules  and  practice  in  the  case  of  questions,  see  Poudra  et  Pierre, 
liv.  vii.  ch.  iii.,  and  Supp.  1879-80,  §  1539.  In  the  case  of  interpellations, 
Id.,  liv.  vii.  ch.  iv. 


120  FRANCE. 

pass  to  the  order  of  the  day,  and  may  be  orders  of  the 
day  pure  and  simple,  as  they  are  called,  which  contain 
no  expression  of  oj)inion,  or  they  may  be  what  are 
termed  orders  of  the  day  with  a  motive,  such  as  "  the 
Chamber,  approving  the  declarations  of  the  Govern- 
ment, passes  to  the  order  of  the  day."  Several  orders 
of  this  kind  are  often  moved,  and  they  are  put  to  the 
vote  in  succession.  The  ministers  select  one  of  them 
(usually  one  proposed  by  their  friends  for  the  purpose), 
and  declare  that  they  will  accept  that.  If  it  is  rejected 
by  the  Chamber,  or  if  a  hostile  order  of  the  day  is 
adopted,  and  the  matter  is  thought  to  be  of  sufficient  im- 
portance, the  cabinet  resigns.  This  is  a  very  common 
way  of  upsetting  a  ministry,  but  it  is  one  which  puts 
the  cabinet  in  a  position  of  great  disadvantage,  for  a 
government  would  be  superhuman  that  never  made 
mistakes,  and  yet  here  is  a  method  by  which  any  of  its 
acts  can  be  brought  before  the  Chamber,  and  a  vote 
forced  on  the  question  whether  it  made  a  mistake  or 
not.  Moreover,  members  of  the  opposition  are  given 
a  chance  to  employ  their  ingenuity  in  framing  orders 
of  the  day  so  as  to  catch  the  votes  of  those  deputies 
who  are  in  sympathy  with  the  cabinet,  but  cannot 
approve  of  the  act  in  question.1     Now  if  adverse  votes 

1  A  very  good  example  of  the  various  shades  of  praise  or  blame  that 
may  be  expressed  by  orders  of  the  day  can  be  found  in  the  Journal 
Officiel  for  July  9,  1893.  There  had  been  a  riot  in  Paris,  which  had 
not  been  suppressed  without  violence  and  even  bloodshed.  The  police 
were  accused  of  wanton  brutality,  and  an  interpellation  on  the  subject 
was  debated  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  July  8.  The  order  of  the 
day  quoted  in  the  text,  "  The  Chamber,  approving  the  declarations  of  the 
government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day,"  was  adopted,  but  the  follow- 
ing were  also  moved  :  — 


INTERPELLATIONS.  121 

in  the  Chamber  are  to  be  followed  by  the  resignation  of 
the  cabinet  and  the  formation  of  a  new  one,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  to  secure  the  proper  stability  and  permanence 
in  the  ministry,  such  votes  ought  to  be  taken  only  on 
measures  of  really  great  importance,  or  on  questions 
that   involve   the   whole    policy    and   conduct    of   the 

"The  Chamber,  disapproving  the  acts  of  brutality  of  which  the  police 
have  been  guilty,  requests  the  government  to  give  to  the  police  instruc- 
tions and  orders  more  conformable  to  the  laws  of  justice  and  humanity." 

"  The  Chamber,  disapproving  the  proceedings  of  the  police,  passes  to 
the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  approving  the  declarations  of  the  government,  and  per- 
suaded that  it  will  take  measures  to  prevent  the  violence  of  the  police 
officials,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  censuring  the  policy  of  provocation  and  reaction  on  the 
part  of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  hoping  that  the  government  will  give  a  prompt  and 
legitimate  satisfaction  to  public  opinion,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  Considering  that  the  government  has  acknowledged  from  the  tribune 
that  its  policy  has  caused  in  Paris  '  sad  occurrences,'  '  deeds  that  must 
certainly  be  regretted,'  and  'some  acts  of  brutality,'  the  Chamber  takes 
notice  of  the  admission  of  the  President  of  the  Council,  demands  that  the 
exercise  of  power  shall  be  inspired  by  the  indefeasible  sentiments  of  jus- 
tice, of  foresight,  and  of  humanity,  and  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  convinced  that  the  government  of  the  Republic  ought 
to  make  the  law  respected  and  maintain  order,  approving  the  declarations 
of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  regretting  the  acts  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the 
police,  and  taking  notice  of  the  declarations  of  the  government,  passes  to 
the  order  of  the  day." 

"The  Chamber,  approving  the  declaration  whereby  the  government 
has  announced  its  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  practices  and  habits  of  the 
police  which  have  been  pointed  out,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  causing  the  laws  to  be 
respected  by  all  citizens,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

In  this  case,  by  voting  priority  for  the  first  of  these  motions  and 
adopting  it,  the  Chamber  avoided  the  snares  prepared  for  it  by  the  in- 
genious wording  of  the  others. 


122  FRANCE. 

administration.  It  is  evident  also  that  they  ought  not 
to  be  taken  hastily,  or  under  excitement,  but  only  after 
the  Chamber  has  deliberately  made  up  its  mind  that  it 
disapproves  of  the  cabinet,  and  that  the  country  would 
on  the. whole  be  benefited  by  a  change  of  ministers. 
The  reverse  of  all  this  is  true  of  the  French  system  of 
interpellations,  and  a  cabinet  which  in  the  morning 
sees  no  danger  ahead,  and  enjoys  the  confidence  of  the 
Chamber  and  the  nation,  may  be  upset  before  nightfall 
by  a  vote  provoked  in  a  moment  of  excitement  on  a 
matter  of  secondary  importance. 

The  frequency  with  which  interpellations  are  used  to 
upset  the  cabinet  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  out  of 
the  twenty-one  ministries  that  have  resigned  in  conse- 
quence of  a  vote  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  since  the 
cabinet  has  been  responsible,  ten  have  fallen  on  account 
of  orders  of  the  day  moved  after  an  interpellation,  or  in 
the  course  of  debate.1  Several  of  these  orders  covered, 
indeed,  the  general  policy  of  the  cabinet,  but  others  — 
like  the  one  relating  to  the  attendance  of  the  employees 
of  the  state  railroads  at  a  congress  of  labor  unions, 
which  occasioned  the  resignation  of  Casimir-Perier's  min- 
istry in  May,  1894  —  had  no  such  broad  significance. 

1  Cf .  Haucour,  Gouv.  et  Min.;  Muel,  Gouv., Min.  et  Const.  Among  the 
resignations  brought  about  in  this  way,  I  have  counted  that  of  Rouvier's 
cabinet  in  1887,  although  this  was  caused  not  by  the  vote  of  an  order  of 
the  day,  but  by  the  refusal  of  the  Chamber  to  postpone  the  debate  on  an 
interpellation,  and  although  the  cabinet  continued  to  hold  office  for  a 
few  days  pending  the  resignation  of  President  Gre'vy.  The  proportion  of 
ministries  that  fall  on  orders  of  the  day  seems  to  be  increasing,  for  of  the 
last  six  crises  caused  by  a  vote  of  the  Chamber,  five  were  due  to  orders  of 
the  day ;  and  of  these  the  last  three  at  least  did  not  involve  the  general 
policy  of  the  government. 


INTERPELLATIONS.  123 

Moreover,  the  production  of  actual  cabinet  crises  is  by 
no  means  the  whole  evil  caused  by  interpellations.  The 
enfeebling  of  the  authority  of  the  ministers  by  hostile 
votes  about  affairs  on  which  they  do  not  feel  bound 
to  stake  their  office  is,  perhaps,  an  even  more  serious 
matter,  for  no  cabinet  can  retain  the  prestige  that  is 
necessary  to  lead  the  Chambers  in  a  parliamentary  gov- 
ernment, if  it  is  to  be  constantly  censured  and  put  in  a 
minority  even  in  questions  of  detail.  The  ministers  are 
not  obliged,  it  is  true,  to  answer  interpellations,1  but 
unless  some  reason  of  state  can  be  given  for  refusing, 
such  as  that  an  answer  would  prejudice  diplomatic 
negotiations,  a  refusal  would  amount  to  a  confession  of 
error,  or  would  indicate  a  desire  to  conceal  the  fact,  and 
would  weaken  very  much  the  position  of  the  cabinet. 

The  large  part  that  interpellations  play  in  French 
politics  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  they  arouse  more  pop- 
ular interest  than  the  speeches  on  great  measures ; 2  and, 
indeed,  the  most  valuable  quality  for  a  minister  to  pos- 
sess is  a  ready  tact  and  quick  wit  in  answering  them.3 

The  first  two  institutions  referred  to  as  not  in  har- 
mony with  parliamentary  government  —  that  is,  the 
method  of  electing  deputies  and  the  system  of  com- 
mittees in  the  Chambers — have  real  merit.  Both  tend 
to  check  the  tyranny  of  party,  and  under  a  form  of 
government  where  the  existence  of  two  great  parties 
was  not  essential,  they  might  be  very  valuable.  But, 
except  in  a  despotism,  the  interpellation  followed  by  a 
motion  expressing  the  judgment  of  the  Chamber  is  a 

1  Poudra  ct  Pierre,  §  1555.  2  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  p.  27. 

8  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  379. 


124  FRANCE. 

purely  vicious  institution.  It  furnishes  the  politicians 
with  an  admirable  opportunity  for  a  display  of  parlia- 
mentary fireworks ;  but  it  is  hard  to  see  how,  under  any 
form  of  popular  government,  it  could  fail  to  be  mis- 
chievous, or  serve  any  useful  purpose  that  would  not 
be  much  better  accomplished  by  a  question  followed  by 
no  motion  and  no  vote.  The  plausible  suggestion  has 
been  made  that  the  administration,  being  free  from 
supervision  by  the  courts  of  law,  can  be  brought  to 
account  for  its  acts  only  in  this  way ;  -1  but  surely  the 
same  result  could  be  as  well  accomplished  by  the 
simpler  process  of  the  question,  and  it  is  hard  to  see 
any  reason  for  imperiling  the  existence  or  the  prestige 
of  the  cabinet  to  rectify  some  matter  of  trifling  conse- 
T  ,  quence.     The    practice    arose   from  the  fact 

Jealousy  J-  *■ 

and  distrust    that,  owing;   to  the  immense   power    of    the 

oi  the  minis-  "  o  I 

part°of  tht  executive  in  France,  and  the  frequency  with 
Chamber.  which  that  power  has  been  used  despotically, 
the  legislature  has  acquired  the  habit  of  looking  on  the 
cabinet  officers  as  natural  enemies,  to  be  attacked  and 
harassed  as  much  as  possible.2     But  such  a  view,  which 

1  See  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  Re'forrne  Administrative  —  La  Justice," 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June  1,  1889,  pp.  595-96. 

2  M.  Dupriez,  in  the  work  already  cited  (vol.  ii.  p.  253  et  seq.~),  has 
explained  the  strength  of  this  feeling  by  a  most  valuable  study  of  the 
history  of  the  relations  between  the  ministers  and  the  legislature  in 
France.  He  points  out  that  it  existed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution, 
for  the  cahiers  or  statements  of  grievances  prepared  by  the  meetings  of 
electors  held  to  choose  members  of  the  States  General  in  1789  express  a 
widespread  dislike  and  distrust  of  all  ministers  as  such.  He  then  shows 
how  the  Constituent  Assembly  tried  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  ministers, 
and  reduce  their  functions  to  a  simple  execution  of  its  own  orders.  It  is 
unnecessary  here  to  follow  the  subject  in  detail.  It  is  enough  to  remark 
that  a  large  part  of  the  political  history  of  France  since  the  Revolution 


INTERPELLATIONS.  125 

is  defensible  enough  when  the  ministers  are  independ- 
ent of  the  Parliament,  becomes  irrational  when  they  are 
responsible  to  it,  and  bound  to  resign  on  an  adverse  vote. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  development  of  inter- 
pellations has  coincided  very  closely  with  that  of  parlia- 
mentary government ; *  and,  in  fact,  the  French  regard 
the  privilege  as  one  of  the  main  bulwarks  of  political 
liberty.  It  is  this  same  feeling  of  antagonism  to  the 
government  that  has  given  rise  to  the  overweening 
power  of  the  committees  in  the  Chamber,  and  their 
desire  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the  ministers.  The 
extent  to  which  this  feeling  is  carried  by  the  Radicals 
is  shown  by  the  proposal  made  a  few  years  ago  to 
divide  the  whole  Chamber  into  a  small  number  of  per- 
manent grand  committees,  such  as  existed  in  1848,  in 
order  to  bring  the  ministers  even  more  completely 
under  the  control  of  the  deputies ;  the  ideal  of  the 
Extreme  Radicals  being  the  revolutionary  convention, 
which  drew  all  the  powers  of  the  state  as  directly  and 
absolutely  as  possible  into  its  own  hands.2     The  less 

is  filled  with  struggles  for  power  between  the  executive  and  the  legisla- 
ture, in  which  the  former  has  twice  won  a  complete  victory,  and  deprived 
the  representatives  of  the  people  of  all  influence  in  the  state.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  suspicion  and  jealousy  of  the  cabinet  shown  by 
Liberal  statesmen  is  not  surprising. 

1  The  practice  was  first  regularly  established  at  the  accession  of  Louis 
Philippe,  the  period  when  cabinets  became  thoroughly  responsible  to  the 
Chamber  ;  and  it  was  freely  used  during  the  Republic  of  1848.  After  the 
Coup  d'Etat  it  was,  of  course,  abolished  ;  but  toward  the  end  of  his  reign 
Napoleon  III.,  as  a  part  of  his  concessions  to  the  demand  for  parliamentary 
institutions,  gradually  restored  the  right  of  interpellation.  Finally,  under 
the  present  Republic  the  right  has  been  used  more  frequently  than  ever 
before.   See  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §§  1544-49;  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  305, 317-18. 

2  Cf.  De  la  Berge,  "  Les  Grands  Comite's  Parlementaires,"  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  1,  1889. 


126  FRANCE. 

violent  Republicans  are,  no  doubt,  very  far  from  accept- 
in  o*  any  such  ideal,  but  still  they  cannot  shake  out  of 
their  minds  the  spirit  of  hostility  to  the  administration 
which  has  been  nurtured  by  long  periods  of  absolute 
rule.  They  fail  to  realize  that  when  the  ministry 
becomes  responsible  to  the  deputies,  the  relations  be- 
tween the  executive  and  the  legislature  are  radically 
changed.  The  parliamentary  system  requires  an  entire 
harmony,  a  cordial  sympathy,  and  a  close  cooperation 
between  the  ministers  and  the  Chamber;  and,  to  the 
obligation  on  the  part  of  the  cabinet  to  resign  when  the 
majority  withdraws  its  approval,  there  corresponds  a 
duty  on  the  part  of  the  majority  to  support  the  min- 
isters heartily  so  long  as  they  remain  in  office.  Par- 
liamentary government,  therefore,  cannot  be  really 
successful  in  France  until  a  spirit  of  mutual  confidence 
between  the  cabinet  and  the  Chamber  replaces  the 
jealousy  and  distrust  that  now  prevail. 

A  comparison  of  the  political  history  of  France  and 
~  England  during"  the  last  few  years  shows  to 

Comparison  o  o  j 

French  what  extent  the  French  procedure  interferes 
?893™ndrthe  w^n  discipline  and  disintegrates  the  parties. 
Uament  of""  In  England  the  Liberals  came  into  power  after 
the  elections  of  1892  with  a  small  majority 
in  the  House  of  Commons ;  and,  although  the  sup- 
porters of- '-the  government  were  far  from  harmonious, 
were,  in  fact,  jealous  of  each  other  and  interested  in 
quite  different  measures',  the  perfection  of  the  parlia- 
mentary machinery  enabled  the  ministers  to  keep  their 
followers  together  and  maintain  themselves  in  office 
for  three   years.     In  France,  on  the  other  hand,  the 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  STATE  OF  PARTIES.  127 

elections  of  1893  produced  a  majority  which,  if  not 
so  large,  was  far  more  homogeneous ;  and  indeed,  if  we 
compare  the  position  of  some  of  the  outlying  groups 
with  that  of  certain  sections  of  the  English  Liberal 
party,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  majority  in  France  was 
both  larger  and  more  homogeneous.  Yet  within  two 
years  this  majority  suffered  three  cabinets  which  rep- 
resented it  to  be  overthrown  on  interpellations  about 
matters  of  secondary  importance,  and  finally  became 
so  thoroughly  disorganized  that  it  lost  control  of  the 
situation  altogether. 

We  have  surveyed  some  of  the  causes  of  the  condi- 
tion  of  political  parties  in  France.     Let   us  Resuitsof 
now  trace  a  few  of  its  results.    In  the  first  Jon^f1^ 
place,  the  presence  of  the   Reactionaries  de-  parties- 
prives    cabinet    crises  of  the    significance    they  might 
otherwise  possess.     The    defeat  of  the  min-   _  . 

— *  Owing  to  the 

isters   does    not  ordinarily  mean  the  advent  presence  of 

•>  the  reac- 

to  power  of  a  different  party,  because  there  tionariesva 

■•-  L         J  ?  change  ot 

is  no  other  party  capable  of  forming  a  cabi-  joes  not 
net,1  —  not  the   Reactionaries,  for  they   are  3^*  of 
irreconcilable   and   hostile   to  the  Republic;  party' 
nor  those  Republicans  who  have  helped  the  Right  to 
turn  out  the  ministers,  because  by  themselves  they  do 
not  constitute   a  majority  of  the  Chamber.     The  new 
cabinet  must,  therefore,  seek  its  support  mainly  in  the 
ranks  of  the  defeated  minority,  and  hence  is  usually 
formed  from  very  much  the  same  material  as  its  prede- 

1  Except  in  the  cases  of  the  recent  Bourgeois  and  Me'line  cabinets,  a 
change  of  ministry  has  never  meant  the  advent  to  power  of  a  substantially 
different  party  since  MacMahon  yielded  to  the  Republicans  in  1877. 


128  FRANCE. 

cessor.  In  fact,  a  number  of  the  old  ministers  have 
Eff  of  generally  kept  their  places,  at  most  an  attempt 
this.  being  made  to  gain  a  little  more  support  from 

the  Right  or  Left  by  giving  one  or  two  additional  port- 
folios to  the  Moderates  or  the  Radicals.1  When  a  min- 
istry falls,  the  parliamentary  cards  are  shuffled,  a  few 
that  have  become  too  unpopular  or  too  prominent  are 
removed,  and  a  new  deal  takes  place.  So  true  is  this, 
that  out  of  the  twenty-four  ministries  that  have  suc- 
ceeded each  other  since  President  MacMahon  appointed 
a  Republican  cabinet  on  December  13, 1877,  only  three 
have  contained  none  of  the  retiring  ministers,  the  aver- 
age proportion  of  members  retained  being  about  two 
fifths.2  Now,  the  fact  that  the  fall  of  the  cabinet  does 
not  involve  a  change  of  party  has  two  important 
effects :  by  removing  the  fear  that  a  hostile  opposi- 
tion will  come  to  power,  it  destroys  the  chief  motive 
for  discipline  among  the  majority  ; 3  and  by  making 
the  Chaniber~feel  that  a  change  of  ministers  is  not  a 
matter  of  vital  consequence,  it  encourages  that  body  to 
turn  them  out  with  rash  indifference.  The  result  is 
that  the  cabinets  are  extremely  short-lived  ;  and  indeed 
during  the  twenty-three  years  the  Republic  has  enjoyed 
responsible  ministries,  —  that  is,  since  MacMahon's 
election  in  May,  1873,  —  there  have  been  thirty-four 
of  them,  so   that   the  average   duration  of  a  French 

1  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  94. 

2  Cf.  Haucour,  Gouv.  et  Min.  ;  Muel,  Gouv.,  Min.  et  Const. ;  Dupriez, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  338,  343.  The  three  exceptions  were  the  cabinets  of  Brisson 
in  1885,  Bourgeois  in  1895,  and  Me4ine  in  1896. 

3  This  is  very  clearly  pointed  out  by  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  vol.  ii. 
p.  390. 


CABINETS   SHORT-LIVED  AND   WEAK.  129 

cabinet  has  been  less  than  eight  months  and  a  half.1 
The  same  fact  explains,  moreover,  the  persistence  of 
the  system  of  interpellations,  for  if  a  change  of  min- 
istry does  not  imply  a  different  programme,  there  is  no 
self-evident  impropriety  in  overthrowing  a  cabinet  on  .a 
question  that  does  not  involve  a  radical  condemnation 
of  its  policy. 

The  subdivision  of  the  Republican  party  into  sepa- 
rate groups  has  also  an  important  bearing  on       . 
the    character  of  the   ministry.     Instead    of  ^'rSI^8 
representing  a  united  party,  the  cabinet  must  ^bineUs  a 
usually  rely  for  support  on  a  number  of  these  and'ther'e- 
groups,  and    the  portfolios  must  be  so  dis-  foreweak- 
tributed  as  to   conciliate  enough  of    them   to  form  a 
majority  of  the  Chamber.2      As  a   rule,  therefore,  the 
cabinet  is  in  reality  the  result  of  a  coalition,  and  suffers 
from  the  evils  to  which  bodies  of  that  kind  are  always 
subject.     The  members  tend  to  become  rivals  rather 
than  comrades,  and  each  of   them  is  a  little  inclined 
to  think  less  of  the  common  interests  of  the  cabinet 
than  of  his  own  future  prospects  when  the  combina- 
tion  breaks    up.3     Such    a    government,   moreover,   is 
essentially  weak,  for  it  cannot  afford  to  refuse  the  de- 
mands of  any  group  whose  defection  may  be  fatal  to 

•  *  I  have  not  counted  the  reappointment  of  the  Dupuy  ministry  on  the 
election  of  Casimir-Perier  to  the  presidency  as  the  formation  of  a  new 
cabinet. 

2  The  first  part  of  the  term  of  the  present  Chamber  is  the  only  time 
when  the  cabinet  has  been  supported  by  a  group  which  contained  by  itself 
anything  like  a  majority  of  the  deputies. 

8  Cf .  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  348-49.  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  85,  speaks 
of  the  never-ending  struggles  for  mastery  within  the  cabinet. 

VOL.    I. 


130  FRANCE. 

its  existence.1  The  ministers  are  not  at  the  head  of  a 
great  party  that  is  bound  to  follow  their  lead,  and  yet 
they  must  secure  the  votes  of  the  Chamber  or  they 
cannot  remain  in  office.  Hence  they  must  seek  support 
as.  best  they  may,  and  as  they  cannot  rule  the  majority, 
they  are  constrained  to  follow  and  flatter  it ; 2  or  rather 
they  are  forced  to  conciliate  the  various  groups,  and, 
It  must  win  as  ^e  members  of  the  groups  themselves 
granting        are    loosely  held  together,  they  must    grant 

favors  to  the  individual  deputies  in  order  to 
secure  their  votes.  This  is  not  a  new  feature  in  French 
politics.  It  is  said  that  during  the  reign  of  Louis 
Philippe,  the  government  kept  a  regular  account  with 
each  deputy,  showing  his  votes  in  the  Chamber  on  one 
side,  and  the  favors  he  had  been  granted  on  the  other, 
so  that  he  could  expect  no  indulgence  if  the  balance 
were  against  him.3  Nor  has  the  cause  of  the  evil 
changed.  It  is  the  same  under  the  Third  Republic  that 
it  was  under  the  Monarchy  of  July,  for  in  both  cases 
the  lack  of  great  national  parties  with  definite  pro- 
grammes has  made  the  satisfaction  of  local  and  personal 
interests  a  necessity. 

We   are,    unfortunately,    only    too    familiar    in  this 
Political  use  country  with  the  doctrine  that  to  the  victors 

belong  the  spoils.  In  France  we  find  the 
same  thing,  although  it  is  not  acknowledged  so  openly, 
and  is  disguised  under  the  name  of  epuration,  or   the 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  347-48,  434-35. 

2  Cf.  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  ch.  vii.  p.  iii. 

8  Hello,  Du  Regime  Constitutionnel,  quoted  by  Minghetti,  /  Partiti 
Polilici,  p.  101  ;  and  see  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  Revolution  and  Reaction  in 
Modern  France,  pp.  118-20. 


PATRONAGE  USED  TO   PLEASE  DEPUTIES.         131 

purification  of  the  administration  from  the  enemies  of 
the  Republic.  The  practice  of  turning  political  foes 
out  of  office  and  substituting  one's  friends  seems  to 
have  begun  during  President  MacMahon's  contest  with 
the  Chamber,  when  the  Reactionary  party  dismissed  a 
large  number  of  officials  who  had  served  under  former 
cabinets.1  After  the  Right  had  been  overthrown  in 
1877,  there  arose  a  cry  that  the  Republic  ought  not 
to  be  administered  by  men  who  did  not  sympathize 
with  it,  and  would  naturally  throw  their  influence 
against  it ;  but  although  the  fear  of  danger  to  the  form 
of  government  was  no  doubt  genuine  at  first,  the  cry 
became  before  long  a  transparent  excuse  for  a  hunt 
after  office.2  In  speaking  of  this  subject,  however,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  France  is  not  divided  into 
two  great  parties  which  succeed  each  other  in  power, 
and  hence  a  wholesale  change  of  public  servants,  such 
as  has  often  taken  place  after  a  presidential  election  in 
the  United  States,  does  not  occur.  The  process  is  con- 
tinuous, but  slower  and  less  thorough.  On  andother 
the  other  hand,  the  evil  in  France  is  by  Pnvilese3- 
no  means  limited  to  office-seeking,  for  owing  to  the 
immense  power  vested  in  the  government,  the  favors 
which  the  deputies  demand  and  exact  as  the  price  of 
their  votes  extend  over  a  vast  field.  Nor  do  they  show 
any  false  modesty  about  making  their  desires  known. 

1  See  Channes,  pp.  18-19,  231-32. 

2  See  the  remarkable  little  book  by  Edmond  Scherer,  La  Democratic  et 
la  France ;  Channes,  Nos  Fautes  (passim)  ;  Simon,  Nos  Homines  d'Etat, 
pp.  114-15,  and  ch.  vi.  ii.  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  502-9  ;  Lamy,  La  Re'pub- 
lique  en  1883,  pp.  6-8,  22  ;  and  see  a  highly  colored  account  by  Hurlbert, 
"  The  Outlook  in  France,"  Fortnightly  Rev.,  vol.  55,  p.  347. 


132  FRANCE. 

They  do  not  hesitate  to  invade  the  executive  offices, 
and  meddle  directly  in  the  conduct  of  affairs.1  Even 
the  prefect,  who  has  the  principal  charge  of  local  ad- 
ministration, is  not  free  from  their  interference.  He 
is  liable  to  lose  his  place  if  he  offends  the  Republican 
deputies  from  his  department,  and  is  therefore  obliged 
to  pay  court  to  them  and  follow  their  lead.  In  short,  the 
prefect  has  become,  to  a  great  extent,  the  tool  of  these 
autocrats ;  and  his  dependence  is  increased  by  the  fact 
that  nowadays  he  does  not  usually  remain  in  office  long 
enough  to  acquire  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  local 
wants,  or  to  exercise  a  strong  personal  influence.  I  do 
not  mean  that  he  has  become  corrupt ;  far  from  it. 
The  level  of  integrity  among  French  officials  appears  to 
be  extremely  high,  and  though  wedded  to  routine,  their 
efficiency  is  great ; 2  but  the  discretion  in  their  hands 
is  enormous,  and  in  using  it  they  must  take  care  not 
to  displease  his  Majesty  the  Deputy.3 

Of  course  the  deputies  do  not  wield  this  immense  in- 
Deputies  fluence  to  forward  their  own  private  ends  alone. 
clS^falor  ^ney  are  representatives,  and  must  use  their 
loo*  San-  position  for  the  benefit  of  the  persons  they 
represent.  But  whom  do  they  represent? 
The  people  at  large?  No  representative  ever  really 
does  that.  So  far  as  he  is  actuated  by  purely  conscien- 
tious motives  he  represents  his  own  ideas  of  right,  and 
for  the  rest  he  represents  primarily  the  men  who  have 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  435,  507-8  ;  Channes,  pp.  253-56  ;  Lamy,  pp. 
21-26  ;  Laffitte,  Le  Suffrage  Universel,  pp.  54-59. 

2  Simon,  "  Stability  of  the  French  Republic,"  The  Forum,  vol.  10,  p.  383. 

3  Cf.  Channes,  Letter  of  Oct.  1,  1884 ;  Laffitte,  pp.  56-58  ;  Dupriez, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  471-72,  506-9. 


POWER  OF  LOCAL  COMMITTEES.  133 

elected  him,  and  to  whom  he  must  look  for  help  and 
votes  in  the  next  campaign.  In  some  countries  this 
means  the  party,  and  those  classes  that  hang  on  the 
skirts  of  the  party  and  may  be  prevailed  upon  to  fall 
into  line.  But  in  France  there  are  no  great  organized 
parties,  and  hence  we  must  consider  how  candidates  are 
nominated  there.  The  government,  at  the  present  day, 
does  not  put  forward  official  candidates  of  its  own,  as 
was  commonly  done  during  the  Second  Empire ; 1  and, 
indeed,  it  is  not  supposed  to  take  an  active  part  in 
elections.  This  last  principle  is  not  strictly  observed, 
for  the  administrative  officials  at  times  exert  no  little 
influence  in  important  campaigns,  and  the  government 
is  said  to  have  spent  a  good  deal  of  money  to  defeat 
Boulanger  in  1889.  Still  there  is  nothing  resembling 
the  control  of  elections  under  Napoleon  III.,  and  es- 
pecially there  is  no  interference  with  the  selection  of 
candidates,  this  matter  being  left  to  the  spontaneous 
movement  of  the  voters  themselves.  The  usual  method 
of  proceeding  is  as  follows  :  a  number  of  men  in  active 
politics  in  a  commune,  or  what  we  should  call  the  wire- 
pullers, form  themselves  into  a  self-elected  committee, 
the  members  usually  belonging  to  liberal  or  semi-liberal 
professions,  and  very  commonly  holding  advanced  views, 
which  are  apt  to  go  with  political  activity  in  France. 
The  committees  or  their  representatives  meet  together 
to  form  an  assembly,  which  prepares  the  programme, 
nominates  the  candidate,  and  proclaims  him  as  the  can- 
didate of  the  party.2    These  self-constituted  committees, 

1  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberte,  p.  372. 

2  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  pp.  17-25  ;  Scherer,  La  Democratic  et  la 


134  FRANCE. 

therefore,  have  the  nomination  entirely  in  their  own 
hands;1  and,  except  in  the  larger  cities,  a  candidate 
owes  his  position  largely  to  local  influence  and  personal 
interests.2  Sometimes  he  has  won  prominence  by  a 
clever  speech  at  a  local  meeting.  Sometimes  he  has 
earned  gratitude  by  services  rendered  in  his  profession, 
or  otherwise.3 

After  the  candidate  is  nominated,  his  first  care  is  to 
issue  his  programme,  and  under  the  system  of  single 
electoral  districts,  each  candidate,  as  has  already  been 
observed,  has  a  separate  programme,  which  expresses 
only  his  particular  views.  The  active  campaign  is  car- 
ried on  by  means  of  placards  posted  on  walls  and 
fences,  which  make  a  great  show,  but  win  few  votes ; 
and  what  is  far  more  effective,  by  means  of  newspapers 
and  the  stump.4     The  stump,  curiously  enough,  is  used 

France,  pp.  22-24  ;  Reinach,  La  Politique  Opportuniste,  186-88  ;  Laffitte, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  64-69. 

1  Since  the  system  of  scrutin  de  liste  has  been  given  up  and  the  single 
electoral  districts  have  been  reestablished,  the  matter  is  said  to  have 
become  somewhat  more  simplified.  It  is  stated  that  the  nominating  com- 
mittees are  now  formed,  at  least  in  many  cases,  without  any  meeting  of 
delegates  from  the  communes  ;  and  that  their  function  lies  not  in  the 
selection  of  a  candidate,  but  rather  in  helping  the  candidate  in  whose 
behalf  they  have  been  organized,  and  acting  as  his  sponsors.  (See  Alfred 
Naquet,  "  The  French  Electoral  System,"  North  American  Rev.,  vol.  155, 
p.  466.  But  see  Charles  Benoist,  "  De  l'Organization  du  Suffrage  Uni- 
versel,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  July  1,  1895,  pp.  15-20.)  However  this 
may  be,  the  close  relations  between  the  deputy  and  a  small  self-consti- 
tuted clique  of  local  politicians,  which  is  the  essential  point  in  the  French 
electoral  system,  remains  very  much  the  same. 

2  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  pp.  24-25. 
8  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  96. 

4  Alfred  Naquet,  "The  French  Electoral  System,"  North  American 
Rev.,  vol.  155,  pp.  468-70. 


POWER  OF  LOCAL  COMMITTEES.  135 

very  little  except  by  the  candidates  themselves,1  who 
constantly  speak  at  political  rallies,  of  late  years  fre- 
quently holding  joint  debates.2  Far  too  often,  unfor- 
tunately, they  also  truckle  to  the  personal  ambition  of 
individual  voters  by  flattery  and  the  promise  of  favors, 
a  course  that  deters  some  of  the  best  men  from  political 
life.3  The  wire-pullers,  indeed,  are  not  over-anxious  for 
really  strong  characters,  because  they  prefer  men  whom 
they  can  control,  and  use  for  their  own  purposes.4  If 
they  want  anything  they  exert  a  pressure  on  the  deputy, 
who  in  his  turn  brings  a  pressure  to  bear  on  the  min- 
isters; and  hence  it  has  been  a  common  saying  that 
the  electoral  committees  rule  the  deputies,  and  the 
deputies  rule  the  government.5 

It  is  asserted  that,  since  the  re-introduction  of  single 
electoral  districts,  the  power  of  the  committees  has  sen- 
sibly diminished,6  and,  whether  this  be  true  or  not,  it  is 

1  Theodore  Stanton,  supplement  to  the  article  of  Alfred  Naquet, 
p.  473. 

2  Alfred  Naquet,  lb.  The  newspapers  at  election  time  are  full  of 
accounts  of  these  meetings  for  joint  debate,  called  Reunions  publiques 
contradictoires. 

3  Cf .  Scherer,  La  Democratic  et  la  France,  pp.  24-25,  39.  Direct  bribery 
of  voters,  though  not  unknown,  seems  to  be  rare,  but  the  complaint  that 
elections  have  been  getting  a  good  deal  more  expensive  of  late  years  is 
general.  Naquet,  lb. ;  Reinach,  pp.  189-90  ;  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie, 
p.  373  ;  Souviens  toi  du  Deux  De'cembre,  p.  91. 

4  Channes,  Nos  Fautes,  pp.  379-81  ;  Laffitte,  p.  69  et  seq. 

6  Channes,  pp.  238-39  ;  and  see  Scherer,  La  Democratic  et  la  France, 
p.  27;  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  378. 

For  this  reason  one  frequently  hears  it  said  that  the  deputies  do  not 
see  the  real  people,  but  only  their  own  political  dependents.  Channes, 
p.  38  ;  Simon,  Souviens  toi  du  Deux  Decembre,  pp.  165-66. 

6  Naquet,  "  The  French  Electoral  System,"  North  American  Rev.,  vol. 
155,  p.  466.  But  see  on  the  other  side  the  article  of  Benoist  in  the 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  July  1,  1895,  pp.  17-19. 


136  FRANCE. 

certainly  easy  to  exaggerate  their  influence,  for  the  dep- 
The  de  u-  uty  mus^  always  consider  other  people  beside 
their  con-  *ne  wire-pullers.  He  must  try  to  strengthen 
stituents.  kis  general  popularity  throughout  his  district. 
He  is,  indeed,  expected  to  look  after  the  political  business 
of  his  constituents,  and  is  a  regular  channel  for  the  pre- 
sentation of  grievances  and  the  distribution  of  favors ; 
one  of  the  complaints  most  commonly  heard  in  France 
being  that  the  deputies  represent  local  and  personal  in- 
terests rather  than  national  ones.  But  even  this  does  not 
end  his  responsibilities.  The  traditions  of  centralization 
which  make  all  France  look  to  Paris  for  guidance,  and 
the  habit  of  paternal  government  that  makes  men  turn 
to  the  state  for  aid,  have  caused  many  people  to  regard 
the  deputy  as  a  kind  of  universal  business  agent  for 
his  district  at  the  capital,  and  burden  him  with  all  sorts 
of  private  matters  in  addition  to  his  heavy  public  duties. 
Sometimes  this  is  carried  to  an  extent  that  is  positively 
ludicrous.  A  few  years  ago  a  couple  of  deputies  gave 
an  account  at  a  public  dinner  of  the  letters  they  had 
received  from  their  districts.  Some  constituents  wanted 
their  representative  to  go  shopping  for  them ;  others 
asked  him  to  consult  a  physician  in  their  behalf ;  and 
more  than  one  begged  him  to  procure  a  wet  nurse, 
hearing  that  this  could  be  done  better  in  Paris  than  in 
the  provinces.1  Is  it  to  be  wondered  that  the  French 
deputy  should  bend  under  the  weight  of  his  responsi- 
bilities ? 

If  I  seem  to  have  drawn  a  somewhat  dark  picture  of 
the  position  of  the  deputy,  I  do  not  want  to  be  under- 

1  This  is  quoted  by  Scherer  in  La  Democratic  et  la  France,  pp.  34r-35. 


THE  DEPUTY  A  CHANNEL  FOR  PRIVATE  FAVORS.    137 

stood  as  implying  that  all  deputies  are  alike ;  that  many 
of  them  are  not  men  of  high  character,  who  will  not 
yield  to  the  temptation  and  pressure  with  which  they 
are  surrounded.  My  object  is  simply  to  describe  a 
tendency ;  to  point  out  a  defect  in  the  French  political 
system,  and  to  show  clearly  the  characteristic  evils 
which  that  defect  cannot  fail  to  develop.  The  recent 
scandals  about  the  bribery  of  deputies  in  connection 
with  the  Panama  Canal,  with  which  the  newspapers 
were  filled  for  three  months,  have  thrown  a  dismal 
light  over  public  life  in  France,  and,  although  at  first 
the  credulous  Parisians  no  doubt  exaggerated  the  ex- 
tent of  the  corruption,  still  there  was  fire  enough  under 
the  smoke  to  show  what  baleful  influences  haunt  the 
corridors  of  the  Palais  Bourbon. 

Before   closing,  let  us   consider   for  a  moment   the 
political  prospects  of  the  country.     The  gen- 

r  t  Prosp6cts  of 

erous  enthusiasm  that  greeted  the  Republic  at  the  Repub- 
the  outset  has  faded  away,  and  even  its  most 
ardent  advocates  have  found  to  their  sorrow  that  it  has 
not  brought  the  promised  millennium.  Such  a  feeling  of 
disappointment  is  not  surprising.  On  the  contrary,  it 
might  have  been  surely  predicted,  for  in  every  form  of 
government  that  has  existed  in  France  since  the  Revo- 
lution  the  period  of  enthusiasm  has  been  followed  by 
one  of  disenchantment,  and  to  this  latter  stage  the  Re- 
public has  come  in  the  natural  course  of  events.  Now 
this  period  may  well  be  looked  upon  as  crucial,  because 
as  yet  no  form  of  government  in  France  has  been  able 
to  live  through  it.  After  a  political  system  has  lasted 
about  half  a  generation,  the  country  has  always  become 


138  FRANCE. 

disgusted  with  it,  torn  it  down,  and  set  up  another,  —  a 
course  that  has  made  any  steady  progress  in  public  life 
impossible.  The  effect  has,  in  fact,  been  very  much 
like  that  which  would  be  produced  by  a  man  who 
should  constantly  root  out  his  crops  before  they  came 
to  maturity,  and  sow  his  field  with  new  and  different 
seed. 

The  reason  for  such  a  state  of  things  is  not  hard  to 
Hitherto  no  &n&-  Since  the  Revolution  every  form  of 
party  las  government  in  France  has  been  the  expres- 
^twifa  si°n  or  outward  sign  of  a  definite  set  of 
revoution.  political  opinions.  So  close,  indeed,  has  the 
connection  been  between  the  two,  that  it  has  been 
impossible  for  men  to  conceive  of  one  without  the 
other,  and  therefore  a  fundamental  change  of  opinion 
has  always  involved  a  change  in  the  form  of  govern- 
ment. Any  one  who  studies  the  history  of  the  nation 
will  see  that  there  has  never  been  a  change  of  party 
without  a  revolution.  There  has  often  been  a  shifting 
of  control  from  one  group  to  another  of  a  slightly  dif- 
ferent coloring,  but  the  real  party  in  opposition  has 
never  come  to  power  without  an  overturn  of  the  whole 
political  system.  Under  the  Restoration,  for  example, 
the  ministers  were  sometimes  Moderate  and  sometimes 
extremely  Reactionary,  but  were  never  taken  from 
the  ranks  of  the  liberal  opposition.  Again,  during  the 
Monarchy  of  July  the  different  groups  of  Liberals  dis- 
puted fiercely  for  the  mastery,  but  neither  the  Radicals 
nor  the  Reactionaries  had  the  slightest  chance  of  com- 
ing  to  power.  If  space  permitted,  this  truth  might  be 
illustrated  by  taking  up  in  succession  each  of  the  gov- 


PROSPECTS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  139 

ernments  that  have  flourished  since  the  Revolution,  but 
perhaps  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  only  apparent 
exception  that  has  occurred.  While  General  MacMahon 
was  President  of  the  Third  Republic,  power  was  cer- 
tainly transferred  from  the  Reactionaries  to  the  Repub- 
licans, but  the  circumstances  of  this  case  were  very 
peculiar.  The  Republic  had  hardly  got  into  working 
order,  and  the  struggle  of  the  Reactionaries  may  be 
looked  upon  as  a  final  effort  to  prevent  it  from  becom- 
ing firmly  established.  The  French  themselves  have 
always  considered  the  occurrence,  not  as  a  normal 
change  of  party,  but  as  the  frustration  of  an  attempt  at 
a  coup  d'etat  or  counter-revolution.  This  case,  there- 
fore, from  the  fact  that  it  has  been  generally  regarded 
as  exceptional,  may  fairly  be  treated  as  the  kind  of 
exception  that  tends  to  prove  the  rule.  A  revolution 
in  France  corresponds  in  many  ways  to  a  change  of 
party  in  other  countries,  but  with  this  grave  disadvan- 
tage, that  the  new  administration,  instead  of  reforming 
the  political  institutions,  destroys  them  altogether.  Of 
course  such  a  method  puts  gradual  improvement  out 
of  the  question,  and  before  the  nation  can  perfect  her 
government  she  must  learn  that  the  remedy  for  defects 
is  to  be  sought  through  the  reform,  not  the  overthrow, 
of  the  existing  system. 

One  would  suppose  that  under  the  Republic  no  such 
difficulty  could  arise,  because  a  republic  means  the  rule 
of  the  majority,  and  the  majority  is  sure  to  be  some- 
times on  one  side  and  sometimes  on  the  other.  But 
this  is  not  the  view  of  most  French  Republicans,  and 
especially  of  the   Radicals.      These  men,    recognizing 


140  FRANCE. 

that,  on  account  of  a  want  of  training  in  self-govern- 
ment, the  people  can  be  cajoled,  or  frightened,  or 
charmed,  or  tricked  into  the  expression  of  the  most  con- 
tradictory opinions,  refuse  to  admit  that  any  vote  not  in 
harmony  with  their  own  ideas  can  be  a  fair  test  of  the 
popular  will,  and  assume  for  themselves  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  declaring  what  the  people  really  want.  As 
M.  Edmond  Scherer  has  cleverly  said :  "  Let  us  add 
that  the  God  (universal  suffrage)  has  his  priests,  whose 
authority  has  never  been  quite  clear,  but  who  know 
his  wishes,  speak  in  his  name,  and,  if  resistance  occurs, 
confound  it  by  an  appeal  to  the  oracle  whose  secrets 
are  confided  to  them  alone."  1  The  Radicals,  therefore, 
cannot  admit  a  possibility  that  the  true  majority  can  be 
against  them,  and  nothing  irritates  them  so  much  as  to 
hear  the  other  parties  claim  that  the  people  are  on 
their  own  side.  It  has  been  said  that  the  Republic  will 
not  be  safe  until  it  has  been  governed  by  the  Conserva- 
tives,2 and  the  remark  has  a  special  significance  in  this 
connection  :  first,  because,  until  the  Conservatives  come 
to  power,  it  will  not  be  clear  whether  the  Republic  has 
enough  strength  and  elasticity  to  stand  a  change  of 
party  without  breaking  down  ;  and  second,  because  the 
right  of  the  majority  to  rule,  which  is  the  ultimate 
basis  of  the  consensus  on  which  the  Republic  must 
rest,  will  not  be  surely  established  until  each  party  has 
submitted  peaceably  to  a  popular  verdict  in  favor  of  the 
other. 

1  La  Democratic  et  la  France,  p.  18. 

2  "  La  Re'publique  et  les  Conservateurs,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  March 
1,  1890,  pp.  120-21.  Tbis  means,  of  course,  the  conservative  elements 
among  the  people,  and  not  merely  the  conservative  Republicans. 


PROSPECTS   OF  THE   REPUBLIC.  141 

That  the  existing  political  system  will  be  accepted  as 
final  by  all  classes  of  the  people,  so  that  the  republican 
form  of  government  will  cease  to  be  the  dogma  of  a 
party  and  become  the  creed  of  the  whole  nation,  seems 
extremely  probable ;  for,  if  the  enthusiasm  for  the 
Republic  has  waned,  the  passionate  attachment  for  the 
Monarchy  and  the  Empire  has  grown  cold  also.  The 
Republic  has  passed  her  first  youth,  and  a  generation 
of  men  are  crowding  upon  the  stage  who  have  not 
shared  the  loves  and  hatreds  of  their  fathers,  and  who 
care  more  for  immediate  ends  than  for  historic  tradi- 
tions. It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  throughout 
the  country  dynastic  questions  are  giving  way  to  others 
that  have  a  more  direct  bearing  on  the  welfare  of  the 
people.  The  Holy  See  has  thrown  its  influence  in  this 
direction,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  it  persists 
in  its  present  policy,  the  last  Reactionaries  must  abandon 
their  irreconcilable  attitude.  Apart,  therefore,  from 
war  or  from  some  terrible  economic  convulsion,  there 
is  every  reason  to  expect  that  the  Republic  will  prove 
lasting. 

When  the  Reactionaries  have  accepted  the  Republic, 
the  immediate  danger  will  be,  not  that  they  will  exert 
too  little  influence,  but  that  they  will  exert  too  much  ; 
that  they  will  rule  the  Right  as  the  Radicals  dominated 
the  Left;  that  the  liberty  of  the  press  will  be  re- 
strained, and  the  church  brought  too  closely  into 
contact  with  political  affairs,  —  a  course  that  would  be 
certain  to  excite  violent  revolutionary  feelings  among 
the  Radicals.  But  this  danger  also,  it  may  be  hoped, 
will  be  removed  by  time,  for  the  peaceful  alternation  in 


142  FRANCE. 

power  of  men  of  opposite  parties,  which  France  as  yet 
has  never  known,  would  gradually  educate  the  people, 
and  produce  moderate  and  practical  opinions  in  politics. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Republic 
has  had  to  contend  hitherto  not  only  with  deep-seated 
prejudices  derived  from  the  fierce  struggles  of  the  last 
century,  but  also  with  a  lack  of  political  experience, 
resulting  in  an  inaptitude  for  self-government  on  the 
part  of  the  nation  at  large.  This  has  made  the  people  an 
easy  prey  to  glittering  theories  and  resounding  phrases. 
But  free  discussion,  popular  meetings,  and  attempts  at 
political  combination  have  extended  widely  within  the 
last  few  years,1  and  cannot  fail  to  develop  a  capacity  for 
judging  of  public  affairs  that  will  render  the  people 
far  less  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  extremists. 

There  is  one  real  danger  ahead  of  the  Republic, 
Financial  which  cannot  be  treated  too  seriously,  and 
dangers.  tnat  is  the  condition  of  the  finances.  For 
some  time  after  the  war  with  Germany  the  treasury  was 
admirably  managed,  and  France  astonished  the  world 
by  the  rapidity  with  which  she  paid  the  war  indemnity ; 
but  before  long  she  fell  into  the  habit,  so  common  in 
our  day,  of  framing  golden  dreams  of  the  future,  and 
discounting  them  at  once.  She  poured  out  money  like 
water  for  roads,  railroads,  and  schools ;  rolled  up  a 
huge  debt  to  pay  for  them,  and  even  then  was  unable  to 
satisfy  the  expectations  she  had  awakened  among  her 
people.2  At  the  same  time  she  built  huge  fortifications, 
set  up  universal  military  service,  and  strove  to  maintain 

1  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  94. 

2  See  Chaiiues,  Letter  of  Jan.,  1885. 


PROSPECTS  OF  THE   REPUBLIC.  143 

a  stronger  army  and  a  more  powerful  fleet  than  her 
larger  neighbor.  Meanwhile  a  bad  system  of  financier- 
ing prevented  her  from  seeing  how  fast  she  was  going. 
A  habit  grew  up  of  dividing  the  expenditure  into 
ordinary  and  extraordinary,  of  which  the  former  alone 
was  defrayed  out  of  the  annual  receipts,  while  the 
latter,  as  something  unusual  that  would  not  occur  again, 
was  provided  for  by  loans.  Nevertheless,  the  items  for 
extraordinary  expenses  reappeared  every  year,  being  in 
fact  a  normal  part  of  the  budget.1  Thus  the  country 
sank  deeper  and  deeper  into  debt,  with  a  gloomy  pros- 
pect of  bankruptcy  before  it  in  case  of  war.  Fortu- 
nately, the  finances  have  of  late  been  put  into  a  much 
better  condition.  Instead  of  the  constantly  recurring 
deficits,  there  has  more  than  once  been  surplus  in 
the  last  few  years,  and  what  is  really  of  even  greater 
importance,  many  of  the  extraordinary  expenses  have 
been  cut  off  and  transferred  to  the  regular  budget.2 
It  will  probably  be  a  good  while  before  this  is  done 
with  all  of  them,  and,  until  the  extraordinary  budgets 
are  suppressed  entirely,  the  finances  of  the  country  will 
not  be  upon  a  thoroughly  solid  basis.  As  yet,  indeed, 
the  danger  has  by  no  means  disappeared,  because  the 
equilibrium  has  been  brought  about  by  a  heavy  increase 
of  taxation,  and  there  is  always  a  risk  that  in  a  time  of 

1  See  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etat,  ch.  iv. 

2  See  Dupriez,  vol.  ii.  pp.  419-20;  Cucheval-Clarigny,  "La  Situation 
Financiere  et  le  Budget  de  1892,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Nov.  1,  1891. 
The  credit  of  this  change  is  due  to  M.  Rouvier,  who  was  for  several  years 
Minister  of  Finance,  but  who  was  brought  into  disgrace  in  1893  by  having 
accepted  money  for  campaign  purposes  from  the  agents  of  the  Panama 
Canal. 


144  FRANCE. 

economic  disaster  some  cabinet,  fearing  to  acknowledge 
the  real  condition  of  the  finances,  or  to  add  to  the 
taxes,  will  renew  the  policy  of  contracting  loans  to  meet 
current  expenses. 

If  the  Republic  proves  lasting,  the  form  of  its  institu- 
Probabie  tions  will  no  doubt  be  gradually  modified,  but, 
Frenfhh^  whatever  changes  take  place,  one  thing  is 
stitutions.  ciear:  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers  to 
parliament  must  be  retained.  In  a  country  like  the 
United  States,  where  power  is  split  up  by  the  federal 
system,  where  the  authority  in  the  hands  of  the 
executive  is  comparatively  small,  and,  above  all,  where 
the  belief  in  popular  government  and  the  attachment 
to  individual  liberty  and  the  principles  of  the  common 
law  are  ingrained  in  the  race,  there  is  no  danger  in 
intrusting  the  administration  to  a  President  who  is 
independent  of  the  legislature.  But  this  would  not  be 
safe  in  France,  because,  owing  to  the  centralization  of 
the  government  and  the  immense  power  vested  in  the 
executive,  such  a  President  would  be  almost  a  dictator 
during  his  term  of  office ;  and  the  temptation  to  pro- 
long his  authority,  from  public  no  less  than  from  selfish 
motives,  would  be  tremendous.  Nor,  in  view  of  the 
tendency  of  the  mercantile  classes,  and  even  of  the 
peasants,  to  crave  a  strong  ruler,  would  it  be  difficult 
for  him  to  do  so,  as  Louis  Napoleon  proved  long  ago. 
A  President  is  able  to  overthrow  a  popular  assembly 
because  the  French  have  long  been  accustomed  to 
personal  government,  and  because  an  assembly  is  in- 
capable of  maintaining  a  stable  majority ;  because,  in 
short,  the  French  know  how  to  work  personal  but  not 


/ 


PROSPECTS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  145 

representative  government :  and  the  danger  will  con- 
tinue until  parliamentary  institutions  are  perfected,  and 
their  traditions  by  long  habit  have  become  firmly 
rooted.  The  French  President  cannot,  therefore,  be 
independent,  and  the  only  feasible  alternative  is  to 
surround  him  with  ministers  who  are  responsible  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  But  if  the  parliamentary  system 
must  be  retained,  it  is  important  to  remove  the  defects 
that  it  shows  to-day,  and  especially  is  it  necessary,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  diminish  the  autocratic  power  of  the 
administration,  which  offers  a  well-nigh  irresistible 
temptation  to  both  minister  and  deputy ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  give  the  cabinet  more  stability,  more 
dignity,  and  more  authority ;  to  free  it  from  the  yoke 
of  the  groups  in  the  Chamber,  and  from  dependence  on 
local  interest  and  personal  appetite  ;  to  relieve  it  from 
the  domination  of  irresponsible  committees,  and  from 
the  danger  of  defeat  by  haphazard  majorities ;  to  enable 
it  to  exert  over  its  followers  the  discipline  that  is  required 
for  the  formation  of  great,  compact  parties ;  to  make  it, 
in  short,  the  real  head  of  a  majority  in  parliament  and 
in  the  nation. 

VOL.   I. 


CHAPTER  m. 

ITALY:    INSTITUTIONS. 

The  perfection  of  its  organization  and  the  excel- 
Causesthat  lence  °f  its  laws  preserved  the  life  of  Rome 
Sneofthe  l°ng  after  its  vital  f°rce  bad  become  ex- 
hausted ;  and  when  the  Teutonic  tribes  had 
once  broken  through  the  shell  of  the  western  empire, 
they  overran  it  almost  without  resistance.  Europe 
sank  into  a  state  of  barbarism,  from  which  she  re- 
covered to  find  her  political  condition  completely 
changed.  Slowly,  during  the  Middle  Ages,  the  nations 
were  forming,  until  at  last  Europe  became  divided 
into  separate  and  permanent  states,  each  with  an  inde- 
pendent government  of  its  own.  In  two  countries, 
however,  —  Italy  and  Germany,  —  this  process  of  de- 
velopment was  delayed  by  the  existence  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  which  claimed  an  authority  far  greater 
than  it  was  able  to  wield,  and,  while  too  weak  to  consoli- 
date its  vast  dominions  into  a  single  state,  was  strong 
enough  to  hinder  them  from  acquiring  distinct  and 
national  governments.  The  condition  of  Italy  was 
further  complicated  by  the  presence  of  the  Pope  ;  for 
although  the  Papacy  was  an  immense  civilizing  force  in 
mediaeval  Europe,  yet  the  constant  quarrels  of  the  Pope 
and  the  Emperor,  and  the  existence  of  the  States  of 
the  Church,  tended  greatly  to  prevent  the  development 


FORMATION  OF  THE  KINGDOM.  147 

of  Italy  as  a  nation.  The  country  was  broken  into 
a  multitude  of  jarring  elements,  and  even  Dante  saw 
no  hope  of  union  and  order  save  under  the  sway  of 
a  German  emperor.  The  north  of  Italy  was  full  of 
flourishing  cities  enriched  by  commerce  and  manufac- 
tures and  resplendent  with  art,  but  constantly  fighting 
with  each  other,  and,  except  in  the  case  of  Venice, 
a  prey  to  internal  feuds  that  brought  them  at  last 
under  the  control  of  autocratic  rulers.1  The  south,  on 
the  other  hand,  fell  under  the  dominion  of  a  series 
of  foreign  monarchs,  who  were  often  despotic,  and,  by 
making  the  government  seem  an  enemy  of  the  gov- 
erned, destroyed  in  great  measure  the  legal  and  social 
organization  of  the  people.  For  thirteen  centuries  — 
from  the  reign  of  Theodoric  the  Ostrogoth  to  the 
time  of  Napoleon  —  the  greater  part  of  Italy  was  never 
united  under  a  single  head,  and  in  both  of  these 
cases  the  country  was  ruled  by  foreigners.  Yet  short- 
lived and  unnatural  as  the  Napoleonic  Kingdom  of  Italy 
was,  it  had  no  small  effect  in  kindling  that  longing  for 
freedom  and  union  which  was  destined  to  be  fulfilled 
after  many  disappointments. 

By  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  in  1815,  Italy  was  again 
carved  into  a  number  of  principalities,  most 
of  them  under  the  direct  influence  of  Austria,   takes  the 
Most  of  them,  but  not  all,  for  in  the  north-  in  the 

strutrele  for 

western  corner  ot  the  peninsula,  between  the  Italian  inde- 
pendence. 
mountains  and  the  sea,  lay  Piedmont,  ruled  by 

a  prince  of  the  house  of  Savoy,  with  the  title  of  King 

1  Genoa  was  torn  with  factions,  and  was  at  times,  though  not  perma- 
nently, subject  to  Milan  or  to  France. 


148  ITALY. 

of  Sardinia.  During  the  great  popular  upheaval  of 
1848,  Charles  Albert,  a  king  of  this  line,  granted  to 

his  people  a  charter  called  the  Statuto,  and 

in  that  year  and  the  following  he  waged  war 
with  Austria  for  the  liberation  of  Italy.  He  was  badly 
beaten,  but  succeeded  in  attracting  the  attention  of  all 
Italians,  who  now  began  to  look  on  the  King  of 
Sardinia  as  the  possible  saviour  of  the  country.  After 
his   second   defeat,    at   Novara,    on    March  23,   1849, 

Charles  Albert  abdicated  in  favor  of  his  son, 
Victor  Victor  Emmanuel,  who  refused  to  repeal  the 

Statuto  in  spite  of  the  offers  and  the  threats 
of  Austria,  —  an  act  that  won  for  him  the  confi- 
dence of  Italy  and  the  title  "  II  Re  Galantuomo,"  the 
King  Honest  Man.  The  reliance,  indeed,  which  Victor 
Emmanuel  inspired  was  a  great  factor  in  the  making  of 
Italy;  and  to  this  is  due  in  large  part  the  readiness 
with  which  the  Italian  revolutionists  accepted  the  mon- 
archy, although  contrary  to  their  republican  sentiments. 

In  fact,  the  chivalrous  nature  of  the  principal 
character  of    actors  makes  the   struggle  for  Italian  unity 

more  dramatic  than  any  other  event  in  modern 
times.1  The  chief  characters  are  heroic,  and  stand  out 
with  a  vividness  that  impresses  the  imagination,  and 
gives  to  the  whole  history  the  charm  of  a  romance. 
Victor  Emmanuel  is  the  model  constitutional  king ; 
Cavour,  the  ideal  of  a  cool,  far-sighted  statesman ; 
Garibaldi,  the  perfect  chieftain  in  irregular  war,  dash- 
ing, but   rash   and   hot-headed ;    Mazzini,  the   typical 

1  Professor  Dicey  speaks  of  this,   and   draws  a  comparison  between 
Italian  and  Swiss  politics,  in  a  letter  to  The  Nation  of  Nov.  18,  1886. 


FORMATION  OF  THE  KINGDOM.  149 

conspirator,  ardent  and  fanatical ;  —  all  of  them  full  of 
generosity  and  devotion.  The  enthusiasm  which  their 
characters  inspired  went  far  to  soften  the  difficulties  in 
their  path,  and  to  help  the  people  to  bear  the  sacrifices 
entailed  by  the  national  regeneration.  Over  against 
these  men  stands  Pius  IX.,  who  began  his  career  as  a 
reformer,  but,  terrified  by  the  march  of  the  revolution, 
became  at  last  the  bigoted  champion  of  reaction.  The 
purity  of  his  character  and  the  subtle  charm  of  his 
manner  fitted  him  to  play  the  part  of  the  innocent 
victim  in  the  great  drama. 

When  Cavour  first  became  prime  minister  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  in  1852,  his  plan  was  a  confeder-  cavour's 
ation  of   the  Italian  States  under  the  Pope  f£j£an  con- 
as  nominal  head,   but  practically   under   the 
lead  of  the  King  of  Sardinia.     Now,  in  order  to  make 
this  plan  a  success,   it  was   necessary  to    exclude  the 
powerful  and  reactionary  House  of  Habsburg  from  all 
influence   in    the  peninsula,    and  with    this  object  he 
induced  Napoleon  III.  to  declare  war  against  Austria 
in  1859 ;  but  when  the  Emperor  brought  the  war  to  a 
sudden   end  by  a  peace   that  required   the  cession  of 
Lombardy  alone,  and  left  Venice  still  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  Cavour  saw  that  so  long  as  Austria  retained 
a  foothold  in   Italy,  many  of  the  principalities   would 
remain  subject  to  her  control.     He  therefore  changed 
his  scheme,  and  aimed  at  a  complete  union  changed  to 
of  Italy  under  the  House   of   Savoy.1     The  ^fora 
whole  country  was  ready  to  follow  the  lead       g  om* 

1  Jacini,  /  Conservatori  e  V  Evolutione  dei  Partiti  Politice  in  Italia,  p. 
55  et  seq. 


150  ITALY. 

of  Victor  Emmanuel,  and,  except  for  Venice  and  Rome, 
which  were  guarded  by  foreign  troops,  the  march  of 
events  was  rapid.  The  people  of  the  northern  States 
had  already  risen  and  expelled  their  rulers,  and  early 
in  1860  they  declared  for  a  union  with  Sardinia. 
Later  in  the  same  year  Garibaldi  landed  at  Marsala 
with  a  thousand  men,  roused  the  country,  and  quickly 
overran  Sicily  and  Naples,  which  decided  by  popular 
vote  to  join  the  new  kingdom,  —  a  step  that  was  soon 
followed  by  Umbria  and  the  Marches.  The  rest  of 
Italy  was  won  more  slowly.  Venice  was  annexed  in 
1866,  as  a  result  of  the  war  fought  against  Austria 
by  Prussia  and  Italy ;  and  Rome  was  not  added  until 
1870,  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  garrison  and 
the  fall  of  Napoleon  III.,  who  had  sent  it  there  to 
protect  the  Pope. 

It  is  curious  that  Sardinia  expanded  into  the  King- 
Government  doni  of  Italy  without  any  alteration  of  its 
dom  of  Italy,  fundamental  laws,  for  the  Statuto,  originally 
The  statute  granted  by  Charles  Albert  in  1848,  remains 
the  constitution  of  the  nation  to-day.  It  has  never 
been  formally  amended,  and  contains,  indeed,  no  pro- 
vision for  amendment.  At  first  it  was  thought  that 
any  changes  ought  to  be  made  by  a  constituent 
assembly,  and  in  1848  a  law  was  passed  to  call  one, 
although,  on  account  of  the  disastrous  results  of  the 
war,  it  never  met.  By  degrees,  however,  an  opinion 
gained  ground  that  the  political  institutions  of  Italy, 
like  those  of  England,  could  be  modified  by  the  ordi- 
nary process  of  legislation.  This  has  actually  been 
done,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  on  several  occasions ; 


THE  STATUTO.  151 

and  now  both  jurists  and  statesmen  are  agreed  that 
unlimited  sovereign  power  resides  in  the  King  and 
Parliament.1  The  Statuto  contains  a  bill  of  rights ; 
but,  except  for  the  provision  forbidding  censorship  of 
the  press,  and  perhaps  that  protecting  the  right  of 
holding  meetings,2  it  was  not  designed  to  guard  against 
oppression  bj  the  legislature,  but  only  by  the  executive. 
The  Statuto  is,  in  fact,  mainly  occupied  with  the 
organization  of  the  powers  of  state,  and  has  gradually 
become  overlaid  with  customs,  which  are  now  so  strong 
that  many  Italian  jurists  consider  custom  itself  a  source 
of  public  law.  They  claim,  for  example,  that  the  habit 
of  selecting  ministers  who  can  command  a  majority  in 
Parliament  has  become  binding  as  part  of  the  law  of 
the  land.3 

Let  us  consider  the  powers  of  state  in  turn,  begin- 
ning with  the  King  and  his  ministers,  then  passing 
to  the  Parliament,  then  to  the  local  government  and 
the  judicial  system,  and  finally  to  the  position  of  the 
Catholic  church. 

1  Brusa,  Italien,  in  Marqnardsen's  Handbuch,  pp.  12-16,  181-82 ;  Ruiz, 
"The  Amendments  to  the  Italian  Constitution,"  Ann.  Atner.  Acad,  of  Pol. 
Sci.,  Sept.,  1895.  It  may  be  noted  that  the  various  contributions  to  Mar- 
quardsen's  work  are  of  very  different  value,  and  that  Brusa's  is  one  of 
the  best.  He  remarks  (p.  15)  that,  before  changing  any  constitutional 
provision,  it  has  been  customary  to  consult  the  people  by  means  of  a  gen- 
eral election,  and  that  it  is  the  universal  opinion  that  Parliament  has  not 
power  to  undo  the  work  of  the  popular  votes  by  which  the  various  prov- 
inces were  annexed  ;  in  other  words,  that  Parliament  cannot  break  up 
the  kingdom.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  courts  can  consider  the 
constitutionality  of  a  law  which  involves  a  forced  construction  of  the 
Statuto,  but  this  view  has  not  prevailed.     (Brusa,  pp.  182,  note  3, 229-30.) 

2  Arts.  28,  32. 

•  See  Brusa,  p.  19. 


152  ITALY. 

At  the  head  of  the  nation  is  the  King,  whose  crown 
is  declared  hereditary,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Salic  law;  that   is,  it  can  be 
inherited  only  by  and  through  males.1     It  sounds  like 
Power  a  Paradox  to  say  that  the  King  is  a  constitu- 

raerSed  tional  sovereign,  bulb  that  the  constitution 
does  not  give  a  correct  idea  of  his  real  func- 
tions, and  yet  this  is  true.  By  the  Statuto,  for  example, 
his  sanction  is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  laws  passed 
by  the  Parliament,2  but  in  point  of  fact  he  never 
refuses  it.3  Again,  the  constitution  provides  that 
treaties  which  impose  a  burden  on  the  finances  or 
change  the  territory  shall  require  the  assent  of  the 
Chambers,4  leaving  the  Crown  free  to  conclude  others 
as  it  thinks  best ;  but  in  practice  all  treaties,  except 
military  conventions  and  alliances,  are  submitted  to 
Parliament  for  approval.5  The  King  is  further  given 
power  to  declare  war,  to  appoint  all  officers,  to  make 
decrees  and  ordinances,  to  create  Senators,  to  dissolve 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  so  forth ; 6  but  the 
Statuto  also  provides  that  no  act  of  the  government 
shall  be  valid  unless  countersigned  by  a  minister ;  and 
in  fact  all  the  powers  of  the  King  are  exercised  in  his 
name  by  the  ministers,  who  are  responsible  to  the 
popular   House.7      He  is,   indeed,    seldom   present   at 

1  Statuto,  Art.  2. 

2  Statuto,  Art.  7. 

3  Brusa,  pp.  105,  153  ;  cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  281,  292-97. 

4  Statuto,  Art.  5. 

5  Brusa,  p.  106. 

6  Statuto,  Arts.  5-9. 

7  Statuto,  Art.  67  ;  and  see  Brusa,  p.  105. 


THE  KING  AND  HIS  MINISTERS.  153 

cabinet  meetings,  and  has  little  or  no  direct  influence 
oyer  current  domestic  politics,1  although  it  is  said  that 
his  personal  opinion  has  a  good  deal  o£  weight  on 
the  relations  with  foreign  states.2  When,  however,  a 
cabinet  crisis  occurs  and  the  ministry  resigns,  the  King 
has  a  great  deal  of  latitude  in  the  appointment  of  its 
successor;  for  the  Chamber  is  not  divided  into  two 
parties,  one  of  which  naturally  comes  into  power  when 
the  other  goes  out,  but,  as  in  France,  it  is  split  up  into 
a  number  of  small  groups,  so  that  every  ministry  is 
based  upon  a  coalition.  The  King  can,  therefore,  send 
for  almost  any  one  he  pleases  and  allow  him  to  attempt 
to  form  a  cabinet.  It  often  happens,  moreover,  that 
the  man  selected  feels  that  he  cannot  get  the  support 
of  a  majority  in  the  existing  Chamber,  but,  hoping  for 
a  favorable  result  from  a  new  election,  is  willing  to 
undertake  to  form  a  cabinet  if  allowed  to  dissolve 
Parliament.  In  such  cases  the  King  exercises  his  own 
discretion,  and  grants  permission  or  not  as  he  thinks 
best ;  for,  contrary  to  the  habit  in  France,  dissolutions 
in  Italy  are  by  no  means  rare.  Thus  the  Italian  King, 
although  strictly  a  constitutional  monarch  tied  up  in  a 
parliamentary  system,  is  not  quite  so  powerless  as  the 
French  President  or  the  English  Queen. 

In  the  selection  of  his  ministers  the  King  is  not 
limited  bv  law  to  members  of  Parliament,  but,   rp,      .  . 

J  '  "     Ihe  minis- 

if  a  man  is  appointed  who  is  not  a  member  of  ters- 
either  House,  he  is  obliged  by  custom  to  become  a  can- 

1  Brusa,  p.  108.    Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  289,  says  that  he  presides  only  when 
peculiarly  important  matters  are  under  discussion. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  296.     This  is  a  common  opinion. 


154  ITALY. 

didate  for  the  next  vacant  seat  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  unless  he  is  created  a  Senator.1  As  in  other 
parliamentary  governments  on  the  Continent,  however, 
the  ministers  and  their  under-secretaries  have  a  right  to 
be  present  and  speak  in  either  Chamber,  although  they 
can  vote  only  in  the  one  of  which  they  happen  to  be 
members.2  The  work  of  the  Parliament  is,  indeed, 
chiefly  directed  by  them  ;  for,  while  individual  members 
have  a  right  to  introduce  bills,  the  power  is  used  only 
for  matters  of  small  importance.3  As  a  rule,  each 
minister  has  charge  of  a  department  of  the  administra- 
tion ;  but  it  is  allowable,  and  was  at  one  time  not 
uncommon,  to  appoint  additional  ministers  without  port- 
folios, whose  duties  consisted  solely  in  helping  to  shape 
the  policy  of  the  government,  and  defending  it  in  the 
Chambers.4 

The  Italian  Parliament  has  two  branches, — the  Senate 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  Senate  is 
composed  of  the  princes  of  the  royal  family,5 

1  Brusa,  p.  108;  and  the  same  thing  is  true  of  the  parliamentary 
under-secretaries.    Id.,  p.  196. 

2  Statuto,  Art.  66  ;  Law  of  Feb.  12,  1888,  Art.  2. 

8  Brusa,  p.  172.  Dupriez  (vol.  i.  p.  308)  says  that  the  ministers  in 
Italy  have  not  so  complete  a  monopoly  of  initiative  as  in  other  countries, 
and  that  private  members  often  propose  measures  with  success.  But  in 
saying  this  he  must  not  be  understood  to  deny  that  the  laws  enacted  as 
a  result  of  private  initiative  are  unimportant  compared  with  the  govern- 
ment measures,  both  as  regards  number  and  character. 

4  Brusa,  p.  197.  See,  also,  the  lists  of  the  different  ministries  published 
in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies.  This  manual,  by  the  way,  is  a  most  valua- 
ble production,  for  it  contains  the  text  of  many  important  laws  and  a  large 
amount  of  interesting  information.  For  the  organization  and  functions  of 
the  various  departments,  see  Brusa,  p.  200  et  seq. 

5  Statuto,  Art.  34. 


THE   SENATE.  155 

and  of  members  appointed  by  the  King  for  life  from 
certain  categories  of  persons  defined  by  the  itscompo_ 
Statuto.1  These  are :  bishops ; 2  sundry  high  Sltl0n 
officials,  civil,  military,  and  judicial ; 3  deputies  who 
have  served  three  terms,  or  six  years ; 4  men  who  have 
been  for  seven  years  members  of  the  Royal  Academy  of 
Science ;  men  who  pay  over  three  thousand  lire  (about 
six  hundred  dollars)  in  taxes  ;5  and  men  deserving  ex- 
ceptional honor  for  service  to  the  state.  Owing  to 
the  extreme  severity  of  the  Senate  in  recognizing  such 
desert,  no  appointment  from  the  last  class  has  been 
made  since  1879 ;  for  the  Senate  itself  has  the  strange 
privilege  of  deciding  whether  a  person  selected  by  the 
King  belongs  properly  to  one  of  these  classes,  and  is 
qualified  to  be  a  Senator.6    Except  for  money 

and  powers. 

bills,  which  must  be  presented  first  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  the  legislative  powers  of  the  two 
Houses  are  the  same,  but  the  Senate  has  also  judicial 
functions.  It  can  sit  as  a  court  to  try  ministers  im- 
peached by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies;  to  try  cases  of 
high  treason  and  attempts  on  the  safety  of  the  state ; 7 

1  Statuto,  Art.  33.    All  the  appointed  members  must  be  forty  years  old. 

2  Since  the  quarrel  with  the  Pope  in  1870  this  class  has  not  been  avail- 
able.    Brusa,  p.  119. 

3  Except  in  the  case  of  the  highest  officials,  persons  of  this  class  can  be 
appointed  only  after  a  period  of  service  which  varies  from  three  to  seven 
years,  according  to  the  office  they  hold.  In  1890  there  were  over  one 
hundred  Senators  from  this  class.    Id.,  p.  119. 

4  Out  of  a  total  of  about  three  hundred  and  sixty,  there  were  about  one 
hundred  Senators  from  this  class.     Id.,  p.  119. 

5  There  were  about  one  hundred  Senators  from  this  class  also.  Id., 
p.  119,  note  3. 

6  Brusa,  p.  119  ;  and  see  the  Statuto,  Art.  60. 

7  Statuto,  Art.  36. 


156  ITALY. 

and  to  try  its  own  members,  —  the  Italians,  curiously 
enough,  having  copied  in  their  Senate  the  antiquated 
privilege  which  entitles  the  English  Peers  to  be  tried 
for  crime  only  by  members  of  their  own  body.1  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Senate  has  very  little  real  power,  and 
is  obliged  to  yield  to  the  will  of  the  Lower  House.2  In 
1878-80  it  did,  indeed,  refuse  to  abolish  the  unpopular 
grist-tax  for  more  than  a  year,  but  gave  way  before  a 
newly  elected  Chamber  of  Deputies.3  It  would  proba- 
bly not  venture  even  so  far  to-day,  for  the  number  of 
Senators  is  unlimited,  and  on  several  occasions  a  large 
batch  of  members  has  been  created  in  order  to  change 
the  party  coloring  of  the  body,  —  in  1890  as  many  as 
seventy-five  having  been  appointed  for  this  purpose  at 
one  time.4  As  in  other  countries  where  the  parlia- 
mentary system  exists,  the  cabinet  is  not  responsible  to 
the  Upper  House ;  and  it  is  only  occasionally,  and  as 
it  were  by  accident,  that  a  minister  has  resigned  on 
account  of  an  adverse  vote  in  the  Senate.5 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  consists  of  five  hundred 
and  eight  members,  elected  on  a  limited  fran- 

TheCham-  °  / 

berof  Depu-  cbise.    By  the  earlier  law,  the  suffrage  was  so 

restricted  that  less  than  two  and  a  half  per 

cent,  of  the  population  were  entitled  to  vote ;   but  this 

1  Statuto,  Art.  37. 

2  The  changes  made  by  the  Senate  in  bills  have  usually  a  legal  rather 
than  a  political  importance.     Dupriez,  p.  313. 

8  Brusa,  pp.  155-56.  See  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  Stoma  d'  Italia, 
1860-1880,  pp.  420-21,  558-59. 

4  In  1886  forty-one  were  appointed  together,  and  in  1892  forty-two. 
See  the  list  of  Senators  with  their  dates,  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies 
for  1892,  p.  806  et  seq.,  and  p.  876. 

6  Brusa,  p.  158,  note  3. 


THE  CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES.  157 

was  felt  to  be  too  small  a  proportion,  and  in  1882  it  was 
increased  by  an  act  whose  provisions  are  still  The  fran. 
in  force.1  By  this  statute  a  voter  must  be  able  chise' 
to  read  and  write,  and  must  have  passed  an  examination 
on  the  subjects  comprised  in  the  course  of  compulsory 
education,2  except  that  the  examination  is  not  required 
in  the  case  of  officials,  professional  men,  graduates  of 
colleges,  and  others  who  could,  of  course,  pass  it;  nor  in 
the  case  of  men  who  have  received  a  medal  for  military 
or  civil  service,  or  who  pay  a  direct  tax  of  nineteen  lire 
and  four  fifths  (about  four  dollars),  or  who  pay  rents  of 
certain  amounts.  The  change  more  than  tripled  the 
quantity  of  voters  at  once;3  and,  although  these  still 
include  only  a  small  part  of  the  citizens,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  with  the  spread  of  elementary  education 
their  number  will  gradually  increase  until  the  suffrage 
becomes  substantially  universal.4 

At  first  the  members  were  chosen  each  in  a  separate 
district,  but  after  the  times  of  enthusiasm  for  Italian 
unity  were  over,  and  the  generous  impulse  that  had 

1  Brusa,  pp.  122-27.  This  law,  with  its  amendments,  recodified  in 
1895,  may  be  found  in  full  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for  that  year. 

2  Education  is  compulsory  in  Italy  only  between  the  ages  of  six  and 
nine.     Act  of  July  15,  1877,  Art.  2. 

3  It  raised  the  number  from  627,838  to  2,049,461.  Brusa,  p.  127.  When 
the  law  went  into  effect,  the  voters  were  not  very  unequally  divided  into 
those  who  passed  the  examination,  those  who  paid  the  taxes,  and  the  other 
excepted  classes.     Id.,  p.  126,  notes  1-2. 

4  In  order  to  restrict  the  arbitrary  influence  of  the  government  over 
elections,  and  to  prevent  the  abuses  which  had  been  common  before,  a 
procedure  for  preparing  the  lists  of  voters  and  insuring  the  secrecy  of  the 
ballot  was  established  by  the  same  law  (see  Brusa,  pp.  127-28,  130-32)  ; 
and  in  this  connection  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  soldiers  and  sailors  in  active 
service  (including  subalterns  and  police  officials)  are  not  allowed  to  vote. 
Law  of  March  28,  1895,  Art.  14. 


158  ITALY. 

stirred  the  country  began  to  give  way  before  the  selfish 
motives  of  e very-day  life,  it  was  found  that  the  deputies 
failed  to  take  broad  views  of  national  questions,  and 
were  largely  absorbed  by  personal  and  local  interests. 
It  was  found,  in  short,  that  they  represented  the  nation 
too  little  and  their  particular  districts  too  much ;  *  and  it 
was  hoped  that  by  increasing  the  size  of  the  districts 
they  would  be  freed  from  the  tyranny  of  local  influence, 
and  enabled  to  form  compact  parties  on  national  issues.2 
With  this  object  the  Act  of  1882  distributed  the  five 
hundred  and  eight  seats  among  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
five  districts,  which  elected  from  two  to  five  deputies 
apiece ; 3  and,  in  order  to  give  some  representation  to 
minorities,  it  was  provided  that  in  those  districts  which 
elected  five  deputies  no  one  should  vote  for  more  than 
four  candidates.4  The  new  system,  called  the  scrutinio 
di  lista,  did  not  produce  the  results  that  were  expected 
from  it.  On  the  contrary,  in  Italy  as  in  France,  where 
the  same  remedy  was  applied  to  the  same  evil,  the 
organization  and  power  of  the  local  wire-pullers  grew 
with  the  increase  in  the  number  of  deputies  elected  in 
a  district,  while  the  influence  of  the  latter  over  the 
ministers  and  the  provincial  officers  was  greater  than 
ever  before.5     An  Act  of  May  5,  1891,  has  therefore 

1  Brusa,  p.  16. 

2  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici,  p.  18  ;  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  p.  504. 

3  Three  districts  elected  two  deputies,  sixty-one  elected  three,  thirty- 
six  elected  four,  and  thirty-five  elected  five.  Brusa,  p.  129.  See  Arts. 
44  and  45  of  the  Act  of  1882,  and  the  table  of  districts  annexed  thereto. 

4  Act  of  1882,  Art.  65. 

5  Brusa,  lb. ;  and  see  Turiello,  Governo  e  Governati  in  Italia,  2d  ed.  ; 
Fatti,  p.  326  ;  Proposte,  p.  171. 


THE  CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES.  159 

abolished  the  scrutinio  di  lista  and  reestablished  single 
electoral  districts.1 

In  accordance  with  the  general  practice  in  Europe, 
the  deputies  are  not  required  to  be  residents 
of  their  districts,  the  only  important  limita-  tion  of  the 
tions  on  the  choice  of  candidates  being  the 
requirement  of  the  age  of  thirty  years,  and  the  pro- 
vision excluding  priests  who   have  active  duties,  mayors 
and  provincial  counselors  in  their  own  districts,  and  all 
officials  paid  from  the  treasury  of  the  state  with  the  ex- 
ception of  ministers,  under-secretaries,  and  a  few  others.2 
The   deputies  receive  no  pay  for  attendance,  but  are 
given  free  passes  over  the  railroads,3  and  it  is  no  doubt 
partly  for  this  reason  that  the  small  attendance  in  the 
Chamber  has  long  been  a  crying  evil. 

The  Chamber  is  elected  for  five  years,  but  so  far 
its  life  has  always  been   cut  short  by  a  dis- 
solution, and  in   fact  the  average  length  of  of  the 
term  has  been  less  than  three  years.4     The 
budget  and  the  contingent  of  recruits  are  adjusted  by 

1  This  law  is  printed  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for  1892,  in  place 
of  Arts.  44,  45,  of  the  Act  of  1882. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  132-34  ;  and  see  Acts  of  Dec,  1860  (Arts.  97,  98),  July  3, 
1875,  May  13,  1877,  July  5,  1882,  March  28, 1895  (Arts.  81-89).  There 
is  a  curious  provision  that  only  forty  officials  of  all  kinds  (except  minis- 
ters and  under-secretaries),  and  among  them  not  more  than  ten  judges 
and  ten  professors,  can  be  deputies  at  the  same  time,  and  if  more  are 
elected  they  are  reduced  to  that  number  by  lot.  Law  of  March  28, 1895, 
Art.  88.  On  account  of  some  scandals  that  occurred  at  one  time  it  is 
further  provided  that  no  officers  of  companies  subventioned  by  the  state, 
and  no  government  contractors,  can  sit  in  the  Chamber.  Brusa,  p.  134  ; 
law  of  March  28,  1895,  Arts.  84-85. 

3  Brusa,  pp.  159-60. 
*  Id.,  p.  139. 


160  ITALY. 

annual  laws,  and  there  would  naturally  be  a  new  session 
every  year;  but  in  order  not  to  interrupt  the  work  of 
Parliament,  and  especially  the  consideration  of  the 
budget,  which  is  apt  to  be  behindhand,  a  curious  habit 
has  grown  up  of  prolonging  the  sessions,  so  that  three 
recent  Parliaments  have  had  only  a  single  session  apiece, 
one  lasting"  two  and  a  half  and  another  three  and  a  half 
years,  all  of  them  unbroken  save  by  occasional  recesses.1 
The  Chamber  of  Deputies  elects  its  own  President 
The  Presi-  anc^  °ther  officers,  and  the  vote  for  President 
dent.  used  to  be  an  occasion  for  a  trial  of  party 

strength,  as  in  most  other  legislative  bodies.  Of  late 
years,  however,  the  English  habit  has  prevailed  of  re- 
electing the  same  man  without  regard  to  party  affilia- 
tions ; 2  and  this  is  the  more  striking  because  the  President 
appoints  the  committees  on  rules  and  contested  elections,3 
which  have,  of  course,  no  little  importance.  The  idea 
that  the  presiding  officer  ought  to  be  strictly  impartial 
is  not  the  only  valuable  suggestion  the  Italians  have 
derived  from  England,  for  they  have  inherited  Cavour's 
admiration  for  British  parliamentary  procedure,  and  in 
general  they  attempt  to  follow  it.  Unfortunately  they 
have  not  done  so  in  all  cases,  for,  as  we  shall  see  when 
we  come  to  consider  the  actual  working  of  the  govern- 

1  Brusa,  p.  139;  and  see  the  list  of  the  sessions  of  the  various  Parlia- 
ments in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  140  and  156,  note  2.  Bianeheri  was  President  of  the 
Chamber  continuously  from  1884  to  1892.  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for 
1892  (pp.  800-802).  In  that  year  he  was  dropped  for  party  reasons, 
and  in  fact  the  practice  of  looking  on  the  President  as  the  representative 
of  a  party  has  unfortunately  revived. 

8  Rules  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Art.  12. 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  SYSTEM.  161 

ment,  the  system  of  committees  and  of  interpellations  or 
questions  has  been  copied  mainly  from  the  French  and 
not  the  English  practice. 

Such,  briefly  stated,  are  the  position  of  the  King  and 
the  composition  of  the  Parliament ;  but  although  the 
King  and  his  ministers  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Par- 
liament on  the  other,  are  the  great  political  forces 
whose  interaction  determines  the  character  of  the 
government,  still  it  is  impossible  to  appreciate  the  re- 
lations between  the  two,  without  some  knowledge  of 
the  method  of  administration,  the  principles  of  local 
government,  and  the  control  exercised  by  the  courts  of 
law,  because  these  matters  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
functions  of  the  cabinet,  and  hence  on  the  nature  of 
the  influence  exerted  upon  it  by  the  Parliament. 

The  administration  both  of  national  and  local  affairs, 
and  to  some  extent  the  judicial  system  of  The  admin- 
Italy,  are  modeled  on  those  of  France,  and  tSmdTitSS 
they  present  the  defects  without  all  the  ad-  thafoffr°m 
vantages  of  the  original.  This  is  particularly  rance* 
true  of  the  administrative  system,  where  Italy  has 
copied  the  centralization,  but  has  been  unable  to  ac- 
quire the  traditions  which  give  real  solidity  to  the 
body  of  officials.  At  first  sight  it  seems  strange  that 
Cavour  and  his  successors,  with  their  admiration  for 
English  institutions,  should  have  turned  to  the  French 
bureaucracy  as  a  pattern  ;  but  there  were  Reasons  for 
several  reasons  for  their  course.  In  the  first  thls' 
place  the  Napoleonic  rule  had  already  made  the  Italians 
familiar  with  the  French  form  of  administration.  A 
far  stronger  motive  came  from  the  fact  that  after  Cavour 

VOL.   I. 


162  ITALY. 

gave  up  the  idea  of  a  confederation,  and  strove  to 
create  a  united  kingdom  of  Italy,  it  became  important, 
in  view  of  the  possible  interference  of  foreign  powers, 
to  consolidate  the  different  provinces  as  completely  and 
rapidly  as  possible.  The  Italian  statesmen  tried,  there- 
fore, to  make  the  people  homogeneous  ;  to  remove  as 
far  as  possible  all  local  differences ;  and  to  destroy  all 
possibility  of  local  opposition.1  The  country,  more- 
over, was  very  backward,  and  a  great  work  of  regen- 
eration had  to  be  undertaken,  especially  in  the  south, 
where  society  was  badly  disintegrated  and  brigandage 
was  rife.  To  accomplish  this  a  highly  centralized  and 
autocratic  system,  in  which  the  government  could  make 
itself  quickly  and  decisively  felt,  was  thought  essen- 
tial ; 2  and  it  was  believed,  not  without  reason,  that 
until  the  union  was  accomplished,  and  order  had  been 
established  in  Naples  and  Sicily,  it  was  impossible  to 
introduce  general  local  self-government  or  universal 
liberty.  The  old  territorial  divisions  were  therefore 
swept  away,  and  replaced  by  artificial  districts  devoid, 
of  course,  of  real  local  life.  A  centralized  form  of 
administration  was  set  up,  and  the  government  was 
given  a  highly  arbitrary  power  to  interfere  with  the 
freedom  of  the  individual.  Such  a  system  might  have 
worked  very  well  in  the  hands  of  a  wise  dictator,  but, 
as  some  of  the  Italian  writers  have  themselves  remarked, 
it  was  so  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  parliamentary 
form  of  government  that  one  of  them  was  sure  to  spoil 

1  See  Brusa,  pp.  23,  337  ;  Jacini,  /  Conservatori,    p.  55  et  seq.,  Due 
Anni  di  Politico,  Italiana,  pp.  93-94. 

2  See  Brusa,  pp.  253-54. 


THE   ADMINISTRATIVE   SYSTEM.  163 

the  other,  and  experience  has  shown  that  both  of  them 
have  suffered  grievously  from  the  combination.1 

There  is  a  marked  contradiction  in  Italy  between 
the  theory  and  practice  of  government ;  for  Contrast  in 
there  is  a  strong  ambition  to  be  abreast  of  t^enbe" 
the  times  and  a  general  belief  in  the  prin-  practicf"? 
ciple  of  personal  liberty ;  but  the  actual  con-  government' 
dition  of  the  nation  has  made  it  impossible  to  live  up 
to  these  standards.  A  striking  example  of  the  con- 
trast between  aspirations  and  results  is  furnished  by 
the  state  of  the  criminal  law,  for  capital  punishment 
has  been  abolished,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  homicide 
is  more  common  than  in  any  other  civilized  country  in 
Europe,2  and  yet  criminal  procedure  is  in  such  a  condi- 
tion that  thousands  of  people  have  been  arrested  on  sus- 
picion, kept  in  prison  sometimes  for  years,  and  finally 
released  because  there  was  not  sufficient  ground  for 
trial.3  Thus  by  her  code  Italy  appears  to  be  in  ad- 
vance of  most  other  nations,  but  in  her  criminal  prac- 
tice she  is  really  far  behind  them.     The  truth  is  that 


1  Cf.  Jacini,  /  Conservatory  pp.  67-68  ;  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici, 
p.  100;  Pareto,  "  L'ltalie  Economique,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Oct. 
15,  1891  ;  and  see  Bertolini,  "I  Pieni  Poteri  per  le  Riforme  Orga- 
niche,"  Nuova  Antologia,  June  1,  1894. 

2  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  330-32. 

3  See  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  vol.  i.  p.  576.  Petruccelli  della 
Gattina  says  (Storia  d'  Italia,  p.  258)  that  in  1876,  93,444  persons  were 
arrested  on  suspicion  and  let  off  because  there  was  no  ground  for  trial. 
This,  it  is  true,  was  eleven  years  before  the  code  was  finally  enacted  ; 
nevertheless  it  illustrates  the  contrast  between  ideals  and  practice  in 
criminal  matters,  and  in  fact  in  that  very  year  the  abolition  of  the  death 
penalty  was  voted  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  but  rejected  by  the 
Senate. 


164  ITALY. 

the  successive  governments,  in  view  of  the  unsettled 
state  of  the  country,  have  been  afraid  to  place  re- 
straints on  their  own  power,  and  weaken  an  authority 
thought  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  order.  Of 
course  the  result  has  been  a  good  deal  of  arbitrary  offi- 
cialism and  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  citizen,1  but 
while  this  is  a  misfortune  for  the  north  of  Italy,  ex- 
traordinary and  autocratic  power  has  at  times  been  in- 
dispensable in  Sicily  and  the  south.2  The  impossi- 
bility, indeed,  of  giving  effect  to  the  theories  of  liberty 
that  are  constantly  proclaimed  from  every  quarter  was 
forcibly  illustrated  by  the  only  serious  attempt  that 
has  been  made  to  do  so.  When  Cairoli  and  Zanardelli 
became  ministers  in  1878  they  tried  to  carry  out  their 
principles  thoroughly.  They  permitted  the  constitu- 
tional right  of  public  meeting  to  be  freely  exercised, 
and  gave  up  the  despotic  practice  of  preventive  arrest, 
trusting  to  the  courts  to  punish  offenders  against  the 
law ;  but  brigandage  increased  so  fast,  and  other  dis- 
turbances became  so  alarming,  that  the  cabinet  was 
driven  from  office,  and  its  policy  was  abandoned.  Of 
late  years  Zanardelli  has  again  held  office,  and  has 
succeeded  in  improving  the  administrative  and  judicial 
system  to  some  extent,  but  the  progress  of  the  reform 
has  been  extremely  slow,  and  the  arbitrary  power  of 
the  government,  although  reduced,  still  conforms  even 
in  quiet  times  far  more  nearly  to  French  than  to 
Anglo-Saxon  notions. 

There  are  two  matters  in  connection  with  the  admin- 

1  Cf.  Brusa,  p.  183. 

2  Cf.  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  vol.  i.  p.  581. 


LEGISLATION  BY  ORDINANCE.  165 

istration  that  require  special  notice.  One  of  tbem  is 
the  power  of  the  executive  officials  to  make 
ordinances.  This  is  even  more  extensively  nance 
used  than  in  France,  and  there  are  complaints 
that  it  is  sometimes  carried  so  far  as  to  render  the  provi- 
sions of  a  statute  nugatory,1  although  the  constitution 
expressly  declares  that  "the  King  makes  the  decrees 
and  regulations  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the 
laws,  without  suspending  their  observance  or  dispensing 
with  them."  2  The  interpretation  put  upon  this  provi- 
sion is  in  fact  so  broad  that  the  government  is  practically 
allowed  to  suspend  the  law  subject  to  responsibility  to 
Parliament,  and  even  to  make  temporary  laws  which 
are  to  be  submitted  to  Parliament  later,  —  a  power  that 
is  used  when  a  tariff  bill  is  introduced,  to  prevent  large 
importations  before  the  tariff  goes  into  effect.3  The 
Parliament  has,  moreover,  a  habit  of  delegating  legis- 
lative power  to  the  ministers  in  the  most  astonishing 
way.  In  the  case  of  the  recent  criminal  code,  for 
example,  the  final  text  was  never  submitted  to  the 
Chambers  at  all,  but  after  the  subject  had  been  suffi- 
ciently debated,  the  government  was  authorized  to 
make  a  complete  draft  of  the  code,  and  then  to  enact 
it  by  royal  decree,  harmonizing  it  with  itself  and  with 
other  statutes,  and   taking  into  account  the  views  ex- 

1  Brusa,  pp.  170-72. 

2  Statuto,  Art.  6.  The  courts  have  power  to  refuse  to  apply  an  ordi- 
nance which  exceeds  the  authority  of  the  government,  but,  in  practice, 
this  is  not  an  effective  restraint.     Brusa,  pp.  171-72,  175,  187. 

3  Brusa,  pp.  186-87.  In  1891  the  customs  duties  on  several  articles 
were  increased  by  royal  decree,  which  was  subsequently  ratified  by  Par- 
liament. 


166  ITALY. 

pressed  by  the  Chambers.  The  same  was  true  of  the 
electoral  law  of  1882,  of  the  recent  laws  on  local  gov- 
ernment and  on  the  Council  of  State,  and  of  many 
other  enactments.1  It  may  be  added  that  although  the 
Statuto  does  not  expressly  provide  for  it,  the  ministers, 
prefects,  syndics,  and  other  officials  are  in  the  habit  of 
making  decrees  on  subjects  of  minor  importance.2  The 
preference  indeed  for  administrative  regulations,  which 
the  government  can  change  at  any  time,  over  rigid 
statutes  is  deeply  implanted  in  the  Latin  races,  and 
seems  to  be  especially  marked  in  Italy.3 

The  other  matter  referred   to  as   requiring  special 

notice  is  the  civil  service.     The  host  of  offi- 

serviceand     cials,   who   are,  unfortunately,  too  numerous 

its  usg  for 

political        and  too  poorly  paid,4  can  be  appointed  or  dis- 

purpo^es.  . 

missed  very  much  at  the  pleasure  ot  the 
government,  for  although  there  are  royal  decrees  regu- 
lating appointments  and  removals  in  many  cases,  they 

1  Brusa,  pp.  175-76;  Bertolini,  "I  Pieni  Poteri,"  Nuova  Antologia, 
June  1,  1894.  Several  laws  of  this  kind  may  be  found  in  the  Manuals  of 
the  Deputies.  They  are  issued  in  the  form  not  of  statutes,  but  of  ordi- 
nances, and  begin  by  reciting  the  legislative  authority  under  which  they 
are  made.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  Italian  statutes  vary  a  great  deal, 
sometimes  containing  only  general  principles,  and  leaving  to  the  govern- 
ment the  task  of  completing  them  by  supplementary  regulations,  and 
sometimes  going  into  minute  details  (Brusa,  p.  171).  Dupriez,  who  looks 
at  the  matter  from  a  French  standpoint,  says  (vol.  i.  p.  336)  that  in  the 
struggle  between  the  government  and  the  Parliament  over  the  limits 
of  the  ordinance  power,  the  government  has  tried  to  extend  its  authority 
beyond  measure,  and  the  Parliament  to  dispute  it  even  in  the  matter  of 
organizing  the  administrative  service. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  188-90. 

8  Minghetti,  pp.  293-94. 
4  Brusa,  p.  260. 


THE  ABUSE   OF  PATRONAGE.  167 

do  not  appear  to  furnish  a  satisfactory  guarantee.1 
Here,  then,  is  a  great  mass  of  spoils,  in  the  distribution 
of  which  the  politicians  take  an  active  part.2  In  1889  a 
bill  on  the  tenure  of  office,  fixing  rules  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  officials,  and  preventing  their  removal  except 
with  the  approval  of  a  permanent  commission,  passed 
the  Senate,  and  was  favorably  reported  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  but  failed  to  become  law  owing  to 
the  dissolution  of  Parliament.3  It  will,  no  doubt,  be 
enacted  before  long,  and  then  one  of  the  great  evils  of 
Italian  politics  will  be  removed.4 

Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  local  government. 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  337-40  ;  Brusa,  pp.  252-55.  For  the  scope  of 
these  decrees,  see  p.  261  et  seq. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  152-53  ;  and  see  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  340-42. 

3  Brusa,  pp.  251. 

4  There  are  two  bodies  that  exercise  a  considerable  control  over  the 
government.  One  of  these  is  the  Council  of  State,  which  has,  however, 
only  an  advisory  power,  except  in  matters  of  administrative  justice,  and 
in  the  case  of  provincial  and  communal  officials  whom  it  protects  from 
arbitrary  removal.  On  this  subject  see  Brusa,  p.  212  et  seq.  The  laws 
of  June  2,  1889,  which  regulate  this  body,  may  be  found  in  the  Manual 
of  the  Deputies  for  1892,  p.  357.  The  other  is  the  Courts  of  Accounts 
{Corte  del  Conti),  whose  members  can  be  removed  only  with  the  consent 
of  a  commission  composed  of  the  Presidents  and  Vice-Presidents  of  both 
Chambers.  It  has  a  limited  supervision  over  the  collection  of  the  revenue, 
and  passes  finally  on  pensions  and  on  the  accounts  of  officials,  provinces, 
and  communes.  It  also  makes  a  yearly  report  to  Parliament  on  the 
accounts  of  each  ministry  ;  but  its  most  extraordinary  function  consists  in 
the  fact  that  all  decrees  and  orders  which  involve  the  payment  of  more 
than  2,000  lire  must  be  submitted  to  it  for  registration,  and  if  it  thinks 
them  contrary  to  the  laws  or  regulations  it  can  refuse  to  register  them. 
It  is,  indeed,  obliged  to  register  them  if  the  Council  of  Ministers  insists 
upon  it,  but  in  that  case  they  must  be  transmitted  to  the  Presidents  of 
the  Chambers  together  with  the  opinion  of  the  Corte  dei  Conti.  Law 
of  Aug.  14,  18G2,  Arts.  14,  18,  19  j  and  see  Brusa,  pp.  219-24. 


1C8  ITALY. 

The  Italian  statesmen  had  at  first  a  general  belief  in 
T     ,  decentralization,1    but   the   force    of   circum- 

Local  gov-  7 

emment.  stances  and  a  repugnance  to  the  idea  of  fed- 
eration were  so  strong  that  the  old  territorial  divi- 
sions, which  could  alone  have  furnished  a  solid  basis 
for  a  decentralized  system,  were  abandoned,  and  the 
Avhole  country  was  cut  up  into  a  series  of  brand-new 
districts.  These  are  the  provinces,  the  circondari,  the 
mandamenti,  and  the  communes,2  of  which  the  first 
and  the  last  are  the  only  ones  of  great  importance. 
Until  the  Act  of  1888,  the  powers  conferred  on  the 
local  bodies  were  extremely  small,  and  even  now  they 
are  far  from  extensive,  for  the  whole  system  is  copied 
from  that  of  France,  and,  with  some  variations  in  de- 
tail, the  organization  and  powers  of  the  French  local 
officers  and  councils  have  been  followed  very  closely.3 
A  general  description  of  the  local  government  would 
therefore  consist  very  largely  in  a  repetition  of  what 
has  been  already  said  in  the  first  chapter  on  France  ; 
and  hence  it  is  only  necessary  to  touch  on  a  few  salient 
points,  begging  the  reader  to  remember  how  great  a 
power  and  how  large  a  share  of  political  patronage  this 

1  In  1868  the  Chamber  actually  voted  an  order  of  the  day  in  favor  of 
decentralization.     Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  pp.  192-95. 

2  In  the  provinces  of  Mantua  and  Venice  the  division  is  somewhat 
different,  but  is  being  brought  into  accord  with  the  general  plan.  Brusa, 
p.  339. 

3  For  a  description  of  the  local  government  see  Brusa,  p.  337  et  seq. 
The  full  text  of  the  law  on  the  subject  was  fixed  by  royal  ordinance 
on  Feb.  10,  1889,  in  accordance  with  the  Act  of  Dec.  30,  1888.  It  was 
followed  by  an  elaborate  ordinance  regulating  its  execution,  and  on  July 
7,  1889,  and  July  11,  1894,  by  acts  amending  the  law.  Manual  of 
Deps.,  1895,  pp.  301-94. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  169 

system  places  in  the  hands  of  the  central  authorities.1 
At  the  head  of  each  province,  which  corresponds  to 
the  French  department,  is  a  prefect  appointed  by  the 
King,  and  directly  subject  to  the  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior. Like  his  French  prototype,  he  is  regarded  as 
a  political  officer,  and  uses  his  influence  more  or  less 
openly  at  elections.2  The  chief  executive  magistrate 
of  the  commune  is  the  syndic  ;  who  is  chosen,  like  the 
mayor  in  France,  by  the  communal  council  from  its  own 
members,  if  the  commune  has  more  than  ten  thousand 
inhabitants  or  is  the  capital  of  a  province  or  circondaro ; 
and  in  other  cases  is  selected  by  the  King  from  among 
the  members  of  the  council.  As  in  France,  both  the 
provinces  and  the  communes  possess  elected  councils.  In 
Italy  they  are  chosen  for  six  years,  one  half  being  renewed 
every  three  years ;  but  the  suffrage  for  these  bodies 
was  exceedingly  restricted,  until  by  the  Act  of  1888  it 
was  extended  so  as  to  be  somewhat  wider,  especially  as 
applied  to  the  peasants,  than  the  suffrage  for  the  elec- 
tion  of  deputies.3     The  abuse  of  local  machinery  for 


1  In  practice  the  administration  appears  to  be,  if  anything,  even  more 
centralized  than  in  France,  owing  to  the  habit  on  the  part  of  the  officials 
of  referring  everything  to  the  central  government.  Jacini,  i"  Conser- 
vator!, p.  130  ;  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici,  pp.  240-41. 

2  Bmsa,  pp.  225,  277.  On  the  eve  of  the  elections  in  1892,  forty-six 
out  of  the  sixty-nine  prefects  were  dismissed  or  transferred  to  other 
provinces,  in  order  to  help  the  government  to  carry  the  country. 

8  The  other  communal  and  provincial  bodies  are  the  municipal  giunta, 
which  is  elected  by  the  communal  council,  and  has  executive  powers  ; 
the  provincial  deputation,  which  occupies  a  similar  position  in  the  prov- 
ince, and  is  elected  by  the  provincial  council  ;  the  prefectoral  council, 
appointed  by  the  central  government  to  assist  the  prefect  ;  and  the  pro- 
vincial administrative  giunta,  partly  appointed  and  partly  elected,  which 


170  ITALY. 

political  purposes,  and  the  results  on  the  public  life  of 
the  nation,  will  be  discussed  later ;  but  it  is  proper  to 
remark  here  that  the  resources  of  the  local  bodies  are 
not  adequate  for  the  fulfillment  of  their  duties,  and 
this,  combined  with  a  love  of  municipal  display,  has 
been  the  cause  of  heavy  debts,  especially  in  the  case 
of  the  larger  cities,  many  of  which  have  long  been  on 
the  verge  of  bankruptcy.1 

There  is  one  branch  of  the  Italian  government  which 
The  judicial  nas  n°t  Deen  centralized,  and  that  is  the  ju- 
system.  dicial  system.  The  lower  courts  are,  indeed, 
new  creations,  organized  on  a  symmetrical  plan  very 
much  resembling  the  French  ;  but,  in  order  apparently 
itsdecen-  n°t  ^°  offend  the  bench  and  bar  of  the  old 
traiization.  principalities,  the  highest  courts  have  been 
suffered  to  remain  in  the  more  important  capitals,  so 
that  there  are  now  five  independent  Courts  of  Cassa- 
tion, those  of  Turin,  Florence,  Naples,  Palermo,  and 
Rome,  each  of  which  has  final  and  supreme  authority, 
within  its  own  district,  on  all  questions  of  ordinary 
civil  law.2  The  Court  of  Cassation  at  Rome  has,  it  is 
true,  been  given  little  by  little  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over  certain  special    matters ; 3  but   the  ordinary  civil 

has  a  certain  share  in  administrative  justice,  and  whose  approval  is  neces- 
sary for  the  validity  of  some  of  the  most  important  acts  of  the  local 
councils.  For  a  list  of  these  acts  see  the  Local  Government  Law  of 
Feb.  10,  1889,  Arts.  142,  166-71,  173,  and  223. 

1  See  Brusa,  pp.  365-67  ;  Turiello,  Proposte,  pp.  56,  63-65. 

2  A  Court  of  Cassation  is  a  court  of  last  resort,  which  considers  only 
errors  in  law  in  the  decisions  of  inferior  tribunals. 

8  These  are,  conflicts  of  competence  between  different  courts,  or  be- 
tween the  courts  and  the  administration  ;  the  transfer  of  suits  from  one 
court  to  another  ;  disciplinary  matters  ;  and  writs  of  error  in  criminal 


THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM.  171 

jurisdiction  is  still  divided  among  the  five  Courts  of 
Cassation,  which  bear  the  same  relation  to  each  other 
as  the  highest  state  courts  in  America.1  There  is  no 
appeal  from  one  to  another,  and  no  one  of  them  feels 
bound  to  accept  the  decisions  of  the  others,  or  to  follow 
them  as  precedents.  One  cannot  help  thinking1  that  this 
is  an  unfortunate  condition,  because  there  is  nothing 
that  tends  more  completely  to  consolidate  a  people, 
without  crushing  out  local  life,  than  a  uniform  admin- 
istration of  justice.  Italy  has,  indeed,  a  series  of  codes 
enacted  at  various  times  from  1865  to  1889,  and  cover- 
ing civil  law,  civil  procedure,  commercial  law,  criminal 
law,  and  criminal  procedure ;  but  a  code  alone  will  not 
produce  uniformity,  because  there  is  still  room  for 
differences  of  interpretation,  and  in  fact  the  Italian 
Courts  of  Cassation  often  disagree,  and  there  is  no  tri- 
bunal empowered  to  harmonize  their  decisions.2 

As  we  have  already  seen  in  the  case  of  France,  the 
decision  of  civil  and  criminal  questions  forms 
only  a  part  of  the  administration  of  justice  in  and  the 

i   -r-i  pit-  officials. 

continental  Europe,  on  account  or  the  distinc- 
tion drawn  between  public  and  private  law.3     In  order, 
therefore,  to  form  a  correct  estimate  of  the  position  of 

eases,  in  complaints  for  violation  of  election  laws,  in  civil  suits  against 
judges,  and  in  questions  of  taxes  and  of  church  property. 

1  For  the  organization  and  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  see  Brusa,  pp. 
231-38. 

2  Cf.  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  vol.  i.  p.  576. 

3  Belgium  presents  an  exception,  for  there  the  officials  can  be  sued, 
and  the  acts  of  the  government  can  be  reviewed  by  the  courts,  as  in  an 
Anglo-Saxon  country.  Cf.  Kerchove  de  Denterghem,  De  la  Responsabilite 
des  Ministres  dans  le  Droit  Public  Beige.  For  Switzerland,  see  chap.  xi. 
infra. 


172  ITALY. 

the  courts,  we  must  consider  their  relation  to  the  gov- 
ernment, and  their  power  to  determine  the  legality  of 
the  acts  of  public  officers.  In  Italy  the  prefects,  sub- 
prefects,  syndics,  and  their  subordinates  still  enjoy  the 
so-called  administrative  protection,  that  is,  they  cannot 
be  sued  or  prosecuted  for  their  official  conduct  with- 
out the  royal  consent.1  This  privilege  is  generally  un- 
popular, and  will  no  doubt  be  abolished  when  the  pro- 
posed bill  on  the  tenure  of  office  is  passed.  Meanwhile 
the  benefit  of  it  is  claimed  more  and  more  frequently, 
although  the  permission  to  proceed  appears  to  be  usually 
granted.2  But  even  when  this  protection  has  been 
taken  away,  the  courts  will  not  have  as  much  authority 
as  in  England  or  America.  The  reader  will  remember 
that  the  officers  of  the  French  government  formerly 
possessed  a  similar  privilege,  and  were  deprived  of  it 
after  the  fall  of  the  Second  Empire.  He  will  remember 
also  that  the  change  made  very  little  practical  difference, 
because  it  was  held  that  the  ordinary  courts  had  no 
power  to  pass  on  the  legality  of  official  acts,  such  ques- 
tioDS  being  reserved  exclusively  for  the  administrative 
courts.  The  result  of  abolishing  the  privilege  will  not 
be  precisely  the  same  on  the  other  side  of  the  Alps, 
because  the  problem  has  been  worked  out  on  somewhat 
different  lines,  a  curious  attempt  having  been  made  to 
establish  a  compromise  between  the  English  and  the 
French  systems. 

1  Law  of  Feb.  10,  1889,  Arts.  8,  139. 

2  Brusa,  p.  282  ;  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  210-11.  The  permission  to  prose- 
cute is  not  necessary  in  the  case  of  offenses  against  the  election  laws. 
Law  of  Feb.  10,  1889,  Art.  100  et  seq. ;  Brusa,  pp.  73,  130,  note  1. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW.  173 

The  subject  of   administrative  law  is,  indeed,  very- 
confused  in  Italy,  and  a  few  years  ago  it  was  Admin;s. 
in    a    thoroughly    unsatisfactory    condition.   tratlvelaw- 
When  the  union  was  formed,  several  of  the  component 
states  possessed  administrative  courts  of  their  own  ;  but 
in  order  to  produce  uniformity,  and  also  with 
a  view  of  furnishing  the  rights  of  the  citizen  the  ordinary 
with  a  better  guarantee,  an  act  of  March  20, 
1865,  abolished  all  these  tribunals,  and  provided  that 
the  ordinary  courts  should  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
all  criminal  prosecutions,  and  of  all  civil  cases  in  which 
a  civil  or  political   right  was  involved,  the  Council  of 
State  being  empowered  to  decide  whether  such  a  right 
was  involved  or  not.1     It  was  not  clearly  foreseen  that 
this  last  provision  would  place  in   the    hands  of   the 
government  an  effective  means  of  tyranny ; 2  but  such 
proved  to  be  the  case,  for  the  Council  of  State,  com- 
posed, as  it  was  at  that  time,  of  members  who  could  be 
removed  at  pleasure,3  showed  little  inclination  in  dis- 
puted cases  to  recognize  that  any  private  rights  were 
involved,  and,  there  being  no  administrative  courts  at 
all,  the   government    had    an   absolutely  free  hand  as 
soon    as  the  jurisdiction    of  the   ordinary  courts  was 
ousted.4    The  attempt  to  place  the  rights  of  the  citizen 

1  Legge  sul  Contenzioso  Administrativo  (March  20,  1865).  See,  espe- 
cially, Arts.  1,  2,  3,  13. 

2  Perhaps  it  would  be  more  correct  to  say  that  it  was  not  foreseen 
how  this  power  would  be  used  for  party  purposes.  Minghetti,  /  Partiti 
Politici,  p.  270  et  seq. 

3  See  Legge  sul  Consiglio  di  Stato  of  March  20,  1865,  Art.  4. 

4  See  Brusa,  pp.  212-13,  247  ;  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici,  p.  147  et 
seq. 


174  ITALY. 

more  fully  under  the  protection  of  the  ordinary  courts 
than  in  France  had  resulted  in  freeing  the  officials  more 
completely  from  all  control ;  for,  except  when  strong 
political  motives  come  into  play,  arbitrary  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  French  officials  is  restrained  by  the 
administrative  courts.  This  state  of  the  law  in  Italy 
gave  rise  to  bitter  complaints,  but  it  lasted  until  1877, 
when  the  decision  of  conflicts,  as  they  are  called,  or 
Administra-  disputes  about  jurisdiction  between  the  ad- 
tive  courts,  ministration  and  the  courts,  was  transferred 
to  the  Court  of  Cassation  at  Rome.1  Still  there  was 
no  system  of  administrative  justice,  and  hence,  however 
illegal,  and  however  much  in  excess  of  the  authority  of 
the  official  who  made  it,  a  decree,  ordinance,  or  other 
act  might  be,  no  redress  could  be  obtained  from  any  tri- 
bunal unless  it  could  be  shown  that  an  actual  legal  right 
was  violated.2  This  omission  in  the  judicial  system  was 
finally  supplied  by  the  statutes  of  1889  and  1890, 
which  reorganized  the  Council  of  State,  created  a  spe- 
cial section  of  it  to  act  as  an  administrative  court,  and 
conferred  an  inferior  administrative  jurisdiction  on  the 
provincial  giunta.3  In  order  to  give  the  council  a  con- 
siderable degree  of  independence,  it  was  provided  at 
the  same  time  that  the  members,  whose  number  is  lim- 
ited, should  be  retired  only  on  account  of  sickness  and 
removed  only  for  breach  of  duty,  and  in  each  case  only 
after  hearing  the  opinion  of  the  Council  of  State  itself.4 

1  Law  of  March  31,  1877  (Manual  of  Deps.  1892,  p.  374). 

2  Cf.  Brusa,  pp.  247-50. 

3  These  acts,  June  2,  1889,  and  May  1, 1890,  are  printed  in  the  Manual 
for  1892,  at  pp.  357  and  377. 

4  Act  of  June  2,  1889,  Art.  4. 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS.  175 

The  section  which  acts  as  an  administrative  court 
enjoys  a  still  greater  degree  of  protection ;  for  it  is 
composed  of  a  president  and  eight  other  members 
selected  from  among  the  Councillors  of  State  by  the 
King,  and  of  these  eight  not  less  than  two  nor  more 
than  four  can  be  changed  in  any  one  year,1  so  that, 
although  the  body  has  not  the  permanence  of  a  court 
of  law,  it  is  by  no  means  a  mere  tool  of  the  govern- 
ment. Except  in  purely  political  matters,  and  in  certain 
questions  relating  to  customs  duties  and  conscription, 
it  has  power  to  decide  whether  the  acts  of  the  cen- 
tral or  local  officers  are  authorized  by  law,  unless  some 
special  tribunal  or  the  ordinary  courts  have  jurisdic- 
tion.2 In  brief,  therefore,  the  legality  of  official  acts 
is  determined  in  civil  cases  by  the  ordinary  courts 
when  a  question  of  private  right,  and  by  the  adminis- 
trative courts  when  a  question  only  of  interest,  is  in- 
volved. The  function  of  the  ordinary  courts  in  these 
cases  is,  however,  strictly  limited  to  the  protection  of 
the  individual,  and  does  not  involve  an  authoritative 
declaration  of  the  law,  for  it  is  expressly  provided  that 
the  judgment  must  be  confined  to  the  case  at  bar,  and 
in  that  alone  is  the  administration  bound  by  the  deci- 
sion.3 This  principle  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  jurispru- 
dence of  the  nation,  for  the  Statute  itself  declares  that 
the  interpretation  of  the  law  in  such  a  way  as  to  be 
universally  binding  belongs  exclusively  to  the  legisla- 
tive power.4  The  Italian,  indeed,  has  a  dread  of  judge- 
made  law,  which  is  really  the  most  wholesome  form  of 

1  Act  of  June  2,  1889,  Art.  8.  2  Id.,  Art.  24. 

3  Act  of  March  20,  1865,  Art.  4.  *  Statuto,  Art.  73. 


176  ITALY. 

legislation,  —  a  prejudice  that  certainly  seems  very 
strange  when  we  consider  what  a  large  part  of  the  law 
of  the  civilized  world,  and  especially  of  the  law  of  the 
Latin  races,  was  developed  by  means  of  the  edicts  of 
the  Roman  praetors. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  Italian  system  of  admin- 
The  Italian  istrative  law  differs  from  that  of  every  other 
SbSstL-  nation.  According  to  the  English  principle, 
Selsfrom  the  ordinary  courts  have  jurisdiction  in  all 
cases,  and  the  very  idea  of  administrative  law 
as  a  distinct  branch  of  jurisprudence  is  unknown.  In 
most  of  the  continental  countries,  on  the  other  hand, 
all  matters  involving  the  legality  of  official  acts  are 
reserved  for  a  special  class  of  courts,  which  have  exclu- 
sive cognizance  of  those  questions  which  constitute  the 
domain  of  administrative  law ;  but  in  Italy  both  classes 
of  tribunals  are  called  upon  to  decide  the  same  ques- 
tions, the  ordinary  courts  being  specially  empowered  to 
protect  legal  rights. 

As   seen  on    the    statute-book,   the   Italian  judicial 

system  appears  to  be  very  good.     It  seems 

system  ap-     to  provide   the   individual  with  more  ample 

strong,  but     remedies,  and  a  better  guarantee  against  arbi- 

really  weak.  „      1  pn    •    -i 

trary  conduct  on  the  part  ot  the  officials, 
than  can  be  found  in  most  of  the  countries  of  conti- 
nental Europe.  But  in  fact  the  judiciary  is  not  strong 
enough  to  protect  the  citizen  effectually.  This  is 
chiefly  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  absence  of  those  deep- 
seated  traditions  that  are  necessary  to  give  the  magis- 
trates a  controlling  authority  over  public  opinion.  It 
is  due  also  to  the  existence  of  the   five  independent 


WEAKNESS  OF  THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM.  177 

Courts  of  Cassation,  which  prevents  any  one  court  from 
having  the  power  that  might  be  acquired  by  a  supreme 
national  tribunal ;  and  indeed  it  is  self-evident  that 
a  decentralized  judiciary  can  hardly  be  expected  to 
restrain  a  centralized  administration.  Nor  insuf£cient 
is  the  protection  afforded  to  the  bench  sat-  of°thetlon 
isfactory.  The  constitution  provides  that  3udges- 
judges,  except  in  the  lowest  courts,  shall  be  irremovable 
after  three  years  of  service,1  and  by  statute  they  can  be 
retired  only  on  account  of  illness,  and  removed  only 
for  crime  or  neglect  of  duty,  and  in  these  cases  only 
with  the  approval  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  at  Rome. 
But  a  judge  is  not  protected  against  a  transfer  from 
one  judicial  post  to  another  of  the  same  rank,  and 
although  by  royal  decree  a  commission  annually  ap- 
pointed by  the  court  at  Rome  must  be  consulted  before 
such  a  transfer  can  be  made,  its  advice  is  not  binding 
on  the  government.2  The  judges  are,  therefore,  by 
no  means  entirely  independent  of  the  executive,  and 
complaints  are  often  made  that  they  are  altogether  too 
much  under  its  control.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how 
far  these  complaints  are  justified,3  but  it  is  certain  that 

1  Statuto,  Art.  69. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  277-78.  In  1878  this  decree  was  repealed  for  a  time,  and 
one  hundred  and  twenty-two  transfers  were  made  in  six  months.  Min- 
ghetti,  pp.  134-35. 

3  Writing  in  1878,  Jacini  (/  Conservatory,  p.  29)  said  that,  so  far,  the 
judiciary  had  resisted  all  party  pressure,  but  since  that  time  this  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  true.  See  Minghetti,  ubi  supra  ;  Turiello,  Fatti, 
p.  316  ;  Proposte,  pp.  234-35  ;  De  Vitidi  Marco,  "  The  Political  Situation 
in  Italy,"  Nineteenth  Cent.,  Oct.,  1895  ;  Pareto,  "  LTtalie  Economique," 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Oct.  15,  1891,  Giornale  dei  Economisti,  March, 
1895,  p.  353  ;  Ruiz,  Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  Sci.,  Sept.,  1895,  p.  54  ; 

VOL.   I. 


178  ITALY. 

the  judiciary  either  has  not  enough  power,  or  does  not 
feel  sufficiently  free,  to  protect  individuals  against  an 
oppressive  abuse  of  political  power,  especially  in  local 
matters.  This  is  true  even  in  tranquil  times,  while 
the  wholesale  resort  to  martial  law  by  the  proclamation 
of  the  state  of  siege  during  the  recent  troubles  in 
Sicily  and  at  Carrara  shows  that  the  courts  are  unable 
to  cope  with  disorder  on  any  large  scale.1 

The  judicial  system  has  been  dwelt  upon  here  at 
what  may  seem  an  inordinate  length  because  its  condi- 
tion is  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  present 
political  condition  of  the  kingdom. 

There  is  one  institution  in  Italy  which  is  not  strictly 
The  church  a  Pai't  °^  the  government,  but  is  so  closely 
^    Ti  ,.       connected  with  it,  and  has  so  direct  an  influ- 

The  Italians 

wholly  ence  on  Pon^ics,  that  it  cannot  be  passed  over. 

Catholic  This  is  tlie  Catholic  church.  Within  the 
last  quarter  of  a  century  every  country  in  central 
Europe  has  found  itself  confronted  with  the  Catholic 
question,  and  has  been  obliged  to  grapple  with  it ;  but 
the  matter  has  a  peculiar  importance  in  Italy.  Not 
because  the  Italian  is  fanatical.  On  the  contrary,  his 
intense  religious  fervor  seems  to  have  burned  itself 
out  during  the  Middle   Ages,  and  has  left  him  com- 

Wolffson,  "  Italian  Secret  Societies,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  May,  1891  ;  Lord, 
"  Italia  non  Fara  da  Se,"  Nineteenth  Cent.,  March,  1892.  The  charge 
that  the  courts  were  subject  to  political  influence  was  made  by  the  Parlia- 
mentary committee  on  the  bank  scandals  in  December,  1894. 

1  Contrast  with  these  events  the  Chicago  riots  of  1894,  where  not  only 
the  military  authorities  never  superseded  the  judicial,  but  where  the  na- 
tional troops  were  called  into  action  solely  by  means  of  the  United  States 
courts. 


CHURCH  AND   STATE.  179 

paratively  indifferent ;  yet  he  clings  to  the  church  with 
a  tenacity  that  is  out  of  proportion  to  his  zeal.1  This 
is  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  he  knows  no  other  creed, 
and  partly  to  his  conservative  nature,  but  chiefly,  per- 
haps, to  the  fact  that  the  ceremonies  and  rites  of  the 
Catholic  faith,  having  been  moulded  for  the  most  part 
by  his  own  race,  are  closely  fitted  to  his  temperament, 
and  therefore  continue  to  attract  him  strongly,  espe- 
cially on  the  aesthetic  side.  The  nation  is  almost  wholly 
Catholic,  and  to-day,  as  in  the  past,  the  church  in  Italy 
is  assailed,  not  by  heretics,  but  by  her  own  children. 

Cavour  proclaimed  the  doctrine  of  a  free  church  in 
a   free    state ;    but    although   the   church    is 
more    independent  of  the  government   than  trine  of  a 

.     ,       ,  ,  .      .  .,  ,  free  church 

might  have  been  expected,  it  is  impossible  to  in  a  free 
carry  the  principle  out  fully  in  a  country 
where  there  is  only  one  religious  body,  and  where  that 
body  has  always  been  intimately  connected  with  public 
life.  The  church  could  not  be  independent  of  the 
state  in  Italy  in  the  same  sense  that  it  is  in  America, 
and  this  fact  has  led  some  of  the  Italian  advocates  of 
the  doctrine  to  misunderstand  it  completely.  They 
complain,  for  example,  that  the  actual  relation  between 
church  and  state  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  church 
is  a  private  association  instead  of  a  public  institution, 
and  lament  that  the  state  has  surrendered  too  much  its 

1  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  in  his  Present  Position  of  European  Politics 
(pp.  261-62),  quotes  the  saying  that  the  Italians  would  be  a  nation  of 
freethinkers  if  they  had  ever  been  known  to  think,  and  remarks  that 
although  the  epigram  is  unfair,  there  is  a  certain  measure  of  truth  under- 
lying it. 


180  ITALY. 

control  over  the  education  of  priests,1  —  expressions 
which  amount  to  a  complaint  that  the  church  is  too 
free.  But,  although  the  principle  cannot  be  applied 
rigorously  in  Italy,  it  has  been  carried  out  to  a  consid- 
erable extent.  The  state  has  abandoned  the  right  of 
nomination  to  ecclesiastical  offices,  which  had  existed 
in  some  of  the  former  Italian  principalities;  and  the 
bishops  are  no  longer  required  to  take  an  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  King.2  Moreover,  the  so-called  exe- 
quatur and  placet,  that  is,  the  requirement  of  permits 
from  the  government  for  the  publication  and  execution 
of  the  acts  of  ecclesiastical  authorities,  have  been  given 
up.3  The  state  has  also  renounced  all  control  over 
the  seminaries  for  priests  in  Rome,4  and  rarely  inter- 
feres with  those  elsewhere ; 5  and  finally  the  church  has 
been  granted  freedom  of  meeting,  of  publication,  and 
of  jurisdiction  in  spiritual  matters.6  Conversely,  the 
acts  of  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  have  ceased  to  be 
privileged.     They  have  no  legal  force  if  they  are  con- 

1  See,  for  example,  Brusa,  pp.  426-27,  429. 

2  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii.  Art.  15.  It  has  been  decided  that  in 
the  case  of  the  lower  clergy  the  oath  was  not  dispensed  with  wherever 
it  had  been  required  by  earlier  laws  (Brusa,  p.  428)  ;  and  even  the 
bishops  are  not  entirely  independent  of  the  state,  for  the  royal  exequatur 
is  still  required  for  the  enjoyment  of  their  revenues  (Id.,  p.  437).  At 
times  these  have  actually  been  withheld,  notably  in  1877.  Speyer, 
in  Unsere  Zeit,  1878,  vol.  ii.  p.  604. 

3  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii.  Art.  16. 

4  Id.,  Tit.  i.  Art.  13. 

5  Brusa,  p.  438. 

6  Id.,  Tit.  ii.  Arts.  14,  16,  17.  Religious  processions  outside  the 
churches  may  be  forbidden  by  the  local  authorities,  if  they  are  liable  to 
interfere  with  public  order  or  public  health.  Law  of  June  30,  1889, 
Art.  8. 


THE  MONASTIC  ORDERS.  181 

trary  to  law  or  violate  private  rights,  and  they  are  not 
exempt  from  the  provisions  of  the  criminal  code.1 

A  thorny  question  for  the  new  kingdom  was  involved 
in  the  position  of  the  monastic  orders,  many  Treatment 
of  which  still  held  great  tracts  of  land,  but  n*s^ce  mo~ 
had  long  outlived  their  usefulness  and  were  orders; 
felt  to  be  an  anachronism.  The  solution  adopted, 
though  almost  a  necessity,  was  drastic,  and  illustrates 
how  far  the  theory  of  a  free  church  in  a  free  state 
was  at  this  time  from  being  a  reality.  The  order 
of  Jesuits  was  absolutely  excluded  from  the  king- 
dom ; 2  and  even  in  the  case  of  the  other  bodies,  which 
had  not  aroused  such  violent  antipathy,  the  govern- 
ment determined,  while  sparing  the  existing  members, 
to  forbid  the  enrollment  of  any  new  recruits.  By 
the  statutes  of  1866  and  1867,  therefore,  all  these 
monastic  institutions  and  most  of  the  benefices  without 
a  cure  of  souls  were  suppressed,  and  their  property 
transferred  to  the  state  to  be  employed  for  the  support 
of  religion ;  but  a  pension  for  life  was  reserved  to  the 
present  possessors,  who  were  also  allowed  to  remain  in 
their  establishments.3  Every  traveler  will  remember 
the  aged  monks  in  white  frocks  who  may  still  be 
seen  wandering  among  the  cloisters  of  the  Val  d'  Ema, 
near  Florence.  These  are  the  last  representatives  of  a 
mighty  order  that  once  overshadowed  Christendom,  and 

1  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii.  Art.  17.  The  Penal  Code  of  1888 
specially  punishes  abuse  of  language  by  the  clergy.     Brusa,  p.  61. 

2  Brusa,  p.  56,  note  4. 

3  Acts  of  July  7,  1866,  and  Aug.  15,  1867.  See,  also,  Brusa,  pp.  431- 
33.  By  an  Act  of  1873  these  provisions  were  applied  to  Rome,  but  in 
a  modified  form.     Brusa,  lb. 


182  ITALY. 

with  the  spirit  of  romance  which  Italy  cannot  shake  off 
even  if  she  would,  they  have  been  allowed  to  drop  away 
one  by  one  until  the  monastery  becomes  silent  forever. 
The  convents  were  not  the  only  great  landowners 
and  of  the  in  the  church.  Many  of  the  higher  secular 
of  th™cu-s  clergy  were  also  richly  endowed.  But  there 
lar  clergy.      wag   a  strong   feeling  that   the    soil    of    the 

country  ought  to  be  controlled  by  laymen,  and  that 
the  larger  ecclesiastical  incomes  ought  to  be  reduced. 
This  feeling  found  its  expression  in  the  same  statutes 
of  1866  and  1867,  by  which  all  church  lands,  except 
those  belonging  to  parishes,  those  used  by  bishops 
and  other  dignitaries,  and  buildings  actually  devoted 
to  worship,  were  taken  by  the  state  and  converted  into 
perpetual  five  per  cent,  annuities ; 1  while  all  ecclesias- 
tical revenues,  not  of  a  parochial  nature,  were  taxed 
thirty  per  cent.,  or  in  other  words  partially  confiscated.2 
By  far  the  most  difficult  question  was  presented  by 
The  position  tne  papacy.  The  Holy  See  had  ruled  over 
of  the  Pope.  a  territory  of  considerable  size  extending 
across  the  peninsula  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the 
Adriatic.  It  pretended  to  traces  its  rights  from  a 
grant  made  in  the  fourth  century  by  the  Emperor 
Constantine  the  Great  to  Pope  Sylvester,  and  in  fact 

1  Act  of  July  7,  1866,  Arts.  11-18. 

2  Act  of  Aug.  15,  1867,  Art.  18.  By  the  Act  of  July  7,  1866,  Art. 
31,  the  revenues  of  bishops  exceeding  10,000  lire  are  taxed  progressively 
for  the  benefit  of  the  general  fund  for  religion,  the  whole  excess  above 
60,000  lire  being  so  taken.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  income  of  a 
>"'=>iop  falls  below  6,000  lire,  it  is  made  up  to  that  sum  out  of  the  gen- 
fund  (Art.  19).  Similar  taxes  for  the  benefit  of  the  fund  *-~ 
led  on  other  ecclesiastical  revenues.     In  the  Act  of  1873 

gently  treated.     Brusa,  pp.  432-33. 


THE   POPE.  183 

its  dominion  was  as  old  and  well  founded  as  that  of 
any  monarch  in  Europe.  It  felt  that  the  sovereignty 
over  its  own  States  —  the  so-called  Temporal  Power  — 
was  necessary  for  its  independence,  and  that  if  the 
Pope  lived  in  a  city  subject  to  another  ruler  he  could 
not  remain  entirely  free  in  spiritual  matters.  But  the 
Italians  felt  no  less  strongly  that  their  country  would 
never  be  a  complete  nation  until  it  included  everything 
between  the  Alps  and  the  sea,  with  Rome  as  its  capi- 
tal, and  this  feeling  was  fully  shared  by  the  Romans 
themselves. 

The  northern  and  eastern  part  of  the   Papal  States 
was  annexed  to  the  new  Kingdom  of  Italy  The  Papal 
at  the  same  time  as  Naples  and  Sicily,  that  nexldby 
is  in  1860 ;  but  Rome  and  the  country  about    ta  y' 
it  was  protected  by  Napoleon   III.,  whose  power  de- 
pended so   much  on  the  support   of   his  ultramontane 
subjects  that  he  could  not  safely  desert  the  cause  of 
the    Pope.     Italy  chafed    under  his  interference,  and 
waited  uneasily  until  the  war  with  Prussia  forced  him 
to  recall  his   troops.     Then  came  the  revolution  that 
overturned    his    throne.     An    Italian    army    at    once 
crossed  the  frontier  of  the  Papal  States,  and  entered 
Rome  on  September  20,  1870. 

The  problem  before  the  government  was  a  delicate 
one,  because  any  appearance  of  an  intention   The  law  of 

1  1.  the  Papal 

to  treat  the  Pope  as  an  Italian  subject  would  Guarantees. 
have  excited  the  indignation  of  the  whole  Catholic 
world,  and  might  have  led  to  foreign  complications, 
or  even  to  an  armed  intervention  in  favor  of  the  Tem- 
poral Power.     The  cabinet  determined,  therefore,  that 


184  ITALY. 

a  law  fixing  definitely  the  position  and  privileges  of 
the  Holy  See  should  be  passed  before  the  seat  of 
government  was  moved  to  Rome.  Recognizing  the 
peculiar  relations  of  the  Pope  to  other  States,  the 
ministers  proposed  to  make  this  law  one  of  interna- 
tional bearing,  so  that  it  would  have  an  effect  analo- 
gous to  that  of  a  treaty,  but  they  yielded  to  the  firm 
opposition  of  the  Left  in  the  Chamber,  and  the  act 
was  finally  passed  as  a  piece  of  domestic  legislation.1 
This  is  the  celebrated  Law  of  the  Papal  Guarantees, 
which  was  enacted  in  May,  1871,  and  remains  un- 
changed at  the  present  day.  Its  object  is  to  insure 
the  freedom  of  the  Pope  in  the  exercise  of  all  his 
spiritual  functions,  and  for  that  purpose  it  surrounds 
him  with  most  of  the  privileges  of  sovereignty.  His 
person  is  declared  sacred  and  inviolable  ;  assaults  or 
public  slander  directed  against  him  being  punishable 
like  similar  offenses  against  the  King.  Public  officials 
in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  are  forbidden  to  enter 
his  palace  or  its  grounds  ;  and  the  same  exemption 
applies  to  the  place  of  meeting  of  a  Conclave  or  (Ecu- 
menic Council.  Searching  any  papal  offices  that  have 
solely  spiritual  functions,  or  confiscating  papers  there- 
from, is  prohibited,  and  it  is  provided  that  priests 
shall  not  be  punished  or  questioned  for  publishing, 
in  the  course  of  their  duties,  the  acts  of  the  spiritual 
authority  of  the  Holy  See.  The  Pope  is  accorded  the 
honors  of  a  sovereign  prince,  and  persons  accredited 
to  him  enjoy  all  the  immunities  of  diplomatic  agents. 
He  is   guaranteed  free  intercourse   with  the  bishops, 

1  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  Storia  <T  Italia,  pp.  93-94. 


THE  POPE.  185 

and  indeed  with  the  whole  Catholic  world,  messages 
sent  in  his  name  being  placed  on  the  same  footing 
as  those  of  foreign  governments.  Moreover  he  is 
granted  a  perpetual  annuity  of  over  six  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  which  is  entered  in  the  great  book 
of  state  debts,  and  is  free  from  all  tax.  This  grant 
he  has  always  refused  to  accept,  and  every  year  it  is 
returned  to  the  treasury.  Finally  he  is  left  in  abso- 
lute possession  of  the  palaces  of  the  Vatican,  the 
Lateran,  and  Castel  Gandolfo,  with  all  their  buildings, 
gardens,  and  lands,  free  of  taxes.1 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  law,  —  which  appears, 
by  the  way,  to  have  been  faithfully  carried  Refusal  of 
out  by  the  Italian  government,  —  assures  to  accept  the° 
the  Pope  absolute  freedom  in  the  exercise  of  Sltuatl0n- 
his  functions  as  head  of  the  Catholic  church,  and 
guards  him  against  all  personal  disrespect.  Neverthe- 
less neither  Pius  IX.  nor  his  successor  Leo  XIII.  has 
been  willing  to  accept  it ;  and  indeed  they  could  not 
have  done  so  without  acknowledging  the  authority  of 
the  government  by  which  it  was  enacted,  and  this 
they  have  never  been  willing  to  do.  They  have  not 
ceased  for  a  moment  to  protest  against  the  destruction 
of  the  Temporal  Power ;  in  fact,  they  have  avoided 
everything  that  could  possibly  be  construed  as  a  rec- 
ognition of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  The  Pope  has 
affected  to  consider  himself  a  prisoner,  and  never  since 

1  This  is  the  law  of  May  13,  1871,  several  sections  of  which  have 
already  been  cited.  There  is  a  criticism  of  the  legal  situation  of  the 
Holy  See  from  a  papal  standpoint  by  Comte  Rostworowski,  entitled  "  La 
Situation  Internationale  de  Saint-Siege,"  in  the  Ann.  de  VEcole  Libre 
des  Sciences  Politiques,  1892,  p.  102. 


186  ITALY. 

the  royal  cannon  opened  a  breach  in  the  Roman  walls 
at  the  Porta  Pia  has  he  placed  his  foot  outside  the 
arounds  of  the  Vatican.1  He  has  even  refused  to 
allow  the  clerical  party  to  vote  for  deputies  to  Parlia- 
ment, on  the  ground  that  this  would  involve  a  tacit 
acknowledgment  of  the  legality  of  the  existing  gov- 
ernment; and  thus  a  large  portion  of  the  Italian 
people  takes  no  part  in  national  politics,  although 
the  same  men  vote  freely  and  sometimes  win  victories 
at  municipal  elections.  Such  a  condition  of  things 
is  very  unfortunate,  for  it  tends  to  create  a  hostility 
between  religion  and  patriotism,  and  makes  it  very 
hard  for  a  man  to  be  faithful  both  to  his  church  and 
his  country.  If  the  Italians  had  any  liking  for  other 
sects,  these  would  no  doubt  increase  rapidly ;  but  as 
religion  and  Catholicism  are  synonymous  terms  in 
Italy,  the  antagonism  between  church  and  state  merely 
stimulates  skepticism  and  indifference. 

It  is  not  easy  to   see  how  the  papal   question  will 

finally  be  solved.     The  present  Pontiff  is  a 

the  papal       man  of  great  tact,  and  with  marvelous  dexterity 

question  dif-  . 

ficuit  f  or  the   he  has  changed  the  pohcv  of  the  Vatican  so  as 

Vatican.  ,     .  .      .  . 

to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  nineteenth 
century.  He  made  a  peace  with  Bismarck  by  which 
the  Iron  Chancellor  virtually  acknowledged  defeat ; 
and  by  his  conciliatory  tone  towards  the  French  Re- 
public he  seems  to  be  in  a  fair  way  to  checkmate  the 
Radicals  in  France  with  their  hatred  of  the  church. 
Yet  even  Leo  XIII.  has  not  been  able  to  come  to 
terms   with    Italy.     One    thing    is    clear.     Italy   will 

1  Until  1888  he  did  not  even  appear  in  St.  Peter's. 


THE  POPE.  187 

never  give  up  Rome,  nor  is  there  the  slightest  prob- 
ability that  any  foreign  country  will  try  to  force 
her  to  do  so ;  and,  indeed,  it  is  said  that  even  in  the 
Vatican  the  restoration  of  the  Temporal  Power  is 
considered  hopeless.1  To  the  outside  observer  it 
hardly  appears  desirable  in  the  interest  of  the  papacy 
itself,  because  with  the  loss  of  its  secular  functions,  the 
Holy  See  has  gained  enormously  in  ecclesiastical 
authority.  This  is  not  an  accident,  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Temporal  Power  is  one  step  in  the  long 
movement  for  the  separation  of  church  and  state, 
which  during  the  last  hundred  years  has  been  break- 
ing the  local  and  national  ties  of  the  clergy  in  the 
different  countries,  and  has  thus  made  the  Catholic 
church  more  cosmopolitan,  more  centralized,  and  more 
dependent  on  its  spiritual  head.  Such,  however,  is 
not  the  view  of  many  ardent  Catholics,  who  are  so 
dissatisfied  with  the  present  situation  that  a  departure 
of  the  Pope  from  Rome  has  often  been  suggested ;  but 
although  on  more  than  one  occasion  a  removal  has 
been  said  to  be  imminent,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree 

1  In  an  answer  ("  Italy,  France,  and  the  Papacy,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  Aug., 
1891)  to  an  article  entitled  "The  Savoy  Dynasty,  the  Pope,  and  the  Re- 
public," by  an  anonymous  writer  (Contemp.  Rev.,  Apr.,  1891),  Crispi 
speaks  of  the  possibility  of  a  French  intervention  in  favor  of  the  Tem- 
poral Power  as  a  real  danger.  One  cannot  help  feeling  that  this  must 
have  been  said  rather  for  its  effect  than  from  conviction.  In  a  previous 
answer  to  the  same  article  ("  Italy  and  France,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  June, 
1891),  Crispi  makes  the  interesting  statement  that  even  in  Rome  only 
the  highest  church  dignitaries  want  the  Temporal  Power,  while  over  the 
rest  of  Italy  the  clergy  never  were  papal,  and  are  not  so  now.  In  a 
later  number  of  the  same  Review  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  papal 
question  arc  further  discussed  by  Emile  de  Laveleye  ("  The  Foreign 
Po!  92.) 


188  ITALY. 

unlikely,  for  the  Holy  See  could  not  get  from  any 
other  state  in  whose  territory  it  might  settle  terms 
more  favorable  than  those  accorded  by  the  Law  of  the 
Papal  Guarantees,  and  even  if  it  should  accept  a  grant 
of  complete  sovereignty  over  some  island  or  small  tract 
of  land,  the  loss  in  prestige  from  the  change  of  resi- 
dence would  be  incalculable.  The  veneration  of  the 
past  still  clings  to  Rome,  and  although  the  splendor 
of  the  Vatican  is  gone,  the  Pope  bereft  of  his  Tem- 
poral Power  wields  a  greater  spiritual  influence  than 
he  has  had  for  centuries. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

ITALY  :    PARTIES. 

In  the  last  chapter  we  examined  the  structure  of  the 
Italian  government ;  the  organization  of  the  The  aetual 
two  Chambers,  and  their  relation  to  the  King  jJh°ri£3L2f 
and  his  ministers ;  the  method  of  administra-  e°vermnent- 
tion  and  local  government ;  the  judicial  system  ;  and 
finally  the  position  of  the  Catholic  Church.  Let  us 
now  inquire  how  the  government  actually  works,  espe- 
cially in  regard  to  the  nature  and  activity  of  political 
parties. 

For  this  purpose  it  may  be  instructive  to  take  a  brief 
survey  of  the  political  history  of  the   king-  The  political 
dom.1       Cavour,  who  shaped   the  destiny  of  the  king- 
Italy,  was  not  a  party  man.     He  was  decid-  „ 

J  \  ...  Position  of 

edly  independent  in  politics,  and  fought  for  Cavour. 
his  own  plan  without  a  great  deal  of  regard  to  party 
affiliations.  In  general  he  may  be  said  to  have  relied 
on  the  support  of  the  Moderates  or  Centre,  but  as  the 
greatness  of  his  statesmanship  came  to  be  understood, 
opposition  to  him  faded  away  so  thoroughly  that  in  the 
first  Italian  Parliament  (elected  in  January,  1861,  after 
the  whole  country  except  Rome  and  Venice  had  been 

1  Cf .  Jacini,  /  Conservatori  e  V  Evolutione  Naturale  dei  Partiti ;  Bon- 
fadini,  "  I  Partiti  Parlamentari,"  Nuova  Antologia,  Feb.  15,  1894  ;  Pe- 
truccelli  dclla  Gattiua,  Storia  d'  Italia. 


190  ITALY. 

united),  his   supporters   numbered  four    hundred    and 
seven,  while  the  opposition  consisted  of  only  thirty-four 
Radicals  on  the  Left  and  two  Clericals  on  the  Right. 
Before  the  end  of  the  following  June  Cavour 
the  parties     was    dead,  and   his   followers,  who    did    not 
and  Left  are  really   form  a  political  party,  and  had  been 
held  together  only  by  his  commanding  influ- 
ence, soon  fell  apart.     They  separated  into  a  Right  and 
a  Left,  of  which  the  Right  believed  in  moving  slowly 
and    cautiously    towards    the    completion    of 
by  the  Italian  unity,  waiting  till  the  turn  of  Euro- 

pean politics  should  give  a  favorable  chance 
to  take  a  decisive  step,  while  the  Left  was  impatient, 
anxious  to  force  the  issue,  and  ready  to  follow  the  pop- 
ular impulse.  Twice  only  (in  1862  and  1867)  the  Left 
under  Rattazzi  came  to  power,  and  both  times  its  policy, 
after  a  short  trial,  proved  a  failure.1  On  each  occasion 
Garibaldi,  with  the  connivance  of  the  ministers,  as  it 
was  supposed,  invaded  the  papal  territory  at  the  head 
of  a  band  of  volunteers,  only  to  find  his  expedition 
checked  by  the  interference  of  Napoleon  III.  In  1862 
the  Italian  government,  to  prevent  a  serious  collision 
with  France,  arrested  him  at  Aspromonte,  and  in  1867 
his  forces  were  dispersed  by  French  troops  at  Mentana. 
On  each  occasion,  moreover,  a  fear  that  Italy  would  be- 
come embroiled  in  a  quarrel  with  the  Emperor  quickly 
replaced  the  Right  in  office.  The  Left  having  shown 
itself  incapable  of  completing  the  unity  of  the  nation, 
the  Right  remained  in  power  until  this  work  was  ended 

1  In  the  first  of  these  cases  the  cabinet  did  not  belong  purely  to  the 
Left,  Sella,  a  leader  of  the  Right,  being  a  member  of  it. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  191 

by  the  annexation  of  Rome  in  1871 ;  and  even  then 
there  remained  a  task  for  it  to  accomplish.  The  mak- 
ing of  Italy  had  been  very  expensive,  and  the  govern- 
ment had  spared  no  cost  in  the  operation.  It  had  spent 
money  lavishly,  not  only  in  war,  but  also  in  creating  an 
army  and  navy  and  in  railroad  building,  and  the  result 
was  a  large  debt  and  an  annual  deficit  in  the  finances. 
The  Right  now  set  itself  to  work  to  bring  about  an 
equilibrium  in  the  budget,  and  this  it  succeeded  in 
doin^  in  1876.     Then  its  work  was  ended  and 

.  .  Fall  of  the 

it  fell.  The  Right  had,  in  fact,  been  kept  in  Right  in 
power  during  the  last  few  years  only  by  a  de- 
sire to  see  the  equilibrium  established  ;  for  while  upright 
in  its  administration,  it  had  been  rigid  and  autocratic, 
and  the  crushing  weight  of  the  taxes,  together  with  the 
disappointment  of  the  people  who  had  expected  the  mil- 
lennium to  come  with  the  union  of  Italy,  had  made  it 
so  generally  unpopular  that  the  elections,  held  shortly 
after  its  fall,  resulted  in  an  overwhelming  victory  for  its 
opponents. 

The  transfer  of  power  to  the  Left  in  1876  marks  a 
turning-point  in  Italian  political  history.  Not  Effect  of  the 
that  any  decided  change  of  policy  took  place,  SlSto  ae 
for  although  during  the  time  the  Right  was  e  ' 
in  office  the  Left  had  been  telling  the  nation  how  much 
better  it  would  govern  if  it  had  a  chance,  and  had  been 
declaiming  about  liberty  and  a  reduction  of  taxes,  it 
found  itself  compelled  on  assuming  power  to  follow 
much  the  same  course  as  its  predecessor.  After  some 
years  it  did,  indeed,  extend  the  electoral  franchise,  and 
abolish  the  unpopular  grist  tax,  without,  however,  much 


192  ITALY. 

lightening  the  general  burden  of  taxation ;  hut  it  con- 
tinued to  use  when  in  office  the  same  arbitrary  powers 
it  had  condemned  in  opposition,  and  showed  as  a  rule 
uo  greater  tenderness  for  the  liberty  of  the  individual 
than  the  Right  had  done  before.  In  short,  the  Left 
which  proclaimed  itself  liberal  proved  to  be  quite  as  con- 
servative as  its  rival.  The  real  change  that  took  place 
in  1876  was  in  the  character  of  the  parties  themselves, 
rather  than  in  the  policy  pursued,  and  the  result  was 
not  so  much  a  new  departure  as  an  exaggeration  of 
the  existing  state  of  things.  The  process  to  which  I 
refer  is  the  breaking  of  the  parties  into  groups.  After 
the  death  of  Cavour  two  opposing  parties  had  been 
formed,  but  even  during  the  struggle  for  Venice  and 
Rome,  when  these  parties  were  divided  by  a  real 
difference  of  opinion,  neither  of  them  was  solidly  united 
within  itself,  while  sundry  lesser  groups,  which  some- 
times supported  the  government  of  the  Right  and 
sometimes  opposed  it,  formed  and  dissolved  with  bewil- 
dering rapidity.  In  fact,  the  parties  were  badly  disin- 
tegrated. On  the  Right,  for  example,  the  harmony 
between  the  two  most  prominent  leaders,  Sella  and 
Minghetti,  was  so  slight  that  they  were  never  members 
of  the  same  cabinet,  and  indeed  the  chiefs  of  the  party 
frequently  helped  to  upset  each  other's  ministries.  The 
Right  held  office  almost  continuously  for  fifteen  years, 
and  yet  its  cabinets  were  constantly  overthrown  to  be 
replaced  by  others  from  the  same  side  of  the  Chamber.1 
This  condition  of  politics  was  increased  by  the  change 

1  In  one  instance  (in  1867)  Depretis,  a  leader  of  the  Left,  bold  for  a 
short  time  a  portfolio  in  a  ministry  of  the  Right. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  193 

of  parties,  for  the  Left  had  no  programme  and  never 
acted  as  a  united  party  after  it  came  to  power  in  1876. 
It  was  merely  a  collection  of  groups  whose  members 
were  held  together  by  personal  attachment  to  rival 
chiefs,  sometimes  allied  and  sometimes  in  open  hostility 
to  each  other,  —  a  state  of  things  which  became  more 
and  more  marked  as  time  went  on.  The  personal  de- 
pendence and  mutual  assistance  between  the  chief  and 
his  followers,  the  relation,  in  short,  of  patron  and  client 
in  political  life,  was  an  innovation  that  came  in,  at  least 
in  its  most  virulent  form,  with  the  advent  to  power  of 
the  Left.  It  started  in  the  south  from  causes  that  I 
shall  point  out  later,  and  spreading  through  all  grades 
of  politics,  local  and  national,  it  has  honeycombed  pub- 
lic life  in  Italy.  The  Right,  indeed,  had  filled  the 
offices,  and  especially  those  of  the  prefects,  with  its  own 
followers,  but  its  use  of  the  authority  of  the  state  to 
reward  political  service  does  not  seem  to  have  gone 
much  further.  The  Left,  on  the  other  hand,  used  the 
immense  power  of  the  government  in  almost  every  con- 
ceivable direction  for  the  private  advantage  of  deputies 
who  supported  the  cabinet,  or  rather  for  that  of  their 
local  patrons,  and  hence  the  prefects  and  other  govern- 
ment officials  became  subject  to  the  influence  and 
control  of  the  deputies  as  they  had  never  been  before.1 
When  the  long  supremacy  of  the  Right  came  to  an 
end,  Rattazzi,  the  former  leader  of  the  Left,  First  cabinet 
had  died  without  leaving  a  successor.     His  ofDePretls- 

1  For  a  strong  statement  of  the  extent  to  which  the  parties  lost  all 
principles  and  were  held  together  only  by  material  interests,  see  Pareto, 
"  L'ltalie  Economique,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Oct.  15,  1891. 

VOL.   I. 


194  ITALY. 

authority  had  become  divided  among  a  number  of 
chiefs,  most  of  them  more  radical  than  himself.  All 
of  these  men  had,  indeed,  begun  life  as  followers  of 
Mazzini,  whose  revolutionary  temper  and  republican 
principles  helped  very  much  to  break  down  the  old 
order  of  things,  but  did  little  or  nothing  towards  build- 
ing up  anything  in  its  place.  With  the  good  sense, 
however,  that  is  characteristic  of  Italians,  the  leaders  of 
the  Left  accepted  loyally  the  constitutional  monarchy 
after  it  had  been  firmly  established,  and  except  for  a 
few  extremists  all  the  public  men  abandoned  their  re- 
publican doctrines.  The  formation  of  the  first  cabinet 
of  the  Left  was  intrusted  to  Depretis,  the  leader  of 
the  most  moderate  group  in  the  party.  He  took  the 
position  of  President  of  the  Council  or  Prime  Minister, 
and  distributed  the  other  portfolios  among  a  number  of 
different  groups,  the  most  important  appointment  being 
Nicotera's  ^ia*  °^  Nicotera  as  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
poi^and  Nicotera  was  strongly  impressed  with  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  order,  and  especially 
of  suppressing  brigandage  and  destroying  the  power 
of  the  Camorra  in  Naples  and  the  Mafia  in  Sicily.  In 
this  he  was  to  a  great  extent  successful,  but  as  the 
means  he  used  were  autocratic  and  not  always  legal,  he 
became  thoroughly  unpopular  ;  and  when  in  December, 
1877,  he  was  accused  of  violating  the  privacy  of  tele- 
grams,  the  indignation  of  the  Chamber  rose  to  such  a 
height  that  a  hostile  order  of  the  day  was  voted,  and 
the  ministry  resigned.  Depretis  then  formed  another 
cabinet,  in  which  the  most  significant  change  was  the 
substitution  of  Crispi  for  Nicotera,  the  other  ministers 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  195 

remaining  very  nearly  the  same  as  before.     The  new 

cabinet  had,  however,  a  short  life,  for  Crispi, 

who  was  expected  to  add  to  its  strength,  was  Crispi  min- 

found  to  have  more  than  one  wife,  and  was 

forced  to  retire  on  March  6,  1878,  the  whole  cabinet 

following  a  few  days  later. 

The  final  cause  of  the  resignation  of  the  ministry 
was  the  choice  as  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties  of  Cairoli,  who  had  for  some  time  been  so  bit- 
terly hostile  to  Depretis  that  his  election  was  looked 
upon  as  equivalent  to  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence. 
The  King,  therefore,  intrusted  Cairoli  with  Cairoii's 
the  formation  of  a  cabinet.  Now,  Cairoli  fi™*0^™8*- 
was  the  leader  of  the  most  radical  part  of  the  Left  that 
was  loyal  to  the  monarchy,  and  yet  he  gave  three  port- 
folios to  members  of  the  Right,  —  a  fact  which  shows 
how  completely  the  parties  had  ceased  to  stand  for  any 
definite  principles.  The  combination  was  all 
the  more  unnatural  because  the  Minister  of  leniency  and 

fall. 

the  Interior,  Zanardelli,  was  the  only  promi- 
nent leader  who  had  a  sincere  faith  in  the  doctrines  of 
personal  liberty  which  the  Left  had  always  preached. 
He  had  a  great  respect  for  the  freedom  of  the  citizen, 
and  believed  in  a  strict  construction  of  the  authority  of 
the  government  in  matters  of  police  ;  and,  what  was  far 
more  unusual,  he  tried  to  carry  its  theories  into  practice. 
The  result  was  an  outbreak  of  lawlessness  and  political 
agitation  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  followed 
by  dissensions  in  the  cabinet,  and  the  resignation  of 
the  ministers  belonging  to  the  Right.  The  disorder 
in    the    country    increased,    brigandage    revived,    and 


196  ITALY. 

complaints  were  loud  of  insufficient  protection  to  person 
and  property,  until  finally  a  bomb  was  thrown  into  a 
crowd  in  Florence,  and  an  attempt  was  made  at  Naples 
to  murder  the  King.  The  knife  of  the  assassin  was 
warded  off  by  the  Prime  Minister  himself,  and,  as  an 
Italian  historian  has  remarked,  the  stroke  killed  not 
the  King,  but  the  cabinet.1  The  ministers  were  inter- 
pellated in  the  Chamber  from  both  Right  and  Left, 
and  were  heavily  beaten  on  an  order  of  the  day  in 
December,  1878. 

The  contrast  between  the  policies  of  Nicotera  and 
Significance  Zanardelli  is  instructive,  as  showing  how  little 
trastbe-n  unity  of  opinion  there  is  in  the  political 
policies  of  parties  in  Italy,  and  how  the  course  of  the 
anTzanar-  government  depends,  not  on  any  principles  of 
the  party  in  power,  but  on  the  personal  views 
of  the  ministers.  Nicotera,  who  held  the  portfolio  of 
the  Interior  in  the  first  cabinet  of  the  Left,  in  his  efforts 
to  suppress  disorder,  resorted  to  arbitrary  repressive 
measures,  and  stretched  the  police  system  to  the  utmost ; 
while  Zanardelli,  who  also  belonged  to  the  Left,  and 
occupied  the  same  position  a  few  months  later,  tried,  on 
the  contrary,  to  leave  to  the  citizen  the  largest  possible 
amount  of  freedom.  The  attitude  of  these  two  men 
furnishes  also  an  example  of  the  lack  of  harmony  in 
Italian  cabinets,  and  illustrates  the  way  in  which  each 
minister  sometimes  directs  his  own  department  without 
regard  to  the  opinions  of  his  colleagues  ;  for  Zanardelli 
was  himself  a  member  of  the  very  cabinet  in  which 
Nicotera  was  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

1  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  Storia  d?  Italia,  p.  345. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  197 

After  the  defeat  of  the  Cairoli-Zanardelli  ministry, 
Depretis  again  came  into  power  at  the  head 
of  a  cabinet  from  the  Left,  which  contained,  net  of 
however,  few  men  of  note,  and  was  defeated 
in  the  following  July  (1879)  on  a  question  of  taxation, 
the  Right,  and  most  of  the  leaders  of  the  Left,  taking 
part   against   it.     It    was   then   the  turn  of 

~    .      -, .  ,  p  -.  •    •    i  Second  cabi- 

(Jairoli,  who  once  more   lormed.  a  ministry,   net  of 
but  this  time  abandoned  Zanardelli  and  his 
principles.     The  new  ministers  were  almost  all  men  of 
secondary  importance,  and  the  cabinet  lasted  only  until 
November,  when  Cairoli,  finding  his  position  growing 
weaker  and  weaker,  offered  to  make  a  coali- 

•  i      t-v  •  r\p  l  i      ^ne  Cairoli- 

tion  with  Depretis.  Ut  course,  such  an  al-  Depretis 
liance  could  not  extinguish  the  rivalry  which 
it  smothered,  but  the  crafty  old  Depretis,  knowing  that 
it  would  not  be  long  before  he  could  get  rid  of  his 
colleague,  accepted  the  offer,  and  took  the  portfolio  of 
the  Interior.  The  fact  that  these  two  men,  who  for 
a  couple  of  years  had  been  constantly  opposed  to  each 
other  and  had  been  alternately  at  the  head  of  the 
state,  could  form  a  coalition  of  this  kind  proves  how 
completely  Italian  politics  had  become  a  question  of 
persons  instead  of  principles.  Even  in  their  personal 
qualities  the  men  were  very  different.  Cairoli  was 
highly  respected  for  his  character,  but  he  was  by  no 
means  a  statesman,  and  still  less  a  politician,  while 
Depretis  was  a  manipulator  of  marvelous  dexterity, 
and  by  his  tact  and  skill  succeeded,  in  spite  of  the  un- 
certainties of  Italian  parliamentary  warfare,  in  keeping 


198  ITALY. 

himself  in  office  all  the  rest  of  his  life.1  The  new 
cabinet  had  by  no  means  a  compact  majority  in  Parlia- 
ment, and  more  than  once  it  was  defeated  on  a  vote  in 
the  Chamber,  but  owing  to  the  weakness  of  its  adver- 
saries, and  a  fear  on  the  part  of  the  Left  that  if  it  were 
overthrown  the  next  cabinet  would  be  formed  from 
the  Right,  it  managed  to  preserve  its  existence  for 
eighteen  months. 

At  last  the  opportunity  for  which  Depretis  had  been 
waiting-  arrived.  Cairoli  was  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs,  and  in  May,  1881,  the  indignation  produced  by  the 
French  annexation  of  Tunis  compelled  him  to  resign. 
Depretis  then  became  President  of  the  Council,  and 
held  the  place  without  a  break  until  his  death  on  July 
27,  1887.     This  does  not  mean  that  the  same 

0UCC6SSIV6 

cabinets  of     ministers  remained  in  office  all  that  time.     On 

1.)  6D  ret  is 

the  contrary,  Depretis  had  no  less  than  five 
separate  cabinets,  for  instead  of  retiring  from  office 
and  leading  an  opposition  when  his  government  was 
defeated  in  the  Chamber,  he  made  what  was  called  a 
Rimpasto  ;  that  is,  he  dropped  those  of  his  colleagues 
who,  by  giving  offense  or  making  themselves  unpopular, 
had  become  a  drag  upon  him,  and  replaced  them  by 
new  men.  Nor  did  he  confine  himself  in  the  choice  of 
ministers  to  the  members  of  one  party,  but  finding  that 
the  country  was  getting  over  its  dislike  of  the  Right, 
which  was  gaining  in  strength-  at  the  expense  of  the 
Left,  he  made  a  coalition  with  it  in  May,  1883,  and 
admitted  one  of  its  members  to  the  cabinet.  This 
change  of  front,  called  the  Transformismo,  involved  a 

1  The   Leisure  Hour  for   1891    (pp.    160,  235)    gives   an   interesting 
description  of  the  recent  Italian  leaders. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  199 

quarrel  with  all  the  other  five  leaders  of  the  Left,  who 
formed  a  hostile  alliance  known  as  the  Pentarchy,  and 
complained  bitterly  that  Depretis  had  deserted  his  old 
friends.1  There  was  now,  in  fact,  little  or  no  difference 
in  political  principles  between  the  parties,  and  the 
ministries  were  fought  for  on  the  basis  "  that  they 
should  take  who  have  the  power,  and  they  should  keep 
who  can."  Under  these  circumstances,  with  no  strong 
party  organizations  to  direct  and  limit  the  path  of  am- 
bition, politics  were  sure  to  be  in  an  unstable  condition 
in  which  no  combination  could  lonp;  endure.  It  was 
not  a  great  while,  therefore,  before  the  coalition  with 
the  Right  began  to  show  itself  less  strong  than  had 
been  hoped.  Rents  appeared  in  the  government  ma- 
jority, and  although  one  portfolio  was  almost  always 
held  by  a  member  of  the  Right,2  a  larger  and  larger 
section  of  that  party  became  hostile  to  the  ministry. 

At  last,  after  a  couple  more  Rimpasti,  the  position 
of  the  government  became  so  weak  that  Depretis  again 
changed  his  policy,  and  abandoning  the  Right,  effected 
a  reconciliation  with  two  members  of  the  Pentarchy,  — 
Crispi  and  Zanardelli,  —  to  whom  he  gave  seats  in  the 
cabinet.  This  was  in  April,  1887,  only  three  months 
before  his  death. 

Depretis  had  succeeded,  thanks  to   his   own   subtle 
tactics  and  to  the  dissensions  of  his  rivals,  in  Unparlia. 
keeping  himself  at  the  head  of  the  state  for  "actic^f 
six  years.     But  he  did  it  by  an  entire  distor-     ePretls- 

1  They  were  Cairoli,  Crispi,  Nicotera,  Zanardelli,  and  Baccarini. 

2  It  is  characteristic  of  the  group  system  of  parties  that  this  meinher 
was  never  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  party. 


200  ITALY. 

tion  of  the  nature  of  parliamentary  government,  for 
instead  of  being  held  to  account  as  the  leader  of  a 
united  cabinet,  he  had  made  himself  the  permanent 
chief  of  a  corps  of  ministers  who  were  liable  to  be 
overthrown  separately  by  the  Chamber.  He  had  vir- 
tually substituted  himself  for  the  King  as  the  irre- 
sponsible head  of  the  state,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
had  deprived  the  cabinet  of  collective  responsibility. 
To  such  an  extent  was  this  true  that  he  not  only  re- 
mained continually  in  office  himself,  but  he  always 
kept  Magliani,  one  of  the  ablest  of  Italian  financiers, 
as  his  Minister  of  the  Treasury.  The  course  of  Depretis 
would  clearly  have  been  out  of  the  question  if  he  had 
stood  for  any  policy,  or  indeed  if  the  parties  in  the 
Chamber  had  had  any  real  programmes.1  It  was  ren- 
dered possible  only  by  the  fact  that  there  had  ceased  to 
be  any  essential  difference  between  the  principles  of  the 
various  groups,  so  that  the  struggles  in  the  Chamber 
were  chiefly  based  on  personal  ambition ;  and  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  until  he  admitted  Crispi  to  the 
cabinet  in  1887,  he  always  retained  in  his  own  hands 
the  Department  of  the  Interior,  which  was  the  main 
reservoir  of  patronage. 

Crispi  was  the  natural  successor  of  Depretis,  and  he 
The  rule  tried  to  carry  on  the  same  practice  of  remod- 
of  Cnspi.  eling  his  cabinet,  when  he  met  with  a  hostile 
vote.  For  a  time  this  worked  well,  and  he  might  have 
continued  in  office  indefinitely  had  he  not  been  made 
of  very  different  stuff  from  his  predecessor;  but  he 
is  a  man  of  strong  personality,  who  cannot  be  colorless, 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  vol.  i.  p.  304. 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  201 

or  help  identifying  himself  with  his  administration. 
At  first  he  seemed  to  be  omnipotent,  but  his  enormous 
expenditures  which  entailed  a  heavy  deficit  in  the 
budget,  the  commercial  quarrel  with  France,  and  his 
own  uncontrollable  temper,  caused  his  overthrow  on 
January  31,  1891.  His  fall  illustrates  how  little  the 
support  of  a  minister  in  Italy  is  due  to  the  policy 
he  pursues,  for  at  the  general  elections  in  November, 
1890,  the  course  of  the  government  seemed  to  be  al- 
most universally  approved.  The  Extreme  Left,  or  Rad- 
icals, alone  conducted  an  active  campaign  against  the 
cabinet,  whose  supporters  carried  about  four  hundred 
out  of  the  five  hundred  and  eight  seats  in  the  Cham- 
ber. Yet  in  less  than  three  months  Crispi  lost  his 
majority,  and  after  his  defeat  only  a  few  deputies  re- 
mained faithful  to  him. 

Crispi   was    succeeded  by   a   coalition    between   the 
opposition  of  the  Right  and  Left,  whose  lead-   The  m.  . 
ing  representatives  in  the  cabinet   were  the  RuJi£fan<i 
Marchese  de  Rudini  and  Nicotera,1  but  this   GiolittL 
ministry  lived  only  a  little  more  than  a  year,  and  was 
followed  in  May,  1892,  by  a  cabinet  containing  none  of 
the  distinguished  party  leaders.     It  is,  indeed,  a  notice- 
able fact  that  Italian  politics  at  the  present  day  do  not 
seem  to  produce  statesmen  of  the  calibre  of  those  who 
developed  during  the  struggle  for  national  existence. 

The  new  cabinet  was  opposed  by  a  coalition  of  the 
Right  and  the  Extreme  Left,  and  was  supported  by  the 

1  Cf.  "  The  Italian  Ministry,"  Westminster  Rev.,  Sept.,  1891  ;  Giaco- 
metti,  "Cinq  Mois  de  Politique  Italienne,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Sept. 
15,  1891. 


202  ITALY. 

groups  of  the  Centre  and  Left,  both  Crispi  and  Zanar- 
delli  giving  it  their  cooperation  at  the  outset.  The 
majority  was,  however,  insecure,  and  at  the  close  of 
the  session  Parliament  was  dissolved.  Official  pressure 
was  freely  used  in  the  campaign ;  two  thirds  of  the 
prefects  were  removed  or  transferred  to  other  provinces ; 
and  as  is  almost  always  the  case  in  Italy,  the  govern- 
ment won  a  victory  at  the  polls.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
that  Crispi  withdrew  his  support,  the  cabinet  obtained 
a  vote  of  confidence  by  a  large  majority;  but  the  pre- 
vailing commercial  distress  was  rapidly  bringing  the 
country  into  a  condition  which  required  a  far  stronger 
hand  than  that  of  Giolitti.  The  state  of  the  finances 
was  deplorable.  Gold  and  silver  had  almost  gone  out 
of  circulation,  and  the  budget  showed  a  huge  deficit, 
which  the  government  could  not  fill  because  it  was 
unable  to  induce  the  deputies  to  consent  to  the  econ- 
omies it  proposed.  Nothing  was  left  but  an  increase 
of  taxation,  and  when  Giolitti  proposed  this  the  peas- 
ants in  Sicily,  who  were  already  overburdened,  broke 
out  in  riot  and  wrecked  the  offices  of  the  tax-gatherers. 
Meanwhile  the  reputation  "of  the  cabinet  had  been 
stained  by  the  discovery  of  the  fraudulent  mismanage- 
ment of  the  Banca  Romana,  in  which  public  men  were 
manifestly  implicated.  After  resisting  as  long  as  he 
could,  Giolitti  finally  consented  to  the  appointment  of 
a  parliamentary  committee  of  inquiry,  whose  report, 
laid  before  the  Chamber  at  the  opening  of  the  session 
on  November  23,  1893,  brought  his  career  to  an  end. 
It  stated  that  most  of  the  papers  seized  at  the  house  of 
the  governor  of  the  bank  had  been  put  out  of  sight 


HISTORY  OF  PARTIES.  203 

by  the  government ;  and  the  ministers,  without  chal- 
lenging a  vote  of  confidence,  laid  their  resignation  be- 
fore the  King-. 

Crispi,  as  the  only  man  able  to  face  the  situation, 
returned   to  power.     He  proclaimed  martial 

1  .        r,.    .-,  -,    i         n  ,  Crispi's  res- 

law  in  oicily,  suppressed,  by  iorce  the  insur-  toration  and 

rection  which  had  assumed  alarming  diluen- 
ts 

sions,  and  throughout  the  kingdom  his  measures  for 
the  maintenance  of  order,  if  of  doubtful  legality,  were 
energetic  and  effective.  His  treatment  of  the  Parlia- 
ment was  no  less  vigorous.  The  cabinet  relied  for  sup- 
port chiefly  on  the  Centre  and  the  Left,  that  is,  in  the 
main,  on  the  same  elements  that  had  followed  the  pre- 
vious ministry ;  but  as  the  opposition  contained  not 
only  the  Extreme  Left  and  part  of  the  Right,  but  also 
the  groups  of  Giolitti  and  Zanardelli,  the  majority  was 
exceedingly  precarious.1  By  clever  management,  how- 
ever, Crispi  was  able  to  keep  the  Chamber  under  his 
control  for  more  than  a  year.  At  last,  in  December, 
1894,  Giolitti  caused  an  explosion  by  producing  the 
papers  he  had  concealed,  which  showed  that  Crispi 
himself  had  received  money  from  the  Banca  Romana. 

During-  the  next  five  months  the  cabinet  was  at  war 
with  the  majority  in  the  Chamber,  and  parliamentary 
government  was  virtually  suspended.  Parliament  was 
prorogued  and  taxes  were  decreed  without  legislative 
sanction ;  but  no   universal   storm  of   indignation  fol- 

1  Bonglii  ("  Gli  Ultimi  Fatti  Parlameutari,"  Nuova  Antologia,  Jan.  1, 
1895)  remarks  that  apart  from  the  Extreme  Left  all  the  deputies  ought 
properly  to  he  classed  as  belonging  to  the  Centre,  so  completely  have  the 
parties  lost  all  political  significance. 


204  ITALY. 

lowed,  because  the  conduct  of  the  deputies  for  many 
years  had  not  been  such  as  to  awaken  enthusiasm  or 
allow  them  to  play  the  part  of  veritable  champions  of 
popular  rights,  while  to  the  middle  classes  Crispi  seemed 
the  only  protection  against  anarchy.  When,  therefore, 
a  dissolution  was  ordered  and  elections  were  held  in  the 
following  May,  the  government  obtained  a  majority 
and  the  parliamentary  forms  were  resumed. 

Crispi  was  playing  a  game  which  could  be  justified 
only  by  necessity,  and  was  bound  to  be  severely  con- 
demned in  case  of  any  lack  of  success.  For  a  time, 
indeed,  his  success  appeared  to  be  complete.  Open  dis- 
order had  been  suppressed,  and  he  had  acquired  the 
control  of  Parliament ;  but  in  1896  trouble  came  from 
an  unexpected  quarter.  Italy  had  been  investing  in 
colonial  speculation  an  amount  of  men  and  money  she 
could  ill  afford  to  lose,  and  that  without  any  adequate 
return.  The  post  on  the  Red  Sea  had  been  a  con- 
stant source  of  expense,  and  at  last  it  brought  her  into 
a  quarrel  with  the  King  of  Abyssinia,  who  routed, 
on  March  1,  the  small  Italian  army  sent  against  him. 
When  news  of  the  disaster  reached  Italy  the  excite- 
ment became  intense ;  riots  occurred  in  several  places, 
and  Crispi  was  the  object  of  such  violent  attack  that 
he  was  forced  to  resign  without  waiting  for  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Chamber.  He  has  been  succeeded  by  a 
cabinet  under  Rudini,  which  as  usual  has  begun  by 
talking  economy. 

The  story  of  the  political  life  of  Italy  since  she  be- 

Comparison    came  a  kingdom  shows  how  far  the  English 

itafy  and  m  parliamentary  system  has  been  from  producing 

the  same  results  as  in  its  native  land.    Instead 


THE  ATTITUDE   OF  THE    CLERICALS.  205 

of  two  great  parties  which  are  alternately  in  power  and 
in  opposition,  we  find,  as  in  France,  a  number  of  groups, 
sometimes  united  and  sometimes  hostile  to  each  other, 
ever  forming  new  combinations,  until  it  becomes 
almost  impossible  to  follow  their  evolutions.1  The 
resemblance  between  the  condition  of  parties  in  France 
and  in  Italy  is  indeed  so  striking,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  difference  between  them  is  so  great,  that  a  compari- 
son of  the  two  is  very  instructive.  In  the  first  place 
we  find  in  both  countries  a  large  body  of  irreconcil- 
ables    who    in    each    case  are  Clericals :    but 

.  „       .       _,  ,  .  ....         The  Cleri- 

wnile  in  France  the  reactionaries  sit    in  the  caisand 
Chamber,  and  by  their  presence  force  the  two  enceon 

.  .  parties. 

wings  of  the  Republicans  to  maintain  a  preca- 
rious alliance,  in  Italy  the   partisans  of  the  Holy  See 
refuse  to  vote  for  deputies,  and  have  no  seats  in  the 
Chamber. 

The  absence  of  the  irreconcilables  from  the  Italian 
Parliament  saves  that  body  from  a  great  deal  of  bitter- 
ness, and  allows  the  members  to  group  themselves  more 
freely,  yet  their  existence  in  the  country  has  a  marked 
effect  on  the  condition  of  parties,  for  the  Clericals  are 
neither  few  nor  passive.  They  have  a  large  number  of 
supporters  who  take  an  active  part  in  municipal  elec- 
tions, and  hence  there  is  a  real  opposition  in  the  state, 
although  it  finds  no  place  in  Parliament.  The  people 
are  separated  into  two  factions,  the  adherents  of  the 

1  Jacini,  as  early  as  18G7,  wrote  :  "  I  ministri  Italiani  sono  una  fantas- 
magoria  di  uomini  che  vanno  e  vengono,  come  proteiforme  giuoco  rf'  influenze, 
di  persone,  di  gruppi,  di  coalizione ;  nascono  e  muoiono  senza  indovinare  il 
perche  "  (quoted  by  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  Storia  d"1  Italia,  p.  194). 


206  ITALY. 

Tiara  and  of  the  Crown  ;  and  this  antagonism,  by  dimin- 
ishing the  apparent  importance  of  any  other  issue,  tends 
to  prevent  it  from  forming  a  basis  for  a  division  into 
two  great  parties.  During  the  time  that  elapsed  after 
Italy  had  become  a  nation,  and  before  Venice  and 
Rome  had  been  won,  political  passion  ran  high  over  the 
policy  to  be  pursued  in  obtaining  those  provinces,  and 
the  deputies  were  pretty  sharply  divided  into  two  op- 
posing sections.  But  with  the  taking  of  Rome  in  1870 
the  conflict  with  the  church  became  more  acute,  and 
since  that  time  there  has  arisen  no  question  great 
enough  to  absorb  public  interest  and  cast  the  religious 
quarrel  into  the  shade.  Moreover  the  Clericals  are  the 
real  Conservatives  in  the  state,  and  their  absence  from 
Parliament  allows  the  supporters  of  the  monarchy,  who 
are  really  all  Liberals,  to  break  up  into  groups  instead 
of  forming  a  single  party.1  To  use  an  antithesis,  it 
may  fairly  be  said  that  in  France  the  presence  of  the 
irreconcilables  in  the  Chamber  forces  together  men 
whose  political  principles  are  essentially  different,  while 
in  Italy  their  absence  fosters  divisions  among  members 
whose  principles  are  really  very  much  the  same. 

In  the  chapter  on  France  several  details  of  the  politi- 
cal machinery  were  pointed  out  that  helped 

Committees  ^  .  ...... 

and  inter-      to  break  up  the   parties  by  diminishing  the 

pellations.  L  x  _  J  ° 

authority  and  stability  of  the  cabinets,  and 
among  the  most  important  of  these  were  the  system  of 
committees  in  the  Chambers,  and  the  practice  of  inter- 

1  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  vol.  i.  p.  302  ;  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879, 
vol.  i.  pp.  579-80  ;  Jacini  (/  Conservator!,  pp.  24-25)  says  that  what  Italy 
needs  in  order  to  get  rid  of  personal  politics  is  a  conservative  party. 


COMMITTEES  IN  THE  CHAMBER.  207 

pellations.1  Both  of  these  peculiarities  are  to  he  found 
in  Italy,  but  they  have  been  so  modified  as  to  be  some- 
what less  repugnant  to  the  parliamentary  system  than 
in  France. 

The  Chambers  are  divided  in  the  same  way  by  lot 
into  sections,  called  Uffici, 2  which  elect  most 
of   the    committees,   but  in   each  branch   of  mitteesys- 

. .  .  .  ill  tem  better 

.Parliament   the    committee    on    the    budget,   in  Italy  than 

in  Frciiic© 

which  is  the  most  important  of  all,  is  chosen 
directly  by  the  Chamber  itself.3  This  gives  the  cabinet 
a  chance  to  exert  a  good  deal  of  influence  over  its  com- 
position, and  in  fact  its  election  has  been  considered 
of  late  years  a  regular  test  of  the  strength  of  the  gov- 
ernment. The  result  is  that  the  choice  of  a  hostile 
committee  is  sometimes  regarded  as  a  vote  of  want  of 
confidence  ; 4  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ministers 

1  The  third  institution  that  was  mentioned  in  the  chapters  on  France  as 
tending  to  break  the  parties  into  groups,  namely,  the  requirement  of  an 
absolute  majority  for  the  election  of  the  deputies,  is  not  discussed  here, 
because  it  did  not  exist  in  Italy  during  the  ten  years  from  1882  to  1892 
when  the  Scrutinio  di  Lista  was  in  force.  A  majority  was  formerly 
required,  but  in  1882  a  plurality  was  substituted.  (See  Brusa,  p.  132, 
and  see  Art.  74  of  the  Act  of  1882.)  By  the  Act  of  June  28,  1892 
(Art.  I.),  the  necessity  of  a  majority  vote  was  restored,  and  of  course  it 
tends  as  in  France  to  encourage  the  various  groups  to  present  separate 
candidates  at  the  first  ballot,  knowing  that  they  can  combine  at  the 
second  if  they  want  to  do  so. 

2  There  are  nine  of  these  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  five  in  the 
Senate,  and  they  are  renewed  every  two  months.  Rules  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  Arts.  18-21  ;  Rules  of  the  Senate,  Arts.,  14-22. 

8  Rules  of  the  Senate,  Art.  23,  of  the  Deputies,  Art.  13.  The  Chamber 
of  Deputies  also  elects  directly  the  committees  on  petitions,  and  on  decrees 
registered  by  compulsion  by  the  Corte  dei  Conti,  while  the  committees 
on  elections  and  on  rules  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Chamber. 
Rules  of  the  Deputies,  Arts.  12,  13. 

4  Brusa,  p.  156,  note  2.  The  whole  committee  is  not  chosen  from  any 
one  party,  but  minorities  are  proportionately  represented.    Brusa,  p.  146. 


208  ITALY. 

succeed  in  getting  their  partisans  elected,  they  are  in 
some  measure  relieved  from  the  labor  of  wrangling-"  with 
a  committee  not  in  sympathy  with  their  views.  They 
are  a  little  better  able  than  in  France  to  take  their 
stand  on  a  budget  prepared  by  themselves,  instead  of 
being  obliged  to  submit  to  all  the  amendments  and 
distortions  suggested  by  an  independent  or  unfriendly 
set  of  committee-men.  The  practice  is  by  no  means 
a  perfect  one,  and  does  not  prevent  the  Chamber 
from  constantly  forcing  on  the  ministers  an  increase 
of  appropriations ;  *  but  its  good  effects  are  seen  in  the 
fact  that  the  government  is  rarely  upset  on  the  budget,2 
although  the  enormous  size  of  the  expenditures  com- 
pared with  the  wealth  of  the  country  renders  the  finances 
of  Italy  very  difficult  to  manage.  They  are  shown  per- 
haps even  more  strongly  by  the  fact  that  the  eminent 
financier  Magliani  was  able  to  remain  at  the  head  of 
the   treasury   for    nine    consecutive  years,   whereas  in 

1  See  Brusa,  p.  156,  note  1 ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  318-19.  Marco  Besso, 
in  the  Nuova  Antologia  ("Megalomania  e  Micromania,"  Feb.  1,  1894), 
remarks  that  the  Parliament  is  the  open  enemy  of  taxes  and  the  secret 
enemy  of  economies. 

2  See  Brusa,  p.  156,  note  2.  Dupriez  (vol.  i.  p.  328)  says  that  since  1849 
the  disagreements  between  the  government  and  the  Chamber  which  have 
caused  cabinet  crises  have  been  exclusively  on  financial  questions.  This 
statement  seems  to  be  erroneous.  It  is  by  no  means  easy  in  every  case 
to  assign  a  single  definite  cause  for  the  fall  of  a  ministry,  because  the 
occasion  for  a  hostile  vote  in  the  Chamber  may  be  very  different  from  the 
real  cause.  I  have  tried,  however,  to  classify  the  cabinet  crises  from  its 
death  of  Cavour  in  1861,  through  May,  1896,  and  leaving  out  of  account 
seven  changes  of  ministry  which  were  not  directly  brought  about  by  the 
action  of  the  Chamber  at  all,  I  find  that  out  of  eighteen  cases  in  which  a 
cabinet  has  resigned  in  consequence  of  a  vote  of  tbat  body,  only  six  arose 
out  of  financial  matters,  and  with  at  least  half  of  these  the  committee  on 
the  budget  had  no  connection. 


COMMITTEES  IN  THE  CHAMBER.  209 

France  the  ministers  of  finance  have  constantly  found 
the  position  untenable.1  A  recent  authority  on  par- 
liamentary government,  and  one  of  the  few  writers  who 
understand  the  importance  of  the  committee  system, 
is  very  severe  in  his  strictures  on  the  Italian  commit- 
tees. 2  He  remarks  that  the  ministers  take  no  part  in 
their  debates  ; 3  that  the  committees  themselves  are  bv 
no  means  always  friendly  to  the  cabinet,  and  not  being 
restrained  by  party  discipline,  sometimes  amend  the 
government  proposals  radically,  sometimes  delay  their 
report  for  the  sake  of  defeating  a  measure,  and  some- 
times even  bring  in  a  bill  based  on  diametrically  op- 
posite principles.  He  says  that  the  reporter  of  the 
committee  is  less  a  helper  than  a  rival  of  the  ministers, 
and  he  adds  that  in  the  case  of  the  budget  the  cabinet 
can  rarely  combat  openly  the  decisions  of  the  committee, 
but  is  often  obliged  to  accept  a  compromise.  These 
criticisms  are,  no  doubt,  perfectly  just,  and  they  illus- 
trate forcibly  the  entire  inconsistency  with  the  parlia- 
mentary form  of  government  of  any  committees  that 
are  not  under  the  control  of  the  cabinet ; 4  but  it  does 
not  follow  that  the  Italian  method  of  selecting  the 
committee  on  the  budget  is  not  a  slight  improvement 
upon  the  French.     Within  a  few  years  Italy  has  made 

1  Rouvier  in  France  was  at  the  head  of  the  finances  from  March,  1890, 
to  January,  1893,  and  this  was  an  unusually  long  period. 

2  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  vol.  i.  p.  309  et  seq.  See,  also,  Minghetti,  / 
Partiti  Politici,  p.  322. 

8  On  this  point  see,  also,  Brusa,  p.  146,  note  2. 

4  On  visiting  the  Chamher  of  Deputies  in  1890,  the  writer  was  struck 
hy  the  way  the  place  reserved  for  the  committee  symbolized  its  political 
position.  The  committee  whose  report  is  debated  occupies  a  special 
bench  facing  that  of  the  ministers. 

VOL.    I. 


210  ITALY. 

a  still  more  important  modification  of  her  procedure.1 
In  1888,  after  a  long  struggle,  the  Chamber  of  Dep- 
uties introduced  experimentally  a  process  of  three  read- 
in  gs,  whereby  the  Chamber  can,  if  it  desires,  order  a 
areneral  debate  and  vote  on  a  bill  before  it  is  referred 
to  a  committee,  and  in  that  case,  the  main  principle  of 
the  measure  having  been  approved  by  the  Chamber, 
the  discussion  in  the  committee  is  limited  to  a  con- 
sideration of  the  details.  When  this  procedure  is  fol- 
lowed the  committee  is  elected  by  the  Uffici,  unless  the 
Chamber  prefers  to  choose  the  members  directly,  or 
to  request  the  President  to  appoint  them.  The  process 
has  the  additional  advantage  of  preventing  the  commit- 
tees from  smothering  bills  by  neglecting  to  take  any 
action  upon  them,  for  it  is  provided  that  in  case  a  com- 
mittee does  not  report  within  thirty  days,  the  govern- 
ment or  any  member  of  the  Chamber  may  move  that  a 
day  be  fixed  for  the  second  reading  of  the  bill. 2  This 
was,  indeed,  Crispi's  chief  motive  in  urging  the  change 
of  system.  The  new  procedure  can  hardly  fail  to  in- 
crease the  authority  of  the  cabinet  by  diminishing  the 
power  of  the  committees. 3 

The  practice  of  interpellations,  that  is  of  questions 
The  inter-  addressed  to  the  ministers  and  followed  by 
are  better  a  debate  and  vote  on  an  order  of  the  day 
expressing  the  opinion  of  the  Chamber,  also 
prevails  in  Italy.  It  is,  however,  better  arranged  than 
in  France,  for  although  a  motion  can  be  made  imme- 

1  Rules  of  the  Deputies,  Arts.  53-62  ;  Brusa,  p.  147,  note  1. 

2  Rules  of  the  Deputies,  Art.  58. 

8  Dupriez  is  clearly  of  this  opinion,  vol.  i.  p.  308. 


INTERPELLATIONS.  211 

diately  after  the  minister  has  answered  the  interpella- 
tion, the  debate  and  vote,  instead  of  taking-  place  at 
once  while  the  Chamber  is  in  a  state  of  excitement,  is 
postponed  to  a  future  day,  so  that  the  members  have 
time  to  cool  down  and  consider  soberly  whether  they 
wish  to  turn  out  the  cabinet  or  not.1 

These  modifications  in  the  system  of  committees  and 
interpellations  have  not  made  the  Italian  cabi-  par]jament_ 
nets  much  more  permanent  than  the  French,   „%  better" 
but    have    endowed   them   with  a    somewhat  nticaimaT 
longer    term   of  life.2     They  appear  also  to  thanin0rse 
have   given   them  a  little  more    dignity  and 
independence  in  the  face  of   the    deputies,  and  made 
them   less   the    sport   of   excitement  or  caprice.     But 
while    the    procedure    in   the   Chamber  accords   better 
with  cabinet  responsibility  in  Italy  than  in  France,  the 
political  material  is  less  adapted  to   the  formation  of 

1  Rules  of  the  Deputies,  Arts.  104-8.  Dupriez  (vol.  i.  pp.  322-24)  re- 
gards this  as  a  useless  waste  of  time,  and  goes  so  far  as  to  regret  that  in 
the  case  of  simple  questions  the  Chamber  has  not  power  to  cut  short  the 
dialogue  between  the  deputy  and  the  minister  by  an  order  of  the  day. 
He  points  out  (vol.  ii.  p.  441)  that  interpellations  are  more  numerous 
and  waste  more  time  in  Italy  than  in  France,  and  he  attributes  their 
quantity  to  the  number  of  groups  into  which  the  Chamber  is  divided. 
(Vol.  i.  p.  324.)  It  is  curious  that  a  man  of  his  keen  insight  should 
consider  the  waste  of  time  as  the  chief  evil  of  the  system,  and  should  not 
see  that  the  interpellations  help  to  weaken  the  cabinet  and  keep  the 
groups  alive.  His  description  of  the  long  dialogues  over  simple  ques- 
tions conveys,  by  the  way,  a  wrong  impression  ;  for  the  Rules  of  the 
Chamber  provide  (Art.  105)  that  the  answer  of  the  minister  shall  give 
rise  neither  to  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  the  deputy,  nor  to  a  debate. 

2  From  Cavour's  death  in  June,  1861,  to  June,  1896,  there  have  been 
thirty-one  different  cabinets,  whose  average  duration  has  therefore  been 
over  thirteen  months  and  a  half  ;  while  the  average  life  of  French 
cabinets  has  been  less  than  eight  months  and  a  half. 


212  ITALY. 

great  parties  and  hence  to  the  parliamentary  form  of 

government.     There  is  a  marked  lack  of  abil- 

wnityamong  ity  to  cooperate  for  public  ends  in  matters 

ters  a  symp-  of  national  importance,  and  this  accounts  for 

torn  of  this.  .... 

the  tact  that  the  Italian  ministries,  in  spite  of 
their  greater  stability,  have  been,  as  a  rule,  even  less 
united  within  themselves  than  the  French.  Now  con- 
sider what  this  means.  The  theory  of  the  parliamentary 
system  is  based  upon  the  idea  that  the  government  of 
the  country  is  intrusted  to  a  committee,  the  members 
of  which  are  jointly  responsible  to  the  popular  Chamber 
for  the  whole  conduct  of  the  administration,  so  that  a 
hostile  vote  on  any  question  is  a  condemnation  of  each 
and  all  of  them.  Hence  the  theory  implies  that  the 
ministers  must  cling  to  each  other  and  present  to  the 
Chamber  a  single  front  and  a  consistent  policy.  This 
is  the  reason  for  the  secrecy  of  cabinet  consultations, 
for  if  the  differences  between  the  ministers  were  exposed 
to  public  view,  it  would  be  impossible  for  them  to  main- 
tain an  appearance  of  harmony.  It  has  already  been 
pointed  out  that  such  a  system  tends  normally  to  divide 
Parliament  into  two  opposing  parties,  because  so  long 
as  the  ministers  act  in  concert  and  stand  or  fall  together, 
the  members  of  the  Chamber  cannot  support  one  of 
them  and  oppose  another,  but  must  follow  their  lead 
absolutely,  or  turn  them  all  out.  Under  normal  condi- 
tions, therefore,  Parliament  must  be  sharply  divided 
into  the  supporters  of  the  cabinet  and  the  opposition  ; 
and  unless  there  is  some  disturbing  element,  the  mem- 
bers of  each  of  these  sections,  by  constantly  working 
together  for  a  single  end,  tend  to  become  consolidated 


THE  CABINETS  LACK  UNITY.  213 

into  a  compact  party  with  a  continuous  life.  But  this 
result  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  ministers  hold  to- 
gether and  stand  before  the  Chamber  as  a  united  and 
inseparable  body.  If  they  do  not  do  so,  any  member  of 
the  Chamber  may  bear  allegiance  to  one  of  them  alone, 
and  thus  each  minister  may  have  his  own  band  of  fol- 
lowers who  support  his  colleagues  only  provisionally; 
and  in  that  case  the  governmental  majority  will  not  be 
a  party,  but  a  collection  of  separate  groups,  bound 
together  by  a  more  or  less  precarious  alliance.  In 
almost  all  the  states  on  the  continent  this  is  true  to 
some  extent;  and  the  various  methods  of  parliament- 
ary procedure  already  mentioned,  together  with  certain 
peculiarities  of  condition  and  temperament  among  the 
people,  have  tended  to  foster  it.  The  English  parlia- 
mentary practice  has  been  generally  followed  so  far  as 
the  form  is  concerned,  for  the  whole  cabinet  habitually 
resigns  on  a  hostile  vote  in  the  Chamber ; *  but  in  sub- 
stance the  ministers  are  by  no  means  jointly  responsible, 
because  as  soon  as  they  have  resigned  a  new  cabinet  is 
formed,  which  often  contains  several  members  of  the 
old  one.  This  state  of  things  has  been  especially 
marked  in  Italy,  and  Depretis  developed  it  so  far  as  to 
make  scapegoats  of  his  colleagues  instead  of  resigning 
himself,  when  the  Chamber  voted  against  the  cabinet 
of  which  he  was  the  head.  The  result  is  that  every 
prominent  political  leader,  instead  of  being  a  member 

1  This  rule  is  not  as  strictly  observed  in  Italy  as  elsewhere,  the  res- 
ignation of  a  single  minister  on  an  adverse  vote  in  Parliament  being 
not  uncommon.  Two  ministers  resigned  in  this  way  in  1871,  one  in 
1873,  one  in  1879,  two  in  1885,  two  in  1888,  and  an  under-secretary  in 
1890. 


214  ITALY. 

of  a  great  party,  is  a  free  lance  who  fights  on  his  own 
account  at  the  head  of  his  retainers. 

The  interest,  indeed,  in  Italian  politics  centres  to  an 
Prominence  unusual  degree  about  the  personal  struggles 
sonafek-1""  between  the  chiefs  of  rival  factions  in  the 
SlKuTpaii-  same  party ;  or,  to  put  this  truth  in  a  more 
general  form,  —  one  of  the  most  striking  fea- 
tures in  Italian  public  life  is  the  prominence  of  the 
personal  element.  Any  one  who  has  read  the  daily 
papers  in  Italy  cannot  fail  to  have  observed  an  illus- 
tration of  this  in  the  large  space  allotted  to  the  de- 
scription of  the  altercations  between  the  President  of 
the  Chamber  and  some  refractory  debater.1  Now  such 
a  prominence  of  personal  matters  as  compared  with 
questions  of  principle  is  not  an  accident.  It  is  a 
symptom  of  a  social  condition  that  pervades  the  whole 
country,  although  far  more  marked  in  the  south  than 
in  the  north.  The  Italians  are  very  different  from  the 
French.  They  are  not  attracted  to  the  same  extent  by 
abstract  theories,  and  hence  they  do  not  form  a  number 
of  parties  or  groups,  each  clinging  obstinately  to  an 
ideal  form  of  government,  and  striving  to  bring  about 
an  ideal  organization  of  society.2  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  endowed  with  a  great  deal  of  shrewd  common 
sense  in  politics,  and  with  a  pretty  clear  perception  of 
what  is  attainable  and  what  is  not.     The  way  in  which 

1  Jacini  says  the  newspapers  found  that  descriptions  of  personal  con- 
tests increased  their  sale,  i"  Conservator i,  p.  73. 

2  Turiello  (Fatti,  p.  92)  says  that,  contrary  to  appearances,  the  faith  in 
political  theories  is  stronger  in  Italy  than  in  France.  Nevertheless,  I 
believe  that  the  common  impression  is  correct.  Turiello  admits  (Id.,  pp. 
115-16)  that  the  Italian  parties  are  commonly  based  on  personal  grounds. 


POLITICAL  DISINTEGRATION.  215 

the  Republican  followers  of  Mazzini,  with  a  mere  hand- 
ful of  exceptions,  gave  up  their  theories  and  accepted 
the  monarchy  is  sufficient  evidence  of  this.  The  Ital- 
ian is  not  so  excitable  as  the  Frenchman,  but  is  com- 
paratively indolent,  and  this  also  tends  to  make  him 
practical.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  far  more  prone  to 
form  cliques,  or  to  attach  himself  to  a  patron,  in  order 
to  obtain  some  private  advantage. 

The  causes  of  this  last  tendency  run  far  back  into 
mediaeval  history.  The  long -continued  op-  gocial 
pression  in  southern  Italy,  and  the  lack  of  a  Nation  hnhe 
firm  and  stable  authority  that  maintained  so-  south' 
cial  order  and  administered  justice  between  man  and 
man,  made  the  people  look  on  every  government  as 
a  natural  enemy  instead  of  a  protector ;  and  hence  so- 
ciety disintegrated,  and  there  developed  a  want  of  mutual 
confidence,  and  a  general  absence  of  social  cohesion. 
The  community  was  reduced  to  its  first  elements,  and 
men  did  just  what  they  have  always  done  when  there 
was  no  higher  power  to  which  they  could  appeal. 
They  banded  themselves  together  for  mutual  assistance. 
The  process  was  precisely  the  same  as  that  which  gave 
birth  to  the  feudal  system,  after  the  fall  of  Rome  had 
plunged  Europe  into  a  state  of  anarchy.  Each  man, 
feeling  his  weakness  and  isolation,  joined  himself  to 
another  man  or  body  of  men  stronger  than  he,  and 
rendered  service  on  condition  of  receiving  protection. 
This  is  the  origin  of  the  relation  of  patron  and  client 
in  southern  Italy ;  and  indeed,  the  only  ties  that  seem 
to  be  thoroughly  natural  there  are  those  of  the  family 
and  of  patronage.1    The  vendetta  or  family  blood  feud, 

1  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  125-26. 


216  ITALY. 

which  has  caused  so  many  tragedies,  arose  from  the 
same  necessity  for  mutual  defense,  and  in  some  form 
or  other  it  is  certain  to  flourish  wherever  the  law  fails 
„     t  to  punish  crime.     Another  and  more  terrible 

societies.  result  of  the  social  condition  has  been  the 
Camorra  in  Naples  and  the  Mafia  in  Sicily,  of  which 
we  have  heard  so  much  since  the  lynching  of  the  Ital- 
ians at  New  Orleans  in  1891.  These  societies  were 
formerly  recruited  from  all  ranks  in  the  community, 
the  poorer  members  obeying  the  orders  of  the  richer, 
and  enjoying  in  return  an  immunity  from  punishment ; 
but  of  late  years  they  have  undergone  a  great  modifi- 
cation, and  are  now  confined  to  the  lowest  classes. 
The  Camorra,  indeed,  appears  to  have  ceased  to  be 
really  dangerous,  and  even  the  Mafia  has  become  far 
less  active  ;  but  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  out  the  exact 
truth  in  regard  to  Italian  secret  organizations,  because 
the  people  who  could  give  evidence  about  them  are 
intimidated  and  do  not  dare  to  testify.1 

Since  Italy  has  been  united  under  the  monarchy  the 

associations  in  the  south  have  tended  to  pur- 

ditionof        sue  a  double  course.     Violence  has  become 

late  years. 

confined  to  the  criminal  classes,  who  combine 
for  protection  against  justice  into  bands  of  malefactors, 
known  by  the  general  name  of  the  Mala  Vita  or  Bad 
Growth  and  Life.  The  classes,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
political     !  take  an  active  part  in  politics  have  formed 

innumerable  cliques,  whose  vital  principle  is 
the  relation  of  patron  and  client,  and  whose  object  is 

1  See  an  article  by  L.  Wolffsohn,  on  the  "Italian  Secret  Societies,"  in 
the  Contemp.  Rev.,  May,  1891. 


POLITICAL  CLIQUES.  217 

the  use  of  the  public  authority  for  their  private  benefit. 
These  cliques  started  in  Naples,  and  the  system  was 
called  /Sjjagnolismo,  from  the  old  Spanish  territory  in 
which  it  took  its  rise.1  At  first  they  were  kept  down 
by  the  active  work  of  national  regeneration,  but  after 
the  Left  came  to  power  in  1876,  they  spread  like 
tubercles  throughout  the  whole  body  politic,  although 
they  are  still  most  highly  developed  in  the  south. 
Here  the  social  conditions  are  peculiarly  suited  to 
them,  and  they  extend  from  the  rural  communes, 
where  they  are  interwoven  with  family  ties,  and  the  old 
family  feuds,  all  through  the  political  system,  to  the 
minister  and  the  deputies  who  form  his  personal  retinue. 
Some  communes  and  provinces  are,  indeed,  excellently 
governed,  but  in  others  a  clique  perverts  the  local 
administration  into  an  instrument  for  promoting  the 
private  interests  of  its  members,  and  even  for  oppress- 
ing its  foes.  Goods  belonging  to  the  friends  of  the 
clique  have,  it  is  said,  been  known  to  be  passed  through 
the  municipal  custom  house  free  of  duty,  while  those 
of  its  enemies  were  heavily  assessed ; 2  and  this  does 
not  seem  to  be  the  only  method  in  which  the  power  to 
levy  local  taxes  has  been  grossly  abused.3     It  is  com- 

1  One  of  the  most  authoritative  and  forcihle  descriptions  of  this  aspect 
of  Italian  politics  has  heen  given  hy  the  late  Marco  Minghetti,  in  his 
book,  /  Partiti  Politlci.  See,  also,  Jacini,  /  Conservatori ;  Turiello, 
Governo  e  Governati  in  Italia.  The  last  of  these  writers  gives  an  interest- 
ing account  of  the  recent  history  and  condition  of  the  Neapolitan  prov- 
inces. Id.,  Fatti,  p.  134  et  seq.  For  the  state  of  Sicily  in  this  respect, 
see  San  Giuliano,  Le  Conditione  Presente  della  Sicilia;  Colajauni,  In 
Sicilia. 

2  Minghetti,  lb.,  p.  175. 

8  Colajanni,  chaps,  viii.  and  ix.;  San  Giuliano,  pp.  11G-17. 


218  ITALY. 

monly  asserted,  moreover,  that  the  councils  have  been 
dissolved  and  the  electoral  lists  falsified  in  the  interest 
of  a  faction,1  and  complaints  are  loud  that  the  commu- 
nal lands  are  managed  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the 
ruling"  class.2  That  the  local  administration  is  often 
misused  in  these  and  other  ways  for  personal  ends  there 
can  be  no  doubt ;  and  in  fact  the  extension  of  local 
self-government  is  thought  by  some  people  to  have 
been  a  very  doubtful  blessing  on  that  account.3  It 
was  to  correct  this  state  of  things,  which  the  ordinary 
courts  were  powerless  to  remedy,  that  the  administra- 
tive tribunals  were  created,  but  as  complaints  have  not 
ceased,  it  may  be  assumed  that  these  courts  have  also 
proved  unequal  to  the  task.  Nor  does  the  action  of  the 
central  government  lessen  the  evil,  but  rather  aggravates 
it,  because  the  cabinet  depends  for  its  tenure  of  office 
on  the  votes  of  the  deputies,  who  are  in  league  with  the 
local  cliques. 

The  relation  of  the  representative  to  the  factions  in 
his  district  varies  no  doubt  a  great  deal  in  the  different 
parts  of  the  country.  It  is  closest  in  the  Neapolitan 
provinces,  where  the  system  is  most  fully  developed, 
and  where  the  deputies  are  themselves  often  the  pa- 
trons of  the  cliques.  In  the  north,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  wire-pullers  are  more  commonly  the  instruments 
of  the  public  men ;  while  in  Sicily  the  deputy  is  apt 
to  consider  himself  a  general  patron  of  the  whole  of 
the  ruling  class,  which  forms  a  sort  of  clique  for  the 

1  Minghetti,  pp.  176,  246  ;  Colajanni,  ubi  sup. ;  San  Giuliano,  pp.  114- 
16  ;  and  see  Pareto,  "  La  Dictature  en  Italie,"  Bib.  Univ.,  April,  1895. 

2  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  238-46  ;  Colajanni,  ubi  sup. 

8  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  72-74  ;  Proposte,  p.  12  et  seq. 


BANEFUL  EFFECT  OF  CLIQUES.  219 

district  to  the  exclusion  of  the  artisans  and  peasants.1 
But  however  the  local  factions  are  organized,  the  deputy 
must  seek  to  propitiate  them,  and  must  in  turn  be  con- 
ciliated by  the  ministers ;  and  on  the  other  hand  the 
extensive  functions  and  arbitrary  power  of  the  govern- 
ment render  every  local  interest  and  every  commercial 
enterprise  more  or  less  dependent  upon  its  good  will, 
and  thus  compel  every  one  to  secure  its  countenance 
through  the  intervention  of  the  members  of  Parlia- 
ment.2 The  deputies,  in  fact,  look  upon  themselves  as 
agents  to  procure  favors  for  their  constituents,  and  a 
striking-  illustration  of  the  extent  to  which  this  is  car- 
ried  is  furnished  by  the  difficulty  the  government  found 
when  it  managed  the  railroads  in  running  fast  express 
trains,  on  account  of  the  interference  of  the  members 
of  the  Chamber,  who  insisted  that  all  the  trains  pass- 
ing through  their  districts  should  stop  at  way  stations. 
That  such  a  condition  of  things  excited  no  general  dis- 
approbation may  be  judged  from  a  remark  made  in  the 
debate  on  the  railroad  bill  in  1876  by  Crispi,  then  one 
of  the  leaders  of  the  opposition,  who  said  that  it  was 
unavoidable,  because  the  political  parties  were  interested 
in  making  for  themselves  an  army  of  friends.3 

1  Cf.  Turiello,  Fatti,  p.  196. 

2  Cf.  De  Viti  de  Marco,  "  The  Political  Situation  in  Italy,"  Nineteenth 
Cent.,  Oct.,  1895. 

8  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici,  pp.  156-57.  One  of  the  few  branches  of 
the  public  service  that  has  been  kept  almost  entirely  out  of  politics,  and 
hence  retains  the  respect  of  the  people,  is  the  army.  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp. 
199,  316.  This  is  used  as  an  educational  as  well  as  a  military  institution, 
and  has  no  doubt  done  a  certain  amount  of  good  in  that  way  ;  for  not 
only  do  the  recruits  receive  direct  instruction,  but  they  are  moved  away 
from  their  own  part  of  the  country,  and  thus  given  some  of  the  advan- 
tages of  travel,  which  few  of  them  would  ever  get  otherwise. 


220  ITALY. 

The  liberal  use  of  patronage  again  suggests  a  com- 
Com  arison  Parison  with  France,  —  a  comparison  which 
•'uuhnuoii-  has  much  the  same  advantage  as  placing  two 
Fiance  and     shades  of  color  side  by  side,  for  the  contrast 

not  only  brings  out  the  difference  between 
the  two,  but  also  helps  to  make  clear  the  precise 
quality  of  each  of  them.  In  both  countries  the  depu- 
ties have  bands  of  supporters  in  their  districts,  and 
use  their  influence  in  Parliament  to  promote  the  special 
interests  of  these  dependents.  In  both  the  attitude  of 
the  deputies  toward  the  ministry  is  influenced  by  ques- 
tions of  local  administration,  and  conversely  the  action 
of  the  government  in  matters  of  local  concern  is  to 
some  extent  determined  by  the  relation  of  the  deputies 
to  the  cabinet ;  and  thus  the  issues  that  arise  in  Parlia- 
ment are  a  good  deal  involved  with  those  that  affect 
only  the  province  or  the  commune.  Such  a  connec- 
tion between  general  and  local  questions  is  peculiarly 
marked  where  the  administration  is  highly  centralized, 

but  it  exists  in  some  form  almost  everywhere. 

In  all  conn-      T  •  1  l 

tries  party      In  any  country  with  a   popular   government 

lines  tend  to  J  J  i  i 

be  the  same    party  lines   tend   to   become  the  same  m  na- 

in  national  . 

and  local       tional  and  local  politics,  where  the  franchise 

politics.  L 

in  both  cases  is  substantially  alike.  I  do  not 
mean  that  the  same  issues  are  necessarily  involved,  or 
even  that  similar  political  principles  are  always  applied 
to  both,  for  a  party  may  advocate  economy  in  one  case 
and  favor  extravagance  in  the  other,  or  it  may  be  pro- 
gressive in  one  and  conversative  in  the  other.  Nor  do 
I  mean  that  the  same  party  must  prevail  in  both,  for 
there  may  be  independents  who  vote  for  the  local  can- 


NATIONAL  AND   LOCAL  PARTIES.  221 

diclates  of  one  party  and  the  national  candidates  of 
the  other,  so  that  one  party  may  be  victorious  in  local 
elections  and  the  other  in  national  ones.  This  has 
often  occurred  in  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  the 
vote  of  a  State  for  the  President  and  the  governor, 
and  it  happens  regularly  in  Canada.  What  I  mean 
is  that  all  political  struggles,  whether  national  or  local, 
in  which  party  lines  are  drawn  at  all,  are  usually 
carried  on  between  the  same  parties.  There  Reasonsfor 
are  two  reasons  for  this.  The  leaders  of  a  thls' 
party  understand  very  well  the  importance  of  keeping 
up  its  organization  and  discipline,  and  they  know  that 
these  would  be  greatly  impaired  if  their  followers  were 
allowed  to  break  ranks  and  take  part  in  a  battle  on 
opposite  sides.  They  realize  how  hard  it  would  be  to 
rally  them  under  the  old  standard  after  they  had  been 
disbanded,  and  hence  they  want  to  keep  up  the  party 
organization  by  bringing  it  into  every  contest.  This 
motive  is,  of  course,  strongest  where  the  organization 
is  most  highly  developed,  but  to  some  extent  it  must 
be  present  everywhere,  even  when  the  ties  of  party  are 
as  loose  as  in  France  and  Italy.  The  other  reason  goes 
deeper  down  into  human  nature.  When  men  have 
attached  themselves  heartily  to  a  party,  they  tend  to 
become  identified  with  it.  It  engages  their  sympathies 
and  colors  their  judgment.  Whatever  may  be  their 
motives  for  joining  it,  —  and  these  are  often  uncon- 
scious and  always  hard  to  analyze,  —  they  are  to  some 
extent  forgotten  in  the  heat  of  the  strife.  The  ultimate 
objects  for  which  the  party  exists  are  more  or  less  lost 
sight  of.     It  ceases  to  be  merely  a  means  to  an  end, 


222  ITALY. 

and  becomes  in  itself  a  proximate  end.  Now  it  is 
impossible  for  most  men  to  feel  a  strong  allegiance  of 
this  kind  for  two  separate  parties,  at  least  on  subjects 
that  are  at  all  connected,  because  they  cannot  keep 
their  passions,  their  attachments,  and  their  antipathies 
sufficiently  distinct.  It  is  hard  to  separate  an  act  from 
the  actor,  to  preserve  unimpaired  our  esteem  for  the 
character  and  good  judgment  of  a  man  who  pursues 
what  we  believe  to  be  a  mischievous  policy,  or  to  turn 
away  from  leaders  whom  we  have  been  in  the  habit  of 
trusting.  The  partisan  is  inclined,  therefore,  to  mag- 
nify the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  the  men  on  his  own 
side,  and  distrust  those  of  his  opponents.  He  cannot 
avoid  bringing  his  prejudices  into  play  in  every  politi- 
cal question,  and  inclines  in  any  contest  to  associate 
himself  with  those  people  in  whom  he  has  learned  to 
have  confidence  in  a  kindred  struggle.  If,  therefore,  the 
lines  of  cleavage  of  national  and  local  parties  are  sub- 
stantially different,  the  loyalty  to  one  or  both  of  them 
is  liable  to  become  enfeebled  until  it  ceases  altogether. 
Hence  it  is  very  difficult  to  maintain  in  national  and 
local  politics  separate  parties  which  are  really  independ- 
ent, and  whose  lines  are  essentially  different.1  There 
are,  of  course,  cases  where  such  a  separation  of  party 
lines  exists.  A  number  of  instances  may  be  found 
among  the  smaller  cities  in  England  and  America,  in 
some  of  which  the  municipal  elections  have  for  many 

1  Where  one  of  the  national  parties  has  an  overwhelming  majority  in 
some  part  of  the  country,  it  sometimes  breaks  up  there  into  factions  which 
fight  among  themselves  over  local  matters.  But  this  is  really  a  case  of 
the  subdivision  of  a  party,  not  of  distinct  parties  for  national  and  local 
politics.     It  is  a  peculiar  case  within  the  rule,  not  an  exception  to  it. 


NATIONAL  AND  LOCAL  PARTIES.  223 

years  had  little  or  no  connection  with  national  politics. 
But  perhaps  the  most  striking  example  of  all  has  been 
furnished  by  the  history  of  the  new  county  council  of 
London.  In  the  last  election  to  that  body,  however, 
the  campaign  came  dangerously  near  being  conducted 
on  party  lines,  and  it  does  not  seem  probable  that  the 
Moderates  and  Progressives  in  the  council  will  long 
remain  distinct  from  the  Conservatives  and  Liberals  in 
the  nation. 

When  the  national  and  local  party  are  the  same,  it 
is  clear  that  both  national  and  local  questions   Parti    ar 
must  enter  into  the  formation  of  parties  ;  but  J,^ft^2y 
it  does  not  follow  that  both  must  enter  to  an  on^ocS'17 
equal  degree.     On  the  contrary,  one  of  them   lssues- 
has  usually  a  decided  preponderance  over  the  other,  so 
that  either   the    local    parties    are   formed    chiefly   on 
national  issues,  or  the  national  parties  are  based  mainly 
on  local  ones.     Now  the  former  is  the  case  in  France, 
the  latter  in  Italy. 

The   French   parties  are  formed  chiefly  on  national 
questions  ;  for,  although  the  deputies  demand  inFrance 
favors  for  their  districts  greedily,  owe  their  prelomi^ 
nominations  largely  to  their  personal  influence  nate' 
there,  and  are  constantly  subjected  to   pressure  from 
home,  still  their  election  turns  in  the  main  on  national 
issues.     The  essential  difference  between  a  Moderate, 
an   Opportunist,  and  a   Radical  consists  in  their  gen- 
eral political  theories,  and  their  views   on   the  course 
which  the  central  government  ought  to  pursue.     While, 
therefore,  the  question  who  shall  be  the  candidate  of 
the  Radical  party  depends  on  local  considerations,  the 


224  ITALY. 

question  whether  the  district  shall  be  represented  by  a 
Radical  at  all  is  determined  mainly  on  national  grounds. 
In  Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  since  the  enthusiasm 
in itii  the  *hat  ^tended  the  birth  of  the  kingdom  faded 
latter.  away,  the  deputies,  especially  in   the    south, 

have  been  elected  mainly  on  local  and  personal  issues, 
with  less  regard  to  their  views  on  national  questions, 
and  therefore  the  groups  in  the  Chamber  are  based 
chiefly  on  personal  and  geographical  motives.1  With 
the  exception  of  the  small  groups  of  Republicans  and 
Socialists  there  cannot  be  said  to  be  any  national  parties 
at  all,2  for,  although  a  grand  reunion  of  a  party  is 
sometimes  held,  its  programme  is  apt  to  be  vague,  and 
is  hardly  meant  seriously.  In  France  there  is  a  real 
difference  in  the  principles,  the  opinions,  and  the  tone 
of  mind  of  the  Radicals  and  the  Moderates;  but  in 
Italy,  at  least  if  we  leave  the  Extreme  Left  out  of 
account,  it  is  hard  to  discern  any  distinction  between 
the  various  groups.  The  bulk  of  the  deputies  assemble 
at  Rome  virtually  unpledged  to  any  definite  policy,  or 
rather  most  of  them  are  pledged  only  to  support  the 
cabinet  of  the  hour,  and  when  that  begins  to  totter 
they  are  ready  to  form  any  coalition  that  their  own 
ambition  or  the  local  interests  of  their  clients  may 
suggest.  Now  it  is  a  singular  fact  that  in  the  Nea- 
politan provinces,  where  the  constituents  are  most  eager 
to  control  the  state  patronage,  the  deputy  is  more  free 
than  in  the  rest  of  Italy  to  follow  his  own  convictions 
on  national  affairs.3     In  short,  the  exceptional  greed  for 

1  See  Turiello,  Fatti,  p.  327.  2  Id.,  p.  319  et  seq. 

a  Id.,  p.  195. 


ABSENCE  OF  NATIONAL  PARTIES.  225 

private  favors  is  accompanied  by  a  comparative  indif- 
ference on  public  questions,  and  in  this  case,  as  in  many 
others,  it  may  be  observed  that  what  is  peculiarly  true 
of  Naples  is  true  in  some  degree  of  the  whole  of  Italy ; 
for,  as  a  recent  writer  from  that  city  has  remarked,  the 
Neapolitan  is  an  exaggerated  type  of  Italian.1 

The  popular  indifference  on  public  questions  has  a 
curious  effect.  It  has  a  tendency  to  remove  Effeet  f 
those  questions  from  the  heat  of  party  strife.  tUs- 
They  may,  of  course,  be  made  the  occasion  for  a  battle, 
but  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case,  for  a  vote  on  them 
one  way  or  the  other  entails  no  breach  of  party  prin- 
ciple, no  violation  of  electoral  pledges,  and  hence  if  the 
cabinet  is  influential  and  commands  respect,  it  has  a 
good  chance  of  passing  its  measures  without  fighting 
a  systematic  party  opposition.  The  more  completely, 
therefore,  the  elections  turn  on  local  and  personal 
issues,  the  more  absolutely  must  the  government  use  its 
administrative  powers  to  please  the  deputies,  but  the 
more  free  will  it  be  to  follow  its  own  opinions  in 
matters  of  general  policy  that  do  not  directly  affect 
private  interests.  This  is  to  a  great  extent  the  case  in 
Italy,  and  the  result  is  a  certain  inversion  of  the  natural 
functions  of  the  branches  of  the  government.  The 
legislature  has  lost  much  of  its  importance  in  legisla- 
tion, while  the  representatives,  not  indeed  as  a  body  but 
individually,  exert  over  executive  acts  an  influence 
that  lowers  the  tone  of  political  morality  and  degrades 
the  administration.  The  abuse  of  political  influence 
for  private   purposes  has  always  existed  under  every 

1  Turiello,  Fatti,  p.  104. 

VOL.   I. 


226  ITALY. 

form  of  government,  but  it  has  a  peculiar  danger  in 
~         ,      democracies :  first,  because  the  poorer  classes 

Danger  of  '  r 

spoils  sys-      who  furnish  a  larg;e  part  of  the  voters  have, 

tem  in  a  or  7 

democracy.  or  think  they  have,  comparatively  little  interest 
in  the  economical  administration  of  public  affairs ;  and 
second,  because  the  smaller  the  fragments  into  which 
power  is  divided,  and  the  larger  the  electorate,  the 
more  difficult  it  is  for  patriotic  individuals  to  oppose 
the  pressure  of  selfish  organizations. 

The  Italians  themselves  are  fully  alive  to  the  blight- 
ing effect   of  the  spoils  system   and  of  the 
curing  the      relation  of  patron  and  client  with  which  it 

social  dis-         .  ......  _. 

organiza-       is  associated  m   their  country.      In  fact,  an 

tion  which  .  . 

causes  the      Italian  writer  has  truly  said  that  in  order  to 

cliques.  J 

create  Italy  it  is  necessary  to  destroy  the 
cliques ;  1  but  the  task  is  by  no  means  light.  We  have 
seen  that  in  the  south,  where  these  grow  most  rank, 
they  are  due  to  the  same  cause  that  formerly  gave  rise 
to  the  Camorra  and  the  Mafia  and  still  disposes  men  to 
seek  aid  and  protection  from  one  another ;  that  is,  to 
a  want  of  mutual  confidence,  and  to  an  absence  of 
respect  for  law  and  government,  to  a  lack,  in  short,  of 

political  civilization.     Now  the  only  way  in 

The  use  of  ,  .    ,  .  „  J       .    ~      . 

administra-    which  social  order  can  be  perfected  rapidly  is 

tive  action  ,  t  L 

inappro-  by  enforcing  public  authority  rigorously  and 
affording  absolute  security  to  the  people  who 
obey  it,  so  that  every  man  may  rely  on  the  determina- 
tion and  ability  of  the  government  to  maintain  justice, 
and  may  look  for  protection  to  the  state  instead  of  to 

1  "Per fare  V Italia  bisogna  disfare  le  sette,"  Foscolo,  quoted  by  Turi- 
ello,  Fatti,  p.  197. 


PARLIAMENT  SPOILS  THE  ADMINISTRATION.       227 

his  powerful  neighbors.  Such  a  result  can  be  attained 
either  by  means  of  the  administrative  officers,  or 
through  the  courts  of  law ;  and,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  order  was  brought  into  France  by  the  first  method 
and  into  England  by  the  second.  The  enforcement  of 
public  authority  by  means  of  the  administration  is, 
indeed,  peculiarly  suited  to  an  absolute  monarchy  like 
that  of  the  French  kings,  for  the  ruler's  tenure  being 
permanent,  he  is  lifted  as  far  as  possible  above  consid- 
erations of  person  and  party,  if  he  has  sufficient 
character  to  resist  the  blandishments  of  his  courtiers. 
But  it  is  clear  that  a  system  which  involves  the  use  of 
power  in  its  nature  arbitrary  can  work  successfully 
only  in  case  favoritism  is  excluded,  and  the 
officials  are  firm  and  impartial.  Now  under  consistent 
a  parliamentary   form    of    government  arbi-   liamentary 

,  ,    .  .    ,-,         system. 

trary  power  cannot  be  exercised  impartially, 
because  the  ministers  are  dependent  upon  the  Cham- 
ber, and  no  cabinet  can  long  pursue  the  steady  auto- 
cratic policy  that  is  necessary  if  it  is  to  be  continually 
called  to  account  by  deputies  whose  constituents  have 
suffered  in  the  process.  The  advantage  of  enforcing 
order  by  means  of  the  administrative  officials,  instead 
of  by  the  courts,  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  ruler  is  not 
tied  down  to  rigid  legal  formulas,  but  can  exercise  his 
discretion  according  to  the  needs  of  the  case,  and  that 
is  a  very  great  gain  in  certain  conditions  of  society ; 
but  it  is  this  very  discretionary  element  that  makes 
the  system  incompatible  with  a  parliamentary  form  of 
government.  The  inconsistency  in  Italy  is,  indeed, 
only  too  apparent. 


228  ITALY. 

This  method  of  perfecting  social  order  being,  there- 
mL   .  ,.        fore,  certain  to  work  badly  under  the  exist- 

The  judi-  •> 

ciaverM  m&  f°rm  °f  government,  the  only  alternative 
enough.  mUst  be  found  in  the  courts  of  law,  provided 
of  course  the  country  has  at  last  reached  a  point  where 
arbitrary  rule  can  be  dispensed  with.  But  if  the  courts 
are  to  produce  the  desired  result  they  must  in  turn  be 
able  to  afford  absolute  protection  to  the  citizen,  and  to 
do  so  they  must  have  final  power  to  administer  justice 
in  all  cases.  We  have  already  seen  that  until  lately 
they  were  very  far  from  having  any  such  authority  in 
Italy,  because  the  government  often  had  a  right  to  inter- 
fere when  they  touched  upon  an  official  act ;  and  even 
under  the  recent  laws  on  administrative  justice  they  do 
not  hold  the  position  which  is  necessary  to  enable  them 
to  fulfill  so  great  a  task.  These  laws,  indeed,  do  not 
strengthen  at  all  the  ordinary  courts,  whose  influence, 
moreover,  is  weakened  by  the  existence  of  the  five 
courts  of  cassation.  Now,  in  order  to  magnify  the 
authority  of  law,  and  to  give  it  the  character  of  some- 
thing eternal  and  immutable,  independent  of  time  and 
place,  it  is  important  to  make  the  administration  of 
justice  as  uniform  throughout  the  nation  as  possible. 
For  this  reason  a  centralization  of  the  judicial  system 
is  certainly  desirable.  In  order  to  raise  the  moral 
force  of  the  courts  to  the  highest  point,  it  is  also 
essential  to  inspire  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  im- 
partiality of  the  judges,  and  in  this  matter  the  Italians 
might  well  find  a  suggestion  in  the  ancient  practice  of 
their  own  cities.  It  was  the  habit  in  the  Middle  Ages 
to  appoint  to  the  office  of  Podesta,  or  highest  judicial 


NEED   OF  A   STRONGER  JUDICIARY.  229 

magistrate,  a  stranger  from  another  city,  on  the  ground 
that  he  would  be  more  free  from  local  influence, 
more  independent  of  the  factions  of  those  days.  This 
example  might,  perhaps,  be  profitably  followed  now, 
and  the  judges  from  Rome  might  sit  in  circuit  and 
hold  court  in  the  different  provinces,  like  the  English 
justices  in  eyre.  But  whatever  method  may  be  adopted, 
it  is  certain  that  the  result  must  be  attained  before 
the  present  government  can  work  really  well.  Owing 
to  the  lack  of  a  strong  system  of  courts,  or  rather  to 
a  political  condition  in  which  such  courts  cannot  exist, 
the  South  American  republics  present  a  constant  parody 
of  the  United  States,  whose  institutions  they  have 
meant  to  copy ;  and  in  the  same  way  Italy  furnishes 
an  illustration  of  the  difficulty  of  making  the  parlia- 
mentary form  of  government  a  success  without  a 
powerful  judiciary. 

The  Italian  statesmen  have  had  great  obstacles  to 
encounter.  They  found  the  country  divided  into  a 
number  of  separate  provinces,  each  of  them  with  its 
own  peculiar  habits  and  traditions,  and  some  of  them 
socially  disorganized.  They  found  it  defenseless  and 
poor,  and  for  the  most  part  well-nigh  devoid  of  rail- 
roads or  telegraphs.  They  have  welded  these  provinces 
together  into  a  single  nation,  to  which  they  have  given 
a  uniform  administration  and  enlightened  codes  of  law. 
They  have  almost  completely  suppressed  brigandage, 
and  have  nearly  rooted  out  the  Camorra  and  Mafia. 
They  have  created  a  large  army  and  a  powerful  fleet, 
and  they  have  covered  the  land  with  a  network  of 
railroads  and  telegraphs.    What  wonder   if   it   should 


230  ITALY. 

appear  that  amidst  all  this  labor  some  things  had  been 
left  undone  and  others  had  been  done  imperfectly ;  if 
it  should  prove  that,  in  establishing  a  free  government 
among  a  people  with  a  defective  political  training,  some 
institutions  had  been  set  up  which  are  inconsistent 
with  each  other,  or  ill  adapted  to  the  condition  of 
the  country.  The  nation  has  not  yet  worked  out  her 
problems,  but  she  has  two  great  advantages  :  her  people 
are  patient  and  sensible  in  politics,  and  have  shown 
themselves  willing  to  bear  the  immense  cost  of  national 
regeneration ;  and  she  has  a  number  of  men,  both 
among  scholars  and  in  active  public  life,  who  are  fully 
sensible  of  her  difficulties,  and  are  trying  earnestly  to 
solve  them. 

The  greatest  immediate  danger  to  Italy  is  economic. 
The  finan-  ^he  ^  a  P00r  country,  possessing  little  capital 
ciai  danger.  an(j  a  comparatively  small  amount  of  com- 
merce or  manufactures,  and  in  Sicily,  at  least,  saddled 
with  customs  in  regard  to  labor  and  the  tenancy  of  land 
that  make  industrial  progress  extremely  difficult ;  yet 
she  strives  to  play  a  great  part  in  Europe.  Her  immod- 
erate ambition  is  said  to  be  fostered  by  the  prevalent 
classical  education  which  keeps  before  the  mind  of  her 
people  the  glories  of  ancient  Rome ;  but  whether  this 
be  the  cause  or  not,  the  effects  are  disastrous.  The 
country  has  rolled  up  a  large  debt,  and  her  army  and 
navy  are  more  expensive  than  she  can  properly  afford. 
The  result  is  that  although  the  taxes  appear  to  be  as 
heavy  as  the  country  can  bear,  deficits  in  the  budget 
have  reappeared  within  the  last  few  years,  and  the  im- 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE.         231 

migration  from  the  rural  districts  is  alarming.1  But  in 
spite  of  the  dark  shadows  that  fall  across  her  path,  one 
cannot  help  believing  that  the  country  which  has  led 
the  world  once  in  arms  and  once  in  arts,  which  has 
given  laws  to  the  whole  of  Europe,  which  in  these  last 
times  has  freed  her  soil  from  the  foreigner,  and  has 
made  herself  a  great  nation,  will  find  in  her  people 
the  sagacity  and  the  self-denial  necessary  to  overcome 
her  difficulties  and  regain  a  share  of  her  ancient  pros- 
perity. 

1  Pareto,  "L'ltalie  Economi<|ue,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Oct.  15, 
1891. 


CHAPTER  V. 

GERMANY:    THE   STRUCTURE    OF   THE    EMPIRE. 

Cherbuliez  has  remarked  that  most  countries  which 
have  grown  in  size  have  started  with  a  com- 
of  Germany  pact  territory  and  increased  it  by  absorbing 
Holy  Roman  the  adjacent  lands,  but  that  Prussia  began 
with  her  frontiers  and  afterwards  filled  in 
between  them.  The  statement  is  almost  literally  true, 
for  early  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  Electors  of 
Brandenburg,  who  were  the  ancestors  of  the  Kings  of 
Prussia,  acquired  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Prussia  on  the 
Baltic  and  the  Duchy  of  Cleves  on  the  Rhine,  posses- 
sions which  form  to-day  very  nearly  the  extreme  limits 
of  the  Prussian  monarchy  on  the  east  and  west.  At 
that  time  these  duchies  did  not  touch  the  Electors' 
other  territories,  and  in  fact  until  less  than  thirty  years 
ago  several  States  were  so  wedged  in  among  the  Prus- 
sian dominions  as  to  cut  the  kingdom  quite  in  two. 
Nor  was  this  the  case  with  Prussia  alone.  The  whole 
map  of  Germany  as  it  stood  in  the  last  century  was  a 
mass  of  patches  of  different  color  mingled  together  in 
bewildering  confusion.  Not  only  were  some  of  the  prin- 
cipalities inconceivably  small,  but  they  often  consisted  in 
part  of  outlying  districts  at  a  distance  from  one  another, 
and  entirely  surrounded  by  the  estates  of  some  other 
potentate.     The  cause  of  such  a  state  of  things  is  to  be 


r^ 


THE  GROWTH  OF  PRUSSIA.  233 

found  in  the  excessive  development  of  the  feudal  sys- 
tem, which  treated  sovereignty  as  a  private  right  of  the 
ruler,  so  that  princes  dealt  with  their  fiefs  very  much  as 
men  do  with  their  lands  to-day.  They  acquired  them 
freely  in  all  directions  by  inheritance,  by  marriage,  and 
even  by  purchase,  and,  what  was  worse,  at  their  death 
they  divided  them  as  they  pleased  among  their  sons. 
Still  another  source  of  confusion  was  presented  by  the 
bishops  and  other  high  church  dignitaries,  who  held 
large  estates  which  they  ruled  as  temporal  sovereigns. 
The  result  was  that  Germany  was  divided  in  a  most 
fantastic  way  among  several  hundred  princes,  who  owed, 
it  is  true,  a  shadowy  allegiance  to  the  Emperor  as  head 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  but  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses were  virtually  independent. 

Almost  alone  among  the  German  States  Prussia  was 
steadily    gaining   in    size    and   power.      Her  The  growth 
growth  may  be  traced  primarily  to  the  Con-  o£  Prussia- 
stitutio  Achillea  of  1473,  which  forbade  the  splitting 
up  of  the  monarchy  among  the  sons  of  the  Electors,  and 
thus  kept  all  their  dominions  together  ;  but  it  was  due 
chiefly  to  the  thrift,  the  energy,  and  the  sagacity  of  the 
rulers  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern.    At  the  close  of  the 
thirty  years'  war,  in  1648,  the  Great  Elector  obtained 
possessions  which  made  his  domains  larger  than  those  of 
any  other  German  State  except  Austria,  and  in  the  next 
century  the  annexations  of  Frederic  the  Great 
more  than  doubled  the  population  of  his  king-  a  time,  hut 
dom.     The  growth  of  Prussia  was  suddenly  helped  by 

iiii  i  tit-  i        Napoleon. 

checked  by  an  event  that  tended  ultimately 

to  hasten  its  development.     This  was  the  outbreak  of 


234  GERMANY. 

the  French  Revolution  and  the  career  of  Bonaparte. 
When  a  series  of  victories  had  laid  Germany  at  his  feet, 
Napoleon  suppressed  a  large  number  of  petty  principali- 
ties including  all  the  ecclesiastical  ones,  and  combined 
the  smaller  States  that  remained  into  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine.  He  also  deprived  Prussia  of  half  her 
territory,  thinking  by  these  means  to  reduce  her  to 
impotence,  and  create  in  the  heart  of  Germany  a  body 
that  would  always  be  devoted  to  the  cause  of  France. 
But  in  fact  the  petty  principalities  had  been  too  small 
to  act  separately  or  to  combine  effectively,  and  too 
independent  to  be  made  serviceable  by  any  sovereign ; 
and  by  suppressing  them  Napoleon  had  given  the  Ger- 
mans some  little  capacity  for  organization,  which  was 
used  against  him  as  soon  as  the  tide  turned.1 

After  his  overthrow  Germany  was  reorganized  by 
The  Ger-  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  and  the  States,  which 
federation"  now  numbered  only  thirty-nine,  were  formed 
e  ie '  into  a  loose  confederation.  This  was  not 
properly  a  federal  union,  but  rather  a  perpetual  in- 
ternational alliance,  the  States  remaining  separate  and 
independent,  except  for  matters  affecting  the  external 
and  internal  safety  of  Germany.  The  only  organ  of 
the  Confederation  was  a  Diet  composed  of  the  diplo- 
matic agents  of  the  different  States,  who  acted  like 
ambassadors,  and  voted  in  accordance  with  the  instruc- 
tions they  received  from  their  respective  governments. 

1  This  is  very  well  stated  by  Colonel  Malleson  in  his  Refounding  of  the 
German  Empire,  pp.  4-6.  Napoleon  prophesied  that  within  fifty  years  all 
Europe  would  be  either  Republican  or  Cossack.  One  of  the  chief  causes 
of  the  failure  of  this  prediction  has  been  the  creation  of  a  united  Germany, 
which  Napoleon  himself  unwittingly  helped  to  bring  about. 


THE  GERMANIC  CONFEDERATION.  235 

It  had  power  to  declare  war  and  make  peace,  to  or- 
ganize the  federal  army,  to  enact  laws  for  the  purpose 
of  applying  the  constitution,  and  to  decide  disputes 
between  the  States  ;  but  it  had  no  administrative  offi- 
cers under  its  command,  the  federal  laws  being"  exe- 
cuted  entirely  by  the  officials  of  the  States.  Hence  the 
only  means  of  getting  its  orders  carried  out  in  case  a 
State  refused  to  obey  them  was  by  the  process  known 
as  federal  execution,  which  meant  that  the  Diet  called 
on  one  or  more  members  of  the  Confederation  to  at- 
tack the  recalcitrant  State,  and  by  invading  its  territo- 
ries to  compel  submission.  The  procedure  in  the  Diet 
was  a  complicated  one.  For  ordinary  matters  it  acted 
by  sections  called  curiae,  when  the  eleven  largest 
States  had  one  vote  apiece,  the  other  twenty-eight 
being  combined  into  six  groups  each  of  which  had  a 
single  vote.  For  constitutional  questions,  on  the  other 
hand,  and  those  relating  to  peace  and  war,  the  Diet 
proceeded  in  'plenum,  and  in  that  case  each  of  the 
smaller  States  had  one  vote,  while  the  fourteen  largest 
had  two,  three,  or  four  votes  apiece.1  This  distribution 
of  votes  was  by  no  means  in  proportion  to  population, 
for  the  largest  States  were  much  more  than  four  times 
as  big  as  the  smallest,  but  it  was  a  distinct  recognition 
of  an  inequality  of  rights  on  the  part  of  the  States, 
and  as  such  it  still  retains  an  especial  importance 
because  the  arrangement  of  the  votes  in  the  plenum 
has  continued  almost  unchanged  in  one  of  the  chief 
organs  of  the  Empire  to-day.     It  must  not  be  supposed, 

1  Six  of  the  States  had  four  votes,  five  had  three,  three  had  two,  and 
twenty-five  had  one. 


236  GERMANY. 

however,  that  the  influence  of  the  States  in  the  Diet 
was  determined  by  the  number  of  their  votes,  for 
Austria,  which  had  a  permanent  right  to  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Assembly,  and  Prussia,  which  had  a  per- 
manent right  to  the  vice-presidency,  exercised  in  fact 
a  controlling  authority.  When  these  two  great  powers 
agreed  they  had  their  own  way ;  when  they  disagreed, 
which  often  happened,  the  opinion  of  Austria  usually 
prevailed. 

The  wars  of  Napoleon  did  a  great  deal  more  for 
Failure  of  Germany  than  to  suppress  petty  principal- 
attemptfto1  ities  and  give  rise  to  a  clumsy  confederation. 
ma'nyin61  They  awakened  a  sentiment  of  German  na- 
tionality. At  first  this  was  only  a  sentiment, 
and  for  a  long  period  it  had  no  practical  results.  It 
was  especially  strong  among  the  Liberals,  and  grew 
stronger  as  time  went  on  ;  but  under  the  reaction  that 
followed  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  the  Liberals  had 
little  influence,  until  the  convulsions  of  1848  and  1849 
brought  them  to  the  front.  At  this  time  they  tried 
hard  to  bring  about  a  national  union  of  Germany,  but 
they  were  sadly  hampered  by  their  theoretical  views 
and  their  want  of  political  experience.  Their  aim  was 
a  German  state  constructed  on  an  ideal  model,  and 
they  lacked  the  quality  which  is  essential  to  real  states- 
manship,—  the  power  to  distinguish  the  elements  in 
the  existing  order  of  things  which  have  a  solid  basis, 
to  seize  upon  these,  and  adapt  them  to  the  end  in  view. 
Hence  their  efforts  expended  themselves  in  declamation 
and  academic  discussion,  and  came  to  nothing.  In 
May,  1848,  they  succeeded   in    bringing    together   at 


LIBERAL  MOVEMENTS   OF  1848.  237 

Frankfort  a  National  German  Parliament  elected  by 
universal  suffrage,  and  if  this  body  had  proposed 
quickly  any  rational  plan  for  a  union  of  Germany,  the 
chances  of  its  adoption  would  have  been  very  good, 
for  every  government  in  the  country  had  been  forced 
to  give  way  before  the  fierce  onslaught  of  the  Liberal 
movement.  But  unfortunately  more  than  four  months 
of  precious  time  were  consumed  in  debating  the  pri- 
mary rights  of  the  citizen,  and  when  these  were  finally 
disposed  of  the  tide  was  beginning  to  ebb.  At  last, 
in  March,  1849,  a  constitution  was  agreed  upon,  and 
the  imperial  crown  was  tendered  to  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia ;  but  the  offer  came  too  late.  Had  it  been  made 
in  the  preceding  summer  it  might  have  been  accepted, 
but  now  the  revolution  had  spent  its  force.  Austria, 
at  first  paralyzed  by  insurrection,  had  now  recovered 
from  the  shock,  was  rapidly  putting  down  her  rebel- 
lious subjects,  and  under  the  able  leadership  of  Prince 
Schwartzenberg  was  determined  to  prevent  any  re- 
organization of  Germany  which  would  diminish  her 
influence.  After  a  feeble  struggle  Prussia  yielded 
to  her  more  determined  rival,  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment came  to  an  end,  and  the  old  Confederation  was 
restored. 

Again  a  period  of  reaction  set  in,  which  lasted  about 
ten  years,  when  Germany  was  thrilled  by  the 

15  is  mire  k 

events  in   Italy,  and  the  Liberals  again  be- 
came  powerful.     Whether   they  would   have  avoided 
their  former   mistakes  and   succeeded  better  it  is  im- 
possible to  say,  for  just  at  this  time  there  appeared 
upon  the  scene  a  man  who  was  destined  to  stamp  his 


238  GERMANY. 

will  on  Germany,  and  change  the  whole  face  of  Euro- 
pean politics.  That  man  was  Count  Bismarck.  He 
belonged  to  the  lesser  Prussian  nobility,  which  is  the 
most  conservative  class  in  the  race ;  but  he  was  of  far 
too  large  a  calibre  to  be  bound  down  by  traditional 
prejudices;  and  indeed  he  had  already  formed  very 
decided  opinions  of  his  own  on  the  subject  of  German 
unity.  He  had  served  as  a  representative  of  Prussia 
at  the  Diet,  and  had  learned  that  a  German  nation 
was  impossible  so  long  as  the  two  great  powers  — 
Austria  and  Prussia  —  were  contending  for  a  mas- 
tery. He  saw  that  the  first  step  must  be  the  forcible 
expulsion  of  Austria  from  all  share  in  German  politics, 
and  he  believed  that  union  could  never  be  brought 
about  by  argument,  that  the  Germans  could  not  be 
persuaded,  but  must  be  compelled  to  unite,  that  the 
work  must  be  done,  as  he  expressed  it,  by  blood  and 
iron. 

An  important  advance  towards  closer  relations  be- 
tween the  States  had,  indeed,  been  made  long  ago  by 
the  creation  of  the  ZoUverehi  or  customs  union. 
This  had  been  founded  by  Prussia  in  the  early  part 
of  the  century,  and  had  gradually  been  extended  until 
it  included  almost  all  the  German  States,  except  Aus- 
tria, which  had  been  jealously  excluded  by  the  Prus- 
sian statesmen ;  but  valuable  as  the  Zollverein  was 
in  teaching  the  people  their  common  interests,  Bis- 
marck was  no  doubt  right  in  thinking  that  no  further 
progress  could  be  expected  without  the  use  of  force. 
Now  it  was  precisely  on  this  point  that  his  methods 
differed  from  those  of  the  Liberals,  for  war  formed  no 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  WAR  OF  1866.  239 

part  of  their  programme,  and  for  that  very  reason  they 
were  unable  to  understand  his  policy.  In 
1859  they  had  obtained  a  majority  in  the  tutionai  con- 
lower  house  of  the  Prussian  Parliament,  and 
had  very  soon  become  involved  in  a  quarrel  with  King 
William  over  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  on  which 
he  had  set  his  heart.1  In  1862  the  King  turned  to 
Bismarck  and  made  him  the  President  of  the  Council. 
Bismarck  submitted  to  the  chamber  a  budget  contain- 
ing the  appropriations  for  the  military  changes,  and 
when  the  chamber  refused  to  pass  it  he  withdrew  it, 
and  governed  without  any  budget  at  all.  This  he  was 
enabled  to  do,  because  the  taxes  were  collected  under 
standing  laws  which  required  no  reenactment,  and  in 
fact  could  not  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  the 
crown ;  and  because  a  doctrine  was  developed  that  in 
case  the  King  and  the  two  houses  were  unable  to 
agree  upon  appropriations,  the  King  was  entitled  to 
make  all  those  expenditures  which  were  necessary  in 
order  to  carry  on  the  government  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  regulating  the  various  branches  of  the  admin- 
istration.2 The  Liberals  were  furious  at  this  budget- 
less  rule,  but  Bismarck  proceeded  in  spite  of  them. 
He  persuaded  Austria  to  join  Prussia  in  wresting  the 
duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  from  Denmark  in 
1864,  and  then  contrived  to  quarrel  with  her  about 
the  disposition  to  be  made  of  them.  The  majority  in 
the  German  Diet  sided  with  Austria,  and  ordered  the 

1  William   became  Regent  on  Oct.   7,  1858,  and  on  the  death  of  his 
brother  Frederick  William  IV.,  on  January  2,  1861,  he  became  King. 
a  See  page  298,  infra. 


240  GERMANY. 

troops  of  the  Confederation  mobilized  against  Prussia. 
m  c    Then    followed   the    war    of    1866,  and   the 

The  war  01 

1866.  crushing  defeat  of  Austria  and  the  smaller 

German  States  that  took  her  part. 

Bismarck  had  originally  intended  to  compel  all  the 
Prussian  States  except  Austria  to  form  a  federal  union, 
andetXheions  but  tne  intervention  of  Napoleon  III.  forced 
Scorfed-  him  to  abandon  the  plan,  and  limit  the  Con- 
eration.  federation  to  the  country  north  of  the  river 
Main.1  He  therefore  determined  as  a  compensation  to 
increase  the  direct  strength  of  Prussia  by  annexing  the 
States  that  had  fought  against  her.2  Hanover,  Electo- 
ral Hesse,3  Nassau,  and  Frankfort,  besides  Schles- 
wig-Holstein,  were  accordingly  incorporated  in  Prussia, 
while  with  the  other  States  north  of  the  Main  a  new  fed- 
eral union  was  formed  under  the  name  of  the  North 
German  Confederation.4  This  had  for  its  president 
the  Prussian  King ;  and  for  its  legislature  two  cham- 
bers, —  one  the  Reichstag,  a  popular  assembly  elected 
by  universal  suffrage,  and  the  other  the  Bundesrath, 
or   federal  council,  which  was   copied   from   the   old 

1  Luxemburg  and  Limburg,  which  belonged  to  Holland,  had  been  a 
part  of  the  old  Confederation,  but  were  allowed  to  drop  out  at  this  time, 
and  were  not  included  in  the  reorganization  of  Germany.  This  was  true 
also  of  the  tiny  principality  of  Lichtenstein  in  the  south. 

2  Von  Sybel,  Begriindung  des  Deutschen  Eeiches,  book  xix.  ch.  ii. 

3  Also  called  Hesse-Cassel  to  distinguish  it  from  Hesse-Darmstadt  or 
grand-ducal  Hesse,  which,  being  the  only  Hesse  remaining  in  existence 
as  a  separate  State,  is  hereinafter  called  simply  Hesse. 

4  The  constitution  of  the  Confederation  was  first  agreed  upon  by  the 
governments  of  the  several  States,  then  accepted  with  slight  modifica- 
tions by  a  National  Assembly  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  finally  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of  the  States. 


THE   NORTH  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION.  241 

Diet,  and  composed  in  the  same  way  of  the  plenipo- 
tentiaries of  the  different  States,  but  was  endowed 
with  peculiar  and  extensive  powers.  Austria  was  ex- 
cluded from  all  participation  in  German  politics ;  while 
the  four  States  south  of  the  Main  —  Bavaria,  Wurtem- 
berg,  Baden,  and  Hesse1  —  were  left  free  to  join  the 
North  German  Confederation,  or  to  form  a  southern 
union  among  themselves.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
made  offensive  and  defensive  alliances  with  the  Con- 
federation, and  formed  with  it  a  Zollverein  or  customs 
union,  whose  organs  were  the  two  chambers  of  the 
Confederation  reinforced  by  representatives  from  the 
southern  States.  Every  one  felt  that  the  union  of 
Germany  was  incomplete  so  long  as  these  States  were 
not  a  part  of  it ;  but  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg  were 
reluctant  to  surrender  their  independence ;  and  the 
enthusiasm  aroused  by  the  war  with  France  in  1870 
was  required  to  raise  the  sentiment  for  German 
nationality  to  such  a  pitch  as  to  sweep  them  into  line. 
Even  then  they  demanded  and  obtained  special  privi- 
leges as  the  price  of  their  adhesion ;  but  at  last  all 
the  difficulties  were  arranged,  and  in  the  autumn  of 
1870  treaties  were  made  with  the  four  southern  States 
whereby  they  joined  the  union.  The  name  of  the 
Confederation  was  changed  at  the  same  time  to  that 
of  "German  Empire,"  the  president  being  The  German 
given  the  title  of  Emperor  ;  and  in  the  course  EmPire- 
of   the   following    winter   the    changes  and   additions 

1  This  is  Hesse-Darmstadt.  It  lay  on  both  sides  of  the  Main,  but 
the  part  on  the  north  of  that  river  was  already  included  in  the  North 
German  Confederation. 

VOL.    I 


242  GERMANY. 

entailed  by  these  treaties  were  embodied  in  a  new  draft 
of  the  constitution.1 

The  constitution  has  nothing  about  it  that  is  abstract 
tieai  01>  ideal.  I*  was  drawn  up  by  a  man  of 
thTcorati-of  affairs  wno  knew  precisely  what  he  wanted, 
tution.  an(j  understood  very  well  the  limitations  im- 

posed upon  him,  and  the  concessions  he  was  obliged  to 
make  to  the  existing  order  of  things.  His  prime  object 
was  to  create  a  powerful  military  state,  and  hence,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  the  articles  on  most  subjects  are 
comparatively  meagre,  but  those  on  the  army,  the  navy, 
and  the  revenue  are  drawn  up  with  a  minuteness 
befitting  the  by-laws  of  a  commercial  company.2 

Before  proceeding  to  a  description  of  the  organs  of 

1  Cf.  Laband,  Deutsches  Staatsrecht,  2d  ed.  ch.  i.  In  1873  three 
amendments  were  made  in  this  instrument.  The  first  (that  of  Feb.  25) 
abolished  the  provision  limiting  the  right  to  vote  in  the  Reichstag,  on 
those  matters  which  by  the  constitution  are  not  common  to  the  whole 
Empire,  to  the  representatives  of  the  States  affected.  The  second 
(that  of  March  3)  put  the  lighthouses,  buoys,  etc.,  along  the  coast  under 
the  control  of  the  federal  government  ;  and  the  third  (that  of  Dec.  20) 
extended  the  legislative  power  of  the  Empire  over  the  whole  field  of  civil 
and  criminal  law.  It  had  previously  covered  contracts,  commercial  law, 
and  criminal  law.  Except  for  a  change  in  the  term  of  the  Reichstag  in 
1888  from  three  to  five  years,  the  constitution  has  remained  unaltered 
since  that  time,  but  substantial  changes  in  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
Empire  have  been  made  without  a  formal  modification  of  the  text. 
(See  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  48-49,  51.)  Some  of  the  German  jurists  main- 
tain that  such  a  practice  is  wrong  (von  Ronne,  Staatsrecht  des  Deutschen 
Reiches,  2d  ed.  pp.  31-34;  Meyer,  Lehrbuch  des  Deutschen  Staatsrechts, 
p.  416) ;  others  that  it  is  quite  proper,  provided  the  majority  required  in 
the  Bundesrath  for  a  formal  amendment  of  the  constitution  is  in  fact 
obtained.  (Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  545-49;  Arndt,  Verfassung  des  Deutschen 
Reiches,  pp.  290-91.)  For  the  method  of  amending  the  constitution,  see 
pages  246,  250-51,  infra. 

2  Lebon,  Etudes  sur  V Allemagne  Politique,  Introd.,  p.  iii. 


THE  IMPERIAL  CONSTITUTION.  243 

the  state,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  examine  the  nature 
of  the  Confederation.  We  are  in  the  habit  of 
speaking  of  the  German  Empire  as  a  federal  the  Confed- 
government,  and  rightly  ;  but  we  must  bear 
in  mind  that  it  departs  essentially  from  the  type  which 
we  commonly  associate  with  that  term,  and  which  is 
embodied  in  our  own  constitution.     We  con-   T       ,   . 

.Large  legis- 

ceive  of  a  federal  system  as  one  in  which  there  lati^f  and 

J  small  exeeu- 

is  a  division  of  powers  between  the  central  tlveP°wers- 
government  and  the  States,  according  to  subjects,  so 
that  in  those  matters  which  fall  within  the  sphere  of 
federal  control  the  central  government  not  only  makes 
the  laws,  but  executes  them  by  means  of  its  own 
officials.  Thus  Congress  enacts  a  tariff ;  the  United 
States  custom  house  collects  the  duties ;  and  the  fed- 
eral courts  decide  the  questions  that  arise  under  the 
law.  But  all  this  is  very  different  in  Germany.  There 
the  legislative  power  of  the  central  government  is  far 
more  extensive  than  in  this  country,  for  it  includes 
almost  everything  that  is  placed  under  the  control  of 
Congress  and  many  other  matters  besides.  In  addition 
to  such  subjects  as  customs  duties  and  taxes,  the  army 
and  navy,  the  consular  service,  and  the  protection  of 
foreign  commerce,  which  are  obviously  essential,  the 
list  comprises  many  matters  of  domestic  legislation.  It 
covers  not  only  the  posts  and  telegraphs,1  transporta- 
tion on  streams  running  through  more  than  one  State, 
and  extraditions  between  the  States,  but  also  in  general 
terms  railroads,'2  roads  and  canals,  citizenship,   travel, 

1  Except  in  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg. 

2  Except  in  Bavaria. 


244  GERMANY. 

change  of  residence,  and  the  carrying  on  of  trades, 
also  the  regulation  of  weights  and  measures,  of  coinage 
and  paper  money,  and  of  banking,  patents,  copyrights, 
and  of  medical  and  veterinary  police.  Moreover,  it 
includes  the  regulation  of  the  press  and  associations, 
and  finally  the  whole  domain  of  ordinary  civil  and 
criminal  law  and  of  judicial  proceedings.  All  these 
things  are  declared  subject  to  imperial  legislation  and 
supervision.1 

The  administrative  power  of  the  Empire,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  very  small,  the  federal  laws  being  carried  out 
in  the  main  by  the  officers  of  the  States  as  under  the 
Confederation  of  1815.  Except,  indeed,  for  foreign 
affairs,  the  navy,  and  to  some  extent  the  army  and  the 
postal  and  telegraphic  service,  the  executive  functions 
of  the  Empire  are  limited  for  the  most  part  to  the 
laying  down  of  general  regulations,  and  a  supervision 
of  their  execution  by  the  several  States.2  Thus  the 
federal  government  can  enact  a  tariff,  make  regula- 
tions which  shall  govern  the  custom-house  officers,  and 
appoint  inspectors  to  see  that  they  are  carried  out ;  but 
the  duties  are  actually  collected  by  state  officials.3     One 

1  Art.  4  of  the  constitution  and  the  amendment  of  Dec.  20,  1873. 

2  See  Laband,  §  66.  In  the  case  of  the  army  (Const.  Arts.  63-66)  and 
the  posts  and  telegraphs  (Art.  50),  the  highest  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  Emperor,  who  gives  them  their  orders,  while  the  subordinates  are 
appointed  by  the  States. 

3  As  a  rule  the  whole  net  revenue  flows  into  the  imperial  treasury,  but 
by  the  tariff  act  of  1879  the  net  revenue  from  customs  duties  above  one 
hundred  and  thirty  million  marks  is  divided  among  the  States  in  propor- 
tion to  their  population.  In  case  the  receipts  of  the  Empire  are  not  equal 
to  its  expenses,  the  deficiency  is  covered  by  means  of  contributions  called 
Matricularbeitrage  assessed  on  the  different  States  in  proportion  to  their 


NATURE  OF  THE  FEDERAL   UNION.  245 

naturally  asks  what  happens  if  a  State  refuses  or  fails 
to  carry  out  a  federal  law.  The  matter  is  reported  to 
the  Bundesrath,  which  decides  any  controversy  about 
the  interpretation  of  the  law.1  But  suppose  the  State 
persists  in  its  refusal  to  administer  the  law,  what  can 
the  federal  government  do  ?  It  cannot  give  effect  to 
the  law  itself,  nor  has  it  any  officials  for  the  purpose. 
Its  only  resource  is  federal  execution,  —  that  is,  an 
armed  attack  on  the  delinquent  State,  —  which  can  be 
ordered  by  the  Bundesrath,  and  is  carried  out  by  the 
Emperor.2  This  last  resort  has  never  been  used,  nor  is 
it  likely  to  be,  because  the  Emperor  is  also  the  King  of 
Prussia,  and  Prussia  alone  is  not  only  larger  than  any 
other  State,  but  larger  than  all  the  rest  put  together. 
Execution  against  Prussia  is  therefore  doubly  out  of 
the  question ;  and  any  other  State  would  be  so  easily 
overpowered  that  it  is  certain  to  submit,  rather  than 
provoke  an  appeal  to  force. 

Another  conception  that  we  associate  with  federal 
government  is  an  equality  of  rights  among  the  mem- 
population.  (Const.  Art.  70,  and  see  Laband,  §  126.)  This  was  originally 
intended  to  be  a  subsidiary  and  exceptional  source  of  revenue,  but  owing 
to  the  quarrel  between  Bismarck  and  the  Reichstag  on  the  subject  of 
federal  taxation,  the  Matricularbeitrage  became  large  and  permanent. 
(Cf.  Lebon,  Allemagne,  p.  106  et  seq.)  Under  the  present  system  the 
excess  of  customs  duties  is  paid  to  the  States,  and  returned  by  them  as 
contributions,  —  a  practice  established  in  order  to  preserve  the  control  of 
the  Reichstag  over  the  imperial  revenues,  for  the  assessments  upon  the 
States  require  a  vote  of  that  body,  whereas  the  customs  duties  once  voted 
can  be  collected  without  further  authorization,  and  the  tariff  cannot  be 
repealed  without  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath,  which  for  this  purpose 
is  entirely  subject  to  the  will  of  the  Emperor.     See  page  249,  infra. 

1  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3. 

2  Const.  Art.  19,  and  see  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  105-6. 


246  GERMANY. 

hers.  But  in  the  German  Empire  all  is  inequality.  It 
ine  uaiity  would,  indeed,  have  been  impossible  to  make 
amon^the  a  federation  on  really  equal  terms  between 
members.  a  numker  0f  States,  one  of  which  contained 
three  fifths  of  the  total  population,  while  the  other 
twenty-four  contained  altogether  only  two  fifths.  The 
compact  could  not  fail  to  resemble  that  between  the 
lion  and  the  fox,  or  rather  a  compact  between  a  lion, 
Privileges  of  na^  a  dozen  foxes,  and  a  score  of  mice.  The 
Prussia.  larger  States  are  accorded  all  sorts  of  privi- 
leges, and  so  much  of  the  lion's  share  of  these  falls  to 
Prussia  that  it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  she  rules 
Germany  with  the  advice  and  assistance  of  the  other 
States.  In  the  first  place  she  has  a  perpetual  right  to 
have  her  King  the  Emperor  of  Germany.1  Secondly, 
amendments  to   the   constitution  —  although 

Under  the  .    .  1  1 .  . 

constitu-  requiring  only  an  ordinary  majority  vote  in 
the  Reichstag  —  are  defeated  in  the  Bundes- 
rath  if  fourteen  negative  votes  are  thrown  against  them, 
and  as  Prussia  has  seventeen  votes  in  that  body,  she 
has  an  absolute  veto  on  all  changes  of  the  constitution.2 
Besides  this,  it  is  expressly  provided  that  in  the  case  of 
all  bills  relating  to  the  army,  the  navy,  the  customs 

1  Const.  Art.  11. 

2  Const.  Art.  78.  In  the  North  German  Confederation  a  two  thirds 
vote  in  the  Bundesrath  was  necessary  for  a  change  in  the  constitution, 
but  when  the  South  German  States  were  admitted,  Prussia  had  no  longer 
a  third  of  the  delegates,  and  in  order  to  preserve  her  veto  the  proportion 
required  was  increased  to  three  quarters.  Finally  at  the  instance  of 
Bavaria,  which  wanted  to  enlarge  the  power  of  the  States  of  the  second 
size,  it  was  agreed  that  fourteen  negative  votes  should  be  enough  to 
defeat  an  amendment  to  the  constitution.  Arndt,  p.  290;  Robinson, 
The  German  Bundesrath,  p.  40. 


PRIVILEGES  OF  PRUSSIA.  247 

duties,  or  the  excises,  and  in  the  case  of  all  proposals 
to  revise  the  administrative  regulations  for  collecting 
the  revenue,  the  vote  of  Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath  is 
decisive  if  cast  in  favor  of  maintaining  the  existing 
institutions.1  In  other  words,  Prussia  has  a  veto  on  all 
measures  for  making  changes  in  the  army,  the  navy, 
or  the  taxes.  She  has  also  the  casting  vote  in  case  of  a 
tie  in  the  Bundesrath,2  and  the  chairmanship  of  all  the 
standing  committees  of  that  body.3 

These  are  Prussia's  constitutional  privileges  ;  but  she 
has  others  obtained  by  private  agreement  with 
her  smaller  partners ;  for  the  several  States  are  cjai  conven- 

...  ..  .  ...       tions  with 

at  liberty  to  make  conventions  or  treaties  with  the  other 

i         i  •  i  re    •  -        States. 

each  other  in  regard  to  the  affairs  that  remain 
subject  to  their  control.4     When  the  North  German 
Confederation  was  formed,  universal  military 
service  and  a  uniform  organization  like  that 
of  Prussia  were  introduced  into  all  the  States,  but  the 
army  was  not  made  exclusively  a  national  or  left  en- 
tirely a    state  institution.5     The  constitution   provides 
that  the  military  laws  shall  be  made  by  the  Empire,6  and 

1  Const.  Arts.  5,  35,  and  37.  2  Const.  Art.  7. 

8  Const.  Art.  8  ;  Laband,  vol  i.  p.  264.  Except  the  committee  on 
foreign  affairs,  where,  as  will  be  explained  hereafter,  it  would  be  of  no 
use  to  her. 

4  Laband,  §  63.  To  some  extent  the  States  are  at  liberty  to  make 
separate  conventions  with  foreign  powers,  and  they  have  a  right  to  send 
their  own  representatives  to  foreign  courts.     Laband,  §  71. 

6  Const.  Arts.  57-68.  The  last  eight  of  these  articles  do  not  apply  to 
Bavaria,  and  only  partially  to  Wurtemberg.  See  page  250,  infra.  The 
expense  of  maintaining  the  army  is  borne  by  the  Empire.  Unlike  the 
army,  the  navy  is  a  purely  national  institution.     Art.  53. 

6  The  double  position  of  the  Prussian  monarch  comes  out  curiously 
here,  for  the  constitution  provides  :  first,  that  the  mibtary  laws  and  regu- 


248  GERMANY. 

declares  that  the  forces  of  the  country  shall  be  a  single 
army  under  the  command  of  the  Emperor,  whose  orders 
they  are  bound  to  obey.  It  gives  him  a  right  to  inspect 
and  dispose  of  the  troops,  and  to  appoint  all  officers 
whose  command  includes  the  entire  contingent  of  a 
State.  It  provides  also  that  the  selection  of  the  gen- 
erals shall  be  subject  to  his  approval,  but  it  leaves  to 
the  States  the  appointment  of  all  inferior  officers,  and 
the  management  of  their  troops  in  other  respects.  Now 
these  reserved  rights  were  of  little  value,  and  all  but 
three  of  the  States  transferred  them  to  Prussia,  chiefly 
in  consideration  of  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
Emperor  not  to  remove  the  troops  from  their  own  ter- 
ritory except  in  case  of  actual  necessity.  Thus  the 
contingents  of  these  States  are  recruited,  drilled,  and 
commanded  by  Prussia,  and  form,  in  short,  an  integral 
part  of  her  army.1 

A  number  of  conventions  of  a  similiar  character,  af- 
fecting other  public  matters,  such  as  the  pos- 

Convention  -  .  ,     ,  .     ..  pi 

with  Wai-      tal  service  and  the  lunsdiction  ot  the  courts, 

deck.  J  ' 

have  been  concluded  between  the  States ;  but 

lations  of  Prussia  shall  be  in  force  throughout  the  Empire  ;  second,  that 
thereafter  a  comprehensive  imperial  military  law  shall  be  enacted; 
and  third  that  any  future  general  orders  of  the  Prussian  army  shall 
be  communicated  by  the  military  committee  of  the  Bundesrath  to  the 
commanders  of  the  other  contingents  for  appropriate  imitation. 

1  Some  of  the  States  transferred  all  their  rights  (Baden  with  a  pro- 
vision that  her  troops  should  form  a  separate  corps)  ;  others  retaiued 
certain  rights,  mainly  of  an  honorary  nature,  but  agreed  that  their 
troops  should  be  united  with  the  Prussian  army,  and  that  Prussia  should 
appoint  the  officers.  Only  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wurtemberg  still  exer- 
cise the  military  functions  reserved  to  them  by  the  constitution.  Cf. 
Laband,  §  94,  iii. ;  Schulze,  Lehrbuch  des  Deutschen  Staatsrechts,  §  335; 
Meyer,  Lehrbuch,  §  197. 


PRIVILEGES  OF  PRUSSIA.  249 

the  most  comprehensive  compact  of  all  was  made  by 
Waldeck.  The  ruler  of  this  little  principality  was 
crippled  with  debts,  and  unable  to  raise  the  money 
required  for  the  reorganization  of  his  army.  So  he 
sold  his  governmental  rights  as  a  whole  to  the  King 
of  Prussia,  retired  from  business,  and  went  to  Italy 
to  live  upon  his  income,  while  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment, having  bought  the  good-will  of  his  trade,  pro- 
ceeded to  carry  it  on  as  his  successor.1  There  is  some- 
thing decidedly  comical  in  treating  the  right  to  govern 
a  community  as  a  marketable  commodity,  to  be  bought 
and  sold  for  cash;  but  to  Bismarck  the  matter  pre- 
sented itself  as  a  perfectly  natural  business  transac- 
tion, and  in  fact  the  contract  bears  a  strong  resem- 
blance to  the  lease  of  a  small  American  railroad  to  a 
larger  one. 

Such  are  the  special  privileges  of  Prussia.     Those 
reserved  to  the  other  States  are  far  less  exten- 

.         .  ,  -,     Privileges 

sive.       By   the    constitution    Hamburg    and  of  the  other 
Bremen  had  a  right  to  remain  free  ports,  out- 
side of  the  operation  of  the  tariff  laws ; 2  but  and  Bre- 
both  of  them  have  now  surrendered  this  privi- 
lege.3    The  other  special  rights  are  mostly  enjoyed  by 
the  southern  States,  and  were  given  to  them  as  an  in- 
ducement to  join  the  Confederation.     Thus    Bavaria, 

1  Cf.  p.  353,  infra. 

2  Const.  Art.  34. 

3  The  treaty  for  this  purpose  was  made  with  Hamburg  in  1881,  and 
went  into  effect  Oct.  1,  1888.  That  with  Bremen  was  made  in  1885. 
For  an  account  of  these  treaties  and  the  way  they  were  brought  about, 
see  Blum,  Das  Deutsche  Reich  zur  Zeit  Bismarck's,  p.  360  et  seq.  j  Laband, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  901-4. 


250  GERMANY. 

Wurtemberg,  and  Baden  are  exempt  from  imperial  ex- 
Bavaria  c*ses  on  brandy  an(l  beer,  and  have  a  right 
blurtand  *o  ^ay  excises  °f  their  own  on  these  articles.1 
Baden.  Bavaria    and   Wurtemberg    have    their    own 

postal  and  telegraph  services,  which  are  subject  only  to 
general  imperial  laws.2  Except  for  the  principle  of 
universal  military  service,  and  the  agreement  to  con- 
form to  the  general  organization  of  the  imperial  army, 
Bavaria  has  in  time  of  peace  the  entire  charge  of  her 
own  troops,  the  Emperor  having  only  a  right  to  inspect 
them ;  while  Wurtemberg,  although  not  so  much  fa- 
vored as  this,  has  greater  military  privileges  than  the 
remaining  States.3  Bavaria  is  further  exempt  from 
imperial  legislation  in  regard  to  railroads,4  and  to  resi- 
dence and  settlement;5  and  finally,  by  the  constitu- 
tion or  by  military  convention,  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and 
Wurtemberg  have  a  right  to  seats  on  the  committees 
of  the  Bundesrath  on  foreign  affairs  and  on  the  army 
and  fortresses.6  In  order  to  guarantee  more  effectually 
these  privileges,  it  is  provided  that  they  shall  not  be 


1  Const.  Art.  35.  But  in  1887  they  gave  up  their  privileges  in  regard 
to  brandy.     See  Blum,  p.  532  ;  Laband,  vol.  ii.  pp.  920,  923-24. 

2  Const.  Art.  52. 

8  Treaties  of  Nov.  23,  1870,  with  Bavaria ;  and  Nov.  25,  1870,  with 
Wurtemberg  ;  incorporated  in  the  constitution  by  a  reference  in  the  Ap- 
pendix to  Part  XI. 

4  Except  in  the  case  of  lines  that  have  a  strategic  importance.  Const. 
Art.  46. 

5  Const.  Art.  4,  §  1. 

6  Const.  Art.  8  ;  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  113.  By  the  treaty  of  Nov.  23, 
1870  (Schlussprotokoll,  Art.  ix.),  Bavaria  has  a  right  to  preside  over  the 
Bundesrath  in  the  absence  of  Prussia,  but  as  this  never  happens,  the  privi- 
lege is  merely  honorary. 


PRIVILEGES   OF   THE  SMALLER  STATES.  251 

changed  without  the  consent  of  the  State  entitled  to 
them.1 

From  this  description  of  the  privileges  of  the  differ- 
ent States  it  is  evident  that  the  German  Em- 
pire is  very  far  from  being  a  federal  union  of  a conthm™ 
the  kind  with  which  we  are  familiar.     It  is  oidConfed- 
rather  a  continuation   of   the   old   Germanic  modified1  a 
Confederation,    with   the    centre    of    gravity 
shifted  from  the  States  to  the  central  government,  and 
the   preponderating    power    placed    in    the   hands    of 
Prussia,  —  the   other   large   States    retaining 
privileges  roughly  in  proportion  to  their  size.2 


1  Const.  Art.  78.  Meyer  (Lehrbuch,  p.  421)  and  Zorn  (Staatsrecht 
des  Deulschen  Reiches,  pp.  88-93)  think  this  provision  applies  only  to  the 
limitations  on  the  competence  of  the  Empire,  aud  not  to  the  privileges 
given  to  the  several  States  in  the  organization  of  the  government,  such 
as  the  presidential  rights  of  Prussia,  the  allotment  of  the  votes  in  the 
Bundesrath,  the  seats  on  committees,  etc.  Their  opinion,  however,  is 
not  generally  accepted.  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  110-14  ;  Schulze,  §  249  ; 
v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii.  pp.  43-48.  It  is  universally  agreed  that  an  affirmative 
vote  in  the  Bundesrath  by  the  delegate  of  the  State  is  a  sufficient  consent 
by  that  State  to  a  law  affecting  its  privileges  so  far  as  the  Empire  is 
concerned  ;  but  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  on  the  question  how  far 
the  ruler  of  the  State  is  bound,  or  can  be  bound,  by  state  law  to  consult 
his  parliament.  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  114-17  ;  Schulze,  bk.  ii.  p.  19  ; 
v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii.  pp.  36-43  ;  Meyer,  p.  422  ;  Zorn,  pp.  94-98. 

2  In  saying  this  I  am  speaking  only  of  the  political  structure  of  the 
government,  and  do  not  mean  to  touch  the  philosophical  question  whether 
the  sovereignty  has  or  has  not  been  transferred  from  the  States  to  the 
Empire.  This  point  has  been  the  subject  of  elaborate  argument,  and  in 
fact  the  same  juristic  questions  about  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  fed- 
eral government  have  been  discussed  in  Germany  as  in  the  United 
States,  (For  a  reference  to  these  discussions  see  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  30- 
33,  52  et  seq.,  and  see  especially  Jellinek,  Die  Lehre  von  den  Staatenver- 
bindungen.)  Some  of  the  German  publicists  maintain  that  the  sovereignty 
resides  in  the  Bundesrath,  a  view  which,  as  Burgess  points  out  in  his 


I 


252  GERMANY. 

Its  chief  organ  of  government  is  still  the  old  Diet,  re- 
named the  Bundesrath  or  Federal  Council,  to  which 
have  been  added  on  one  side  an  Emperor,  who  is  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  forces,  and  represents  the  Em- 
pire in  its  relation  with  foreign  powers ;  and,  on  the 
other,  an  elected  chamber,  called  the  Reichstag,  created 
for  the  sake  of  stimulating  national  sentiment  and 
enlisting  popular  support  as  against  the  local  and  dy- 
nastic influences  which  have  free  play  in  the  Bundes- 
rath.    Let  us  consider  each  of  these  organs  in  detail. 

The  Reichstag  is  elected   for   five  years   by    direct 
The  universal    suffrage    and   secret  ballot.1      The 

Reichstag,  voters  must  be  twentyrfive  years  old,  and  not 
in  active  military  service,  paupers,  or  otherwise  disquali- 
itscompo-  fied.2  The  members  are  chosen  in  single  elec- 
sition.  toral  districts  fixed  by  imperial  law.3     These 

had  originally  a  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  apiece,4 
but  they  have  not  been  revised  for  more  than  a  score 
of  years,  and  with  the  growth  of  the  large  cities  have 
gradually  become  very  unequal.  In  the  case  of  Berlin 
the  disproportion  is  enormous,  for  the  city  has  now 
over  a  million  and  a  half  inhabitants,  but  is  still  rep- 

Political  Science  (vol.  ii.  pp.  90-93)  is  somewhat  artificial.  For  those  who 
think  as  I  do,  that  sovereignty  is  not  in  its  nature  indivisible,  the  question 
loses  much  of  its  importance.  (Cf.  Essays  on  Government,  chapter  on  the 
Limits  of  Sovereignty.) 

1  Cf.  Laband,  §  34 ;  Const.  Arts.  20,  24.  Until  1888  the  period  was 
three  years. 

2  Wahlgesetz,  May  31,  1869,  §§  1-3.  Every  voter  who  has  been  a 
citizen  of  any  State  for  a  year  is  eligible  in  any  district  in  the  Empire 
without  regard  to  residence.  Soldiers  in  active  service,  though  not  al- 
lowed to  vote,  are  eligible.     {Id.,  §  4.) 

8  Wahlgesetz,  §  6.  4  Except  in  the  smallest  States. 


THE   REICHSTAG.  253 

resented  by  only  six  members.  The  government,  how- 
ever, is  not  anxious  for  a  redistribution  of  seats,  be- 
cause Berlin  elects  Radicals  and  Socialists,  who  form 
a  troublesome  opposition,  —  a  tendency  which  is  also 
true  of  other  large  centres.  As  in  the  United  States, 
no  district  can  be  composed  of  parts  of  different  States, 
so  that  every  State,  however  small,  elects  at  least  one 
representative.  The  three  hundred  and  ninety-seven 
seats  are  in  fact  distributed  as  follows  :  Prussia  has 
two  hundred  and  thirty-five,  or  about  three  fifths  of 
the  whole  number,  Bavaria  forty-eight,  Saxony  twenty- 
three,  Wurtemberg  seventeen,  Alsace-Lorraine  fifteen, 
Baden  fourteen,  Hesse  nine,  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  six, 
Saxe-Weimar  three,  Oldenburg  three,  Brunswick  three, 
Hamburg  three,  Saxe-Meiningen  two,  Saxe-Coburg- 
Gotha  two,  Anhalt  two,  and  all  the  rest  one  each.1  As 
regards  the  method  of  election  the  system  of  ballotage 
prevails ;  that  is,  an  absolute  majority  is  required  for 
election  on  the  first  ballot,  and  if  no  one  obtains  this, 
a  second  ballot  takes  place  which  is  confined  to  the 
two  candidates  who  have  received  the  largest  number 
of  votes.2 

Universal  suffrage  was  looked  upon  as  an   experi- 
ment of  a  somewhat  hazardous  character,  and  paymentof 
Bismarck  insisted  on  the  non-payment  of  the  members- 
members  of  the  Reichstag  as  a  safeguard.3     This  has 

1  Wahlgesetz,  §  5  ;  Const.  Art.  20  ;  Act  of  June  25,  1873  (Alsace- 
Lorraine),  §  3. 

2  Wahlgesetz,  §  12.  Lebon  (p.  82)  thinks  this  last  provision,  by  cut- 
ting out  all  the  candidates  but  the  two  highest  on  the  hst,  favors  the 
government  and  hampers  the  free  expression  of  opinion. 

8  Const.  Art.  32. 


254  GERMANY. 

been  a  bone  of  contention  with  tbe  Liberals  ever  since, 
—  the  Reichstag  having  repeatedly  passed  bills  for  the 
payment  of  members,  which  the  Bundesrath  has  inva- 
riably rejected.  The  absence  of  remuneration  has  not 
been  without  effect,  for  it  has  deterred  university  pro- 
fessors and  other  men  of  small  means,  usually  of  liberal 
views,  from  accepting  an  office  which  entails  the  expense 
of  a  long  residence  in  Berlin,  but  it  has  not  fulfilled 
the  predictions  that  were  made  either  by  its  foes  or  its 
friends,  for  it  has  not  caused  a  dearth  of  candidates, 
or  discouraged  the  presence  of  men  who  make  poli- 
tics their  occupation.1  The  provision  has,  however,  a 
meaning  one  would  hardly  suspect.  In  1885,  when 
the  Socialist  representatives  were  paid  a  salary  by  their 
own  party,  Bismarck,  claiming  that  such  a  proceeding 
was  illegal,  caused  the  treasury  to  sue  them  for  the 
sums  of  money  they  had  received  in  this  way,  and, 
strange  to  say,  the  Imperial  Court  of  Appeal  sustained 
the  suits.2  The  object  of  withholding  pay  from  the 
members  is,  of  course,  to  prevent  the  power  of  the 
poorer  classes  from  becoming  too  great ;  but  a  much 
more  effectual  means  to  the  same  end  is  the  habit  of 
holding  elections  on  working  days,  instead  of  holding 
them  on  Sundays,  as  is  done  in  France  and  most  of  the 
other  Catholic  countries.3 

1  Blum,  pp.  36-37. 

2  Laband,  §  38  ;  Lebon,  p.  78.  The  members  cannot  be  arrested  dur- 
ing the  session  except  for  certain  flagrant  offenses,  and  if  a  criminal 
prosecution  is  pending  against  one  of  them  the  Reichstag  can  order  him 
to  be  set  at  liberty  (Const.  Art.  31),  but,  in  fact,  it  has  not  always  been 
easy  to  make  this  last  right  effective.     Lebon,  pp.  84-85. 

3  Lebon,  p.  82. 


THE   REICHSTAG.  255 

The  Reichstag  has  the  ordinary  privileges  of  a  legis- 
lative assembly,  electing  its  own  president, 
making  its  own  rules,  and  deciding  upon  the  mittee  sys- 
validity  of  elections.1  Its  internal  organiza- 
tion conforms  to  the  pattern  generally  followed  in  con- 
tinental chambers.  At  the  beginning  of  each  session 
the  members  are  divided  by  lot  into  seven  Abthei- 
lungen  or  sections,  which  correspond  to  the  Bureaux 
of  the  French  Chambers,  but  differ  from  these  in  the 
important  respect  that  they  last  during  the  whole 
session,  instead  of  being  renewed  at  short  intervals. 
The  duties  of  the  sections  consist  in  making  a  prelimi- 
nary examination  of  the  validity  of  elections  to  the 
Reichstag,  and  in  the  choice  of  committees,  each  section 
electing  one  or  more  committee-men,  according  to  the 
importance  of  the  committee.2  As  in  France  and  Italy, 
however,  the  choice  by  the  sections  is  really  cut  and  dried 
beforehand.  It  is  in  fact  controlled  by  the  Senioren- 
Convent,  a  body  composed  of  the  leaders  of  the  dif- 
ferent parties,  who  determine  in  advance  the  number 
of  seats  on  the  committee  to  which  each  party  shall 
be  entitled.3  Bills  are  not  always  referred  to  a  com- 
mittee ;  but  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  more  advanced 
Liberals  have  constantly  urged  such  a  reference  in 
the  case  of  government  bills,  because  the  authoritative 
influence  of  the  ministers  is  thereby  diminished,  and 
greater  opportunity  is  given  for  criticism  and  amend- 

i  Const.  Art.  27. 

2  Laband,  vol.  ii.  pp.  327-29.     Unlike  the  French  Bureaux,  their  choice 
is  not  confined  to  members  of  their  own  section.     Lebon,  p.  88. 
8  Lebon,  lb. •  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  526  ;  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  328. 


256  GERMANY. 

ment ;  while  the  more  moderate  parties,  following  the 
lead  of  the  government,  have  often  preferred  an  imme- 
diate discussion  of  important  measures  by  the  full 
house,  without  the  intervention  of  any  committee  at  all. 
The  powers  of  the  Reichstag  appear  very  great  on 

paper.  All  laws  require  its  consent,  and  so 
of  the  do  the  budget,  all  loans,  and  all  treaties  which 

involve  matters  falling  within  the  domain  of 
legislation.  It  has  a  right  to  initiate  legislation,  to  ask 
the  government  for  reports,  and  to  express  its  opinion 
on  the  management  of  affairs.1  In  reality,  however, 
its  powers  are  not  so  great  as  they  seem.  The  consti- 
tution provides,  for  example,  that  the  budget  shall  be 
annual,2  but  the  principal  revenue  laws  are  permanent, 
and  cannot  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrath,3  while  the  most  important  appropriation, 
that  for  the  army,  is  virtually  determined  by  the  law 
fixing  the  number  of  the  troops,  and  this  has  hitherto 
been  voted  for  a  number  of  years  at  a  time.4  The 
chief  function  of  the  Reichstag  is,  in  fact,  the  consid- 
eration of  bills  prepared  by  the  Chancellor  and  the 
Bundesrath.  These  it  criticises  and  amends  pretty 
freely ;  but  its  activity  is  rather  negative  than  positive, 
and    although    important    measures    have    occasionally 

1  Const.  Arts.  5,  11,  23,  69,  73  ;  Laband,  §  33. 

2  In  1867  Bismarck  wanted  triennial  sessions,  and  in  1888,  when  the 
term  of  the  Reichstag  was  changed  to  five  years,  he  wanted  the  sessions 
held  only  every  other  year. 

8  It  is  to  be  remembered,  moreover,  that  the  bulk  of  the  civil  adminis- 
tration is  in  the  hands  of  the  States,  which  provide  the  means  of  carrying 
it  on. 

4  In  1871,  for  three  years  ;  in  1874,  1880,  and  1887  for  seven  years  ; 
and  in  1893  for  five  years. 


THE  REICHSTAG.  257 

been  passed  at  its  instigation,1  it  cannot  be  said  to 
direct  the  policy  of  the  state  either  in  legislation  or 
administration.2 

The  influence  of  the  Reichstag  is  also  diminished 
by  the  fact  that  it  can  be  dissolved  at  any  The  .  ,,  f 
time  by  the  Bundesrath  with  the  consent  of  dissolution- 
the  Emperor.3  In  most  constitutional  governments  at 
the  present  day  the  power  of  dissolution  is  the  com- 
plement of  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers,  and 
is  used,  at  least  in  theory,  to  ascertain  whether  the 
cabinet  possesses  the  confidence  of  the  nation.  But 
in  Germany  it  exists  without  any  such  responsibility, 
and  hence  is  simply  a  means  of  breaking  down  re- 
sistance in  the  Reichstag.  It  has,  indeed,  been  used 
for  this  purpose  on  three  memorable  occasions :  first, 
in  1878,  when  the  Reichstag  refused  to  pass  a  bill 
for  the  repression  of  agitation  by  the  Socialists ;  after- 
wards in  1887,  when  it  refused  to  pass  the  bill  fixing 
the  size  of  the  army  for  seven  years  ;  and  again  in  1893, 
when  it  refused  to  sanction  changes  proposed  in  the 
military  system.  In  each  case  the  new  Reichstag  sup- 
ported the  plans  of  the  government,  and  thus  a  serious 
conflict   with   the   Chancellor   was    avoided,   and   the 

1  A  striking  example  of  this  was  the  amendment  to  Art.  4  of  the  con- 
stitution extending  the  competence  of  the  Empire  to  ordinary  civil  and 
criminal  law. 

2  Cf.  Lebon,  pp.  113-16.  The  debate  in  the  budget  is  used  as  an 
occasion  for  criticism  of  the  government,  and  for  the  expression  of 
opinion,  but  in  the  budget  itself  few  changes  are  made.  The  reductions 
have  little  importance,  while  the  rejection  of  an  appropriation  asked  for 
is  extremely  rare,  and  an  increase  is  almost  unknown.  Dupriez,  vol.  i. 
pp.  543-^4. 

8  Const.  Art.  24. 
Vol.  i. 


258  GERMANY. 

question  of  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  different 
organs  of  the  state  was  postponed. 

The  rules  of  the  Reichstag  provide  for  interpella- 
inte  eiia-  tions,  but  the  question  to  whom  these  shall 
tions.  De  addressed  involves  one  of  the  paradoxes, 

or  contradictions  between  theory  and  practice,  which 
are  common  in  the  government  of  the  Empire.  There 
is  no  imperial  cabinet,  and  the  Chancellor,  who  is  the 
only  minister,  has  no  right,  as  such,  to  sit  in  the 
Reichstag.  In  theory  he  comes  there  only  as  one  of 
the  delegates  to  the  Bundesrath,  —  all  whose  members 
have  the  privilege  of  being  present  in  the  Reichstag, 
where  a  special  bench  is  reserved  for  them.  They 
appear  as  the  representatives  of  the  united  governments 
of  Germany,  and  are  entitled  to  speak  whenever  they 
choose ;  for  the  Bundesrath  is  not  only  a  collection 
of  delegates  from  the  governments  of  the  different 
States,  but  has  also  some  of  the  attributes  of  an  im- 
perial cabinet.  In  form,  therefore,  interpellations  are 
addressed  to  the  Bundesrath,  but  in  fact  they  are  com- 
municated to  the  Chancellor,  who  usually  answers  them 
himself,  or  allows  one  of  his  subordinates  to  do  so.  A 
debate  may  ensue  if  demanded  by  fifty  members,  but 
it  is  not  followed  by  an  order  of  the  day  expressing 
the  opinion  of  the  House,1  and,  indeed,  interpellations 
have  no  such  importance  as  in  France  and  Italy,  because 
the  parliamentary  system  does  not  exist ;  that  is,  the 

1  Lebon,  p.  105 ;  v.  Ronne,  p.  268.  A  resolution  can,  of  course,  be 
moved  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  rules  of  procedure,  and  this  was 
done  on  the  occasion  of  the  expulsion  of  the  Poles  in  Jan.,  1886.  Blum, 
pp.  498-501.     Dupriez  (vol.  i.  p.  545)  comments  on  the  Polish  incident. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  259 

Chancellor  does  not  resign  on  an  adverse  vote  of  the 
Reichstag,  nor  does  he  feel  obliged  to  conform  to  its 
wishes. 

Let  us  now  examine  more  closely  the  Bundesrath,  — 
that  extraordinary  mixture  of  legislative  cham-  The  Bun 
ber,  executive  council,  court  of  appeal,  and  desrath- 
permanent  assembly  of  diplomats.  It  is  the  most  thor- 
oughly native  feature  of  the  German  Empire,  and  has, 
therefore,  a  peculiar  vitality.  The  Bun  desrath  is  com- 
posed of  delegates  appointed  by  the  princes  Its  eomposi. 
of  the  States  and  the  senates  of  the  Free  tlon* 
Cities ;  *  and  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Alsace-Lorraine, 
which  was  taken  from  France  in  1871,  is  not  strictly  a 
member  of  the  union,  but  only  Reichsland  or  imperial 
territory,  and  hence  has  no  right  to  a  representative 
in  the  Bun  desrath,  although  as  a  part  of  the  empire 
it  elects  members  of  the  Reichstag.  Its  position  is  in 
some  ways  analogous  to  that  of  one  of  our  Territories, 
while  the  other  parts  of  the  Empire  correspond  to  our 
States.  Curiously  enough,  Alsace-Lorraine  has  been 
allowed  since  1879  to  send  to  the  Bundesrath  dele- 
gates who,  like  the  representatives  of  the  Territories  in 
Congress,  can  debate,  but  cannot  vote.2 

The  seats  in  the  Bundesrath  are  distributed  anions: 
the  States  and  Cities  in  such  a  way  that  each  of  them 
is  entitled  to  the  same   number   of   votes   as   in   the 

1  Const.  Arts.  6-10. 

2  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  219-20.  In  the  law  of  1879,  as  originally  drawn 
up  by  Bismarck,  Alsace-Lorraine  was  entitled  to  ordinary  delegates  to 
the  Bundesrath  ;  but  that  body,  in  order  not  to  increase  the  seats  virtually 
controlled  by  the  King  of  Prussia,  insisted  that  they  should  have  no  vote. 
Blum,  pp.  635-36.     The  number  of  these  delegates  is  four. 


260  GERMANY. 

diet  of  the  old  Germanic  Confederation  when  that  body 
proceeded  in  plenum ;  except  that  Bavaria,  as  part 
of  the  inducement  to  join  the  Empire,  was  given  six 
delegates  instead  of  four,1  and  Prussia  obtained  those 
of  the  States  she  absorbed  in  1866.2 

There  are  in  all  fifty-eight  members,  of  which  Prussia 
has  seventeen,  Bavaria  six,  Saxony  and  Wurtemberg 
four  each,  Baden  and  Hesse  three  each,  Brunswick  and 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin  two  each,  and  the  remaining 
fourteen  States  and  three  Free  Cities  one  each.  But 
Prussia  has  really  three  votes  more,  because  the 
contract  for  the  government  of  Waldeck  already  men- 
tioned gave  her  the  vote  of  that  State,  and  in  1884-85 
she  caused  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  to  be  excluded 
from  the  succession  in  Brunswick,  got  a  Prussian 
prince  appointed  perpetual  regent,  and  thus  obtained 
the  virtual  control  of  these  two  votes  also;3  so  that 
she  has  in  reality  twenty  votes  out  of  the  fifty-eight. 
This,  of  course,  is  much  less  than  her  proportion  of  the 
population ; 4  but  twenty  votes  in  the  same  hand  count 

1  She  had  six  votes  in  the  Bundesrath  of  the  Zollverein  from  1866 
to  1871. 

2  Lahand,  vol.  i.  p.  220.  The  votes  acquired  by  Prussia  in  this  way  were 
those  of  Hanover,  4  ;  Hesse  Cassel,  3  ;  Holstein-Lauenburg,  3  ;  Nassau, 
2  ;  and  Frankfort,  1. 

3  The  Duke  was  excluded  because  as  son  and  heir  of  the  late  King  of 
Hanover  he  insisted  on  his  right  to  that  kingdom,  and  refused  to  acknow- 
ledge its  incorporation  in  Prussia.  For  an  account  of  this  transaction, 
see  Blum,  p.  489  et  seq. 

4  The  population  of  Germany  on  Dec.  1,  1890,  was  about  forty-nine 
millions,  of  which  Prussia  had  thirty  millions,  Bavaria  five  millions  and 
a  half,  Saxony  three  millions  and  a  half,  Wurtemberg  two  millions, 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  Baden  a  million  and  a  half  apiece,  Hesse  one  mil- 
lion, and  the  other  nineteen  States  together  four  millions. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  261 

far  more  than  the  same  number  held  by  different 
States,  and  she  has  only  to  win  ten  additional  votes,  — 
those  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg,  for  example,  or 
those  of  some  of  the  smaller  States,  —  in  order  to 
have  an  absolute  majority.  In  fact,  she  has  usually 
had  her  way,  although  on  several  notable  occasions  the 
other  States  have  combined  and  defeated  her.  This 
happened  in  1877,  when  the  seat  of  the  Imperial 
Court  of  Appeal  was  fixed  at  Leipsic  instead  of  Berlin 
as  she  desired ; 1  and  in  1876  on  the  more  important 
question  of  the  imperial  railroad  law.  At  that  time 
Bismarck  refrained  altogether  from  introducing  into 
the  Bundesrath  a  bill  for  the  purchase  of  railroads  by 
the  Empire,  knowing  that  it  would  be  defeated  by  the 
opposition  of  the  middle-sized  States,  although  the 
project  was  one  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart.2 
Again,  in  1879,  another  railroad  bill  was  killed  in  the 
Bundesrath  by  the  opposition  of  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and 
Wurtemberg,3  and  in  the  same  year  a  conference  of 
the  finance  ministers  of  the  States  refused  to  consent 
to  the  tobacco  monopoly.4 

The  members  of  the  Bundesrath  are  diplomats  rather 
than  senators.5  They  enjoy  at  Berlin  the  privileges  of 
foreign   ambassadors,  and  are  appointed  and  removed 

1  Cf.  Blum,  pp.  146-47.  The  vote  in  favor  of  Leipsic  was  thirty  to 
twenty-eight ;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  if  Prussia  had  then  controlled 
the  votes  of  Brunswick  the  majority  would  have  been  the  other  way. 

2  Cf.  Blum,  pp.  165-68. 

3  Blum,  p.  345. 

4  Blum,  p.  312.     On  this  point,  however,  they  yielded  some  years  later. 

5  The  constitution  (Art.  10)  provides  that  the  Emperor  shall  vouchsafe 
to  them  the  protection  accorded  to  ambassadors,  while  the  members  of 
the  Reichstag  have  the  ordinary  privileges  of  members  of  a  parliament. 


262  GERMANY. 

at  will  by  the  States  they  represent,  —  which  also  pay 

them  or  not  as  they  please.     The  votes  they 

the  Bundes-  cast  are  the  votes  of  the  States,  not   those 

position  of      of  its  representatives,  and  it  is  therefore  pro- 

its  members* 

vided  that  all  the  delegates  of  a  State  must 
vote  alike.  In  fact,  all  the  votes  belonging  to  a  State 
are  counted  without  reference  to  the  number  of  dele- 
gates actually  voting ; *  and  thus  the  seventeen  votes 
of  Prussia,  for  example,  can  be  cast  in  her  name  by  a 
single  representative,  just  as  at  the  meeting  of  a  pri- 
vate corporation  a  properly  authorized  agent  can  vote 
on  all  the  shares  of  stock  belonging  to  his  principal. 
The  delegates,  moreover,  vote  according  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  their  home  government,  and  the  constitu- 
tion expressly  declares  that  votes  not  instructed  shall 
not  be  counted.2  This  last  provision  has  given  rise  to 
some  comment.  It  does  not  mean  that  a  delegate  must 
produce  his  instructions  before  he  is  allowed  to  vote. 
On  the  contrary,  the  Bundesrath  appears  to  take  no 
cognizance  of  instructions,  which  may,  indeed,  be  of 
any  kind,  including  an  authority  to  vote  as  the  delegate 
thinks  best ;  and  it  is  even  asserted  that  a  vote  is  valid 
whether  it  is  in  accord  with  the  instructions  or  not.3 
The  provision  in  the  constitution  is  probably  a  mere 
survival;  but  it  has  been  suggested  that  its  object  is, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  allow  a  delegate  to  excuse  himself 
from  voting  on  the  plea  that  he  has  not  been  instructed, 
and  on  the  other  to  make  it  clear  that  a  vote  can  be 
taken,  although  the   delegates  have   not  all   received 

1  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  223.  -  Const.  Art.  7. 

3  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  229. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  263 

their  instructions,  thus  taking  away  an  excuse  for  delay 
that  might  otherwise  be  urged.1 

A  delegate  is  usually  an  officer  of  the  State  he  repre- 
sents, often  one  of  its  ministers,  or  even  the  head  of  its 
cabinet,  and  in  any  case  the  ministers  of  a  State  are 
responsible  according  to  its  own  laws  for  their  instruc- 
tions to  the  delegates.2  In  fact,  the  ministers  are  fre- 
quently questioned  in  the  local  Landtag  or  legislature, 
about  the  instructions  they  have  given,  or  propose  to 
give ;  and  resolutions  are  sometimes  passed  in  regard  to 
them.3  If,  indeed,  the  strict  parliamentary  system 
existed  in  any  of  the  German  States,  the  cabinet  would 
no  doubt  be  held  responsible  to  the  Landtag  for  these 
instructions  as  for  every  other  act  of  the  government. 

Although  the  delegates  are  frequently  officers  of 
the  State  they  represent,  they  are  not  necessarily  even 
citizens  of  it ;  and  it  is  not  uncommon  for  several  of 
the  smaller  States,  from  motives  of  economy,  to  em- 
power the  same  man  to  act  as  delegate  for  them  all 
jointly.  This  habit  grew  to  such  an  extent  that  in 
April,  1880,  when  a  stamp  act  proposed  by  the 
Chancellor  was  seriously  amended  by  a  vote  of  thirty 
to  twenty-eight,  thirteen  of  the  smaller  States  were  not 
represented  by  any  delegates  of  their  own,  their  votes 
being  cast  by  two  delegates  from  other  States.  Bis- 
marck tendered   his    resignation   in  disgust,    and   this 

1  Cf.  Robinson,  "  The  German  Bundesrath,"  Pub.  Univ.,  Pa.  Pub.  Law 
Series,  vol.  iii.  no.  1,  pp.  34—35. 

2  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  225-27. 

8  Interpellations,  for  example,  were  presented  and  answered  in  several 
States  in  regard  to  the  proposal  for  the  purchase  of  railroads  by  the  Em- 
pire, to  wbicb  allusion  has  already  been  made  (Blum,  p.  167). 


264  GERMANY. 

caused  the  Bundesrath  to  reconsider  its  action  and 
vote  the  tax.  But  the  Chancellor  was  not  satisfied. 
He  complained  that  the  practice  of  substitution  de- 
prived the  Bundesrath  of  the  presence  of  members 
who  were  open  to  argument,  and  he  insisted  on  the 
adoption  of  a  rule  dividing  the  session  into  two  periods, 
in  one  of  which  the  important  matters  should  be 
considered,  and  delegates  from  all  the  States  should  be 
present,  while  the  other  should  be  devoted  to  current 
affairs,  when  the  States  might  appoint  substitutes  if 
they  pleased.  This  rule  was  adopted,  and  for  the  con- 
venience of  the  delegates  the  former  period  is  made  as 
short  as  possible.1 

The  Bundesrath  is  in  its  nature  unlike  any  other 
body  in  the  world,  and  its  peculiarities  can  be  ex- 
plained only  by  a  reference  to  the  Diet  of  the  old  Ger- 
manic Confederation.  It  is  not  an  international  con- 
ference, because  it  is  part  of  a  constitutional  system, 
and  has  power  to  enact  laws.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  a  deliberative  assembly,  because  the  delegates  vote 
according  to  instructions  from  home.  It  is  unlike  any 
other  legislative  chamber,  inasmuch  as  the  members  do 
not  enjoy  a  fixed  tenure  of  office,  and  are  not  free  to 
vote  according  to  their  personal  convictions.  Its  es- 
sential characteristics  are  that  it  represents  the  govern- 
ments of  the  States  and  not  their  people,  and  that  each 
State  is  entitled  to  a  certain  number  of  votes  which  it 
may  authorize  one  or  more  persons  to  cast  in  its  name, 
these  persons  being  its  agents,  whom  it  may  appoint, 
recall,  or  instruct  at  any  time.     The  true  conception  of 

1  Blum,  pp.  348^9;  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  256-57. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  265 

the  Bundesrath,  therefore,  is  that  of  an  assembly  of 
the  sovereigns  of  the  States,  who  are  not,  indeed, 
actually  present,  but  appear  in  the  persons  of  their 
representatives. 

The  internal  organization  of  the  Bundesrath  is  in 
accord  with  its  federal  character  and  the  The  internal 
privileged  position  of  the  larger  States.  We  °f  rt^Bun-11 
have  already  seen  that  the  seventeen  votes  desratl1- 
of  Prussia  are  more  than  enough  to  defeat  any  con- 
stitutional amendment,  and  that  she  is  expressly  given 
a  veto  on  all  proposals  to  change  the  laws  relating  to 
the  army  or  the  taxes.  Besides  this,  the  constitution 
declares  that  the  Emperor,  that  is,  the  King  of  Prussia, 
shall  appoint  the  Chancellor,  who  presides  over  the 
body  and  arranges  its  business,  and  through  whose 
hands  all  communications  from  the  Reichstag  and  all 
motions  and  petitions  must  pass,1  and  who  is  in  fact 
always  one  of  the  Prussian  delegates.2  But  the  con- 
stitution goes  into  much  smaller  details  in  regulating 
privileges  of  the  States,  and  prescribes  even  The  com_ 
the  composition  of  the  committees  ;  for  the  lmttees- 
Germans  have  shown  a  remarkable  astuteness  in  this 
matter,   and  nowhere    else   in  the   world  can   we  find 

1  Const.  Art.  15.     Cf.  Robinson,  p.  37. 

2  Most  of  the  German  jurists  argue  that  the  Chancellor  must  always  be 
a  Prussian  delegate,  because  Art.  15  of  the  constitution  implies  that  he 
must  be  a  member  of  the  Bundesrath,  and  the  Emperor  has  power  to 
create  such  members  only  in  his  capacity  as  King  of  Prussia.  Laband, 
vol.  i.  pp.  253-54  ;  Meyer,  Lehrbuch,  §  124  ;  Schulze,  vol.  ii.  p.  91. 
Hensel  (Die  Stellung  des  Reichskanzlers,  pp.  10-12)  denies  this  and  quotes 
Bismarck  in  his  favor.  The  Chancellor  is  authorized  to  commit  the  duty 
of  acting  as  chairman  to  a  substitute,  and  in  fact  he  rarely  presides  in 
person.     See  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  522,  and  Blum,  p.  143. 


266  GERMANY. 

the  important  influence  of  committees  in  a  legislative 
body  so  thoroughly  recognized.  There  are  eight  stand- 
ing committees  of  the  Bundesrath  established  by  the 
constitution.1  The  members  of  one  of  these  —  that 
on  the  army  and  fortresses  —  are  appointed  by  the 
Emperor;  but  it  is  provided  by  the  constitution  that 
Bavaria,  and  by  military  convention  that  Saxony  and 
Wurtemberg,  shall  have  places  upon  it.  The  members 
of  the  committee  on  maritime  affairs  are  also  appointed 
by  the  Emperor ;  while  the  committees  on  taxes  and 
customs,  on  trade,  on  railroads,  posts  and  telegraphs, 
on  justice,  and  on  accounts,  are  elected  every  year  by 
the  Bundesrath  itself.  On  each  of  the  last  seven 
committees,  five  States  at  least  must  be  represented, 
of  which  one  must  always  be  Prussia,  whose  member 
is  always  the  chairman.  But  here  again  we  have  an 
illustration  of  the  fact  that  the  Bundesrath  is  an 
assembly  of  diplomats  and  not  of  senators,  for  the 
practice  followed  by  the  Emperor  or  the  Bundesrath 
—  whichever  has  the  power  of  appointment  —  is  to 
designate  the  States  to  be  represented,  and  the  dele- 
gation from  each  of  those  States  chooses  one  of  its 
own  members  to  sit  on  the  committee.  The  seat  on  a 
committee  belongs,  therefore,  not  to  the  representative 
selected,  but  to  the  State  which  he  rej>resents.  There 
is  one  other  committee  provided  for  by  the  constitu- 
tion,—  that  on  foreign  affairs.  Its  functions  are  pe- 
culiar ;  for  it  does  not  report  like  the  other  committees, 
but  its  members  listen  to  the  communications  made  to 
them  by  the  Chancellor,  and  express  the  views  of  their 

1  Const.  Art.  8. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  267 

respective  governments  thereon.  It  is  thus  in  reality 
a  means  by  which  the  ministers  of  the  larger  States 
may  be  consulted  upon  foreign  affairs ;  and  it  consists 
of  representatives  of  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Wurtemberg, 
and  two  other  States  designated  every  year  by  the 
Bundesrath.  As  its  only  function  is  to  consult  with 
the  Chancellor,  who  is  virtually  the  Prussian  minister 
for  foreign  affairs,  Prussia  has  no  seat  upon  it,  and 
in  her  absence  Bavaria  presides.1 

Another  illustration  of  the  federal  character  of  the 
Bundesrath  is  to  be  found  in  the  provision   0nl  dele 
that  on  matters   not   common  to   the  whole  |tates°fthe 
Empire,  —  such,   for   example,  as  the  excise  Slowed^ 
on  beer,  from  which  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,   TOte' 
and    Baden  enjoy  an    exemption,  —  only  those  States 
which  are  interested  can  vote.2     There  was  at  first  a 
similar  provision  for  the  Reichstag,  but  it  was  felt  to 
be  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  a  national  house  of 
representatives,  and  was  repealed.3 

The  powers  of  the  Bundesrath  are  very  extensive, 
and  cover  nearly  the  whole  field  of  govern- 

T      .  p      .         ,       .   ,  .,     Powers  of 

ment.     It  is  a  part   ot  the  legislature,  and   the  Bundes- 

,  .  4  T>  rath- 

every   Jaw   requires    its    assent.      But,  more 

1  There  are  also  three  standing  committees  not  provided  for  by  the 
constitution  :  those  on  Alsace-Lorraine,  on  the  constitution,  and  on  rules. 
All  the  standing  committees  may  sit  when  the  Bundesrath  is  not  in 
session.     On  the  subject  of  the  committees,  see  Laband,  §  31. 

2  Const.  Art.  7. 

3  Amend.  Feb.  24,  1873. 

4  Including  treaties  that  fall  within  the  domain  of  legislation,  Const. 
Art.  11.  Each  State  has  the  right  of  initiative  (Art.  7),  which  is,  of 
course,  most  frequently  used  by  Prussia. 


268  GERMANY. 

than  this,  it  has  the  first  and  last  word  on  almost  all 
the  laws,  for  the  Reichstag  has  not  succeeded 
in  making  its  right  of  initiative  in  legislation 
very  effective,  and  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  statutes 
(as  well  as  the  budget)  are  prepared  and  first  discussed 
by  the  Bundesrath.  They  are  then  sent  to  the  Reich- 
stag, and  if  passed  by  that  body,  are  again  submitted 
to  the  Bundesrath  for  approval  before  they  are  pro- 
mulgated by  the  Emperor.1  The  Bundesrath  may 
therefore  be  said  to  be  not  only  a  part  of  the  legisla- 
ture, but  the  main  source  of  legislation. 

It  is  also  a  part  of  the  executive.     As  such,  it  has 
power  to  make  regulations  for  the   conduct 

Executive.  „    ,  ,      .    .  .  ,  ,. 

oi  the  administration,  and  to  issue  ordinances 
for  the  completion  of  the  laws,  so  far  as  this  power  has 
not  been  specially  lodged  by  statute  in  other  hands.2 
In  regard  to  finance  its  authority  is  even  more  exten- 
sive, for  it  has  been  given  many  of  the  functions  of  a 
chamber  of  accounts.3  It  enjoys  a  share  of  the  power 
of  appointment,  for  it  nominates  among  other  officials 
the  judges  of  the  Imperial  Court,  and  elects  the  mem- 
bers  of   the  Court  of  Accounts ;    while    collectors  of 

1  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  542  ;  Sehulze,  vol.  ii.  p.  118. 

2  Const.  Art.  7.  It  exercises  this  power  with  great  freedom.  Robin- 
son, pp.  50-53.  There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  how  far  this  power 
extends.  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  236-37  ;  v.  Roune,  vol.  i.  pp.  213-15  ;  Arndt, 
pp.  115-19.  Arndt  has  also  published  a  treatise  on  this  subject,  Das 
Verordnungsrecht  des  DeutscJien  Reiches.  It  is  also  empowered  to  decide 
upon  defects  that  appear  in  the  execution  of  the  laws.  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3. 
The  meaning  of  this  clause  has  been  much  discussed.  Laband,  vol.  i. 
pp.  238-42,  246  ;  v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  pp.  215-16  ;  Arndt,  Verfassung  des 
Deutschen  Reiches,  p.  119  ;  Robinson,  pp.  56-59. 

3  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  24446. 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  269 

taxes  and  consuls  can  be  appointed  only  with  the 
approbation  of  its  committees.1  Under  this  head  of 
executive  power  must  also  be  classed  the  provisions  by 
which  its  consent  is  required  for  a  declaration  of  war,2 
for  a  dissolution  of  the  Reichstag,3  and  for  federal 
execution  against  a  refractory  State.4  The  Bundesrath, 
moreover,  acts  in  some  ways  like  a  ministry  of  state, 
for  it  designates  one  or  more  of  its  members  to  support 
in  the  Reichstag  the  measures  it  has  approved ;  and  in 
fact  a  practice  has  grown  up  of  informing  the  Reich- 
stag during  the  progress  of  a  debate  what  amendments 
to  a  bill  the  Bundesrath  is  willing  to  accept.5  But 
the  federal  nature  of  the  Bundesrath  comes  into  play 
again  curiously  here,  for  each  of  the  members  also 
represents  in  the  Reichstag  his  particular  government, 
and  can  express  its  views,  although  contrary  to  those 
of  a  majority  of  his  colleagues.6 

The  Bundesrath  has   no  little   power  of  a  judicial 
or  semi-judicial  nature.     It  decides  disputes 

.  Judicial. 

between  the  imperial  and  state  governments 
about   the   interpretation   of  imperial   statutes.7     It  is 
virtually  a  court  of  appeal  in   cases   where  there  is  a 
denial  of  justice  by  a  state  court.8     It  decides  contro- 
versies between  States,  which   are   not  of   the   nature 

1  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  242-43. 

2  Except  on  the  ground  that  an  attack  has  been  made  on  the  territory 
of  the  Empire.     Const.  Art.  11. 

3  Const.  Art.  24. 

4  Const.  Art.  19. 

5  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  537,  n.  5. 

6  Const.  Art.  9. 

7  This  is  deduced  from  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3.     See  page  268,  note  2,  supra. 

8  Art.  77. 


270  GERMANY. 

of  private  law,  if  appealed  to  by  one  of  the  parties ; x 
and,  finally,  when  a  constitutional  question  arises  in  a 
State  which  has  no  tribunal  empowered  to  decide  it, 
the  Bundesrath  must  try  to  settle  it  by  mediation  if 
requested  to  do  so  by  one  of  the  parties,  or  if  this  fails, 
it  must  try  to  dispose  of  the  matter  by  imperial  legis- 
lation.2 

The  Bundesrath    has    not   only  far  more   extensive 
s  eciai  powers  than  the  Reichstag,  but   it  has  also 

theV1Bundes-  certain  privileges  that  enhance  its  prestige 
rath*  and  increase  its  authority.     Thus  the.Reich- 

stag  cannot  be  summoned  to  meet  without  the  Bundes- 
rath, whereas  the  latter  can  sit  alone,  and  must  in  fact 
be  called  together  at  any  time  on  the  request  of  one 
third  of  its  members.3  Unlike  the  Reichstag,  moreover, 
the  order  of  business  in  the  Bundesrath  is  not  broken 
off  by  the  ending  of  the  session,  but  is  continuous,  so 
that  matters  are  taken  up  again  at  the  point  where 
they  were  left,  and  thus  its  work  is  made  far  more 
Privacy  of  effective.4  The_most_  jmportanLjp.riYilege^ ,it 
meetings.  enjoys,  however,  is  that  of  excluding  the 
public   from   its  ^meetings.5      This    has    given    it    the 

1  Const.  Art.  76.  If  unfitted  to  decide  the  question,  it  can  substitute 
for  itself  some  other  body,  and  this  it  did  in  1877  in  the  case  of  the  con- 
troversy between  Prussia  and  Saxony  in  regard  to  the  Berlin-Dresden 
railroad,  selecting  the  Court  of  Appeal  of  Liibeck.  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  249, 
note  2. 

2  Const.  Art.  76,  §  2. 
8  Const.  Arts.  13-14. 

4  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  253. 

6  The  constitution  does  not  provide  whether  the  sessions  shall  be  public 
or  not,  and  in  fact  they  have  always  been  secret  (v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  pp. 
210-11).     A  brief  report  of  the  matters  dealt  with  and  the  conclusions 


THE  BUNDESRATH.  271 

advantage  of  concealing  to  some  extent  its  internal 
differences,  and  has  enabled  it  to  acquire  a  reputation 
for  greater  unanimity,  and  consequently  to  exert  more 
influence  than  it  would  otherwise  possess.  Privacy, 
indeed,  would  seem  to  be  almost  as  essential  to  the 
Bundesrath,  as  to  the  cabinet  in  a  parliamentary  gov- 
ernment, or  to  an  Anglo-Saxon  jury.  It  is  easy  to 
perceive  that  the  twelve  jurors  would  seldom  agree,  if 
the  public  were  allowed  to  witness  the  mysterious 
process  of  reaching  a  verdict;  and  it  is  equally  clear 
that  harmony  in  the  Bundesrath  would  be  very  seriously 
imperiled,  if  its  galleries  were  filled  with  spectators. 
One  can  imagine  how  the  newspapers  would  gloat  over 
the  last  altercation  between  the  Chancellor  and  the 
representative  of  Bavaria  or  Saxony,  and  how  hard  it 
would  be  for  the  contending  parties  to  make  the  con- 
cessions necessary  to  effect  an  agreement  after  their 
differences  had  been  discussed  in  public.  The  work 
of  the  Bundesrath  must  be  an  unending  series  of 
compromises,  and  a  compromise  is  a  thing  with  which 
the  world  at  large  has  little  sympathy.  If,  therefore, 
the  meetings  of  the  Bundesrath  were  open,  it  would 
be  a  hotbed  of  dissensions  between  the  governments 
of  the  different  States,  instead  of  a  bond  of  union  and 
a  means  of  mutual  understanding. 

In  regard  to  the  power  and  influence  actually 
wielded  by  the  Bundesrath,  the  most  contradictory  state- 
reached  is  given  to  the  press  after  each  session,  hut  the  Bundesrath  can 
vote  to  withhold  from  the  public  all  information  about  any  matter,  and 
the  rules  provide  that  the  oral  proceedings  both  in  the  Bundesrath  and 
its  committees  shall  be  kept  secret  in  all  cases.     Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  259. 


•272  GERMANY. 

ments  are  made.  It  is  said  on  the  one  hand  to  be  the 
Actual  in-  most  important  body  in  the  Empire,1  and  on 
&  Bunles-  tne  °ther  that  it  is  a  mere  nullity  which 
rath.  moves    almost    entirely    at   the    dictation    of 

Prussia.2  Both  these  statements  are  largely  true,  for 
considered  as  an  independent  council  with  a  will  of 
its  own  the  Bundesrath  is  a  nullity,  because  it  derives 
its  impulse  exclusively  from  outside  forces  ;  but,  con- 
sidered as  an  instrument  by  means  of  which  the 
governments  of  the  larger  States,  and  especially  of 
Prussia,  rule  the  nation,  it  is  probably  the  most  im- 
portant, although  the  least  conspicuous,  organ  in  the 
Empire.  The  extent  of  Prussia's  authority  in  the 
Bundesrath  cannot  be  accurately  determined,  owing  to 
the  secrecy  of  the  proceedings.  That  her  will,  or  rather 
the  will  of  the  Chancellor  acting  in  her  name,  is  the 
chief  moving  and  directing  force,  is  evident ;  but  that 
he  is  not  influenced  by  the  opinions  of  the  other  States, 
that  he  does  not  modify  his  plans  in  consequence  of 
their  objections,  or  make  compromises  with  them  on 
contested  points,  it  seems  hazardous  to  assert.  The 
members  are  usually  wise  enough  not  to  talk  about 
their  differences  in  public,  and  hence  these  are  only 
partly  known  to  the  world.  At  one  time  the  minister 
of  Wurtemberg  complained  openly  in  the  Reichstag 
that  bills  were  presented  to  the  Bundesrath  drawn  up 
in  a  complete  form  by  Prussian  officials,  and  filled 
exclusively  with  a  Prussian  spirit ; 3  but  we  know  that 

1  Robinson,  p.  43. 

2  Lebon,  pp.  145-51  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  478,  517-23. 
8  See  Blum,  p.  140. 


THE  EMPEROR.  273 

this  has  not  always  been  the  case,  and  that  important 
measures  have  frequently  been  considered  and  discussed 
by  the  ministers  of  all  the  larger  States  before  they 
were  introduced  at  all.1  We  know  also  that  in  more 
than  one  instance  Bismarck  found  it  impossible  to  per- 
suade the  Bundesrath  to  adopt  his  views,2  and  that 
on  another  occasion  he  thought  a  threat  of  resigna- 
tion necessary  to  compel  submission.3  In  this  case 
the  threat  produced  the  desired  result,  but  it  may  well 
be  doubted  whether  it  would  have  the  same  effect  in 
the  mouth  of  any  one  but  the  Iron  Chancellor,  whose 
strong  will  dominated  also  the  Reichstag  and  the 
throne.4 

We  now  come  to  the  Emperor.5  The  title  seems  to 
denote  an  hereditary  sovereign  of  the  Empire,  The  Em 
but  from  a  strictly  legal  point  of  view  this  is  peror" 
not  his  position.  He  is  simply  the  King  of  Prussia, 
and  he  enjoys  his  imperial  prerogatives  by  virtue  of 
his  royal  office.  There  is,  in  fact,  no  imperial  crown, 
and  the  right  to  have  her  King  bear  the  title,  and 
exercise  the  functions  of  Emperor,  is  really  one  of  the 
special  privileges  of  Prussia.  The  language  of  the 
constitution  is:  "The  presidency  of  the  union  belongs 

1  This  was  notably  true  in  the  case  of  the  Gerichtsverfassunggesetz  in 
1873  (Blum,  p.  141). 

2  See  page  261,  supra. 

8  See  pages  263-64,  supra. 

4  Lebon  (p.  147)  thinks  that  Prussia  has  a  good  deal  of  influence  in 
the  appointment  of  delegates  by  the  other  States,  and  refers  to  the  case 
where  Bismarck  procured  the  recall  of  the  Bavarian  representative  in 
1880. 

5  Cf.  Const.  Arts.  11-19. 


274  GERMANY. 

to  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  bears  the  title  of  German 
Emperor."  The  succession  is  therefore  determined 
solely  by  the  law  of  the  Prussian  Royal  House,  and  in 
case  of  incapacity  the  Regent  of  Prussia  would,  ipso 
facto,  exercise  the  functions  of  Emperor.1 

It  has  been  said  that  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
His  power  army  and  navy  the  Emperor  has  in  theory 
h  wmpara-    *ne  personal  direction  of  military  matters,  but 

tively  small;    ^^  'n    a][    ^J^g    fo   actg    ag    ^  delegate    of 

the  confederated  governments,  under  the  direction  of 
the  Bundesrath ; 2  and  even  if  this  statement  is  not 
strictly  accurate,  it  gives  a  very  fair  idea  of  his  prerog- 
atives. He  has  charge  of  foreign  affairs,  makes  trea- 
ties subject  to  the  Hmitatiqns  already  mentioned,  and 
represents  the  Empire  in  its  relation  to  other  countries, 
to  the  States,  or  to  individuals.  He  declares  war  with 
the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath,  and  carries  out  federal 
execution  against  a  State  when  it  has  been  ordered  by 
that  body.  He  summons  and  adjourns  the  Chambers, 
and  closes  their  sessions,  and  with  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrath~he  can  dissolve  the  Reichstag.  He  pro- 
mulgates the  laws,  and  executes  them  so  far  as  their 
administration  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Empire,  subject, 
however,  to  the  important  qualification  that  most  of 
the  administrative  regulations  are  made  by  the  Bundes- 
rath. He  appoints  the  Chancellor  and  all  other  offi- 
cers, except  in  cases  where  the  Bundesrath  has  been 
given  the  right  of  appointment  or  confirmation ;  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  laws  are  mainly  adminis- 
tered by  the  state   governments  under  federal  super- 

1  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  202-4.  2  Lebon,  pp.  154-55. 


THE  EMPEROR.  275 

vision,  and  hence  there  are  comparatively  few  federal 
officials  to  appoint.  In  short,  the  executive  power  of 
the  central  government  is  very  limited ;  and  even  that 
limited  power  is  shared   by  the  Bundesrath. 

The  Emperor  has,  therefore,  very  little  jpower  as  such, 
except  m~military  and  foreign  matters.  His  but  as  Kin 
authority  as  Emperor,  however,  is  vigorously  °tf;f ™*ya 
supplemented  by  his  functions  as  King  of  great" 
Prussia.  Thus  a_s  Emperor  he  has  no  initiative  in 
legislation ;  *  and  indeed  he  is  not  represented  in  the 
Reichstag  at  all ;  for  the  Chancellor,  strictly  speaking, 
appears  there  only  as  a  member  of  the  Bundesrath.2 
But  as  King  of  Prussia  the  Emperor  has  a  complete 
initiative  by  means  of  the  Prussian  delegates  to  the 
Bundesrath  whom  he  appoints.  As  Emperor  he  has 
no  veto,  but  as  King  he  has  a  very  extensive  veto,  — 
for  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  negative  vote  of 
Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath_is  sufficient  to  defeat  any 
amendment  to  the  constitution,  or  any  proposal  to 
change  the  laws  relating  to  the  army,  the  navy,  or  the 
taxes.  His  functions  as  Emperor  and  as  The  two  sets 
King  are,  indeed,  so  interwoven  that  it  is  g^Sgeiy118 
very  difficult  to  distinguish  them.  As  Em- 
peror he  has  supreme  command  of  the  army  and 
appoints  the  highest  officers.     As  King  of  Prussia  he 

1  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  537.  Strictly  speaking,  the  initiative  in  the 
Bundesrath  belongs  to  the  States,  and  in  the  Reichstag  it  is  confined  to 
the  members.     Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  534. 

2  Cf.  Lebon,  pp.  155-56  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  534.  If,  as  the  German 
jurists  maintain,  the  Chancellor's  right  to  preside  in  the  Bundesrath 
depends  on  his  being  a  Prussian  delegate,  the  Emperor,  as  such,  is  not 
represented  in  the  Bundesrath  at  all.     See  p.  265,  n.  2,  supra. 


276  GERMANY. 

appoints  the  lower  officers,  and  has  the  general  man- 
agement of  the  troops  over  most  of  Germany.  As 
Emperor  he  instructs  the  Chancellor  to  prepare  a  bill. 
As  King  he  instructs  him  to  introduce  it  into  the 
Bundesrath,  and  directs  how  one  third  of  the  votes  of 
that  body  shall  be  cast.  Then  the  bill  is  laid  before 
the  Reichstag  in  his  name  as  Emperor,1  and  as  King 
he  directs  the  Chancellor  what  amendments  to  accept 
on  behalf  of  the  Bundesrath,  or  rather  in  behalf  of  the 
Prussian  delegation  there.  After  the  bill  has  been 
passed  and  become  a  law,  he  promulgates  it  as  Em- 
peror, and  in  most  cases  administers  it  in  Prussia  as 
King ;  and  finally  as  Emperor  he  supervises  his  own 
administration  as  King.  This  state  of  things  is  by  no 
means  so  confusing  to  the  Germans  as  might  be  sup- 
posed ;  for  it  is  not  really  a  case  of  one  man  holding 
two  distinct  offices,  but  of  the  addition  of  certain  im- 
perial functions  to  the  prerogatives  of  the  King  of 
Prussia.  The  administration  of  the  country  is  vested 
in  the  sovereigns  of  the  States,  among  whom  the  King 
of  Prussia  is  ex  officio  president ;  and  until  one  has 
thoroughly  mastered  this  idea,  it  is  impossible  to  under- 
stand the  government  of  Germany.2 

There  is  no  imperial  cabinet,  and  the  only  federal 

The  Chan-     minister  is  the  Chancellor,  who  has  subordi- 

oniy  federal    nates  but    no  colleagues.3      The    reason    for 

this  is  to  be  found  partly  in  Bismarck's  per- 

1  Const.  Art.  16. 

2  Schulze  (Preussen,  in  Marquardsen,  pp.  33-34)  remarks  that  the  two 
offices  are  so  closely  bound  together  that  it  is  impossible  to  think  of 
them  separately. 

8  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  348  ;  and  see  §  40. 


THE  CHANCELLOR.  277 

sonal  peculiarities,  and  partly  in  the  nature  of  the 
ties  that  bind  Prussia  to  the  Empire.  In  the  first  place, 
Bismarck  preferred  to  stand  alone,  and  did  not  want 
to  be  hampered  by  associates.  He  had  had  experience 
enough  of  the  Prussian  cabinet,  where  each  of  the 
ministers  was  very  independent  in  the  management  of 
his  own  department,  and  he  did  not  care  to  create  for 
himself  a  similar  situation  in  imperial  matters.  After 
he  had  decided  on  a  course  of  action,  he  hated,  as  he 
said,  to  waste  his  time  and  strength  in  persuading  his 
colleagues,  and  all  their  friends  and  advisers,  that  his 
policy  was  a  wise  one.  Hence  he  would  not  hear  of 
an  imperial  cabinet.1  In  the  second  place,  he  did  not 
originally  intend  to  have  any  federal  ministers  at  all. 
According  to  his  plan  the  general  supervision  and  con- 
trol of  the  administration  was  to  be  exercised  by  the 
Bundesrath,  while  those  matters  —  such  as  military 
and  foreign  affairs  —  which  from  their  nature  must  be 
intrusted  to  a  single  man,  were  to  be  conducted  by  the 
King  of  Prussia  as  President  of  the  Confederation,  all 
others  being  left  in  the  hands  of  the  several  States. 
The  Chancellor  was  to  be  a  purely  Prussian  officer,  who 
should  receive  his  instructions  from  the  King,  and  be 
responsible  to  him  alone.2  This  plan  is  very  interest- 
ing, because,  although  in  form  it  was  not  accepted,  in 
substance  it  presents  an  almost  exact  picture  of  the 
real  political  situation,  except  that  the  power  of  the 
Prussian  King  has  become   greater  than  was  at  first 

1  Cherbuliez,  L'Allemagne  Politique,  2d  ed.,  pp.  228-29.  Meyer,  in  his 
Grundziige  des  Norddeutschen  Bundesrechts  (pp.  88-97),  discusses  Bis- 
marck's objections  to  a  collegiate  ministry. 

2  Lebon,  p.  152. 


278  GERMANY. 

intended.1  The  Liberals  objected  to  it,  and  under 
the  lead  of  Bennigsen  the  constituent  Eeichstag 
amended  the  draft  of  the  constitution,  by  providing 
that  the  acts  of  the  President2  should  be  countersigned 
by  the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  assumed  responsibility 
for  them,  —  thus  making  the  Chancellor  a  federal  offi- 
cer responsible  to  the  nation.3  The  principle  was 
excellent,  but  has  remained  unfruitful ;  for 
politically      the  Chancellor  is  not  responsible  criminally, 

F6SD011Slul.6 

to  the  and  Bismarck  refused  to  hold  himself  polit- 

Reichstag.        . 

ically  responsible  to  any  one  but  the  monarch. 
He  always  insisted  that  the  motto  "  The  King  reigns 
but  does  not  govern  "  had  no  application  to  the  House 
of  Hohenzollern.  In  short,  the  parliamentary  system 
does  not  exist  in  the  Empire,  and  the  Chancellor  is  not 
forced  to  resign  on  a  hostile  vote  in  the  Reichstag".  If 
that  body  will  not  pass  one  of  his  measures,  he  gets 
on  as  well  as  he  can  without  it ;  or,  if  he  considers  the 
matter  of  vital  importance,  he  causes  the  Reichstag  to 
be  dissolved  and  takes  the  chance  of  a  new  election, 
a  course  which  up  to  this  time  has  always  been  crowned 
with  success.4 

1  It  is  a  striking  fact  that  the  high  imperial  officials  are  almost  always 
selected  from  among  the  Prussian  functionaries.     Lebon,  p.  157. 

2  This  was  in  1867,  before  the  King  of  Prussia  was  given  the  title  of 
Emperor. 

8  Const.  Art.  17.  Unlike  matters  of  military  administration,  the  acts- 
of  the  Emperor  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  are  not  treated  as 
requiring  a  countersignature.     Schulze,  Lehrbuch,  p.  93. 

4  I  do  not  mean  that  no  imperial  official  has  ever  been  driven  from 
office  by  the  Reichstag.  The  fall  of  a  minister  may  be  occasionally 
brought  about  by  the  opposition  of  a  popular  chamber,  although  there 
is  no  general  cabinet  responsibility. 


THE  CHANCELLOR.  279 

The  Chancellor  is  at  the  head  of  the  whole  body  of 
federal  officials.  Besides  this  he  presides  in  ms  ftmc_ 
the  Bundesrath,  and  is,  in  fact,  its  leading  tions* 
and  moving  spirit.  He  also  takes  an  active  part  in 
the  debates  in  the  Reichstag,  where  he  is  the  chief 
representative  of  the  policy  of  the  government.  But 
like  his  royal  master  he  has  a  double  nature,  and  his 
functions  are  partly  imperial  and  partly  Prussian. 
As  Chancellor  appointed  by  the  Emperor  he  is  at  the 
head  of  the  national  administration,  and  presides  in 
the  Bundesrath ;  but  it  is  as  Prussian  delegate  that 
he  votes  in  that  body,  and  indeed  his  influence  there 
is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  he  speaks  in  the  name 
of  Prussia,  and  casts  as  he  chooses  the  twenty  votes 
which  she  controls.  In  the  Reichstag,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  nominally  appears  as  commissioner  for  the 
Bundesrath  or  as  one  of  its  Prussian  members,  while 
his  importance  is  really  due  to  his  position  as  chief 
of  the  federal  government.  It  is  obviously  essential 
to  the  Chancellor's  position  that  he  should  be  the 
leader  of  Prussia's  delegation  in  the  Bundesrath,  and 
able  to  direct  her  imperial  policy.  For  this  reason 
the  Chancellor,  except  for  short  intermissions,  has  been 
also  the  president  of  the  Prussian  cabinet.  We  shall 
consider  this  matter  more  fully  in  the  chapter  which 
treats  of  the  actual  working  of  the  German  govern- 
ment. 

The  powers  of  the  German  Chancellor  in  Bismarck's 
day  were   greater    than   those  of  any  other  Hissubsti- 
man  in  the  world,  and  his  work  and  respon-  tutes' 
sibilities  were  heavier  than  even  his  iron  frame  could 


280  GERMANY. 

bear.  In  order,  therefore,  to  relieve  him  in  part,  an 
act  was  passed  in  1878  providing  for  the  appointment 
by  the  Emperor  of  substitutes,  whenever  the  Chan- 
cellor should  declare  himself  prevented  from  doing 
his  work.  These  offices  were  expected  at  first  to  be 
temporary,  especially  that  of  Vice-Chancellor,  or  gen- 
eral substitute,  who  was  intended  to  act  only  during 
the  illness  of  the  Chancellor ;  but  with  the  increase  of 
business  they  have  become  a  permanent  necessity,  the 
Chancellor  declaring  that  he  is  prevented  from  doing 
his  work  by  the  fact  that  he  has  too  much  of  it  to  do. 
For  many  years  there  has  been  a  Vice-Chancellor  con- 
tinuously, and  it  has  been  the  habit  to  make  as  many 
of  the  Secretaries  of  State  as  possible  special  substi- 
tutes for  their  own  departments,1  appointing  them  at 
the  same  time  Prussian  delegates  to  the  Bundesrath,  in 
order  that  they  may  be  able  to  speak  both  in  that 
body  and  in  the  Reichstag.2  The  substitutes  counter- 
sign  the  acts  of  the  Emperor  in  the  Chancellor's  stead, 
but  are  nevertheless  subject  to  his  orders,  and  thus  he 
still  remains  sole  head  of  the  government,  and  is  mor- 
ally responsible  for  its  whole  policy.3 

1  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  495-97.  The  substitution  can  be  made  only  for 
those  matters  which  the  Empire  administers  directly.  Dupriez,  lb. ;  La- 
band,  vol.  i.  p.  358. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  522. 

8  Laband,  vol.  i.  p.  359 ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  497-99.  The  federal 
administration  began  in  a  very  simple  form,  for  there  was  only  one  chan- 
cery office  (Bundeskanzleramt),  divided  into  three  sections,  the  Prussian 
officials  doing  in  some  departments  a  good  deal  of  federal  work.  But  as 
the  number  of  affairs  to  be  attended  to  has  grown,  the  federal  machinery 
has  become  more  elaborate.  The  general  chancery  office  has  disap- 
peared, and  there  are  now  nine  separate  departments,  each  with  a  secre- 


THE   COURTS  OF  LAW.  281 

The  judicial  branch  of  the  imperial  government 
remains  to  be  considered.  Justice  is  admin-  The  .udi 
istered  in  the  first  instance  by  the  state  ciary# 
courts;  but  curiously  enough,  the  organization  of 
these  courts  is  regulated  by  imperial  statutes.1  Their 
rules  of  practice  are  also  derived  from  the  same  source, 
for  the  federal  government  has  enacted  general  codes 
of  civil  and  criminal  procedure,  which  apply  to  the 
state  tribunals.2  It  has,  moreover,  enacted  a  univer- 
sal criminal  code  and  a  commercial  code,  and  has  just 
added  to  these  a  general  code  of  civil  law;  so  that 
there  are  in  each  State  a  similar  series  of  courts  or- 
ganized on  an  imperial  plan  and  expounding  imperial 
laws  in  accordance  with  imperial  forms  of  procedure, 
but  whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  local  sov- 
ereign and  render  their  decisions  in  his  name. 

Apart  from  administrative  and  consular  courts,  there 
is  only  one  federal  tribunal,  called  the  Reichs-  The  Reicha. 
gericht,  or  Court  of  the  Empire.  It  has  gericht- 
original  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  treason  against  the 
Empire,  and  appellate  jurisdiction  from  the  federal 
consular  courts,  and  from  the  state  courts  on  questions 
of  imperial  law.3     It  is  to  be  observed,  therefore,  that 

tary  of  state  at  its  head.  They  are  the  Interior,  Foreign  Affairs,  Navy, 
Post  Office,  Justice,  Treasury,  Railroads  owned  by  the  Empire,  Super- 
vision of  other  railroads,  and  Imperial  Bank.     Laband,  §  41. 

1  The  Gerichtsverfassunggesetz  of  Jan.  27,  1877.  Laband,  §  86,  and  see 
§  81.  This  is  true  only  of  the  ordinary  courts  of  law,  the  subject  of 
administrative  courts  being  left  for  the  most  part  in  the  discretion  of  the 
several  States.     See  Laband,  vol.  ii.  p.  368. 

2  The  Civilprozessordnung  of  Jan.  30,  1877.  The  Strafprozessordnung 
of  Feb.  1,  1877. 

3  Laband,  §  84. 

i 


282  GERMANY. 

with  the  completion  of  the  system  of  national  codes 
this  year,  the  imperial  tribunal  has  become  a  general 
court  of  error  in  all  cases  arising  under  the  ordinary 
civil  or  criminal  law.1 

While  speaking  of  the  judicial  branch  of  the  govern- 
Powerof  ment,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  there 
tohofd1*3  nas  Deeu  a  great  deal  of  discussion  among 
Mconsti-  German  publicists  over  the  question  whether 
a  court  of  law  can  inquire  into  the  constitu- 
tionality of  a  statute.  Some  writers  maintain  that  it 
can  do  so,2  while  others  insist  that  the  promulgation  by 
the  Emperor  settles  conclusively  the  validity  of  a  law.3 
The  problem  is  not,  of  course,  confined  to  the  Empire, 
but  may  arise  in  the  States  whenever  a  legislature 
passes  a  law  that  violates  the  state  constitution ;  the 
solution  depending  ultimately  on  the  question  whether 

1  A  State  which  has  several  courts  of  error  can  create  a  supreme  court 
of  appeal  and  confer  upon  it  the  appellate  civil  jurisdiction  of  the 
Reichsgericht,  but  this  has  been  done  by  Bavaria  alone.  Laband,  vol. 
ii.  pp.  365-66. 

2  v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii.  pp.  62-63.  This  was  maintained  as  a  general  principle 
by  Robert  von  Mohl,  in  his  Staatsrecht,  Vblkerrecht  u.  Politik  (1860),  I.  3. 

3  E.  g.  Laband,  vol.  i.  pp.  551-58  ;  Zorn,  Staatsrecht  des  Deutschen 
Reiches,  §  7,  iii.  Gneist,  who  is  commonly  cited  in  favor  of  the  authority 
of  the  court,  came  to  the  conclusion,  in  his  Soil  der  Richter  auch  iiber  die 
Frage  zu  bejinden  haben,  ob  ein  Gesetz  verfassungsmassig  zu  Stande  gekom- 
men,  that  the  courts  can  decide  whether  an  ordinance  issued  by  the 
executive  is  within  its  constitutional  powers,  and  whether  a  law  has 
received  the  assent  of  the  chambers  as  required  by  the  constitution,  but 
that  they  cannot  inquire  whether  the  substance  of  a  law  passed  in 
proper  form  violates  the  provisions  of  that  instrument. 

The  constitution  of  Prussia  declares  expressly  (Art.  106)  that  statutes 
and  ordinances  are  binding  if  promulgated  in  the  form  prescribed  by  law, 
and  that  the  legality  of  royal  ordinances  regularly  issued  can  be  examined 
only  by  the  chambers. 


UNCONSTITUTIONAL  LAWS.  283 

the  constitution  shall  be  treated  as  a  law  of  superior 
obligation,  or  whether  it  shall  be  regarded  merely  as 
establishing  a  rule  for  the  guidance  of  the  legislator. 

The  matter,  however,  is  one  in  which  practice  is  far 
more  important  than  abstract  theory,  and  it  is  certain 
that  the  courts  have  not  in  fact  exercised  any  general 
power  of  refusing  to  apply  statutes  on  constitutional 
grounds.  The  late  Brinton  Coxe,  in  the  recent  work 
on  "  Judicial  Power  and  Unconstitutional  Legislation," 
has  collected  the  most  important  German  cases  on  the 
subject.1  In  one  of  these  the  Hanseatic  Court  of 
Appeal  held  in  1875  that  a  statute  enacted  in  Bremen, 
which  deprived  a  person  of  property  without  compen- 
sation, was  in  conflict  with  the  constitution  of  the  city, 
and  that  the  court  must  regard  the  latter  as  a  binding 
law  and  refuse  to  apply  the  statute.2  Eight  years  later 
the  doctrine  of  this  case  was  expressly  overruled  by 
the  federal  court  in  another  suit  that  arose  in  Bremen 
upon  a  similar  state  of  facts,  the  court  declaring  that 
the  constitutional  provision  was  to  be  understood  only 
as  a  rule  for  the  legislative  power  to  interpret.3  Since 
that  time  no  German  tribunal  appears  to  have  held  a 
statute  unconstitutional,  but  in  1889  the  federal  court 
remarked,  in  the  course  of  an  opinion,  that  the  question 
whether  the  judiciary  had  a  right  to  examine  the  con- 
stitutionality of  an  imperial  law  was  still  an  open  one, 
although  the  weight  of  authority  was  in  the  affirmative.4 

i  Ch.  ix. 

2  Gabacle  v.  Bremen,  Seuff,  Arch.,  vol.  xxxii.  No.  101. 
8  K.  and  Others  v.  Dyke  Board  of  Niedervieland,  Dec.  of  the  Reichs- 
gericht,  vol.  ix.  p.  233. 
4  Dec.  of  the  Reiehsgericht,  vol.  xxiv.  p.  3. 


284  GERMANY. 

As  the  question  is  the  same  for  imperial  and  state  laws, 
the  remark  would  seem  to  imply  a  change  of  opinion  on 
the  part  of  the  court.  It  is  not  at  all  likely,  however, 
that  the  Reichsgericht  will  have  the  courage  of  its  con- 
victions, and  venture  to  disregard  statutes  passed  by 
the  legislature  of  the  Empire. 

Even  in  a  federal  system  such  a  power  could  be 
effectively  used  only  where  the  central  government  was 
exceedingly  weak,1  or  where  the  authority  of  the  courts 
had  been  raised  to  a  pitch  like  that  which  it  has  ac- 
quired in  Anglo-Saxon  countries  from  the  prolonged 
judicial  centralization  of  England.  It  would,  indeed, 
seem  absurd  to  draw  a  distinction  between  public  and 
private  law,  as  is  commonly  done  in  Germany,  and  deny 
to  the  courts  the  right  to  consider  the  legality  of  an 
administrative  ordinance  on  the  ground  that  it  falls 
into  the  province  of  public  law,  and  at  the  same  time 
give  them  power  to  pass  on  the  validity  of  a  statute 
enacted  by  the  legislature. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said,  the  German  Empire 
Character  of  ^s  a  federal  government  of  a  peculiar  type,  in 
federal"^-  which  legislative  centralization  is  combined 
with  administrative  decentralization.  The 
centre  of  gravity  is  to  be  found  in  the  body  repre- 
senting the  governments  of  the  several  States,  and 
here  Prussia  has  a  controlling  influence,  and  a  veto 
on  the  most  important  matters.  In  fact,  the  Con- 
federation is  not  a  union  of  States  with  equal  rights, 
but   rather  an   association   of   privileged  members,  so 

1  That  the  courts  cannot  exercise  such  a  power  in  a  centralized  State, 
see  the  writer's  Essays  on  Government,  pp.  40-45. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  THE  SYSTEM.  285 

contrived  that  Prussia  has  the  general  management, 
subject  only  to  a  limited  restraint  by  her  associates. 
And  herein  there  is  a  marked  contrast  between  the 
American  and  German  federal  systems.  That  of  the 
United  States  is  based  on  the  equality  of  the  members ; 
and  a  decided  preponderance  on  the  part  of  any  one 
State  would  destroy  the  character  of  the  union.  That 
of  Germany,  on  the  contrary,  is  organized  on  a  plan 
that  can  work  successfully  only  in  case  one  member 
is  strong  enough  to  take  the  lead,  and  keep  the  main 
guidance  in  its  own  hands ; *  for  if  the  States  were 
nearly  equal,  their  mutual  jealousy  would  effectually 
prevent  the  sovereign  of  any  one  of  them  from  infus- 
ing a  real  vitality  into  the  office  of  Emperor,  while  the 
control  of  the  Bundesrath  over  the  administration 
would  paralyze  the  executive  unless  that  body  derived 
its  impulse  from  a  single  source. 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  475-77. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

GERMANY  I     PRUSSIA   AND    THE    SMALLER  STATES. 

The   preponderating   influence    of    Prussia   in   the 

German  Empire  makes  a  knowledge  of  her 

ment^oYtke    institutions  necessary  for  a  thorough  compre- 

not beun^n"  hension  of  the  imperial  system,  and  therefore 

Without  a      a  sketch  of   the  Prussian  government  must 

knowledge  ,  1      i*  •  p     n 

of  Prussian    precede   any  general   discussion  01    German 

institutions.  .       1 

politics. 
The   present    constitution    of   Prussia,   which    dates 

from  January  31,  1850,  was  granted  by  the 
sianconsti-     King   after   the  revolutionary   movement  of 

1848  had  begun  to  subside,  and  is  far  less 
democratic  than  the  Liberals  would  have  liked.2  In 
some  ways  it  is  even  less  liberal  than  the  text  would 
lead  one  to  suppose  ;  for  although  it  contains  quite  an 
elaborate  bill  of  rights,  Professor  Gneist  spoke  of  it 
as  a  lex  imperfecta,  owing  to  the  absence  of  machinery 
for  giving  effect  to  its  provisions.3     It    purports,  for 

1  The  area  of  Prussia  is  134,463  square  miles  out  of  a  total  of  208,670 
for  the  whole  Empire,  while  her  population  by  the  census  of  Dec.  1,  1890, 
was  29,957,367  out  of  49,428,470. 

2  Dupriez  (vol.  i .  pp.  349-50),  after  pointing  out  that  the  constitution 
of  Prussia  is  largely  copied  from  that  of  Belgium,  remarks  that  the 
latter  rests  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation,  while  the  former  is  based 
on  the  sovereignty  of  the  king. 

8  Soil  der  Richter,  3d  ed.  p.  20. 


THE  CONSTITUTION.  287 

example,  to  guarantee  the  liberty  of  instruction  ; 1  but 
as  no  statute  has  been  passed  to  carry  this  out,  the 
previous  laws  remain  in  force,  whereby  no  school  can 
be  opened  without  permission  from  the  government.2 
Again,  it  declares  that  the  right  to  assemble  without 
arms,  except  in  the  open  air,  shall  be  free ; 3  but  in  fact 
notice  of  every  meeting  held  to  discuss  public  affairs 
must  be  given  to  the  police,  who  have  a  right  to  be 
present,  and  a  very  extensive  power  of  breaking  it  up.4 
The  result  of  such  a  state  of  things  is  that  neither 
the  parliament  nor  the  citizens  have  sufficient  means 
of  defending  their  rights ;  and  although  the  recent  in- 
crease of  local  self-government  and  the  establishment 
of  administrative  justice  have  done  something  towards 
remedying  this  defect,5  personal  and  political  liberty 
are  still  far  from  enjoying  the  same  protection  as  in 
Anglo-Saxon  countries.  The  constitution  was  clearly 
not  intended  as  a  restraint  on  legislation,  for  it  can  be 
changed  by  a  simple  majority  vote  of  both  chambers, 
sanctioned  by  the  King ;  the  procedure  in  such  a  case 
differing  from  the  ordinary  process  of  enacting  a  stat- 
ute only  in  the  fact  that  there  must  be  two  separate 
votes,  between  which  an  interval  of  twenty-one  days 
must  elapse.6 

1  Const.  Art.  22.     Cf.  Arts.  26  and  112. 

2  v.  Ronne,  Das  Staatsrecht  der  Preussiscken  Monarchic,  4th  ed.  §  169; 
and  see  Schulze,  Preussen,  in  Marquardsen,  p.  123. 

8  Const.  Art.  29.     Cf.  Art.  30. 

4  v.  Ronne,  lb.,  §  145  (and  see  p.  193,  note  8,  p.  194,  note  1). 

5  Schulze,  p.  32. 

8  Const.  Ait.  107  ;  v.  Ronne,  §  158.     Amendments  have  in  fact  been 
made  on  more  than  a  dozen  different  occasions. 


288  PRUSSIA. 

At  the  head  of  the  state  is  the  King,  whose  crown  is 
hereditary  according  to  the  principles  of  the 
Salic  law,  that  is,  it  can  be  inherited  only  by 
and  through  males.1  Every  statute  requires  his  con- 
sent, as  well  as  that  of  the  chambers,2  and  he  appoints 
directly  or  indirectly  all  the  officers  of  the  state.3  He 
has  power  also  to  confer  titles  of  nobility,  —  a  prerog- 
ative, by  the  way,  that  as  Emperor  he  does  not  pos- 
sess.4 The  civil  list,  which  is  granted  not  for  the  life 
of  the  monarch  as  in  England,  but  in  perpetuity,  is 
absolutely  at  his  disposal,  and  out  of  it  he  is  expected 
to  provide  for  all  the  members  of  the  royal  family ; 
and  in  this  connection  it  is  worth  while  to  observe,  as 
an  illustration  of  the  relation  of  the  imperial  office  to 
the  royal  one,  that  the  Emperor  as  such  has  no  civil 
list,  and  that  there  is  no  imperial  household,  with  its 
chamberlain,  its  marshal,  and  so  forth,  all  these  high 
dignitaries  being  officers  of  the  Prussian  court.5 

The  constitution   declares  that  all  the   acts  of   the 

The  minis-     King  must  be  countersigned  by  a  minister, 

who  thereby  becomes  responsible  for  them;6 

1  Const.  Art.  53  ;  Schulze,  pp.  47-50. 

2  Const.  Art.  62.  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  does  not  need  to  withhold  his 
consent,  because  he  can  always  get  the  Peers  to  reject  a  Liberal  bill, 
but  no  one  doubts  that  he  would  withhold  it  in  case  of  need.  (Cf.  Du- 
priez,  vol.  i.  p.  409.) 

8  See  Const.  Arts.  45-47  ;  v.  Ronne,  §  99. 

4  Schulze,  p.  45. 

5  Id.,  p.  47. 

6  Const.  Art.  44.  In  practice  the  countersignature  of  a  minister  is  not 
required,  for  orders  to  the  army  issued  by  the  king  as  commander-in- 
chief,  for  ordinances  concerning  the  administration  of  the  Evangelical 
church,  of  which  the  king  is  the  head,  for  the  conferring  of  decorations 


THE  KING  AND  HIS  MINISTERS.  289 

but  as  the  ministers  are  in  reality  responsible  only  to 
the  King  himself,  this  provision  does  not  Theirre_ 
diminish  the  royal  authority.  The  ministers  sPonsibillty- 
and  their  substitutes  have,  indeed,  a  right  to  appear 
in  either  chamber,  where  they  enjoy  the  privilege  of 
speaking  as  often  as  they  please,  although  the  members 
themselves  do  not.  They  must  even  be  given  the  floor 
at  any  time  they  ask  for  it,  unless  a  member  is  actually 
addressing  the  house,1  and  in  fact  they  take  a  very 
active  part  in  the  debates  ; 2  but  they  do  not  resign  on 
an  adverse  vote,  and  are  not  responsible  in  the  parlia- 
mentary sense  of  the  term.  They  are,  in  short,  the 
servants,  not  of  the  chambers,  but  of  the  crown,  a  fact 
that  finds  its  outward  expression  in  the  frequency  with 
which  they  refer  to  the  personal  opinions  of  the  King.3 
Nor  are  they  subject  to  an  effective  control  of  any  kind 
on  the  part  of  the  legislature,  for  although  the  consti- 
tution provides  that  they  can  be  prosecuted  for  bribery, 
treason,  or  violation  of  the  constitution,  upon  a  resolu- 
tion passed  by  either  house,4  there  is  no  statute  pre- 
scribing any  penalties,  and  hence  the  provision  is  a 
dead  letter.5     A  real  restraint  on  the  ministers  is,  how- 


and  titles,  or  for  addresses  to  the  chambers,     v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  p.  418  ; 
Meyer,  Lehrbuch,  p.  187. 

1  Const.  Art.  60  ;  v.  Ronne,  §  73  and  notes. 

2  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  401,  407. 

8  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  401.  The  royal  rescript  of  Jan.  4,  1882,  insists  on 
the  right  of  the  king  to  direct  personally  the  politics  of  his  government. 
Cf.  Blum,  p.  479. 

4  Const.  Art.  61. 

6  v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii.  pp.  356-59  ;  Schulze,  pp.  42-43.  In  France,  curi- 
ously enough,  a  similar  provision  is  held  to  authorize  the  High  Court  to 
VOL.   I. 


290  PRUSSIA. 

ever,  supplied  by  the  Chamber  of  Accounts  (Oberrech- 
nung shammer),  which  is  independent  of  them,  inasmuch 
as  its  members  are  protected  from  removal  like  the 
judges.  This  body  examines  all  the  finances,  and 
reports  to  the  Landtag  ;  *  but  if  a  minister  has  exceeded 
the  appropriations  and  the  Landtag  refuses  to  vote  a 
supplementary  credit  to  cover  the  amount,  there  is  no 
way  of  holding  him  legally  responsible  for  it.2  This 
restraint,  therefore,  while  very  important  morally,  has 
no  legal  sanction. 

One  of  the  most  marked  peculiarities  of  the  Prussian 

ministers  is  their  lack  of   cohesion.     There 

pendenceof    is,  indeed,  a  Minister  President,  but  he  has 

each  other.  . 

no  authority  over  his  colleagues  and  cannot 
compel  them  to  adopt  his  views.  There  is  also  a 
ministry  of  state  (Staatsministerium)  composed  of  all 
the  ministers  sitting  together;  but  this  body  bears  very 
little  resemblance  to  the  cabinet  in  England  or  France. 
It  has  power,  when  the  public  safety  requires  it  or  un- 
usual distress  prevails,  and  the  Landtag  is  not  in  session, 
to  make  temporary  laws  in  the  form  of  royal  ordinances, 
which  are  binding  until  the  Landtag  next  assembles, 
when  they  must  be  submitted  to  it  for  approval.3  Its 
consent  is  necessary,  moreover,  in  certain  other  matters, 
and  notably  for  proclaiming  the  state  of  siege,  which 

impose  any  penalty  it  sees  fit.  Lebon,  Franbreich,  in  Marquardsen,  pp. 
55-58. 

1  This  body  was  also  made  the  Chamber  of  Accounts  for  the  Empire  ; 
the  Bundesrath  being  empowered  to  appoint  additional  members.  Schulze, 
pp.  73-74. 

2  v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii.  p.  353,  note  6  ;  Schulze,  p.  112. 

8  Const.  Art.  63  ;  v.  Ronne,  vol.  iii.  p.  77  ;  Schulze,  pp.  71-72. 


THE  KING  AND  HIS  MINISTERS.  291 

involves  a  temporary  suspension  of  personal  liberty  in 
the  places  to  which  it  applies ; 1  but  except  for  these 
special  cases  where  the  ministers  are  obliged  by  law  to 
act  together,  they  are  in  the  habit  of  administering 
their  several  departments  without  much  regard  to  each 
other's  opinions.  Ordinances  of  1814  and  1817  pro- 
vide, it  is  true,  that  the  ministry  of  state  shall  meet 
once  a  week,  and  that  all  matters  of  general  importance 
shall  be  referred  to  it,2  but  this  statute  has  not  united 
the  members  because  the  decisions  of  the  majority  do 
not  bind  the  minority,  their  effect  being  simply  that  of 
advice  to  the  King.3  The  result  is  that  the  ministers 
are  far  more  independent  of  each  other  than  in  most 
countries,  often  differing  widely  in  their  political  tend- 
encies.4 In  seeking  an  explanation  of  this  fact  we  may 
observe  that  the  parliamentary  system  does  not  exist, 
and  hence  the  ministers  not  being  jointly  responsible 
for  the  whole  conduct  of  the  administration,  are  not 
compelled  to  hold  together  and  support  one  another. 
Their  responsibility  is  only  to  the  King,  and  there  is 
no  reason  why  he  should  dismiss  them  all  because  he 
is  dissatisfied  with  one  of  them.  He  selects  them  for 
their  administrative  qualities  rather  than  their  political 
opinions,  and  requires  of  them  administrative  capacity 
and  obedience  to  himself.5  The  ministers,  therefore, 
stand  each  on  his  own  feet,  or  as  the  lawyers  say  in  a 

1  v.  Ronne,  lb. •  Schulze,  lb. 

2  v.  Ronne,  vol.  iii.  pp.  75-76  ;  Schulze,  p.  71. 

3  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  367-71. 

4  Cf.  Id.,  vol.  i.  pp.  361,  363. 
6  Id.,  voL  i.  pp.  359-60. 


292  PRUSSIA. 

deed  of  trust,  they  are  liable  each  for  his  own  acts  and 
defaults,  and  not  one  for  those  of  the  others. 

The  number  of  the  ministers,  their  functions,  and 
Organi/a-  tne  arrangement  of  their  staff  of  officials  are 
depart-the  regulated  by  the  King  at  his  pleasure,  sub- 
ject only  to  the  vote  of  the  necessary  appro- 
priations for  salaries  by  the  Landtag  ;  and  it  is  no 
doubt  partly  for  this  reason  that  the  organization  of 
the  several  departments  is  not  uniform  or  based  on 
any  systematic  plan,  but  has  developed  according  to 
the  needs  of  each  case.  There  are  at  present  nine 
ministers  :  those  for  Foreign  Affairs  ; *  Interior ;  Trade 
and  Commerce  ;  Public  Works  ;  Agriculture,  Domains, 
and  Forests ;  Keligion,  Education,  and  Medicine  ;  Jus- 
tice ;  Finance ;  and  War ;  to  which  must  be  added  as 
forming  part  of  the  ministry  of  state  the  Imperial 
Secretaries  of  State  for  the  Interior  and  Foreign 
Affairs.2 

1  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  is  also,  of  course,  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Empire. 

2  Schulze,  p.  62  et  seq. ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  448  et  seq.  There  is  also 
a  Staatsrath,  or  Council  of  State,  which  in  composition  resembles  some- 
what the  English  Privy  Council.  It  deserves  mention  for  its  insignifi- 
cance rather  than  its  importance,  for  in  fact  it  amounts  to  nothing. 
(v.  Ronne,  vol.  iii.  pp.  73-75  ;  Schulze,  pp.  72-73.)  In  1884  Bismarck 
tried  to  give  it  new  life  by  intrusting  it  with  the  consideration  of  bills  to 
be  submitted  to  the  Bundesrath,  but  after  a  few  days  of  activity  it  re- 
lapsed into  its  dormant  condition.  (Lebon,  pp.*811-13.)  Another  body 
with  analogous  functions  is  the  Volkswirthschaftrath  created  by  royal  ordi- 
nance in  1880  and  composed  of  thirty  members  appointed  by  the  King, 
and  forty-five  more  selected  by  him  from  a  number  twice  as  large  nom- 
inated by  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  Trade  and  the  Agricultural 
Associations.  It  considers  and  gives  advice  upon  all  bills  affecting  trade 
and  agriculture.  (Schulze,  p.  67.)  This  was  one  of  Bismarck's  pet 
institutions,  but  was  not  generally  popular.     (See  Blum,  pp.  353-54.) 


THE  BUREAUCRACY.  293 

Subordinate  to  the  ministers  is  the  bureaucracy, 
which  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  efficient  The  bureau- 
bodies  of  officials  in  the  world.  Its  members  craC7, 
are  intelligent,  honest,  and  active,  and  although  some- 
what rigid  and  autocratic,  do  not  appear  to  be  exces- 
sively tied  down  by  routine.  Nor  is  the  administra- 
tive system  in  its  actual  working  highly  concentrated 
as  compared  with  those  of  other  continental  nations, 
for  the  officials  do  not  feel  obliged  to  refer  every  im- 
portant question  to  their  superiors,  but  are  willing  to 
act  on  their  own  responsibility  within  their  spheres  of 
duty.  An  apprenticeship  and  examination  are  required 
for  admission,1  and  a  severe  discipline  is  maintained  by 
means  of  special  tribunals  composed  of  administrative 
officers,  whose  consent  is  required  for  the  dismissal 
without  a  pension  of  any  permanent  member  of  the 
civil  service.2  These  conditions  explain  the  existence 
of  a  dictatorial  power  on  the  part  of  the  officials,  and  a 
constant  interference  in  the  affairs  of  every-day  life, 
which  under  a  system  of  favoritism  and  spoils  would 
be  well-nigh  intolerable.  Not  that  the  service  is  strictly 
non-partisan,  for  the  government  does  not  give  offices 
to  its  political  enemies,  but  neither  the  deputies  nor 
the  parties  have  any  control   over  appointments,  and 

1  The  upper  and  lower  administrative  services  are  kept  distinct,  dif- 
ferent qualifications  and  separate  examinations  being  required  for  each 
branch,     v.  Ronne,  §  256. 

2  Id.,  §§  251,  260,  264.  The  Disciplinarhof  (which  has  jurisdiction 
over  officials  appointed  by  the  King  or  the  ministers,  and  must  be  con- 
sulted in  cases  of  appeals  by  other  officials)  contains  in  addition  to  the 
administrative  members  at  least  four  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  all 
the  members  being  appointed  for  three  years.     Id.,  vol.  iii.  p.  387. 


294  PRUSSIA. 

hence  the  bureaucracy,  though  at  times  actively  used 
to  influence  elections,1  does  not  degenerate  into  the 
creature  or  the  tool  of  party. 

Notwithstanding  the    excellent   organization  of   the 

bureaucracy,  its  enormous  power  could  hardly 
tive  justice     be  endured  without  the  restraint  exercised  by 

the  administrative  courts.  Before  the  present 
century  the  elaborate  system  of  administrative  appeals, 
and  the  permanence  of  traditions  that  prevailed  in  the 
bureaucracy,  many  of  whom  were  learned  in  the  law, 
preserved  a  great  uniformity  in  the  administration,  and 
furnished  a  real  guarantee  against  arbitrary  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  officials.  But  with  the  spread  of  new 
ideas  after  the  French  Revolution,  a  marked  change 
took  place.  The  sharp  distinction  drawn  between  jus- 
tice and  administration  deprived  administrative  pro- 
cedure of  its  judicial  character,  and  made  the  decisions 
of  the  officials  turn  less  on  law  and  more  on  expedi- 
ency. By  an  ordinance  of  1808  the  officers  of  the 
government  were,  indeed,  subjected  to  the  ordinary 
tribunals  in  certain  specified  cases,  which  came  to  be 
known  by  the  curious  name  of  Enklaven,  or  oases  of 
justice;  but  except  to  this  limited  extent  the  officials 
enjoyed  an  entire  immunity  from  judicial  control. 
Moreover,  the  torpid  old  bureaucratic  system,  with  its 
delays  and  its  conservatism,  offered  a  serious  hindrance 
to  the  reforms  planned  by  Stein  and  Hardenberg.  They 
needed  and  created  a  more  elastic  form  of  government 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  446-48.  This  caused  a  great  deal  of  com- 
plaint and  aroused  much  discussion  after  the  elections  to  the  Reichstag  in 
1881.     Blum,  pp.  478-81. 


THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS.  295 

in  -which  an  impulse  could  make  itself  quickly  and 
decisively  felt  from  a  central  point,  not  dreaming  for  a 
moment  that  the  vast  discretionary  power  they  gave  to 
the  officials,  and  especially,  to  the  ministers,  would  ever 
be  abused  for  party  purposes.  But  in  fact  the  system 
they  introduced  was  adapted  only  to  the  rule  of  a 
benevolent  autocrat,  and  its  defects  became  manifest 
after  the  outbreak  of  1848  had  given  rise  to  a  parlia- 
ment. 

In  1850  the  Conservatives,  or  rather  the  landowners, 
who  formed  the  ruling  element  in  the  party,  came  into 
power,  and  made  a  free  use  of  their  vast  public  author- 
ity to  help  their  partisans.  The  confirmation  of  local 
officials,  the  granting  of  passports,  of  building  permits, 
and  of  licenses  for  hotels  and  saloons,  and  even  the 
direction  of  the  police  at  Berlin,  were  employed  as  a 
means  of  influencing  elections.  The  evil  continued 
unabated  for  eight  years,  when  William  became  Regent 
and  put  a  stop  to  it ;  but  before  any  permanent  remedy 
could  be  applied  the  conflict  with  the  Parliament  broke 
out,  and  the  reform  was  postponed  till  after  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war.  Then  at  last  a  series  of  administrative 
tribunals  was  established  in  connection  with  the  new 
scheme  of  local  government,  and  the  result  has  been  a 
return  of  confidence  in  the  justice  of  the  bureaucracy 
without  serious  detriment  to  its  energy.1 

The  administrative  courts  in  Prussia  are  more  inde- 

1  Cf.  Gneist,  Das  Englische  Verwaltungsrecht,  3d  ed.  pp.  367-72,  413- 
21  ;  Zur  Verwaltungsreform  in  Preussen,  pp.  1-53;  "Les  Rdformes  Ad- 
ministratives  en  Prusse,"  Revue  Gen.  du  Droit  et  des  Sciences  Pol.,  Oct.  1, 
1886 ;  Schulze,  pp.  153-65  ;  Goodnow,  book  vi.  div.  ii.  ch.  vii. 


296  PRUSSIA. 

pendent  of  the  government,  and  hence  in  a  better  po- 
sition to  control  the  officials  than  in  France  ; 

The  adraln-      „         .         ,        ,  .  „      , 

istrative  tor  in  the  lower  ones  a  majority  ot  the  mem- 
bers are  private  citizens  chosen  by  the  local 
representative  assemblies  and  serving  without  pay ; * 
while  the  highest,  the  so-called  Oberverwaltimgsge- 
7*icht,  is  composed  of  men  appointed  by  the  King  for 
life,  and  protected  like  the  ordinary  judges,  so  that 
they  can  neither  be  removed,  suspended,  nor  trans- 
ferred without  the  approval  of  a  judicial  tribunal.  The 
whole  subject  of  administrative  justice  as  a 

Their  possi-     .  1        o  •   ■         i  •  -ii    •        •         •     t> 

bie  develop-  branch  or  positive  law  is  still  in  its  infancy, 
and  is  liable  to  undergo  grave  modifications. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  independent  position  of 
the  members  of  the  Prussian  Oberverwaltungsgericht, 
and  their  consequent  separation  from  the  mass  of  gov- 
ernment officials,  is  likely  to  have  important  results. 
Every  judicial  body  has  a  natural  tendency  to  follow 
precedents,  and  hence  to  develop  fixed  rules  of  deci- 
sion. If  this  has  been  true  of  the  judicial  section  of 
the  French  Council  of  State  whose  members  are  remov- 
able, it  will,  no  doubt,  be  even  more  true  of  the  Prus- 
sian court.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  alongside  of 
the  ordinary  civil  law  there  will  grow  up  in  Germany 
an  equally  logical  and  equally  inflexible  administrative 
law,  which  will  control  the  officials  as  effectually  as  the 
common  law  does  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries.  It  is  not 
improbable   also    that  the    inconvenience    of   two   sys- 

1  There  are  two  sets  of  these  courts,  the  Bezirksausschiisse  and  the 
Kreisaussehusse,  which  will  be  described  under  the  head  of  local  govern- 
ment in  the  subsequent  part  of  this  chapter. 


THE  LANDTAG.  297 

terns  of  law  enforced  by  separate  courts  will  in  time 
bring  about  a  fusion  of  the  two  in  the  same  way  that 
the  English  common  law  and  equity  are  tending  to 
become  fused  ;  and  if  this  happens,  the  government 
officers  will  lose  their  peculiar  privileges  and  become  in 
the  end  subject  to  the  same  tribunals  as  the  rest  of  the 
community.  From  an  Anglo-Saxon  standpoint  such  a 
result  is  certainly  desirable,  but  it  must  be  observed 
that  the  Germans  prefer  their  own  system  to  the  Eng- 
lish, on  the  ground  that  the  administrative  courts  are 
inclined  to  take  a  broader  view  of  public  interests  than 
the  ordinary  judges,  who  are  constantly  occupied  with 
questions  of  private  law.1  If  this  is  an  advantage,  it 
applies  with  especial  force  to  the  lower  courts,  whose 
members  are  actively  engaged  in  the  work  of  adminis- 
tration. 

The  legislative  power  in  Prussia  is  vested  in  the 
King  and  the  Landtag,  or  Diet.  The  latter  The 
consists  of  two  houses,  which  always  sit  sep- 
arately, unless  the  King  becomes  insane,  or  the  crown 
passes  to  an  infant,  when  they  meet  in  joint  session  to 
vote  the  need  of  a  regency,  and  to  appoint  a  regent  in 
case  the  King  has  no  male  relative  who  is  entitled 
under  the  constitution  to  occupy  that  position.'2  The 
Landtag  must  be  summoned  to  meet  at  least  once  every 
year,  and  cannot  be  adjourned  for  more  than  thirty 
days,  or  more  than  once  in  a  session,  without  its  own 

1  E.  g.  Gneist,  Der  Rcchtsstaat,  2d  ed.,  pp.  269-74  ;  v.  Ronne,  vol.  ii. 
p.  331.     The  same  view  is  expressed  by  Goodnow,  vol.  i.  pp.  9-14. 

2  Const.  Arts.  56  and  57. 


298  PRUSSIA. 

consent.1  These  privileges,  however,  are  not  as  impor- 
tant as  they  seem,  because  the  King  can  close  the  ses- 
sion at  any  time  and  can  dissolve  the  lower  house.  In 
the  latter  case  there  is,  indeed,  a  provision  requiring 
that  elections  shall  be  held  within  sixty  days,  and  the 
new  Landtag  called  together  within  three  months,2 
but  the  power  of  dissolution  is  unlimited,  and  it  has 
happened  several  times,  when  the  elections  have  been 
unfavorable  to  the  government,  that  the  new  Landtag 
has  been  dissolved  before  it  met.3 

The  powers  of  the  Landtag  of  a  strictly  legislative 
Itsiegisia-  character  are  on  their  face  decidedly  broad, 
tive  power.     £[y  jawg  pgq^g  fa  consent,4  and  so  do  the 

taxes,  the  loans,  and  the  yearly  budget.5  But,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  the  right  to  vote  the  appropriations 
has  once  been  virtually  suspended.6  This  was  during 
the  period  of  conflict  with  the  crown  which  preceded 
the  war  with  Austria,  and  although  since  that  time  no 
attempt  has  been  made  to  spend  money  without  the 
consent  of  the  Landtag,  the  constitutional  question  has 
never  been  definitely  settled.  Most  of  the  Prussian 
jurists  still  teach  the  doctrine  that  the  popular  Chamber, 
not  having  power  alone  to  repeal  a  law,  has  no  right  to 

1  Const.  Arts.  76  and  52.  Tbe  two  houses  must  be  summoned  and 
adjourned  at  the  same  time.     Id.,  Art.  77. 

2  Const.  Art.  51. 

3  Schulze,  p.  61. 

4  Const.  Art.  62.  Except  in  case  of  urgency  when  it  is  not  in  session. 
Art.  63. 

5  Arts.  99,  100,  103.  The  budget  in  Prussia  is  really  the  work  of  tbe 
government,  that  is,  the  reductions  made  by  the  Landtag  are  unimpor- 
tant and  an  increase  is  rare.     Dupriez,  vol.  i.  p.  418. 

6  See  page  239,  supra. 


THE  LANDTAG.  299 

bring  about  the  same  result  by  refusing1  the  money 
required  for  its  execution ;  and  that  in  case  of  a  dis- 
agreement between  the  different  powers  in  the  state 
the  King  has  a  right  to  carry  on  the  government  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  standing  laws,  and  make  the  expendi- 
tures necessary  for  that  purpose.1  Hence  it  would  be 
rash  to  assert  that  if  another  serious  conflict  with  the 
crown  should  arise,  Bismarck's  practice  would  not  be 
revived. 

The  Landtag  has  the  right  to  initiate  legislation,2 
but  this  is  not  much  used,  and  in  fact  the  bulk  of  the 
bills  introduced,  and  almost  all  those  that  are  enacted, 
are  proposed  by  the  government.3  In  regard  to  their 
own  bills,  moreover,  the  ministers  are  not  so  much 
afraid  of  rejection  as  they  are  of  serious  amendments,4 
and  hence  we  may  fairly  say  that  the  chief  activity  of 
the  Landtag  consists  in  the  consideration  and  amend- 
ment of  measures  submitted  by  the  crown. 

The  control  of  the  Landtag  over  the  administration 
is  very  slight.     It  can  appoint  commissions  to 

.  .  -  ,  ,  Its  control 

make  investigations,    but  the  government  can   over  the  ad- 

.  .  ministration. 

forbid  the  officials  to  give  them  any  informa- 
tion, and  in  fact  the  ministers  have  insisted  that  such 
commissions,  like  all   the  committees  of  the  Landtag, 

1  Cf.  Schulze,  pp.  102^1  ;  Gneist,  Die  Militarvorlage  von  1892  und  der 
Preussische  Verfassungskonflikt.  The  authorities  are  collected  and  dis- 
cussed by  Laband,  vol.  ii.  pp.  993-95,  1037,  et  seq.  ;  v.  Ronne  (§  118)  is 
of  the  contrary  opinion.  Compare,  in  this  connection,  Const.  Arts.  100, 
109. 

2  Const.  Art.  64. 

8  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  404,  405-6. 
4  Id.,  pp.  407-8. 
6  Const.  Art.  82. 


300  PRUSSIA. 

shall  hold  no  direct  communications  with  any  officers 
but  themselves.1  It  can  require  the  presence  of  the 
ministers  and  ask  them  questions,2  but  they  may  answer 
or  not  as  they  please.3  It  can  address  interpellations 
to  the  government,  but  as  the  parliamentary  system 
does  not  exist  in  Prussia  these  have  not  the  same 
importance  as  in  France  and  Italy.  Each  chamber 
can  also  present  addresses  to  the  King,4  who  may  pay 
attention  to  them  or  not,  as  he  thinks  best.  In  short, 
the  influence  of  the  Landtag  over  the  administration  is 
confined  to  expressing  an  opinion  which  is  not  likely 
to  have  any  great  effect. 

Each  house  elects  its  own  President,  and  makes  its 
The  pro-  own  mles?5  the  forms  of  procedure  being 
cedure.  very  much  like  those  of  the  Reichstag,  for 
which,  indeed,  they  served  as  a  pattern.6  The  houses 
are  divided  in  the  same  way  into  Abtheihmgen,  or 
sections,  whose  only  duties  are  the  choice  of  commit- 
tees, and  in  the  lower  house  the  preliminary  examina- 
tion of  elections.7     There  is  also  the  same  jealousy  of 

1  v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  pp.  294-96. 

2  Const.  Arts.  60  and  81. 
8  Schulze,  p.  59. 

4  Const.  Art.  81. 

5  Const.  Art.  78. 

6  Cf.  Lebon,  p.  207. 

7  v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  pp.  331-34  ;  Schulze,  p.  59  ;  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp. 
389-90.  In  the  House  of  Peers  there  are  five  sections  ;  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  seven.  The  sections  differ  from  the  French  Bureaux  in 
two  respects.  Instead  of  being  renewed  every  month,  they  last  during 
the  whole  session,  and  while  in  the  lower  house  the  division  is  made  as 
in  France  by  lot,  in  the  Peers  it  is  made  by  the  President.  A  section  is 
not  obliged  to  select  its  representatives  on  a  committee  among  its  own 
members. 


THE  HOUSE  OF  PEERS.  301 

the  power  of  committees,  for  the  ministers  realize  that 
an  amendment  proposed  by  a  committee  has  a  better 
chance  of  being  adopted  than  one  moved  from  the 
floor.  Hence  they  prefer  to  have  their  measures  con- 
sidered directly  by  the  whole  house,  and  a  reference 
to  a  committee  is  so  far  from  being  a  matter  of  course 
that  a  motion  to  that  effect  is  beginning  to  be  looked 
upon  as  a  sign  of  hostility  to  the  bill.1 

Curiously  enough,  the  constitution  does  not  pre- 
scribe the  composition  of  the  Herrenhaus,  The  House 
or  House  of  Peers,  but  delegates  the  power  of  Peers- 
to  do  so  to  the  King,  only  providing  that  the  members 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  crown  in  heredity  or  for  life, 
and  that  a  royal  ordinance  on  the  subject  once  issued 
shall  not  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  the  Land- 
tag.2 By  the  ordinance  of  October  12,  1854,  which  is 
still  in  force,  the  house  consists  first  of  princes  of 
the  blood  royal  summoned  by  the  King ;  then  of 
hereditary  nobles  whose  ancestors  were  formerly  inde- 
pendent princes  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  of 
hereditary  members  created  at  will  by  the  crown  ;  then 
of  life-members,  four  of  whom  are  the  holders  of  cer- 
tain great  offices  of  state  or  of  the  household,  while 
others  are  appointed  by  the  King  at  his  pleasure,  and 
others  again  are  appointed  by  him  on  the  nomination 
of  the  larger  landowners,  of  the  universities,  of  evan- 
gelical bodies,   and  of    certain   cities.3     The  members 

'1  Dupriez,  vol.  i.  pp.  407-8.  There  are  in  each  house  eight  standing 
committees,  all  the  others  heing  specially  appointed  to  consider  particular 
measures,     v.  Rbnne,  ubi  supra. 

2  Const.  Arts.  65-68,  as  amended  May  7,  1853. 

8  Schulze,  pp.  52-53.     The  constitutionality  of  some  of  these  provisions 


302  PRUSSIA. 

appointed  at  will  by  the  King  are  not  limited  in  num- 
ber like  the  rest,  and  hence  the  crown  by  a  creation 
of  peers  can  control  the  house  at  any  time.  At  present, 
however,  the  total  number  of  members  is  about  three 
hundred,  of  whom  more  than  one  third  are  hereditary 
nobles  possessing  large  estates,  while  another  third  are 
nominated  by  the  landowners,  so  that  the  house  is 
really  controlled  by  the  landed  gentry.1  Now  this 
class  has  strongly  marked  characteristics  in  Prussia, 
and  is  widely  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  people. 
It  is  devotedly  loyal  to  the  throne,  and  at  the  same 
time  extremely  conservative  and  very  jealous  of  its 
rights.  It  can  always  be  relied  upon,  therefore,  to  sup- 
port the  crown  against  any  attempt  at  innovation  on 
the  part  of  the  more  popular  house,  and  to  refuse  its 
consent  to  progressive  measures,  which  the  representa- 
tives of  the  people  have  passed,  and  the  King  does  not 
want  to  sanction.  But  it  is  by  no  means  equally  ready 
to  follow  the  crown  in  a  liberal  policy ;  and  this  it 
showed  in  1872,  when  it  rejected  the  bill  for  the  re- 
form of  local  self-government  which  Bismarck  had 
determined  to  enact,  and  was  chastised  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  twenty-four  new  members. 

Except  for  the  fact  that  the  budget  and  all  money 
bills  must  be  presented  first  to  the  lower  house  and 
must  be  accepted  or  rejected  as  a  whole  by  the  Peers,2 

has  been  seriously  questioned  on  the  ground  that  many  of  the  life-mem- 
bers are  not  really  appointed  for  life,  but  keep  their  seats  only  so  long 
as  they  retain  the  qualifications  on  which  their  appointment  was  based, 
v.  Ronne,  vol.  i.  pp.  205,  note  7,  215,  note  1. 

1  Lebon,  p.  191. 

2  Const.  Art.  62. 


THE  HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  303 

the  powers  of  the  two  houses  are  identical ;  and  in  fact 
the  Peers  exercise  their  power  of  amendment  with  a 
good  deal  of  freedom  and  no  little  effect. 

The    Abgeordneterihaus,  or   House   of   Representa- 
tives, has  an  organization  nearly  as  singular 
as  that  of  the  Peers.1     It  is  composed  of  four  of  Repre- 
hundred  and  thirty-three  members  elected  for 
five  years 2  by  a  suffrage,  which  although  universal 3  is 
neither  direct  nor  equal.     The  members  are  chosen  in 
districts,  each  of  which  elects,  as  a  rule,  two  deputies, 
but   frequently  only  one,  and    sometimes  as  many  as 
three.4     The  members,  however,  are  not  chosen  by  the 
people,  but  by  electors,  and  for  this  purpose 
the  districts   are    subdivided  into  a  number  class  system 
of  smaller  divisions  called  Urwahlbezirhe,  or 
original  electoral  districts,  in  each  of  which  one  elector 
is  chosen  for  every  two  hundred  and  fifty  souls,  on  the 
following  curious  system.     The  voters  are  divided  into 

1  See  Const.  Arts.  69-74,  as  amended  in  1851,  1867, 1876,  and  1888  ; 
Schulze,  pp.  53-54  ;  v.  Ronne,  §§  57-60,  and  the  annotated  translation  of 
the  constitution  by  J.  H.  Robinson,  published  by  the  Am.  Acad,  of  Pol. 
and  Soc.  Science.  The  constitution  provides  (Art.  115)  that  until  an 
electoral  law  is  enacted  the  election  of  deputies  shall  be  regulated  by 
the  royal  ordinance  of  May  30, 1849.  No  such  law  has  ever  been  passed, 
but  this  ordinance  with  its  amendments  is  nearly  identical  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution. 

2  The  term  was  originally  three  years,  but  like  that  of  the  Reichstag, 
it  was  changed  to  five  years  in  1888. 

3  The  franchise  extends  to  all  Prussians  twenty-four  years  old,  and  not 
disqualified  by  crime,  pauperism,  etc.  The  constitution  says  twenty-five 
years  old,  but  the  ordinance  says  twenty-four. 

4  The  districts  have  not  been  changed  since  1860,  and  are  now  very 
unequal.  Berlin,  for  example,  with  about  one  twentieth  of  the  whole 
population,  elects  only  nine  representatives. 


304  PRUSSIA. 

three  classes  according  to  the  amount  of  taxes  they 
pay ;  the  largest  tax-payers  who  together  pay  one  third 
of  the  taxes  forming  the  first  class ;  the  next  largest 
tax-payers  paying  another  third  of  the  taxes  forming 
the  second  class ;  and  the  rest  of  the  people  who  pay 
of  course  the  remaining  third  forming  the  third  class. 
Each  of  these  classes  chooses  separately,  and  by  abso- 
lute majority  vote,  one  third  of  the  electors  to  which 
the  Urwahlbezirh  is  entitled.1  All  the  electors  so 
chosen  in  the  district  then  meet  together  and  elect  the 
representative  by  absolute  majority  vote.2  The  system 
has  another  strange  feature.  The  electors  retain  their 
functions  during  the  whole  term  of  the  Landtag,  so 
that  when  a  seat  in  the  house  becomes  vacant,  the 
people  do  not  proceed  to  a  new  election,  but  the  old 
electors  are  called  together  again  to  choose  another 
representative.  The  result  is  that  a  by-election  in- 
volves a  fresh  appeal,  not  to  the  constituents,  but  only 
to  the  electors,  and  these  are  not  likely  to  have  changed 
their  party  affiliations. 

The  three-class  system  of  election  was  devised  in 
1849,  and  is  a  singular  compromise  between  universal 
suffrage  and  property  qualification.  Under  it  every- 
body votes,  and  has  a  certain  share  in  the  direction  of 

1  If  after  dividing  the  number  of  electors  by  tbree  there  is  one  elector 
left  over,  he  is  chosen  by  the  second  class.  If  two  are  left  over  they  are 
chosen  by  the  first  and  third  classes. 

2  Any  Prussian  thirty  years  old,  who  is  not  a  peer  or  disqualified  from 
being  a  voter,  is  eligible,  and  may  be  chosen  in  any  district  without  re- 
gard to  residence  or  official  position,  but  a  member  loses  his  seat  by 
accepting  any  paid  office  or  any  official  promotion.  Const.  Arts.  74  and 
78. 


THE  THREE-CLASS   SYSTEM  OP  ELECTION.        305 

public  affairs ;  but  the  largest  tax-payers,  that  is,  the 
richest  men,  who  are,  of  course,  comparatively  few  in 
number,  choose  as  many  electors  as  the  great  mass  of 
laborers,  or  to  put  the  same  thing  from  the  opposite 
point  of  view,  property  and  the  bearing  of  the  public 
burdens,  as  well  as  mere  numbers,  are  taken  into  account 
in  the  apportionment  of  power.  The  same  principle 
is  applied  in  the  Prussian  cities  and  villages,  where  the 
councils  are  divided  into  three  equal  parts,  one  of 
which  is  elected  by  each  of  the  three  classes  of  tax- 
payers. 

In  municipal  government  the  system  appears  to  have 
the  good  effect  of  making  the  administration 

.  Its  effects. 

of  the  city  a  matter  of  business  rather  than 
of  politics  ;  but  as  applied  to  the  legislature  it  assumes 
a  somewhat  different  aspect,  for  there  is  a  strong  feel- 
ing that  a  representative  body  elected  on  such  a  plan 
does  not  really  express  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  and 
this  feeling  deters  a  good  many  people  from  voting, 
especially  among  the  Social  Democrats  of  the  large 
cities.  The  system  has  been  praised  even  by  foreigners 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  an  attempt  to  represent  social 
interests  instead  of  geographical  districts,1  and  this  is 
becoming  a  favorite  point  of  view  with  certain  think- 
ers ;  but  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  in  a  demo- 
cracy a  political  organization  of  the  different  classes  is 
desirable.  The  obvious  result  is  to  make  party  lines 
coincide  with  social  distinctions ;  to  array  the  different 
classes  in  separate  groups  ;  and  to  accentuate  the  an- 
tagonism   between    rich    and    poor.     This    evil,    from 

1  Cf.  Prins,  La  Democratic  et  le  Regime  Parlementaire,  chap.  x. 

VOL.  I. 


306  PRUSSIA. 

which  Germany  suffers  in  a  peculiar  degree,  will  be 
referred  to  at  greater  length  in  the  following  chapter 
on  the  actual  working  of  parties  in  that  country. 

Curiously  enough,  the  effect  of  this  method  of  election 
its  effect  on  tue  relative  strength  of  the  parties  is  by  no 
on  parties.  means  as  marked  as  one  would  suppose  ;  and, 
indeed,  the  experience  of  all  countries  has  shown  that 
although  a  change  in  the  suffrage  may  seriously  modify 
the  policy  of  the  different  parties,  it  has  usually  much 
less  permanent  influence  on  their  proportions  than  is 
expected.  The  system  has  been  said  to  favor  the  Con- 
servatives at  the  expense  of  the  Liberals,1  and  it  is  no 
doubt  true  that  the  Social  Democrats,  who  are  mainly 
workingmen  from  the  cities,  hold  a  number  of  seats 
in  the  Reichstag  and  scarcely  any  in  the  Landtag.  As 
regards  the  other  parties,  however,  the  result  is  by 
no  means  so  clear,  for  if  we  compare  the  elections  to 
the  Prussian  House  of  Representatives  which  are  con- 
ducted in  this  way  with  those  of  the  Prussian  members 
of  the  Reichstag  who  are  elected  by  direct  universal 
suffrage,  we  find  that  from  1870  to  1878,  when  the 
government  was  allied  with  the  Moderate  Liberals  and 
only  partially  friendly  with  the  Conservatives,  the 
former  had  an  advantage  over  the  latter  in  the  elec- 
tions to  the  Landtag  as  compared  with  the  elections  to 
the  Reichstag  ;  that  in  1878-79,  when  Bismarck's  rela- 
tions to  the  parties  were  still  uncertain,  the  ratio  of  the 
different  groups  in  the  two  representative  bodies  was 
not  very  unequal ;  and  that  after  this  time,  when  the 
favor  of  the  government  was  definitely  transferred  to 

1  Lebon,  pp.  200-3. 


THE  THREE-CLASS   SYSTEM   OF  ELECTION.         307 

the  Conservative  parties,  the  proportion  of  these  in  the 
Landtag  was  decidedly  larger  than  in  the  Reichstag.1 
Such  a  result  would  seem  to  prove  that  the  chief  effect 
of  the  Prussian  method  of  election  is  not  so  much  the 
help  it  gives  to  the  Conservatives  as  the  opportunity  it 
affords  to  the  government  for  exerting  pressure  at  elec- 
tions ;  and  this  is  probably  due  less  to  the  three-class 
system  than  to  the  fact  that  the  voting  in  the  case  oi 

1  It  must  be  remembered  tbat  tbe  National  Liberals  split  in  1880,  and 
tbe  fraction  wbich  kept  tbe  name  adbered  to  tbe  government.  Tbe 
figures  for  the  elections  to  tbe  Reichstag  in  the  following  table  are  taken 
from  the  Monatshefte  zur  Statistik  des  Deutschen  Reichs,  1875,  v.  p.  65  ; 
1879,  vi.  pp.  37,  73  ;  1882,  iii.  p.  35  ;  1885,  i.  p.  139  ;  1887,  iv.  p.  35 ; 
1890,  iv.  p.  61  ;  1893,  iv.  p.  3.  For  the  Landtag  I  have  not  been  able  to 
get  the  official  statistics,  and  the  figures  are  taken  from  Miiller  (Politische 
Geschichte  de  Gegemvart),  who  is  apt  to  lump  the  smaller  groups  together 
as  unclassed.  The  figures  for  the  Prussian  members  of  the  Reichstag 
are  printed  in  roman  type,  those  for  the  Landtag  in  italics. 


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308  PRUSSIA. 

the  Landtag  is  oral,1  while  for  the  Reichstag  it  is  con- 
ducted by  secret  ballot. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  it  is  worth  while  to  ob- 
serve that  indirect  elections  in  Prussia  have  worked  in 
the  same  way  as  our  method  of  choosing  the  President 
by  means  of  a  college  of  electors  ;  that  is,  the  Prussian 
electors  do  not  really  select  the  representative,  but  are 
themselves  almost  always  voted  for  in  the  name  of  a 
definite  candidate  whom  they  are  pledged  to  support ; 2 
and,  indeed,  this  must  necessarily  be  the  case  whenever 
the  electors  have  no  other  functions  than  the  election. 

Although  local  institutions  in  Germany  have  not  as 
Local  gov-  direct  a  bearing  on  general  politics  as  in 
France,  the  subject  of  local  government  in 
Prussia  has  a  profound  interest  on  account  of  the  light 
it  throws  on  German  political  conceptions,  and  still 
more  because  it  embodies  a  recent  attempt  to  solve  one 
of  the  most  difficult  problems  of  modern  government.3 

After  the  popular  convulsion  of  1848-49  had  sub- 
The  late  sided,  one  of  those  reactions  set  in  which  have 
re  orms.  been  so  common  in  the  history  of  Prussia. 
The  landowners  and  a  section  of  the  Liberal  party  that 

1  This  is  true  of  the  voting  both  by  the  people  for  the  electors,  and  by 
these  for  the  representatives,  the  Liberal  party  having  tried  in  vain  to 
introduce  the  secret  ballot,     v.  Ronue,  vol.  i.  p.  232  ;  Lebon,  p.  200. 

2  Boettcher,  "  Der  Parlamentarismus  im  Deutschen  Reiche "  Unsere 
Zeit,  1881,  2,  p.  520. 

3  For  a  description  of  the  Prussian  local  government  see  v.  Rbnne, 
§  204  et  seq. ;  Schulze,  Abs.  viii.  ;  Goodnow,  book  iii.  chap.  vii.  On  this 
subject  see  also  Gneist's  works,  and  especially  Die  Kreis-Ordnung,  Zur 
Verwaltungsreform  in  Preussen,  Das  Englische  Verwaltungsrecht,  3d  ed., 
pp.  369-72  and  413-21,  and  "  Les  Re'formes  Administratives  en  Prusse," 
in  the  Revue  Generate  du  Droit  et  des  Sciences  Politiques  for  Oct.  1,  1886. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  309 

thought  all  property  threatened  formed  a  powerful  coa- 
lition, which  was  in  fact  managed  entirely  in  the  interest 
of  the  landowners,  and  these,  as  we  have  seen  when 
treating  of  administrative  justice,  abused  their  power 
beyond  measure  for  the  benefit  of  their  partisans.  As 
a  part  of  their  plan  they  effected  an  organization  of  the 
local  administration  which  placed  the  control  in  their 
own  hands,  and  in  spite  of  all  movements  for  reform 
the  system  they  established  lasted  until  the  foundation 
of  the  Empire. 

At  this  time  the  late  Professor  Gneist,  the  great 
historian  of  the  English  Parliament,  prepared  a  memoir 
on  the  subject  of  local  government  which  was  after- 
wards published  with  some  alterations  under  the  title 
"  Die  Kreis-Ordnung."  He  pointed  out  that  the  imi- 
tations on  the  continent  of  the  English  parliamentary 
system  had  in  most  cases  been  unsuccessful,  because 
the  institutions  which  stood  at  the  top  of  the  British 
form  of  government  had  alone  been  copied,  while  there 
had  been  no  attempt  to  adopt  those  which  lay  at  the 
base  of  the  structure.  He  declared  that  the  whole 
English  system  rested  on  the  organization  of  the  local 
bodies.  In  these  the  taxes  were  paid  and  the  power 
exercised  by  the  upper  and  middle  classes,  which  formed 
in  consequence  a  strong  aristocracy,  and  became  at  the 
same  time  the  natural  leaders  of  public  opinion.  The 
result  was  harmony  between  all  the  classes,  and  the 
development  in  each  electoral  community  of  a  collec- 
tive political  conscience,  producing  there  a  continuous 
Liberal  or  Conservative  tendency,  and  in  the  nation 
at  large  the  permanence  of  party  that  is  essential  to 


310  PRUSSIA. 

the  stability  of  parliamentary  government.1  He  urged 
the  application  of  a  similiar  principle  in  Prussia  as 
being  preferable  both  to  the  half-bureaucratic,  half- 
feudal  system  in  existence,  and  to  the  democratic  sys- 
tem in  vogue  in  other  countries ;  and  he  argued  that 
by  insisting  on  gratuitous  service  on  the  part  of  the 
upper  and  middle  classes  in  local  affairs,  the  state 
would  not  only  improve  the  administration,  but  awaken 
a  public  sentiment  strong  enough  to  counterbalance  the 
conflict  of  classes  and  consolidate  the  electoral  bodies. 
Bismarck  adopted  these  views,  and  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  at  the  outset  of  the  general  public,  of  all  his 
colleagues,  and  of  most  of  the  high  government  officials, 
he  succeeded,  with  the  firm  support  of  the  King,  in 
enacting  from  1872  to  1883  a  series  of  laws  which 
remodeled  the  local  government  on  the  lines  suggested 
by  Gneist. 

One  of  the   chief  objects  aimed  at  by  the  reformers 

was  to  lessen  the  privileges  of  the  great  land- 
of  the  owners.     But  on  the  other  hand  the  control 

was  not  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
masses;  the  intention  being  to  prevent  class  tyranny, 
which  had  been  peculiarly  active  in  Prussia  in  the 
past,  and  to  give  to  each  class  a  certain  share  of  power 
without  allowing  any  one  of  them  to  acquire  a  control- 

1  Gneist  remarks  that  the  change  in  the  basis  of  political  power  in 
England  from  land  to  industry  has  resulted  in  class  conflicts  and  rapid 
changes  of  party,  which  is  not  the  school  in  which  true  public  life  is 
developed.  ("  Les  Rdformes  Administratives,"  op.  cit.)  In  this  con- 
nection may  be  noticed  the  curious  fact  that  Prussia  has  adopted  the 
principles  of  the  old  English  local  government  at  the  very  time  when 
England  has  begun  to  abandon  them. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  311 

ling  authority.  Another  object  of  the  reformers  was 
by  introducing  compulsory  unpaid  offices,  to  lessen  the 
influence  of  the  bureaucracy  in  local  affairs,  and  to 
draft  into  the  public  service  the  better  class  of  private 
citizens.  A  third  object  was  to  establish  a  system  of 
administrative  justice,  and  for  this  purpose  the  reform- 
ers, instead  of  creating  an  entirely  distinct  set  of  tribu- 
nals, took  as  a  model  the  English  Justices  of  the  Peace, 
and  confided  judicial  and  executive  powers  to  the  same 
local  bodies.  Finally,  a  fourth  object  was  to  do  away 
with  special  legislation  altogether,  placing  the  duty  of 
supervising  local  affairs  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the 
administrative  officials.  Now  if  special  legislation  is 
excluded  the  system  needs  to  be  elastic,  and  hence  the 
functions  of  the  local  bodies  in  Prussia  are  not  minutely 
prescribed,  but  power  is  given  to  them  in  general  terms, 
while  the  exercise  of  this  power  is  subjected  to  an 
extensive  control  on  the  part  of  the  higher  adminis- 
trative authorities.  Appeals  from  each  body  to  the 
next  one  above  it  in  the  hierarchical  scale  are  allowed 
with  great  freedom,  the  result  being  a  very  complicated 
procedure.  The  whole  system  is,  in  fact,  not  a  little 
confusing,  and  cannot  be  understood  without  keeping 
in  mind  certain  principles  which  affect  every  part  of  the 
local  government,  and  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  Prussian 
conception  of  administration. 

One  of  these  principles  is  the  separation  of  those 
matters  which  are  supposed  to  affect  the  whole  country 
(Staatsgeschafte),  and  form  a  part  of  the  general  admin- 
istration of  the  state  (Allgemeine  Lantdesv)erwaltung\ 
from  those  which  have  only  a  local  bearing.     The  dis- 


312  PRUSSIA. 

tinction  is  common  to  most  continental  countries,  but 
Se  aration  ^  *s  n0^  0Dvi°us  to  an  American.  In  Prus- 
of^ne^aT  ^  the  subjects  of  police,  religion,  schools, 
adlinLfra-    and    *ne    supervision     of    subordinate    local 

authorities,  for  example,  are  considered  as 
affecting  the  whole  country,  and  are  placed  in  the 
hands  of  persons  who  act  as  agents  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment; while  the  construction  of  roads,  the  mainte- 
nance of  almshouses  and  asylums,  and  the  voting  of 
appropriations  for  purely  local  purposes  are  treated 
as  matters  of  local  interest.  The  subjects  falling  into 
the  domains  of  general  and  local  administration  in 
Prussia  are  sometimes  confided  to  the  same  body,  some- 
times to  separate  ones,  but  in  all  cases  they  are  kept 
carefully  distinct,  the  supervision  and  control  of  the 
government  over  the  matters  of  general  interest  being 
more  strict  and  far-reaching  than  over  the  others. 

Another  distinction  which  it  is  important  to  notice 

is  that  between  those  officers  who  belong  to 

Distinction         .  p        ■  1         1      ■    •    i       •  •  •  i 

between        the    protessional   administrative    service    and 

professional        .  .  1  „ 

and  lay         those    who    do    not,   lor  the    laws    expressly 

officials.  i  •    i       i  i        •  a  i 

provide  to  which  class  the  incumbent  of  each 
office  shall  belong.  The  first  class  are  members  of  the 
Prussian  bureaucracy,  and,  of  course,  are  always  paid. 
Before  they  are  qualified  to  hold  any  position,  they  are 
required  to  go  through  an  elaborate  training,  and  to 
pass  an  examination  which  varies  according  as  they 
intend  to  pursue  a  strictly  administrative,  or  a  judicial 
or  semi-judicial  career.  The  non-professional  officers 
have  no  special  training,  but  are  selected  from  the 
community  at  large,  and  in  most  cases  they  receive  no 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  313 

compensation,  their  work  being,  as  a  rule,  both  gratui- 
tous and  compulsory.  This  separation  of  professional 
and  lay  offices  has  a  strong  tendency  to  discourage  the 
pursuit  of  politics  as  a  trade,  and  the  use  of  appoint- 
ments as  political  rewards ;  for  the  professional  posi- 
tions are  open  only  to  the  members  of  the  bureaucracy, 
and  these  are  expected  to  be  continually  in  office  ;  while 
the  places  reserved  for  laymen,  being  gratuitous,  offer 
no  pecuniary  temptation. 

Prussia  is  divided  into  twelve  provinces,  —  East  Prus- 
sia, West  Prussia,  Brandenburg,  Pomerania,  Theprov- 
Silesia,  Posen,  Saxony,1  Westphalia,  the  Rhine  mces' 
Province,  Hanover,  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  Hesse-Nas- 
sau. These  are  not  new  arbitrary  districts,  but  his- 
torical territories,  which  have  been  left  so  completely 
in  their  original  form  that  parts  of  some  of  them 
comprise  detached  pieces  entirely  surrounded  by  the 
others.  The  new  system  of  local  self-government  was 
originally  applied  only  to  the  six  provinces  first  named, 
lying  in  the  eastern  part  of  Prussia ;  but  the  scope 
of  the  new  laws  has  gradually  been  enlarged  so  as  to 
cover  all  the  provinces  except  Posen,  which  has  been 
suffered  to  remain  under  the  old  bureaucratic  rule, 
partly  because  it  makes  a  very  important  frontier 
against  Russia,  and  partly  because  the  Poles,  who  form 
a  large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants,  have  often  shown 
great  hostility  to  the  Prussian  government.  But  al- 
though the  new  system  has  been  extended  over  almost 
the    whole    of    Prussia,  its   application    has    not   been 

1  The  province  of  Saxony  must  not  be  confused  with  the  kingdom  of 
the  same  name. 


314  PRUSSIA. 

strictly  uniform.  Sometimes  one  name  is  given  to  a 
local  subdivision  or  office,  and  sometimes  another,  while 
in  a  few  points  the  method  of  government  is  substan- 
tially different  in  the  different  provinces.  These  varia- 
tions will  be  noted  in  passing,  where  they  are  of  any 
considerable  importance. 

The  provincial  government  is  closely  connected  with 

that  of  the  lesser  local  divisions ;  so  closely, 
local  divi-      in  fact,  that  before   describing  it   one  must 

explain  what  the  other  divisions  are.  The 
twelve  provinces  are  divided  into  Regierungsbezirke, 
or  government  districts,  of  which  there  are  thirty-five 
in  all.  These  again  are  subdivided  into  Kreise,  or 
circles,  of  which  there  are  four  hundred  and  sixty- 
four,  that  is,  on  the  average,  thirty-nine  in  each  prov- 
ince. The  total  population  of  Prussia,  exclusive  of 
Berlin,  being  about  thirty  millions,  the  average  number 
of  inhabitants  in  a  Kreis  is  about  sixty-four  thousand, 
although,  of  course,  the  variations  in  this  respect  are 
very  great.  Smaller  than  the  Kreise,  there  are  districts 
for  local  police  called  Amtsbezlrke,  and  smallest  of  all 
are  the  rural  Gemeinde,  or  communes,  which  are  in 
many  cases  hardly  more  than  villages.  The  cities  have 
a  special  municipal  organization  of  their  own. 

In  the  province,  the  matters  that  form  part  of  the 

general  administration  of  the  state,  and  those 
of  the  prov-    which  have  a  purely  local  interest,  are  intrusted 

to  entirely  distinct  sets  of  officials.  This  was 
not  the  original  intention,  for  the  bill  as  introduced 
contemplated  only  one  board  or  council  which  should 
deal  with  both  classes  of  subjects ;  but  the  Conserva- 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  315 

tives  in  the  House  of  Peers,  in  order  to  secure  more 
independence  in  local  affairs,  and  to  obtain 

Matters 

greater  power  tor  themselves,  brought  about  which  form 
the  creation  of  a  separate  council  for  each  general  ad- 

x     _  ministration 

class.     The  chief  executive  officer  of  the  prov-  of  *he 
ince  for  matters  of  general  administration  is 
the  Oberprasident,  who  is  a  purely  professional  official 
appointed  by  the  King,  and  acts  as  the  direct  The  0ber 
representative  of  the  ministers  at  Berlin.     He  Prasident- 
attends  to  all  affairs  of  this  nature  that  affect  more  than 
one  Regierungsbezirk,   watches    over   the    subordinate 
administrative  and  local  authorities,  and  presides  in  a 
number  of  boards.     For  the  conduct  of  matters  of  gen- 
eral administration,  there  is  also  a  Provinzial-  The  Pro. 
rath,  or  provincial  council,  composed  of  the  vixmalrath- 
Oberprasident   as    chairman,   of   a   single   professional 
councillor  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  the   Interior 
practically  for  life,  and  of  five  lay  members  elected  for 
six  years  by  the  Provinzialausschuss,  a  body  which  will 
be  described  in  due  course.1     The  Provinzialrath  has  a 
direct  executive  authority  over  a  very  limited  range  of 
subjects,  such  as  the  duration  of  markets  and  the  con- 
struction of  certain  roads ;  but  its  chief  power  is  indi- 
rect.    Of  this  nature  are  its  function  of  hearing  and 
deciding  appeals  from  some  of  the  subordinate  admin- 
istrative bodies,  especially  the  city  councils,  and  more 
important  still  its  control  over  many  of  the  acts  of  the 

1  As  is  generally  the  case  in  the  Prussian  organs  of  local  government 
these  lay  members  are  not  all  elected  at  once,  but  they  are  chosen  by 
twos  and  threes  every  three  years  ;  and,  as  is  also  usually  the  case  in 
these  organs,  a  substitute  for  each  member  of  the  council  is  selected  at 
the  same  time. 


316  PRUSSIA. 

Oberprasident,  all  whose  ordinances,  for  example,  require 
its  consent.1  By  means  of  this  indirect  power  the  lay 
members,  who  form  the  majority,  are  enabled  to  exert  an 
effective  control  over  the  bureaucracy,  a  result  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  authors  of  the  reform  intended  to 
bring  about. 

We  come  now  to  those  matters  which  are  considered 
as  having1  a  purely  local  interest.     The  lesis- 

TVT   ++  f  OX*/  o 

local  in-         lative  organ  for  this  class  of  subiects  is  the 

terest. 

Promnziallandtag,  or  assembly  of  the  prov- 
vinziaL^  ince,  a  body  composed  of  members  elected 
n  tas"  for  six  years  by  the  various  Kreise  into 
which  the  province  is  divided,  half  the  members 
retiring  every  three  years.  The  seats  are  distributed 
among  the  Kreise  according  to  population  ;  but  in  order 
to  avoid  frequent  elections  by  the  people,  the  members 
are  chosen  not  directly  by  them,  but  by  the  diets  of  the 
Kreise,  or,  in  case  a  city  forms  a  Kreis  by  itself  (which 
happens  whenever  it  has  twenty-five  thousand  inhab- 
itants), they  are  chosen  by  the  municipal  authorities. 
The  Provinziallandtag  is  summoned  by  the  crown  to 
meet  at  least  every  two  years,  and  as  much  oftener  as  is 
necessary.  Its  duties  cover  the  construction  of  roads, 
the  maintenance  of  almshouses  and  asylums,  agricultu- 
ral improvements,  the  creation  of  provincial  offices,  the 
enactment  of  by-laws,  the  giving  of  advice  on  provin- 
cial matters  when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  royal  govern- 
ment, and  the  voting  of  appropriations  and  taxes,  the 
latter  being  paid  not   directly  by  the  citizens,  but  by 

1  In  cases  that  are  urgent,  the  Oberprasident  can  make  ordinances  valid 
for  three  months  without  such  consent. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  317 

the  various  Kreise,  which  are  thus  the  provincial  unit 
for  both  taxation  and  representation.1  It  is  impossible, 
however,  to  give  a  complete  catalogue  of  the  functions 
of  the  Landtag,  because  it  is  empowered  in  general 
terms  to  do  anything  it  thinks  best  within  the  domain 
of  provincial  administration.  But  an  authority  so 
vague  and  comprehensive  implies  a  careful  supervision 
and  control  on  the  part  of  the  government,  and  hence 
the  Oberprasident,  as  the  representative  of  the  state, 
is  given  a  right  to  be  present  in  the  Landtag,  and  can 
suspend  any  of  its  acts  which  are  beyond  its  com- 
petence.2 Moreover,  its  by-laws  require  the  approval 
of  the  crown,  while  all  loans,  all  taxes  above  a  cer- 
tain amount,  and  a  number  of  other  acts,  require  the 
consent  of  one  or  more  of  the  ministers  at  Berlin. 
Finally,  in  case  the  Landtag  becomes  refractory,  it 
can  be  dissolved  by  the  King. 

The    executive    organ    of    the    province    for   local 
matters  is  the  Provinzialcmsschuss,  or  pro- 

•       •    ,  •  n  „     7  ,r  The  Pro- 

vincial   committee,     composed    or    members   vinziai- 

ausschuss. 

elected  by  the  Provinziallandtag  for  six  years, 
and  varying  in  number  according  to  the  by-laws,  from 
seven  to  fourteen.3  This  body  carries  out  the  votes 
of  the  Landtag,  and  has  under  its  orders  a  salaried 
administrative  officer  called  the  Lcmdeshauptmann  or 
Landesdirector,  who  is  ex  officio  one  of  its  members, 

1  A  considerable  part  of  the  revenues  of  the  provinces  is,  however, 
derived  from  subsidies  granted  by  the  state. 

2  The  Oberprasident  does  not  preside,  but  acts  only  as  a  sort  of  royal 
commissioner,  the  Landtag  being  allowed,  in  accordance  with  the  older 
traditions,  to  choose  its  own  presiding  officer. 

3  As  usual,  one  half  of  them  retire  every  three  years. 


318  PRUSSIA. 

and  is  also  elected  by  the  Landtag,  but  must  be  con- 
firmed by  the  King.  In  the  province,  therefore,  the 
administration  of  general  and  local  matters  is  placed 
in  entirely  distinct  hands,  the  former  being  confided  to 
the  Provinzialrath  and  the  latter  to  the  Provinzialaus- 
schuss.  These  are  the  two  bodies  that  were  combined 
in  the  original  plan,  but  were  separated  by  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Conservatives  in  the  House  of  Peers. 
Such  a  separation  is  not,  however,  carried  into  any  of 
the  smaller  local  divisions ;  for,  although  the  two 
classes  of  subjects  are  kept  distinct,  there  is  no  other 
case  where  they  are  intrusted  to  different  organs 
existing  side  by  side  in  the  same  district. 

There  are  some  variations  in  the  government  of 
the  different  provinces  which  are  not  of 
sufficient  consequence  to  require  special  men- 
tion here.  But  it  is  important  to  notice  that  Berlin 
is  separated  both  for  central  and  local  administration 
from  Brandenburg,  and  forms  for  these  purposes  vir- 
tually a  province  by  itself.  It  has,  however,  no  special 
provincial  organization,  all  the  duties  that  would  other- 
wise fall  to  the  provincial  authorities  being  discharged 
by  the  municipal  officers,  except  the  police,  which  is 
confided  to  a  commission  appointed  by  the  royal  gov- 
ernment. 

In  the  province  local  affairs  play  a  much  more  promi- 

The  Regie-  nent  part  than  those  which  affect  the  whole 
rungsbezirk.   state .    but   the   next    clivisions?   the   Regie- 

The  Regie-  rungsbezirke,  exist  solely  for  the  conduct  of 
rung.  general    administration.      In    each    of   these 

districts   there  is  a  Regierung,   or  government,  com- 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  319 

posed  exclusively  of  professional  officials  appointed  by 
the  King,  and  having  at  its  head  a  Hegierungsjirasi- 
dent,  who  has  a  very  considerable  power  of  overriding 
its  decisions.  It  has  charge  of  questions  relating  to 
state  taxes,  churches,  schools,  and  the  public  domain ; 
in  other  words,  all  matters  that  are  administered 
directly  by  the  officials  of  the  district,  except  the 
police.  This,  together  with  the  control  of  subordinate 
authorities,  is  confided  to  the  JBezirksaus-  TheBezirks- 
schass,  or  district  committee.  The  object  aussehuss- 
of  the  arrangement  was  to  keep  state  taxes  and  the 
other  matters  already  enumerated  exclusively  in  the 
hands  of  professional  officials,  but  to  place  the  police 
and  the  supervision  of  local  bodies  under  control  of 
laymen.  In  the  Bezirksausschuss,  therefore,  the  popu- 
lar or  lay  element  predominates,  for  of  the  seven 
members  four  are  non-professional  men  elected  by  the 
Provinzialausschuss  for  six  years,  one  half  being 
chosen  every  three  years.  Of  the  three  remaining  mem- 
bers, one  is  the  Regierungsprasident ;  another  must  be 
qualified  for  the  judicial,  and  the  third  for  the  higher 
administrative  service,  both  of  the  last  being  appointed 
by  the  King  for  life.  The  functions  of  the  committee 
are  threefold :  first,  its  consent  is  required  for  police 
ordinances  made  by  the  Regierungsprasident ;  second, 
with  that  officer  as  its  chairman,  it  supervises  the  in- 
ferior local  authorities,  and  hears  appeals  from  their 
decisions  in  matters  of  official  discretion  ;  lastly,  it  acts 
as  an  administrative  court,  and  in  that  case  the  Re- 
gierungsprasident does  not  sit,  but  the  judicial  mem- 
ber presides,  and  all  the  members  enjoy  the  immunity 
of  judges. 


320  PRUSSIA. 

The  organization  of  the  Regierungsbezirk  seems  to 
a  foreigner  needlessly  complex,  and  the  division  of 
its  functions  between  two  bodies  somewhat  unneces- 
sary, especially  when  we  consider  that  both  of  them 
act  as  agents  of  the  central  government,  and  deal 
only  with  those  matters  that  are  supposed  to  affect  the 
whole  state.  But  the  system  is,  in  fact,  the  result  of  a 
careful  and  logical  application  of  the  modern  Prussian 
theories  of  administration.  In  the  first  place,  it  was 
thought,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  matters  of  state 
taxes,  schools,  etc.,  ought  to  be  managed  entirely  by 
professional  officials,  but  that  the  police,  in  its  wider 
sense,  and  the  supervision  of  the  organs  of  local  self- 
government,  ought  to  be  largely  under  the  control  of 
laymen.  Hence  the  separation  between  the  Regierung 
and  the  Bezirksausschuss.  In  the  second  place,  it  was 
felt  that  a  sharp  line  ought  to  be  drawn  between  execu- 
tive action  and  judicial  decisions ;  that  the  Regierungs- 
prasident,  who  might  be  concerned  with  the  issuing  of 
police  ordinances  by  the  subordinate  local  authorities, 
ought  not  to  sit  in  the  tribunal  that  passed  upon  their 
legality.  From  1872  to  1875  the  same  body  had 
exercised  both  classes  of  functions,  but  experience 
showed  the  evils  of  this  arrangement,  and  in  the  latter 
year  two  separate  bodies  were  created.  In  1882  they 
were  again  united,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  and  the 
lay  members  were  suffered  to  act  in  both  capacities  ; 
but  it  was  provided  that  the  professional  members 
should  be  changed  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
business  to  be  transacted.1 

1  See  Gneist,  Zur  Venoaltungsreform,  ch.  viii.  ;  Das  Englische  Verwal- 
tungsrecht,  3d  ed.,  pp.  420-21,  and  "  Les  Re'f  ornies  Administrate ves,"  op.  cit. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  321 

In  the  Kreis,  or  circle,  the  distinction  between  the 
spheres  of  central  and  local  administration  is 
again  preserved,   but  both   are   intrusted  to 
the  same  organs,  which  exercise  therefore  a  double  set 
of  functions.     These   organs,   however,   are    subjected 
to  a  strict  supervision  and  control,  especially  on  the 
part    of    the   Bezirksausschuss.       The    chief  The  Land- 
executive   officer  of  the  Kreis   is   the   Land- 
rath,   who   is   appointed  by  the  Oberpriisident,  and  is 
usually,  but  not   necessarily,  selected  from  a  list  pre- 
sented by  the  Kreistag,   or  diet    of  the  circle.      He 
is  a  strictly  professional  officer,  and  must  have  passed 
examinations    qualifying  him  for  the  higher   adminis- 
trative service.      As    his  competence  extends   to  both 
central   and   local    matters,    his    duties   are  analogous 
not  only  to   those  performed  in  the  province  by  the 
Oberprasident,    but    also    to    those    intrusted    to    the 
Landesdirector.     Moreover,  he  presides  over  the  Kreis- 
tagr  and  the  Kreisausschuss. 

The  body  last  mentioned,  composed  of  the  Landrath 
and  six  lay  members  elected  by  the  Kreistag  The  Kre.g_ 
for  six  years,  is  the  executive  committee  of  ausscllU3S- 
the  circle,  and  as  such  it  corresponds  to  the  Pro- 
vinzialausschuss.  But  it  has  also  functions  analogous 
to  those  formerly  exercised  by  the  English  justices  of 
the  peace  in  the  special  and  quarter  sessions.  In 
this  capacity  it  hears  appeals  from  the  acts  of  the 
subordinate  officials.  It  is,  indeed,  the  lowest  ad- 
ministrative court :  and  herewith  is  connected  a  dis- 
tinction in  procedure  ;  for  when  an  executive  matter  is 
under    consideration,  the    session    is   secret   and   the 


322  PRUSSIA. 

members  are  liable  for  their  acts  like  other  officials ; 
but  when  an  administrative  cause  is  tried,  the  session 
is  public,  the  procedure  is  judicial,  and  the  members 
are  protected  like  judges.  The  preponderance  of 
the  lay  element  in  the  Kreisausschuss  has  prevented 
bureaucratic  routine,  while  the  presence  of  the  Land- 
rath  has  preserved  the  interests  of  the  state,  and  in 
fact  this  body,  which  is  certainly  one  of  the  most 
characteristic  features  of  the  new  system,  is  generally 
considered  one  of  the  most  successful. 

Before  turning  to  the  Kreistag  there  is  one  officer 
TheAmts-  wno  mus^  be  considered,  because  he  is  in 
vorsteher.  reality  a  member  of  the  executive  govern- 
ment of  the  Kreis.  This  is  the  Amtsvorsteher  or 
Amtmann,  whose  authority  extends  over  a  district 
comprising  a  number  of  communes,  and  containing 
about  fifteen  hundred  inhabitants.  He  occupies  a 
position  similar  to  that  of  an  English  justice  of  the 
peace  (except  that  he  has  no  strictly  judicial  func- 
tions), for  he  administers  the  poor  and  health  laws 
and  takes  charge  of  the  police,  having  under  his  orders 
for  this  purpose  the  mayors  of  the  communes.  He  is 
appointed  by  the  King  for  six  years  from  a  list  drawn 
up  by  the  Kreistag,  and  is  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Kreisausschuss.  The  object  of  creating  this  office  was 
to  take  the  control  of  the  police  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  hereditary  magistrates  and  intrust  it,  not  to  the 
bureaucracy,  but  to  the  better  class  of  citizens  selected 
from  the  community  at  large ;  and  hence  the  office  is 
compulsory  and  unpaid.  Like  the  English  justice  of 
the  peace,  the  Amtsvorsteher  is  chosen  as  a  rule  from 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  323 

among  the  large  landowners,  who  therefore  continue  to 
perform  as  officers  of  the  crown  the  same  functions 
they  formerly  exercised  in  their  own  right.1 

The  representative  body  of  the  Kreis  is  called  the 
Kreistag,  and  like  most  of  the  other  organs  The  ^^ 
of  local  government  it  is  elected  for  six  tag< 
years,  one  half  of  the  members  retiring  every  three 
years.  It  has  power  to  make  rules  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  local  affairs,  to  create  local  offices,  and  to 
establish  charitable  and  other  institutions  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  Kreis ;  but  its  most  important  business  is 
raising  a  revenue,  which  it  does  by  making  additions 
to  the  direct  state  tax.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  expenses  of  the  province,  so  far  as  they  are  not 
defrayed  by  donations  from  the  state  treasury,  are 
assessed  upon  the  Kreis,  which  thus  votes  the  taxes 
required,  not  only  for  its  own,  but  also  for  the  pro- 
vincial administration.  In  order,  therefore,  to  prevent 
extravagance,  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  the  Kreistag 
shall  not,  without  the  consent  of  the  superior  authori- 
ties, make  an  addition  of  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  to 
the  state  tax,  or  contract  any  loans  not  specially  au- 
thorized. 

The  Kreistag  is,  however,  a  body  of  far  greater 
importance  than  this  description  of  its  functions  would 
indicate,  for  it  chooses,  directly  or  indirectly,  all  the 
elective  officers  of  the  Kreis,  the  Regierungsbezirk, 
and  the  province.  It  is  thus  the  foundation  on  which 
rest  all  the  organs  of  local  self-government,  except  the 

1  C.  Bornhak,  "  The    Local  Government  of  Country  Communities  in 
Prussia,"  Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.,  Jan.,  1893,  p.  7. 


324  PRUSSIA. 

cities  and  the  rural  communes,  because  it  is  the  source 
from  which  their  members  are  derived.  The  charac- 
ter of  the  whole  local  government  depends,  therefore, 
on  the  method  of  election  to  the  Kreistag.  Before 
1875  the  franchise  was  so  regulated  that  the  great 
landowners  held  almost  all  the  power;  but  although 
under  the  new  system  the  three  former  electoral 
colleges  of  landowners,  peasants,  and  cities  have 
been  retained,  they  have  been  reorganized  with  a 
view  of  preventing  any  one  of  them  from  acquiring 
a  decided  preponderance.  The  representatives  are 
allotted  to  these  three  colleges,  or  Verbande,  as  they 
are  called,  in  the  following  complicated  manner : x 
first,  they  are  divided  between  the  cities  and  the  rural 
districts  according  to  population,  subject,  however,  to 
the  provision  that  all  the  cities  in  the  Kreis  shall  not 
together  elect  more  than  one  half  of  the  members, 
or,  if  there  is  only  one  city,  it  shall  not  elect  more 
than  a  third.  The  urban  seats  are  then  distributed 
among  the  cities,  the  representatives  being  chosen, 
not  by  the  inhabitants,  but  by  the  municipal  authori- 
ties ;  and  lastly  the  seats  that  fall  to  the  rural  dis- 
tricts are  divided  equally  between  the  two  remaining 
colleges.  Of  these,  the  college  of  the  great  land- 
owners, or  rather  the  large  tax-payers,  is  composed  of 
all  persons,  natural  or  corporate,  who  pay  within  the 
Kreis  and  outside  of  the  cities  a  tax  on  land  or  trade, 

1  A  representative  must  be  a  member  of  the  college  by  which  he  is 
chosen;  and  if,  as  in  the  case  of  the  cities  and  rural  communes,  the 
election  is  made  by  districts,  he  must  be  a  voter  in  the  district  which  he 
represents. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  325 

which  may  be  fixed  by  the  Provinziallandtag  at  any 
sum  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  four  hundred 
and  fifty  marks,  each  member  of  the  college  having 
a  single  vote.  The  third  college  has  a  much  more  com- 
plicated organization.  The  electors  consist,  first,  of 
all  persons  who  pay  within  the  rural  portion  of  the 
Kreis  a  small  tax  on  their  trade  or  occupation ;  second, 
of  delegates  chosen  by  the  assemblies  of  the  rural 
communes ;  and  third,  of  the  proprietors  of  manors, 
which  are  treated  like  communes,  but  are,  in  fact, 
fast  disappearing.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  method 
of  electing  the  Kreistag  is  by  no  means  democratic, 
since  the  suffrage  is  neither  universal  nor  equal.  The 
system  is  not  based  on  the  theory  that  every  man 
ought  to  have  an  equal  share  in  the  management  of 
public  affairs,  but  proceeds  on  the  principle  of  so 
balancing  the  various  interests  in  the  community  that 
no  one  of  them  can  oppress  another.  Interests,  not 
numbers,  are  represented,  and  hence  plural  voting, 
which  has  been  so  much  decried  of  late  in  England, 
is  deliberately  sanctioned,  for  residence  in  the  Kreis 
is  not  required,  but  a  man  can  vote  wherever  he  owns 
property  or  carries  on  his  business.  Even  the  state  is 
allowed  to  cast  a  ballot  if  it  possesses  land,  —  a  privi- 
lege which,  in  the  college  of  large  tax-payers,  is  also 
extended  to  women,  infants  and  lunatics  acting  by 
means  of  their  representatives. 

The    government    of  the    Landfjemeinde,    or    small 
rural  communities,  has  recently  been  simpli-  The  rural 
fled  by  the  statutes  of  1891-92,  which  apply  comraune8- 
to   the     seven    eastern    provinces   and    to   Schleswig- 


326  PRUSSIA. 

Holstein.1  By  these  acts  the  franchise,  which  was 
formerly  confined  to  landowners,  has  been  extended  to 
all  persons  who  pay  a  certain  tax  or  have  a  certain 
income.  Yet  the  more  recent  laws  are  in  some  ways 
less  democratic  than  the  older  ones,  for  all  the  citizens 
who  enjoyed  the  franchise  were  formerly  treated  alike 
and  given  a  single  vote  apiece,  but  now  one  third  of 
the  total  voting  power  is  exercised  by  each  of  the 
three  classes  of  tax-payers  without  regard  to  numbers. 
This  is  true  of  the  smaller  communes,  where  business 
is  transacted  by  a  mass  meeting  of  all  the  voters,  as 
well  as  of  the  larger  ones,  where  it  applies  to  the 
election  of  a  representative  council.2  Owing  to  the 
small  size  of  the  communes,  their  powers  are  far 
from  extensive,  and  their  organization  is  comparatively 
simple. 

The  mass  meeting  of  citizens,  or  the  representative 
body,  as  the  case  may  be,  regulates  the  common  pas- 
turage, the  churches,  the  schools,  and  the  less  important 
roads.  It  also  elects  for  six  years  a  mayor,  known  in 
some  parts  of  the  country  as  the  Schulze,  in  others 
as  the  Gemeindevorsteher  or  Dorfsrichter ;  and  it 
chooses  in  the  same  way  one  or  more  assistants  called 
Scho-ppen,  Gerichtsmanner,  or  Dorfsgeschicorene? 
The  Schulze  is  the   executive  head  of  the   commune, 

1  For  a  review  of  these  acts,  see  C.  Bornhak,  "  The  Local  Government 
of  Country  Communities  in  Prussia,"  op.  cit. 

2  In  the  western  provinces  the  three-class  system  does  not  apply, 
but  the  larger  tax-payers  are  given  a  special  share  of  power.  There 
appear  to  be  elected  councils  in  all  the  communes  of  these  provinces. 

3  The  choice  of  these  officers  can  be  vetoed  by  the  Landrath  with  the 
consent  of  the  Kreisausschuss.  In  the  Rhine  Province  the  Schulze  is 
appointed  by  the  Landrath. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT.  327 

and  subject  to  the  control  of  the  meeting  of  citizens, 
or  the  representative  body,  he  administers  the  local 
affairs,  the  Schoppen  being  only  his  advisers.  He  is 
also  an  officer  of  the  central  government,  and  in  that 
capacity  has  control  of  the  police.  He  is  not,  how- 
ever, a  professional  member  of  the  bureaucracy,  and 
his  position  is  both  obligatory  and  unpaid.  Many  of 
the  rural  communes  and  manors  are  too  small  to  per- 
form their  duties  properly,  and,  as  they  have  shown 
themselves  reluctant  to  unite  voluntarily  into  larger 
groups,  the  acts  of  1891-92  empowered  the  superior 
authorities,  when  necessary,  to  combine  them,  either 
for  all  local  purposes,  or  for  certain  special  ones.  The 
change  in  the  law  aroused  no  little  opposition  on 
the  part  of  the  landed  gentry,  who  want  to  preserve 
as  far  as  possible  the  political  independence  of  their 
estates. 

Among   the    remnants    of   the    feudal    system    that 
still  exist  in  Prussia,  there  are  a  few  manors 

7        •  mi  e  i  ^ie  manor- 

(Guts bezir Ice).  These  form  communes  by 
themselves,  the  administration  of  public  affairs  being 
in  the  hands  of  the  lord  of  the  manor,  who  bears  all 
the  charges  at  his  own  expense,  and  has  a  right  to 
act  as  mayor  himself  or  appoint  a  deputy  to  fill  the 
office,  subject,  however,  in  either  case,  to  the  approval 
of  the  Land  rath. 

The  government  of  the  Prussian  cities  is  regulated 
by  statutes  which  are  older  than  the  reform 
laws   of    1872,  and  which  are    not  identical 
for  all  the  different  provinces.     The  general  principles, 
however,   are   much   the   same   in  most   parts   of  the 


828  PRUSSIA. 

kingdom.1  The  central  organ  of  the  system  is  the 
Thecit  C^J  councnl?  composed  of  members  (Stadtver- 
councii.  ordnete)  chosen  generally,  if  not  always,  by 
the  citizens  voting  in  three  classes,  according  to  the 
amount  of  taxes  they  pay,  the  method  of  election 
being  the  same  as  that  employed  in  the  case  of  the 
Prussian  House  of  Representatives.  Of  course,  this 
system  throws  a  controlling  power  into  the  hands  of 
a  comparatively  small  number  of  the  richer  men,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  in  Bonn,  at  the  elec- 
tions of  1885,  the  first  class  of  highest  tax-payers 
contained  only  five  per  cent,  of  the  voters,  and  the 
second  only  fourteen  and  a  half  per  cent. ;  so  that  less 
than  one  fifth  of  the  voters  (or  six  hundred  and  thirty- 
three  men  out  of  a  population  of  over  thirty-five 
thousand),  elected  two  thirds  of  the  council,  while  the 
remaining  four  fifths  elected  the  other  third.2  In 
Berlin  the  proportions  are  even  more  unequal,  the  first 
class  containing  less  than  two  per  cent,  of  the  voters, 
the  second  less  than  thirteen  per  cent.,  and  the  third 
eighty-six  per  cent.  Sometimes  the  inequality  is  still 
greater,  as  for  example  in  Essen,  which  has  been  built 
up  by  the  Krupp  gun-works  into  a  city  of  nearly  one 
hundred  thousand  people,  and  yet  where  the  class  of 
highest  tax-payers  consists  of  only  four  men.3  The 
members  of  the  council  are,  as  usual,  elected  for  six 

1  In  addition  to  the  authorities  already  cited,  see  Leclerc,  "  La  Vie 
Munieipale  en  Prusse,"  Annates  de  VEcole  Libre  des  Sciences  Politiques, 
188S,  p.  492  ;  and  Albert  Shaw,  Municipal  Government  in  Continental 
Europe,  chs.  v.  and  vi. 

2  Leclerc,  lb.,  pp.  504-5. 
8  Shaw,  pp.  307-8. 


THE   CITIES.  329 

years,  one  third  retiring  every  two  years.  Their  num- 
ber varies  in  the  different  cities,  being  on  the  average 
about  fifty ;  but  in  some  cases  it  is  much  larger,  as 
for  example  in  Berlin,  where  it  is  one  hundred  and 
twenty-six.  The  council  has  general  control  of  the 
city  administration,  electing  the  executive  officials,1 
and  directing  how  the  public  business  shall  be  con- 
ducted. It  has,  in  fact,  an  exceedingly  wide  discre- 
tion, for  the  statutes  do  not  define  the  functions  which 
the  municipality  shall  exercise,  but  allow  the  council 
to  undertake  whatever  public  services  it  sees  fit,  —  a 
power  which  has  been  used  in  a  number  of  Prussian 
cities  to  establish  municipal  savings  banks  and  pawn- 
shops, and  gas  and  electric  plants  for  the  supply  of 
both  public  and  private  wants.  An  authority  of  such 
an  unlimited  character  is  not  of  course  granted  without 
some  means  of  supervision,  and  this  is  found  partly  in 
the  executive  board  of  the  city,  which  has  power  to 
veto  any  measures  of  the  council  that  require  its 
own  active  participation,  and  do  not  fall  within  the 
ordinary  current  administration,  and  partly  in  the 
Bezirksausschuss,  whose  consent  is  required  for  certain 
important  matters,  notably  for  loans  and  taxes  above  a 
certain  limit. 

The  executive  body  of  the  city  (Gemeindevorstcmd, 
Magistratsrath,  or  Stadtrath)  is  in  most  of  Theeity 
the  provinces  a  board,  consisting  of  a  burgo-  executlve- 
master  and  a  number  of  professional    and   lay  mem- 

1  In  Hanover  the  members  of  the  Stadtrath,  or  executive  board  of  the 
city,  take  part  in  the  election  of  their  colleagues  or  successors.  In 
Schleswig-Holstein  these  officers  are  chosen  directly  by  the  citizens. 


330  PRUSSIA. 

bers,  the  services  of  the  last  being  obligatory  and 
unpaid.1  The  board  manages  the  different  depart- 
ments of  the  administration  by  means  of  permanent 
commissions,  each  of  which  contains  in  like  manner 
both  professional  and  lay  members  selected  by  the 
city  council  with  the  approval  of  the  executive  board. 
The  object  of  the  system  is  to  enlist  a  large  number 
of  private  citizens  in  the  service  of  the  city,  the 
necessary  technical  knowledge  being  supplied  by  the 
presence  of  the  professional  officials.  The  burgomaster 
Theburgo-  is  on^J  the  president  of  the  executive  board, 
master.  an(j  jjas  n0  Spec£al  functions ;  but  his  office 
is  nevertheless  the  most  important  one  in  the  city, 
owing  to  the  great  influence  he  derives  from  his  pro- 
fessional training;  and  his  lonof  tenure  of  office.  The 
occupation  is,  indeed,  a  career,  for  when  a  city  is  in 
need  of  a  burgomaster  it  advertises  for  applicants, 
and  often  takes  one  who  has  made  a  reputation  in  a 
smaller  place.2  Moreover,  the  appointment  must  be 
made  for  at  least  twelve  years,  and  may  be  made  for 
life ;  but  whatever  the  nominal  term  of  office  may  be, 
the  position  is  virtually  permanent,  a  good  man,  it  is 
said,  being  always  reappointed.3  It  must  be  added 
that,  as  compared  with  the  usual  pay  of  officials  in 
Germany,  the  salary  is  very  large. 

1  In  the  Rhine  Province,  the  cities  have  a  right  to  establish  either  a 
board  of  this  kind,  or  a  single  executive  officer,  —  the  burgomaster. 
Most  of  the  cities  have  preferred  the  latter.  Leclerc,  ubi  supra,  pp. 
509-12. 

2  Goodnow,  p.  333  ;  Leclerc,  p.  511 ;  Shaw,  pp.  317-19. 

3  From  1850  to  1888  Bonn  had  only  two  burgomasters.  In  fact,  the 
first  one  was  reelected  for  a  third  term  of  twelve  years,  but  the  govern- 
ment refused  to  confirm  him.     Leclerc,  p.  510. 


THE  CITIES.  331 

Like  most  of  the  agencies  of  local  government,  the 
Stadtrath  exercises  a  double  set  of  functions,  and  is 
placed  under  a  double  supervision.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  is  the  executive  organ  of  the  city  for  matters  of 
purely  municipal  interest,  and  as  such  it  is  controlled 
by  the  city  council,  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the 
Bezirksausschuss.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  intrusted 
with  the  administration  of  affairs  affecting-  the  whole 
state,  and  in  these  it  is  checked  by  the  Regierung. 
But  unlike  the  rural  communities,  this  is  not  considered 
a  sufficient  guarantee  of  law  and  order.  The  state  has, 
therefore,  reserved  the  right  to  put  the  city  police  into 
the  hands  of  a  commission  appointed  by  itself,  and 
in  the  case  of  the  large  cities  it  has  commonly  done  so.1 
As  an  additional  safeguard,  moreover,  the  selection  of 
the  burgomaster,  and  in  fact  of  all  the  professional 
members  of  the  Stadtrath,  requires  the  approval  of  the 
central  government,  which,  in  Bismarck's  day,  seems  to 
have  been  often  refused  for  political  reasons. 

In  regard  to  the  actual  working  of  local  government 
in  Prussia,  a  foreigner  must  express  an  opin- 

.  .  .  ml  .  .   -,-,       Actual 

ion   with  great   caution.      Inis  is   especially  working  of 

„,  ....  ,  ,...  the  system- 

true  of   the  provincial  and  rural  institutions, 

both  on  account  of  the  comparatively  short  time  they 

have  been  in  operation,  and   because  it  is  difficult  to 

acquire  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  country  districts, 

1  Cf .  Shaw,  p.  321.  When  a  city  has  over  twenty-five  thousand  inhab- 
itants,  its  share  of  the  general  or  state  administration  is  still  further 
increased,  because  it  forms  a  Kreis  by  itself.  Under  these  circumstances 
a  Stadtausschuss,  composed  of  the  burgomaster  and  four  persons  elected 
by  the  city  council,  is  formed  to  act  as  an  administrative  court,  and  to 
attend  to  other  duties  usually  performed  by  the  Kreisausschuss. 


332  PRUSSIA. 

or  to  find  any  really  decisive  test  of  efficiency.  The 
best  evidence  in  favor  of  that  part  of  the  new  scheme 
consists  in  the  fact  that  its  author,  Professor  Gneist, 
was  well  satisfied  with  its  results.1  In  the  case  of  the 
cities,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  to  form  a  more 
positive  judgment,  and  this  is  fortunate,  because  in 
most  countries  of  the  present  day  the  problem  of  muni- 
cipal government  is  more  pressing  and  far  more  difficult 
than  that  of  rural  administration.  The  Prussian  sys- 
tem has  succeeded  in  enlisting  in  the  public  service 
the  best  class  of  citizens.  Merchants,  professional 
men,  and  even  scholars,  think  it  an  honor  to  sit  in  the 
council,  and  reflections  are  so  general  that  a  steady 
progressive  policy  can  be  pursued.  Among  the  pro- 
fessional officials,  also,  capable  public  servants  virtually 
enjoy  a  permanent  tenure  of  office.  In  short,  politics, 
in  the  lower  sense  of  the  term,  seems,  as  a  rule,  to  have 
very  little  to  do  with  the  administration  of  the  city, 
which  is  conducted  on  strictly  business  principles  ;  and 
the  result  is  not  only  honesty,  but  efficiency  and  econ- 
omy in  a  high  degree.2  Unfortunately  the  govern- 
ment that  is  best  administered  is  not  necessarily  perfect, 
and  the  Prussian  municipal  system  seems  to  have  one 
grave  defect.  Its  excellence  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  city  is  governed  by  the  most  intelligent  and 
thrifty  class  of  citizens,  by  those  who  pay  the  taxes, 
and  hence  are  anxious  to  see  that  the  revenues  are 
carefully  and    wisely  spent.     But  the  preponderating 

1  See  Zur   Verwaltungsreform,  ch.  vi.  ;  Der  Rechtsstaat,  2d  ed.  pp.  314- 
20  ;  "  Les  Re"formes  Admhristratives,"  ubi  supra. 

2  Cf.  Shaw,  pp.  311,  332-33  ;  Leclerc,  pp.  516-19. 


RESULTS   OF  THE   NEW  SYSTEM.  333 

influence  given  to  the  rich  seems  to  be  a  cause  of  dis- 
content among  the  poor.  Their  indifference  is  shown 
by  the  small  part  of  the  lowest  class  of  tax-payers  who 
take  the  trouble  to  vote  at  municipal  elections.  At 
Berlin,  for  example,  in  1893,  forty-seven  and  a  half 
per  cent,  of  the  first  class  of  tax-payers  voted,  thirty- 
seven  per  cent,  of  the  second,  and  twenty-six  and  a  half 
per  cent,  of  the  third.1  In  Bonn  the  disproportion  at 
the  elections  of  1885  was  even  greater,  for  sixty-four 
per  cent,  of  the  first  class  and  sixty-six  of  the  second 
voted,  but  only  twenty-two  of  the  third.  In  the  last 
of  these  cities,  indeed,  it  is  a  striking  fact  that  while 
the  proportion  of  voters  in  the  first  two  classes  had, 
on  the  whole,  increased  during  the  preceding  ten  years, 
that  in  the  third  had  steadily  diminished.2  The  in- 
difference on  the  part  of  the  working-classes  is  not  the 
result  of  mere  apathy  or  lack  of  interest  in  public  affairs. 
It  is  a  symptom  of  a  graver  trouble.  The  large  cities 
of  Prussia  are  teeming  with  socialists,  whose  moving 
sentiment  is  a  profound  dissatisfaction  with  the  political 
and  social  condition  of  the  state,  and  not  least  amonof 
their  causes  of  discontent  may  be  placed  their  small 
share  in  the  municipal  administration.  The  present 
system  of  local  government  certainly  has  not  produced 
in  the  cities  the  harmony  between  the  different  classes 
which  was  urged  as  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  late 
reforms.3 

1  Shaw,  pp.  307-8. 

2  The  abstention  of  the  poor  is  said  to  be  clue  partly  to  the  small  im- 
portance of  their  votes,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that,  the  vote  being  oral 
and  public,  the  workmen  are  afraid  to  declare  themselves  openly  in  favor 
of  a  candidate  who  is  opposed  by  their  employers.     Leclerc,  pp.  505-6. 

3  The  actual  municipal  system  antedates  Gneist's  memoir,  but  is  quite 


334  SAXONY. 

The  smaller  German  States  are  far  less  important 
factors  in  the  Empire  than  Prussia,  and  yet  a 
German  description  of  the  political  system  of  Ger- 
many would  not  be  complete  without  a  refer- 
ence to  their  institutions.  With  the  exception  of  the 
three  Hanse  cities,  each  of  these  States  has  a  mo- 
narchical form  of  government ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  all  of  them  save  the  Mecklenburgs,  a  repre- 
sentative body,  elected  on  a  more  or  less  extended 
suffrage,  has  a  general  control  over  legislation  and 
finance.  The  ministers,  however,  are  nowhere  respon- 
sible to  this  body  in  the  parliamentary  sense,  and  hence 
the  princes  exercise  personally  a  great  deal  of  power. 
Throughout  Germany,  therefore,  the  monarchical  prin- 
ciple retains  its  vigor ;  and  while  the  representatives  of 
the  people  have  obtained  a  share  in  the  direction  of 
public  affairs,  in  no  State  have  they  drawn  the  whole 
conduct  of  the  government  into  their  own  hands.  Let 
us  consider  briefly  these  States  in  succession. 

The  existing  Saxon  constitution  was  made  in  1831, 

Saxony  Du^  smce  that  time  amendments  have  been 

sq'.^Q.'fpop.   passed  extending  the  franchise  and  increasing 

the  power  of  the  Landtag,2 — an  amendment 

in  accord  with  its  principles.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Gneist  spoke  of 
the  harmony  of  classes,  he  was  referring  primarily  to  rural  communities. 
Bornhak,  in  a  memoir  of  Gneist,  comments  on  the  failure  of  his  system 
in  this  respect.     (Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  Sci.,  March,  1896,  pp.  94-95.) 

1  The  populations  given  in  the  text  are  those  of  the  census  of  Dec.  1, 
1890. 

2  See  Leuthold,  Sachsen,  in  Marquardsen.  The  constitutions  of  all 
the  German  States  in  force  in  1884  (except  the  Mecklenburgs,  which 
have  no  written  constitutions)  may  be  found  in  Stoerk,  Handbuch  der 
Deutschen  Verfassungen. 


THE  KING.  335 

requiring  in  each  chamber  the  presence  of  three  quar- 
ters of  the  members  and  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  those 
present.1  In  order  to  prevent  conflicts  on  constitu- 
tional questions,  there  has  been  established  in  Saxony 
and  in  some  of  the  other  German  States  a  special  tri- 
bunal, called  the  Staatsgerichtshqf,  composed  of  six 
judges  selected  by  the  King,  and  six  members  of  the 
Landtag,  three  of  whom  are  chosen  by  each  of  the 
chambers.  The  duties  of  this  body  consist  in  trying 
impeachments,  and  deciding  any  disputes  about  the 
interpretation  of  the  constitution. 

At  the  head  of  the  state  is  the  King,2  whose  admin- 
istrative authority  and  power  to  issue  ordinances  ap- 
pear to  be,  if  anything,  even  more  extensive  than  in 
most  of  the  German  States.  His  control  over  legisla- 
tion  is  also  unusually  wide,  for  not  only  do  all  laws 
require  his  consent,  but  he  can  require  the  Landtag  to 
accept  or  reject  a  bill  without  amendment  in  the  form 
in  which  he  chooses  to  present  it.  Moreover,  in  case 
the  Landtag  fails  to  vote  such  supplies  as  the  ministers 
think  necessary,  he  can  collect  and  expend  the  taxes  for 
a  year  on  his  own  authority.  The  constitution  contains, 
indeed,  the  customary  provision  about  countersignature 
by  a  minister  ;  but  in  Germany  this  does  not  practi- 

1  If  the  proposal  comes  from  the  Chambers  and  not  from  the  crown, 
the  amendment  must  pass  two  successive  Landtage,  a  provision  which 
shows  a  curious  dread  of  popular  impulse,  considering  the  fact  that  in  all 
cases  an  amendment  requires  the  royal  assent. 

2  The  constitution  is  mentioned  before  the  King  for  the  sake  of  con- 
venience, but  the  reader  must  not  suppose  that  the  royal  prerogatives 
are  in  any  sense  derived  from  that  instrument.  On  the  contrary,  accord- 
ing to  the  German  view  of  the  matter,  the  constitution  merely  limits  the 
exercise  by  the  crown  of  its  own  inherent  powers. 


336  SAXONY. 

cally  limit  the  personal  authority  of  the  monarch,  be- 
cause he  appoints  and  removes  the  ministers  at  will. 

The  Standeversammlung,  or  Assembly  of  Estates, 
which  must  be  summoned  to  a  regular  Landtag  at 
least  every  other  year,  consists  of  two  chambers.  The 
first  contains  the  royal  princes ;  certain  nobles ;  high 
officials,  clerical,  educational,  and  municipal ;  members 
appointed  by  the  crown ;  and  representatives  elected 
by  certain  privileged  bodies.  The  second  is  composed 
of  thirty-seven  members  from  the  cities  and  forty-five 
from  the  country,  each  of  whom  is  chosen  by  direct 
secret  ballot  in  a  separate  district  fixed  by  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior.1  The  franchise  extends  to  all  men  who 
pay  three  marks  a  year  in  taxes  on  land  or  income,  and 
the  term  is  six  years,  one  third  of  the  members  retiring 
every  two  years.  The  budget  and  all  laws  require  the 
consent  of  the  Landtag,  as  do  all  treaties  touching 
matters  that  fall  within  its  competence.2  It  has  also 
power  to  address  the  crown,  to  initiate  legislation,  and 
to  impeach  and  interpellate  the  ministers,  who  have,  of 
course,  a  right  to  be  present  and  speak  on  all  occa- 
sions. According  to  the  old  German  custom,  it  chooses 
a  permanent  committee  of  its  own  members  {Landtag  s- 
ausschuss),  which  continues  to  act  between  the  ses- 
sions, and  whose  chief  duty  is  to  help  in  the  administra- 
tion  of  the  public  debt.3 

1  A  plurality  elects.     The  members  are  paid. 

2  If  the  chambers  do  not  agree  about  any  measure,  including  the 
budget,  a  conference  committee  is  appointed,  and  the  report  of  this 
body  is  considered  as  adopted  unless  rejected  by  a  two  thirds  majority 
in  one  of  the  chambers. 

3  This  body  exists  in  most  of  the  German  States. 


BAVARIA.  337 

The  administrative  system  and  the  method  of  local 
government  bear  in  their  general  traits  a  considerable 
resemblance  to  those  of  Prussia. 

In  Bavaria 1  the  constitution,  which  dates  from  1818, 
was  modeled  a  good  deal  on  that  of  the  king-  Bavaria 
dom  of  Westphalia,  and  in  spite  of  later  ^^.'f^28 2 
changes  bears  the  trace  of  French  ideas.  The  5'594,982) 
process  of  amendment  is  somewhat  peculiar,  for  not 
only  is  a  two  thirds  vote  required  in  each  chamber  on 
three  separate  occasions,  but  the  right  of  the  Landtag 
to  propose  amendments,  which  was  originally  denied 
altogether,  is  still  restricted. 

The  King 2  has  the  usual  powers,  and  there  is  the 
ordinary  provision  that  his  acts  must  be  countersigned. 
By  royal  ordinance,  indeed,  the  most  important  acts 
require  the  signatures  of  all  the  ministers. 

The  Landtag  has  two  chambers,  of  which  one,  the 
Heichsrathf  is  composed  of  the  royal  princes,  of  crown 
officers  and  high  ecclesiastics,  of  mediatized  nobles,  and 
of  members  appointed  by  the  king  in  heredity  or  for 
life.  The  other,  the  Abgeordnetenkammer,  consists 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty-nine  members  chosen  for  six 
years  by  electors,  who  in  turn  are  chosen  by  the  peo- 
ple, the  franchise  extending  to  all  men  who  pay  direct 
state  taxes.3  The  electoral  districts  return  from  one  to 
four  members  apiece;  and,  subject  to  certain  general 
provisions  of  law,  are  determined  not  by  statute  but  by 

1  See  Von  Seydel,  Bayern,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  The  present  King  being  insane,  the  royal  power  is  actually  exercised 
by  his  uncle  Luitpold  as  regent. 

8  The  ballot  is  secret.     An  absolute  majority  is  required  for  election. 
The  members  are  paid. 

VOL.   I. 


338  BAVARIA. 

the  administration,  —  a  power  of  which  the  ministers 
have  made  use  more  than  once  to  change  the  districts 
on  the  eve  of  election  in  hopes  of  obtaining  a  majority 
favorable  to  themselves. 

The  Landtag,  which  must  be  regularly  summoned 
every  other  year,  has  practically  control  over  the  budget 
of  expenses.  Moreover,  all  laws  which  alter  existing 
statutes,  or  touch  personal  freedom  or  property,  require 
its  consent,  as  do  all  direct  taxes,  and  all  changes  in 
the  indirect  ones.  The  traces  of  French  influence  may 
be  seen  both  in  the  restrictions  placed  upon  it,  and  in 
the  extent  of  the  powers  granted  to  it ;  for  the  cham- 
bers are  forbidden  to  debate  matters  that  do  not  fall 
within  their  competence,  or  to  issue  addresses  to  the 
people,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  given  unusual 
authority  in  the  matter  of  holding  inquests,  requiring 
information,  and  interpellating  the  ministers.1 

The  Bavarian  local  government  does  not  resemble 
the  Prussian  so  closely  as  does  that  of  Saxony,  but, 
except  in  the  cities,  there  is  a  similar  effort  to  give  a 
special  share  of  power  to  the  larger  tax-payers,  although 
the  principle  is  worked  out  in  a  ruder  form.2 

The  political  history  of  Bavaria  since  1869  has 
hinged  upon  the  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  Ultra- 
montanes  to  make  the  cabinet  responsible  in  the  parlia- 

1  A  minister  must  answer  an  interpellation  or  explain  his  reasons  for 
not  doing  so.  His  answer  may  be  followed  by  a  debate,  but  no  motion 
can  be  made  at  that  time.  The  ministers  have,  as  usual,  a  right  to  speak 
in  the  chambers. 

2  In  Bavaria,  there  is  a  system  of  administrative  courts.  There  is  also 
a  Staatsrath  with  advisory  functions,  but  its  duties  are  not  very  im- 
portant. 


POLITICAL  PARTIES.  339 

mentary  sense  of  the  term.1  In  1869,  and  again  in 
1870,  they  succeeded  in  forcing  out  of  office  one  or 
two  ministers  who  were  peculiarly  obnoxious  to  them, 
but  with  these  exceptions  their  efforts  have  failed,  — 
a  result  which  is  the  more  extraordinary  because  they 
have  had  a  small  but  almost  uninterrupted  majority 
in  the  popular  house,  while  the  ministers,  although 
not  always  in  harmony  among  themselves,  and  by  no 
means  the  representatives  of  any  party,  have  pursued 
in  the  main  a  decidedly  liberal  policy.2  The  success  of 
the  ministers  in  maintaining  themselves  in  office  in  the 
face  of  a  majority  often  bitterly  hostile  has  been  due 
partly  to  their  dexterity  in  making  timely  concessions, 
partly  to  the  help  of  the  Reichsrath,  which  has  usually 
been  on  their  side,  but  above  all,  to  the  determined 
support  of  the  crown.  The  entrance  of  Bavaria  into 
the  Empire,  for  example,  was  due  to  the  personal  con- 
victions of  King  Louis,  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether, 
if  the  cabinet  had  been  responsible  to  the  deputies, 
Bavaria  would  ever  have  taken  that  step.  The  un- 
willingness of  the  King  to  select  his  ministers  among 
the  Clericals  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are  extreme  in 
their  views.  In  no  other  country  of  Europe,  except 
Belgium,  do  the  priests  take  such  an  active  part  in  pol- 
itics, the  wide  suffrage  rendering  their  influence  over 
the  peasants  a  controlling  factor  at  elections.     Hence 

1  See  a  series  of  articles  by  Midler,  in  Unsere  Zeit  for  1870,  1874, 
1883,  1887,  and  1891. 

2  At  the  elections  of  July,  1893,  the  Ultramontanes  lost  their  majority. 
The  seats  they  lost  were  won,  however,  not  by  the  Liberals,  but  by  the 
Social  Democrats  and  the  Peasants'  League,  both  radical  bodies,  who  now 
hold  the  balance  of  power. 


340  WURTEMBERG. 

the  government  cannot  accept  the  guidance  of  the 
Clericals  without  submitting  to  the  dictation  of  the 
church ;  and  even  Prince  Luitpold,  who  had  formerly 
been  in  sympathy  with  them,  found  himself  compelled 
on  becoming  Regent  to  follow  the  policy  of  the  late 
King. 

The  difficulties  in  the  political  situation  at  home 
have  to  some  extent  thrown  the  King  into  the  arms 
of  the  Emperor,  and  brought  about  a  greater  harmony 
between  the  courts  of  Munich  and  Berlin  than  would 
probably  have  existed  otherwise.  The  result  is,  how- 
ever, due  to  another  cause  also ;  for,  in  speaking  of  her 
position  in  the  Empire,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  reserved  rights  of  Bavaria  are  greater  in  appear- 
ance than  in  reality,  and  that  her  King  has  more 
the  show  than  the  power  of  an  independent  sovereign. 
As  has  been  remarked,  he  has  a  right  to  appoint 
ambassadors  without  the  power  to  make  treaties,  and 
he  has  an  army  which  he  cannot  command  in  time 
of  war.1  His  share  in  the  federal  administration  is 
chiefly  advisory,  and  hence  his  influence  depends  to  a 
great  extent  on  the  cordiality  of  his  relations  with  the 
imperial  government. 

The  constitution   of   Wurtemberg  is    one    of  those 

granted  in  1819,  shortly  after  the  formation 

berg.  of  the  old  Germanic  Confederation ;   but   it 

sq.  m.' ;  pop.,  has,    of  course,    been    seriously  modified   at 

2,036,522.)  7  .  7  i  •    ■■ 

different   times,   a    two  thirds  vote   of   both 
chambers  being  required  for  amendment. 

1  "La  Baviere  et  l'Ernpire  Allemand,"  Junon,  Annales  de  VEcole 
Libre  des  Sciences  Pol.,  1892,  p.  283. 

2  See  Gaupp,  Wurttemberg,  in  Marquardsen. 


THE  KING  AND  THE  ASSEMBLY.  341 

The  King-  can  do  no  political  act  (except  conferring 
titles  of  nobility)  without  the  signature  of  a  minister, 
and  all  his  most  important  acts  must  be  considered 
by  the  whole  cabinet.  Acting  through  his  ministers, 
however,  his  authority  is  unusually  extensive,  even  for 
a  German  sovereign ;  for  he  has  the  sole  right  of  ini- 
tiative in  financial  matters,  and  his  power  to  take  meas- 
ures for  the  safety  of  the  state  in  case  of  necessity 
is  not  limited  to  the  times  when  the  chambers  are  not 
in  session.  Nor  does  an  ordinance  issued  under  this 
power  need  to  be  submitted  to  them  for  approval.1 

The  legislature,  which  still  bears  the  old  name  of 
Standeversammlung,  or  Assembly  of  Estates,  consists 
of  a  House  of  Lords,  which  has  a  composition  similar 
to  that  of  the  Upper  House  in  Bavaria,  and  a  House 
of  Deputies,  containing  ninety-three  members  elected 
for  six  years.  Of  these  ninety-three,  thirteen  are 
members  of  the  landowning  nobility  chosen  by  their 
peers,  nine  are  high  dignitaries  of  the  Protestant  and 
Catholic  churches,  and  one  is  the  Chancellor  of  the 
University,  while  the  seven  principal  cities  and  the 
sixty-three  rural  districts  elect  one  deputy  apiece  by 
manhood  suffrage.2     This  is   the  only  lower  house  in 

1  It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  that  the  crown  has  power  to  dissolve  the 
Assembly,  and  that  all  laws  require  its  assent,  as  these  rights  exist  in  every 
monarchical  German  State.  The  same  thing  is  true  (except  in  the  two 
Mecklenburgs)  of  the  necessity  of  a  countersignature  for  all  acts  of  the 
crown,  and  of  the  right  of  the  ministers  to  speak  in  the  chambers. 
Curiously  enough,  the  Assembly  of  Wurtemberg,  on  account  of  its  jeal- 
ousy of  the  ministers,  has  refused  to  give  them  a  general  privilege  of 
addressing  committees. 

2  The  election  is  direct  and  the  ballot  secret,  the  choice  being  made  by 
absolute  majority  and  ballotage.  As  usual  in  Germany,  the  age  of  voting 
is  twenty-five  years.     The  members  are  paid. 


342  WURTEMBERG. 

Germany  that  contains  privileged  members,  and  also 
the  only  one  where  members  are  elected  by  direct 
universal  suffrage.1  The  Assembly  must  be  summoned 
to  meet  once  in  three  years,  but  is,  in  fact,  called 
together  every  year.  All  laws,  appropriations,  and 
taxes,2  and  certain  treaties,  require  its  consent ;  and, 
in  accordance  with  historic  traditions,  which  formerly 
prevailed  in  all  the  German  States,  the  public  debt  is 
managed  by  officials  chosen  by  the  houses  in  joint 
session  and  confirmed  by  the  King,  these  officials  being 
under  the  direction  of  committees  of  the  Assembly.  In 
order  to  prevent  the  houses  from  becoming  too  inde- 
pendent, they  are  forbidden  to  hold  any  communica- 
tions, either  directly  or  through  their  committees,  with 
any  state  officials  or  other  persons  except  the  ministers ; 
and  although  they  may  interpellate  the  latter,  they 
cannot  oblige  them  to  answer.  There  is  a  standing 
committee,  elected  by  the  houses  in  joint  session,  whose 
duty  consists  in  watching  over  constitutional  rights, 
directing  the  management  of  the  public  debt,  and  giv- 
ing advice  on  financial  matters  when  the  Assembly  is 
not  in  session. 

Local  self-government  in  "Wurtembera:  is  much  less 
developed  than  in  Prussia,  and  is  far  more  under  state 
tutelage.3 

1  That  is  the  only  one  in  any  German  State  that  has  two  chambers. 

2  The  House  of  Lords  has  no  power  to  amend  the  budget  passed  by 
the  deputies.  If  it  rejects  this  budget,  the  positive  and  negative  votes  in 
both  houses  are  counted,  and  the  majority  thus  found  is  decisive. 

3  There  is  in  Wurtemberg  a  system  of  administrative  justice,  and 
there  is  a  special  court  to  decide  constitutional  controversies,  part  of 
whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  King,  and  part  elected  by  the 
chambers. 


POLITICAL  PARTIES.  343 

The  reader  will  no  doubt  have  observed  that  the 
political  organization  of  Wurtemberg  is  very  far  from 
liberal,  even  if  judged  by  German  standards,  and  yet 
the  actual  policy  of  the  government  has  been  by  no 
means  unprogressive.1  The  cause  of  this  paradox  is 
to  be  found  in  the  character  of  the  people,  for  there 
is  no  party  in  the  state  that  can  properly  be  called 
reactionary,  but  there  is  a  powerful  body  of  radicals, 
imbued  with  French  ideas,  who  have  repeatedly  de- 
manded a  single  representative  chamber  elected  by  uni- 
versal suffrage,  and  it  is  chiefly  a  dread  of  the  extreme 
principles  of  these  men  that  has  prevented  any  revi- 
sion of  the  existing  constitution.  The  result  is  that, 
while  the  undemocratic  forms  have  been  retained,  the 
country  has  been  ruled  by  a  ministry  of  moderate  pro- 
gressive views  supported  by  the  Conservatives  and 
National  Liberals.  This  condition  has  lasted  many 
years,  for  the  present  head  of  the  cabinet,  von  Mitt- 
nacht,  has  held  a  portfolio  continuously  since  1867, 
and  has  had  no  serious  difficulty  with  the  Assem- 
bly since  the  war  with  France  in  1870.  Two  things 
about  the  political  history  of  Wurtemberg  are  especially 
noteworthy.  The  first  is  that,  as  in  the  other  South 
German  States,  politics  turn  to  a  great  extent  on 
imperial  questions,  interpellations  and  motions  being 
constantly  made  in  regard  to  the  instructions  of  the 
delegates  to  the  Bundesrath.  The  second  is  that, 
unlike  Bavaria,  but  like  most  other  continental  states, 
the   deputies  are   divided    not  into  two  great  parties, 

1  Some  account  of  the  recent  political  history  of  Wurtemberg  may  he 
found  in  Unsere  Zeit  for  18G9,  1875,  1883,  and  1891. 


344  BADEN. 

but  into  a  number  of  groups.  In  Wurtemberg  there 
are  four  of  these,  —  the  Conservatives,  the  National 
Liberals,  the  Democrats,  and  the  Clericals ;  the  first  two 
supporting  the  government,  and  the  others  forming 
the  opposition. 

Baden.  -^n    Baden1   the    constitution    dates    from 

sqfm.fpop.,  1^18,  but  has  been  frequently  amended,  any 
1,657,867.)  change  requiring  a  two  thirds  vote  of  both 
chambers. 

The  Grand  Duke  has  the  usual  powers  of  a  German 
monarch,  and  there  is  the  universal  provision  about 
countersignatures. 

Of  the  two  chambers  of  the  Landstande,  one  is 
composed  of  the  princes  of  the  ducal  house,  of  a 
Catholic  bishop  and  a  Protestant  dignitary,  of  a  pro- 
fessor chosen  by  each  of  the  two  universities,  of  the 
heads  of  the  great  noble  families,  of  eight  members 
elected  by  the  nobles  of  the  second  grade,  and  finally, 
of  eight  members  appointed  by  the  Grand  Duke  for 
the  session.  The  other  chamber  consists  of  sixty-three 
members,  elected  by  universal  suffrage  and  indirect 
secret  ballot,  in  fifty-six  districts  which  are  not  exactly 
equal  in  population,  but  are  based  to  some  extent  on 
taxation.  The  term  of  this  chamber  is  four  years,  one 
half  of  the  members  being  elected  every  two  years. 
The  Landstande  must  be  summoned  at  least  every 
other  year.     All  taxes,  loans,  and  expenditures,2  and 

1  Schenkel,  Baden,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  In  case  of  necessity,  the  government  has  the  usual  power  to  spend 
money  without  the  consent  of  the  Landstande,  subject  to  their  subsequent 
approval.     In  case  of  war,  it  can  also  levy  taxes.   Whenever  a  budget  has 


INSTITUTIONS  AND  PARTIES.  345 

all  laws  which  affect  the  freedom  or  property  of  the 
citizens,  require  its  consent.  This  leaves  a  considerable 
room  for  legislation  by  ordinance ;  and  although  the 
domain  in  which  the  government  makes  laws  without 
the  consent  of  the  chambers  has  been  constantly  nar- 
rowing in  practice,  the  crown  still  controls,  as  in  most 
of  the  German  States,  the  organization  of  the  adminis- 
trative service,  except  so  far  as  its  power  is  limited 
by  the  necessity  of  providing  for  the  salaries  in  the 
budget. 

The  system  of  local  government  in  Baden  resembles 
closely  that  of  Prussia.  In  it  the  larger  tax-payers  are 
given  an  especial  share  of  power,  chiefly  by  means  of 
the  three-class  method  of  election.  Baden  has  also  a 
series  of  administrative  courts  similar  to  tlie  Prussian, 
and  in  fact  she  was  the  first  of  the  German  States 
to  create  independent  tribunals  of  this  character.1 

Baden  has  been  on  the  whole  the  most  liberal  of  the 
German  States,  and,  except  for  the  reactionary  period 
between  1850  and  1860,  the  government  has  steadily 
pursued  a  progressive  policy.  It  has  also  been  de- 
cidedly national  in  its  tendencies.  As  early  as  1860, 
both  the  ministers  and  the  chambers  favored  a  closer 
union  of  Germany ;   and  although  the  Grand  Duke  was 

not  been  voted,  the  government  can  continue  to  collect  the  existing  taxes 
for  six  months.  A  provision  of  this  nature  is  common,  especially  in  the 
smaller  States.  If  the  upper  chamber  rejects  the  budget,  the  same 
practice  is  followed  as  in  Wurtemberg. 

1  Before  any  official  can  be  sued  or  prosecuted,  his  superior  can  require 
from  the  highest  administrative  court  a  decision  whether  the  act  com- 
plained of  is  contrary  to  law,  and  the  opinion  so  given  is  binding  on  the 
ordinary  courts. 


346  BADEN. 

forced  by  circumstances  to  take  the  side  of  Austria  in 
1866,  his  troops  displayed  such  a  masterly  inactivity 
that  the  general  was  accused  of  being  a  traitor  to 
the  South  German  allies.  After  the  war,  Baden  was 
anxious  to  be  admitted  to  the  North  German  Con- 
federation, and,  as  her  geographical  position  made  this 
impossible  for  a  time,  her  government  maintained  a 
close  harmony  with  Prussia,  until  the  war  with  France 
brought  about  the  union  of  all  Germany  in  the  Empire. 
In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  the  ministers  are  op- 
posed by  the  Clericals  and  Democrats,  and  rely  for 
support  upon  the  Liberal  or  National  Liberal  party, 
whose  majority,  sometimes  overwhelming  and  some- 
times narrow,  has  continued  without  a  break  for  more 
than  thirty  years.  While,  however,  this  party  has,  on 
the  whole,  acted  in  harmony  with  the  cabinet,  the 
relation  between  the  two  has  been  very  different  from 
that  which  exists  in  a  parliamentary  system.  The 
majority  has  occasionally  rejected  or  modified  seriously 
the  measures  proposed  by  the  government,  and  in  1880 
it  forced  out  of  office  a  minister  whose  concessions  to 
the  church  it  did  not  approve.  At  one  time,  indeed, 
the  Liberals  complained  that  a  new  cabinet  had  been 
formed  without  consulting  them  or  including  any  of 
their  members,  and  that  the  government  did  not 
sufficiently  consider  their  opinions ;  but  the  breach  was 
healed  by  the  aggressive  attitude  of  the  Clericals  and 
Democrats,  which  caused  the  Liberals  to  rally  to  the 
support  of  the  ministers  against  their  common  enemies.1 

1  This  was  in  1868.     The  nearest  approach  to  a  parliamentary  change 
of  ministers  occurred  in  1860,  when  a  reactionary  cabinet  was  replaced 


HESSE.  347 

In  Hesse,1  again,  the  constitution,  originally  made  in 
1820,  though  seriously   modified,  is   still    in   Hess 
force,  the  amendments  requiring  a  two  thirds  i^'-2'!!65 
vote  of  both  chambers.  992,883.) 

At  the  head  of  the  government  is  the  Grand  Duke, 
who  rules  by  means  of  a  cabinet  composed  of  a  Minis- 
ter of  State  and  two  other  chiefs  of  departments. 

The  first  chamber  of  the  Standeversammlung,  or 
legislature,  is  similar  to  that  of  Baden,2  while  the  sec- 
ond is  chosen  by  electors,  in  their  turn  chosen  by 
men  who  pay  an  income  tax.  There  are  in  all  fifty 
members,  of  whom  ten  are  allotted  to  the  cities,  and 
the  rest  to  the  forty  country  districts,  the  urban  and 
rural  districts  being  carefully  separated  according  to 
the  German  custom,  in  order  to  prevent  the  city  voters 
from  being  swamped  by  the  peasants.  The  members 
are  elected  for  six  years,  one  half  being  renewed 
every  three  years.  The  legislature  has  the  same 
powers  as  in  Baden ;  but,  in  order  to  avoid  deadlocks 
between  the  chambers,  there  is  a  curious  provision, 
resembling  that  which  regulates  the  voting  of  the 
budget  in  Wurtemberg  and  Baden.  In  case  one  of 
the  chambers  rejects  a  bill,  the  government  may 
submit   it   at   the    next  session;   and   if  one  chamber 

by  a  liberal  one  in  consequence  of  a  vote  of  the  chamber  ;  but  the 
change  would  probably  not  have  taken  place  against  the  personal  opinions 
of  the  Grand  Duke.  Miiller  has  given  a  sketch  of  the  history  of  Baden, 
in  his  articles  in  Unsere  Zeit,  in  1872,  1883,  and  1891. 

1  See  Gareis,  Hesse,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  among  the  families  possessing  hereditary 
seats  is  still  found  that  of  Baron  Riedesel,  who  commanded  the  Hessians 
in  the  American  Revolution. 


348  OLDENBURG. 

again  refuses  to  pass  it,  the  government  may  never- 
theless treat  it  as  accepted,  provided  the  whole  number 
of  affirmative  votes  in  both  chambers  exceeds  the  total 
negative  vote.1 

The  local  government  and  the  system  of  administra- 
tive justice  have  been  copied  from  Prussia. 

The  constitution  of  Oldenburg,2  made  in  1852,  may 
OMenbur  ^e  classed  among  those  in  which,  from  a 
iqrm.'-2ptp9  German  point  of  view,  the  amount  of  self- 
354,968.)  government  is  quite  large.  It  has  worked 
smoothly  and  well ;  but  in  framing  it  a  peculiar  diffi- 
culty was  presented  by  the  geographical  division  of 
the  territory,  for  the  State  consists  of  one  large  tract 
of  land  and  two  small  outlying  districts.  One  of  these, 
the  principality  of  Birkenfeld,  lies  far  to  the  south, 
while  the  other,  the  principality  of  Lubeck,  is  close 
to  the  city  of  that  name.  Each  of  the  two  princi- 
palities is  administered  by  a  government  board  subordi- 
nate to  the  ministers,  and  has  an  elected  council,  which 
has  a  right  to  make  suggestions  and  complaints  about 
affairs  specially  affecting  the  principality,  and  must, 
indeed,  be  consulted  in  regard  to  them.  These  local 
organs  have,  therefore,  an  advisory  voice  about  meas- 
ures that  have  a  peculiar  local  interest,  but  the  final 
determination  rests  with  the  Grand  Duke  and  the 
Landtag  which  represents  every  part  of  the  State. 
This  system,  although  not  perfectly  satisfactory,  has 
in  practice  given  a  sufficient  influence  to  the  opinions 
of  the  outlying  districts.     In  Oldenburg,  as  in  all  the 

1  This  does  not  apply  to  amendments  of  the  constitution. 

2  Becker,  Oldenburg,  in  Marquardsen. 


THE  GRAND  DUKE  AND  THE  LANDTAG.    349 

monarchical  German  States  that  remain  to  be  con- 
sidered, the  Landtag  consists  of  a  single  chamber.  It 
is  composed  of  thirty-four  members1  chosen  by  the 
tax-payers,  the  method  of  election  being  indirect,  and 
the  ballot  secret.  The  term  is  three  years,  and  a 
session  must  be  held  at  least  once  during  that  period. 
The  inconvenience  that  might  arise  from  the  infre- 
quency  of  its  meetings  is  to  some  extent  obviated 
by  its  election  of  an  Ausschuss,  or  committee,  which 
is  charged  with  the  duty  of  watching  over  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Landtag  and  seeing  that  its  votes  are 
carried  out,  and  which  is  authorized  to  consent  to 
new  laws  and  appropriations  that  are  urgent  but  not 
important  enough  to  warrant  a  special  session  of  the 
Landtag. 

The  officials  in  Oldenburg  are  subject  to  the  ordinary 
courts  to  a  greater  extent  than  is  usual  in  Germany ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  no  administrative 
courts,  —  an  omission  which  Becker  explains  by  point- 
ing out  that  the  evil  which  has  made  these  courts  a 
necessity  in  other  German  States,  that  is,  the  abuse 
of  administrative  power  for  party  purposes,  does  not 
exist  here.  The  conflicts  between  the  different  classes 
which  have  brought  so  much  bitterness  into  party  strife 
in  Germany  find  no  place  in  Oldenburg,  for  there  is 
neither  a  powerful  nobility  nor  a  large  city  population. 
In  fact,  the  Landtag,  which  has  become  more  and 
more  exclusively  composed  of  peasants,  is  no  longer 
divided  into  parties ;  and  the  Grand  Duke,  who  has 
been  a  wise  and  philanthropic  ruler,  has  scarcely  any 

1  The  members  are  paid. 


850  BRUNSWICK. 

difficulties  of  a  political  nature  with  the  representatives 
of  the  people. 

In  Brunswick1  the  constitution  was  made  in  1832, 
.  ,      and  requires  for  amendment  a  vote  of  two 

.Brunswick.  ■*■ 

(Area,  1,424    thirds  of  all  the  members  of  the  Landesver- 

sq.  m.  ;  pop., 

403,773.)  sammlung.  The  nominal  head  of  the  state 
is  the  hereditary  Duke,  but  the  present  possessor  of 
the  crown  is  not  the  actual  ruler  of  the  country.  The 
late  Duke  was  the  last  member  of  his  branch  of  the 
family,  and  the  next  heir,  the  Duke  of  Cumberland, 
son  of  the  King  of  Hanover,  refused  to  acquiesce  in 
the  annexation  of  that  kingdom  by  Prussia.  Now  the 
government  of  Brunswick  by  a  prince  hostile  to  Prussia, 
and  out  of  sympathy  with  the  political  organization  of 
Germany,  would  have  produced  constant  friction ;  and 
therefore  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  was  adopted 
in  1879,  providing  for  a  regency  on  the  death  of  the 
reigning  Duke.  When  this  happened  in  1884  Prince 
Albert,  a  member  of  the  Prussian  royal  house,  was 
chosen  Regent,  and  exercises  the  ducal  powers. 

The  Landesversammlung  is  elected  for  four  years, 
and  must  be  called  together  twice  as  often.2  Its  com- 
position is  singularly  complicated.  It  contains  forty- 
six  members,  of  whom  ten  are  chosen  by  the  cities, 
twelve  by  the  rural  communes,  three  by  the  clergy  of 
the  Evangelical  church,  and  twenty-one  by  various 
classes  of  tax-payers.  The  powers  of  the  body  are  no 
less    complex   than    its    organization.     Statutes   which 

1  Otto,  Braunschweig,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  Until  the   amendment  of   March   26,  1888,  it  was  elected   for   six 
years,  one  half  being  renewed  every  three  years. 


ANHALT.  351 

amend  the  constitution,  change  organic  institutions,  or 
affect  the  financial,  military,  criminal,  or  private  civil 
laws,  require  its  consent,  but  it  need  only  be  consulted 
about  others,  including  police  regulations  to  which 
small  penalties  are  attached.  The  legislative  power  is, 
however,  further  complicated  by  the  existence  of  an 
Ausschuss  elected  by  the  Landesversammlung,  and  pos- 
sessing an  independent  right  to  give  its  consent  to  a 
large  class  of  statutes  when  that  body  is  not  in  ses- 
sion.1 

The  local  government  resembles  that  of  Prussia,  and 
there  is  a  system  of  administrative  courts,  the  members 
of  which  are,  however,  all  government  officials. 

The  constitution  of  Anhalt2  dates  from  1859,  when 
the   State  was   divided  between    two  dukes ;   Anhalt 
but  after  it  became  united  under  one  head  ^^'jpop. 
by  the  extinction  of  one  of  the  ducal  lines  in  271»963J 
1863,  a  number  of  important  amendments  were  passed. 

The  Duke  rules  by  means  of  a  Ministry  of  State, 
which  is  composed  of  a  single  minister  and  a  number 
of  councillors. 

1  When  the  constitution  is  violated,  and  in  certain  other  prescribed 
cases,  the  Ausschuss  can  call  the  legislature  together.  In  addition  to 
the  powers  mentioned  in  the  text,  the  Landesversammlung  can  initiate 
legislation,  demand  redress  of  grievances,  and  impeach  public  officials. 
It  also  elects  for  life  a  Landsyndicus,  who  acts  as  its  clerk  and  general 
adviser,  having  for  this  purpose  a  right  to  examine  the  administration  of 
the  finances.  In  case  the  taxes  are  not  voted,  the  government  has  a  right 
to  continue  to  collect  them  for  another  year.  As  is  not  uncommon  in 
the  German  States,  it  is  provided  that  the  Landesversammlung  must  not 
refuse  the  appropriations  needed  for  expenses  constitutionally  incurred, 
but  may  make  its  own  estimate  of  their  amount.  It  is  not  clearly  settled 
what  happens  in  case  of  disagreement  on  this  point. 

2  Pietscher,  Anhalt,  in  Marquardsen. 


352  ANHALT. 

The  Landtag,  elected  for  six  years,  consists  of  thirty- 
six  members,  of  whom  two  are  appointed  by  the  Duke, 
eight  are  chosen  by  the  persons  who  pay  a  tax  of 
twenty-one  marks  on  land,  and  two  by  those  who  pay 
a  tax  of  fifteen  marks  on  trade,  while  the  remaining 
twenty-four  members  are  chosen  by  universal  suffrage, 
indirect  elections,  and  secret  ballot,  fourteen  of  them 
being  allotted  to  the  cities,  and  ten  to  the  rural  districts. 
The  Landtag  must  be  summoned  at  least  once  in  three 
years,  but  in  fact  meets  every  year.  Its  approval  is 
required  for  the  budget  and  for  all  laws  which  affect 
the  constitution  or  the  rights  or  property  of  citizens, 
and  in  practice  no  laws  are  enacted  without  its  consent. 
It  can  amend  bills ;  and  although  it  has  strictly  no  right 
of  initiative,  it  can  request  the  enactment  of  statutes. 

While  dealing  with  Anhalt,  it  may  be  observed  that 
in  this  duchy,  as  in  many  of  the  smaller  German 
States,  the  administration  of  justice  is  not  entirely 
conducted  by  the  courts  of  the  State.  Thus  the 
duchy  has  no  supreme  court  of  her  own,  an  appeal 
from  her  highest  court  lying  to  one  of  the  neighboring 
Prussian  tribunals.  This  method  of  combining  for 
the  maintenance  of  courts,  which  is  a  striking  illustra- 
tion of  the  absence  of  petty  jealousy  on  the  part  of  the 
German  sovereigns,  gives  to  the  smaller  States  a  better 
judiciary  than  they  could  afford  by  themselves,  and 
also  confers  on  the  whole  country  some  of  the  advan- 
tages of  judicial  centralization. 

The  constitution  of  Waldeck1  was  made  in  1852, 
and  modified  in   1878.     Amendments   require  a   two 

1  Bottcher,  Waldeck,  in  Marquardsen. 


WALDECK.  353 

thirds  vote  of  the  Landtag.     The  nominal  head  of  the 

state  is  the  Prince,  who  still  retains  the  insig- 

nia  of  the  reigning  sovereign,  but  has  really   (Area,  433 

it      n   1  •  •  i         i  i  sq.  m.  ;pop., 

surrendered  all  his  powers  into  the  hands  of  57,281.) 
the  King  of  Prussia,  in  consideration  of  the  assumption 
by  the  latter  of  a  part  of  the  expense  caused  by  the  union 
of  Germany  and  the  adoption  of  universal  military 
service.  This  arrangement  was  made  in  1867  for  ten 
years  by  a  treaty  ratified  by  the  Landtag.  At  the  expi- 
ration of  that  time  it  was  renewed  for  ten  years  more, 
and  finally  in  1887  was  prolonged  indefinitely,  subject 
to  termination  on  notice  given  by  the  Prince.  By  its 
terms  the  King  of  Prussia  takes  the  place  of  the  Prince 
for  the  whole  internal  government,  except  so  far  as  the 
church  and  the  domains  of  the  crown  are  concerned. 
The  Prince  reserved,  it  is  true,  the  prerogative  of  par- 
don, and  the  right  of  giving  his  consent  to  changes  in 
the  constitution  and  to  statutes,  but  he  agreed  at  the 
same  time  that  he  would  make  no  use  of  these  powers 
that  might  be  disagreeable  to  Prussia.1  He  retained  also 
the  nominal  control  of  foreign  relations,  including  the 
right  to  make  treaties  and  to  appoint  the  member  of 
the  Bundesrath,  but  these  powers  are  exercised  through 
the  Landesdirector,  who  is  appointed  by  the  King  of 
Prussia.  The  Prince  can,  indeed,  object  to  the  person 
selected  for  the  office,  but  in  that  case  his  authority  is 
limited  to  choosing  between  two  other  persons  nomi- 
nated by  the  King.     During  the  continuance  of  the 

1  The  formula  for  the  promulgation  of  laws  recites  that  they  are  en- 
acted by  the  King  of  Prussia  in  accordance  with  the  treaty,  and  with  the 
consent  of  the  Prince  and  of  the  Landtag. 
VOL.  1. 


354  LIPPE-DETMOLD. 

treaty,  therefore,  all  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Prince 
are  practically  transferred  to  the  Prussian  monarch. 
The  latter  appoints  the  officers  of  state,  who  take  an 
oath  of  allegiance  to  him ;  and  in  fact  the  administra- 
tion is  conducted  largely  by  Prussian  officials.  Justice, 
moreover,  is  administered  in  the  last  instance  by  the 
Prussian  courts;  and,  in  short,  the  country  is  ruled  in 
many  respects  like  a  Prussian  province,  a  condition 
which  is  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  the  acts  of  the 
King  are  countersigned  not  only  by  the  Landesdirector 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  Waldeck,  but  also  by  a 
minister  at  Berlin  as  acts  of  the  Prussian  crown. 

The  Landtag,  which  is  chosen  for  three  years,  and 
must  be  summoned  annually,  is  composed  of  fifteen 
members  elected  indirectly  by  the  three-class  system.1 
This  system  is  also  applied  in  the  local  government, 
which  bears  a  strong  resemblance  to  that  of  Prussia. 

The    constitution    of    Lippe-Detmold 2  was  made  in 

1836,  but   the   organization  of   the  Landtag 

moid.  was   changed  in   1876,  a  two  thirds  vote  of 

(Area,  469  °  -to 

sq.m. ;  pop.,   that  body   being   required   for  amendments. 

128,495.)  mi  • 

The  Prince  rules  partly  through  a  single 
Minister  of  State,  and  partly  by  means  of  a  govern- 
ment board,  an  old-fashioned  institution,  formerly  very 
common  in  Germany. 

The  Landtag,  which  has  the  usual  powers,  is  com- 
posed of  twenty-one  members  chosen  by  direct  vote 
and  secret  ballot  on  the  three-class  system.3    It  is  elected 

1  The  voting  is  oral.     The  members  are  paid,  and  the  powers  of  the 
body  are  broader  than  in  many  of  the  States. 

2  Falkmann,  Lippe,  in  Marquardsen. 
8  The  members  are  paid. 


SCHAUMBURG-LIPPE.  355 

for  four  years,  and  must  be  summoned  at  least  every 
other  year. 

In  population,  Schaumburg-Lippe 1  is  the  smallest  of 
all   the  German    States,  but   the    hereditary 

Tt  '  ,i  p  .  Schaum- 

rnnce  enjoys  the  powers  01  a  sovereign  on  burg-LiPPe. 

...  ..!        ..  ml  .         .  (Area,  131 

equality   with    the    rest.       Ihe    constitution,  sq.m.  ;Pop., 
which  dates  from  1868,  was  amended  in  1879. 

The  Landtag  has  a  curious  organization.  It  con- 
tains fifteen  members,  of  whom  two  represent  the  crown 
domains  and  are  appointed  by  the  Prince,  one  is  chosen 
by  the  landowning  nobility,  another  by  the  clergy,  and 
a  third  by  the  lawyers,  doctors,  and  schoolmasters,  while 
of  the  other  ten  three  are  elected  by  the  cities,  and 
seven  by  the  rural  districts.  Its  term  is  six  years,  but 
it  meets  annually.  The  yearly  budget,  all  laws  and  all 
treaties  which  affect  commerce  or  impose  burdens  or 
duties  on  the  state  or  on  individuals,  require  its  con- 
sent, and  it  has  the  power  of  initiative.  It  also  elects 
an  Ausschuss  of  three  members  to  watch  over  its 
rights  while  it  is  not  in  session. 

We  now  come  to  the  Thuringian  States,  a  group  of 
eight  small  principalities  lying  in  the  centre 
of  Germany,  broken  fragments  of  the  terri-  jj™sj£n 
tory  possessed  by  the  Ernestine  branch  of  the 
House    of  Saxony.     The    territory   has,  indeed,   been 
subdivided  in  a  singular  way,  most  of  these  little  prin- 
cipalities   consisting  of    two   or  more    tracts  of   land, 
which  are  separated  from  one  another.     They  retain, 
however,    some    joint    institutions,    which    recall    their 
common  origin.      Thus   the  four    Saxon   duchies  still 

1  Bomers,  Schaumburg-Lippe,  in  Marquardsen. 


356  SAXE-WEIMAR. 

maintain  a  common  university  at  Jena,  and  the  Ober- 
landesgericht  at  the  same  place  acts  as  a  court  of 
appeal  for  all  Thuringia  (except  Schwarzburg-Sonders- 
hausen),  as  well  as  for  some  of  the  adjoining  parts  of 
Prussia. 

Saxe-Weimar,1  the  largest  of  these  principalities,  has 

the  oldest  constitution  in   Germany.     It  was 

Weimar.        granted    in    1816,    but    the  powers    of    the 

(Area,  1,388     °  i  i    ■       ior^  i 

sq.m.;  pop.,   Landtag1  were  enlarged  in  looO,  amendments 

326,091.)  .  &  .  &  7 

requiring  a  two  thirds  vote  of  that  body  and 
the  presence  of  three  quarters  of  the  members. 

The  sovereign  is  the  Grand  Duke,  who  is  assisted 
by  a  cabinet  composed  of  the  Minister  of  State  and  two 
other  heads  of  departments,  all  his  acts  being  counter- 
signed by  one  of  these  three  officials. 

The  Landtag  consists  of  thirty-one  members,  of 
whom  one  is  elected  by  the  landowning  nobility,  four 
by  the  other  landowners  who  have  an  income  of  three 
thousand  marks,  five  by  persons  having  an  income  of 
the  same  size  from  other  sources,  and  twenty-one  by 
electors  chosen  by  universal  suffrage.  Professor  Meyer 
is  of  opinion  that  the  privilege  given  to  the  rich  classes 
has  proved  an  advantage  by  insuring  the  presence 
in  the  legislature  of  men  of  culture  ;  but  he  thinks 
that  the  indirect  method  of  choosing  the  representa- 
tives of  the  people  at  large  has  had  the  bad  effect  of 
making  the  voters  indifferent,  and  to  this  system  he 
attributes  the  fact  that  in  the  larger  cities  scarcely 
ten  per  cent,  of  the  voters  go  to  the  polls.  One  finds 
it  a  little  difficult  to  understand  why  the  placing  of  an 

1  Meyer,  Sacksen-  Weimar-Eisenach,  in  Marquardsen. 


SAXE-MEININGEN.  357 

additional  cog-wheel  in  the  electoral  machinery  should 
produce  that  result.  But  a  sufficient  cause  of  a  lack 
of  interest  on  the  part  of  the  voters  may,  perhaps,  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  popular  representatives  form 
only  two  thirds  of  the  Landtag,  whose  powers,  more- 
over, are  rather  limited,  and  whose  regular  sessions  are 
held  only  once  during  its  term  of  three  years,  —  a  term 
for  which  the  budget  also  is  voted. 

In  the  local  government,  the  principle  of  giving 
special  privileges  to  the  higher  tax-payers  is  applied 
in  the  smaller  communes,  but  not  in  the  larger  ones. 
In  none  of  these  small  states  are  there  any  administra- 
tive courts. 

In  Saxe-Meiningen 1  the  constitution  dates  from  1829, 
but  has  been  amended,  notably  by  acts  passed 
in  1873  and  1875.     The  Duke    governs   bv  Meiningen. 

«         ,  (Area,  953 

means  of  a  minister,  and  a  number  of  other  sq.  m.;  pop., 

223,  832.) 

heads  of  departments,  of  which  there    have 
been  of  late  years  only  two. 

The  Landtag,  whose  powers  are  somewhat  broader 
than  usual,  contains  twenty-four  members ;  four  being 
elected  in  two  districts  by  persons  who  pay  a  tax  of 
sixty  marks  on  land,  four  in  four  districts  by  persons 
who  pay  certain  other  taxes,  and  sixteen  in  as  many 
separate  districts  by  all  the  other  citizens  voting  directly. 
The  term  is  six  years,  and  the  budget  is  triennial,  but 
in  fact  the  Landtag  meets  every  year. 

As  in  Saxe-Weimar,  the  higher  tax-payers  have  a 
privileged  vote  in  the  smaller  communes,  but  not  in 
the  cities. 

1  Kircher,  Sachsen-Meiningen,  in  Marquardscn. 


358  SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA. 

The  two  duchies  of  Coburg  and  Gotha *  are  not  con- 
tiguous,  although  each  of  them  comprises 
and  aftha  tracts  of  land  inclosed  in  the  territory  of  the 
aq^-pop.,  °tner-  Until  1852,  moreover,  their  only  po- 
206,513.)  litical  connection  was  the  fact  that  they  had 
the  same  sovereign,  but  in  that  year  the  Duke,  after 
trying  in  vain  to  consolidate  them,  succeeded  in  getting 
a  common  constitution  adopted  which  created  a  union 
of  a  strangely  federal  character.  Certain  matters  are 
declared  to  be  common  to  both  duchies.  These  are : 
the  relations  to  the  Duke,  to  the  Empire,  and  to  for- 
eign countries ;  the  constitution  ;  the  joint  Landtag ; 
the  ministry ;  the  courts  ;  the  archives ;  and  the  laws 
governing  the  conduct  of  officials.  The  matters  not 
common  to  both  duchies  are  the  ordinary  internal 
administration,  the  schools,  churches,  and  finance. 

The  Duke2  governs  by  means  of  a  joint  ministry, 
which  is,  however,  divided  into  two  sections,  one  for 
the  special  affairs  of  each  duchy,  the  joint  affairs  being 
confided  to  the  section  to  which  the  Minister  of  State 
happens  to  belong.  This  officer  is  at  the  head  of  the 
whole  ministry,  and  in  practice  is  treated  as  solely  re- 
sponsible for  all  the  acts  of  both  sections.  The  subor- 
dinate officials  are  partly  joint  and  partly  several,  but 
are  governed  in  all  cases  by  the  common  administra- 
tive laws. 

The  legislative  system  is  even  more  complicated. 
Each  duchy  has  a  separate  Landtag,  elected  by  indirect 
vote  for  four  years  by  all  citizens  who  pay  a  direct  tax 

1  Forkel,  Sachsen-Coburg  und  Gotha,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  The  present  sovereign  is  the  Duke  of  Edinburgh. 


SAXE-ALTENBURG.  359 

and  have  households  of  their  own.  These  bodies  meet 
regularly  in  the  first  and  fourth  years  of  their  terms, 
and  attend  to  all  matters  which  are  not  common.  The 
Landtag  of  Coburg  contains  eleven  members,  that  of 
Gotha  nineteen,  and  these  thirty  meet  together  at  least 
once  every  four  years  to  form  a  joint  Landtag,  whose 
competence  extends  to  those  affairs  which  are  made 
common  by  the  constitution,  or  are  subsequently 
declared  to  be  such.  In  order,  however,  to  protect 
the  representatives  from  Coburg  from  being  outvoted 
by  their  colleagues,  it  is  provided  that  no  amendment 
shall  be  made  in  the  constitution,  no  addition  shall  be 
made  to  the  common  affairs,  and  no  change  shall  be 
made  in  the  administrative  organization  whereby  an 
office  is  transferred  from  one  duchy  to  the  other, 
without  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  representa- 
tives from  each  duchy. 

The  finances,  as  we  have  seen,  are  not  common  to 
the  two  duchies,  and  hence  the  joint  Landtag  does  not 
vote  a  budget.  It  merely  approves  the  estimates  for 
joint  expenses,  and  thereupon  these  are  inserted  in  the 
budgets  of  the  separate  Landtags  in  the  proportion  of 
three  tenths  for  Coburg  and  seven  tenths  for  Gotha. 

Considering  the  size  of  the  community,  one  feels, 
in  examining  this  complicated  mechanism,  as  if  he 
were  studying  entomology  with  a  microscope. 

The  constitution  of  Saxe  -  Altenburg, 1  which  was 
made  in  1832  and  modified  in  1870,  can  be  Saxe-Alten- 

.   .        burg. 

amended  by  the  Duke  and  the  Landtag  with-  (Area,  bh 

J  sq.  in-  :  i>"!>- 

out  any  special  formalities.      The  Duke  gov-   170,864.) 

1  Sonnenkalb,  Sachsen-Altenburg,  in  Marquardsen. 


360  SAXE-ALTENBURG. 

erns  with  the  aid  of  a  cabinet,  composed  of  the  Minis- 
ter of  State  and  two  other  heads  of  departments. 

In  the  Landtag,  which  is  elected  for  three  years,  the 
representation  of  property  is  carried  out  more  elabo- 
rately than  in  any  other  State.  Of  the  thirty  mem- 
bers, nine  are  chosen  in  as  many  districts  by  the  largest 
tax-payers,  the  line  being  drawn  so  high  that  only  one 
person  is  admitted  into  this  class  for  every  five  hundred 
inhabitants  of  the  district.  The  other  twenty-one  seats 
are  distributed  among  seven  districts  (three  urban  and 
four  rural)  returning  three  members  apiece,  one  deputy 
being  elected  by  each  of  the  three  classes  into  which 
the  remaining  tax-payers  of  the  district  are  divided. 
The  franchise  extends,  therefore,  only  to  persons  who 
pay  a  tax,  and  these  are  divided  into  four  classes  ac- 
cording to  the  amount  of  taxes  they  pay,  the  highest 
class  choosing  nine  representatives  and  the  other  three 
seven  apiece.1  The  powers  of  the  Landtag  are  more 
circumscribed  than  usual.  It  has  no  authority  to  ini- 
tiate legislation,  but  only  a  general  right  of  petition  ; 
and,  apparently  from  a  fear  that  an  assembly  chosen 
by  tax-payers  might  have  a  tendency  to  parsimony, 
it  is  provided  that  the  Landtag  shall  not  reduce  the 
appropriations  for  current  expenses  below  the  amounts 
granted  in  the  previous  budget  without  the  consent  of 
the  government.2 

1  The  three-class  system  of  election  is  also  applied  in  the  local  govern- 
ment, which  is  not  unlike  that  of  Prussia. 

2  The  budget  is  voted  for  three  years  at  a  time.  There  is  a  provision, 
which  is  common  in  the  smaller  States,  that  in  case  of  a  failure  to  agree 
on  the  budget  the  government  can  continue  to  collect  and  expend  the 
existing  taxes  for  another  year.  In  Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt  this  can  be 
done  for  three  years. 


SCHWARZBURG-RUDOLSTADT.  361 

In  Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt,1  the  constitution,  made 
in  1854,  and  amended  in  1861  and  1870,  can  Sehwar2. 
be  changed  only  by  a  two  thirds  vote  of  the  s^JtRudoI~ 
Landtag  when  three  quarters  of  the  members  i^m.'^op., 
are  present.  The  sovereign  of  the  State  is  85'863) 
the  Prince,  whose  cabinet  consists  of  a  Minister  and 
three  other  heads  of  departments. 

The  Landtag  contains  sixteen  members,  four  of 
whom  are  elected  in  separate  districts  by  persons  who 
pay  one  hundred  and  twenty  marks  in  direct  taxes,  the 
remaining  twelve  being  chosen  in  separate  districts,  by 
all  the  other  tax-payers.2  The  term  and  the  budgetary 
period  are  three  years,  and  unless  there  are  pressing 
matters  that  require  attention,  only  a  single  session  is 
held  during  that  time.  One  would  suppose  that  a  body 
of  sixteen  members  living  near  together  could  meet  so 
easily  that  it  would  hardly  be  necessary  for  them  to 
appoint  a  committee  to  represent  them  between  the 
sessions ;  but  the  ancient  practice  is  nevertheless  fol- 
lowed of  electing  an  Ausschuss  which  not  only  pre- 
pares business,  and  watches  over  the  constitutionality 
of  public  acts,  but  also  has  authority  by  unanimous 
vote  to  sanction  the  enactment  of  statutes. 

The    constitution    of    Schwarzburg  -  Sondershausen 3 
dates  from  1857,  and  can  be  amended  only  Schwara_ 
by  a  two  thirds  vote  of  the  Landtag  repeated  J^hausen. 
after  an  interval  of  fourteen  days.     The  cabi-  {J5;  pop., 
net  of  the  Prince  consists  of  three  members,   7o'510) 

1  Klinghammer,  Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt,  in  Marquardsen. 

2  The  higher  tax-payers  have  no  special  privileges  in  the  local  govern- 
ment. 

3  Schamback,  Schwarzburg-Sondershausen,  in  Marquardsen. 


362  SCHWARZBURG-SONDERSHAUSEN. 

the  control  tending  always  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  chief  minister.1 

The  Landtag  is  composed  of  five  members  elected 
directly  by  the  highest  tax-payers,  five  elected  indirectly 
by  all  the  other  voters,  and  not  more  than  five  ap- 
pointed by  the  Prince  for  life.  The  term  is  four  years ; 
but  a  session  must  be  held  every  other  year,  although 
the  budget  is  voted  for  four  years  at  a  time.  The 
legislature  has  the  usual  powers,2  and  it  elects  an  Aus- 
schuss,  which  prepares  its  business  and  can  be  intrusted 
with  other  duties.  In  local  government  the  three-class 
system  of  election  is  applied. 

In  Reuss-Schleiz 3  the  constitution  rests  on  the  laws 

of  1852  and  1856,  modified  by  the  electoral 

Schieiz.         law    of    187 1.4      This   little    principality  de- 

(Area,  319  .  n    i  •  •  i.  • 

sq.m.  ;Pop.,   serves  admiration  from  all  historians  for  sim- 

119,811.) 

phfying  the  nomenclature  of  its  sovereigns 
by  the  artless  device  of  naming  all  the  scions  of  the 
princely  house  Henry.5  The  boys  receive  successive 
numbers  in  the  order  of  their  birth,  and  each  new 
century  begins  with  number  one.  Thus  the  reign- 
ing Prince  is  Henry  XIV.,  and  his  father  was 
Henry  LXVII.  Unfortunately,  this  is  the  only  val- 
uable contribution  to  the  art  of  government  that  Reuss 

1  As  in  many  of  the  smaller  states  there  are  more  departments,  but  in 
practice  they  have  not  all  different  heads. 

2  As  is  commonly  the  case  in  the  smaller  states,  the  rules  of  procedure 
are  not  made  by  the  Landtag  at  its  pleasure,  but  are  fixed  by  statute, 
and  hence  cannot  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  the  Prince. 

3  Miiller,  Reuss  jiingerer  Linie,  in  Marquardsen. 

4  No  particular  formality  seems  to  be  necessary  for  amendments. 

5  The  practice  is  not  new,  and  in  fact  dates  back  to  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury. 


REUSS-SCHLEIZ  AND  REUSS-GREIZ.  363 

has  made.  In  other  respects  her  political  system  does 
not  differ  materially  from  that  of  the  other  little  Ger- 
man States. 

The  Prince  rules  with  the  help  of  a  cabinet,  consist- 
ing of  a  minister  and  two  other  heads  of  departments ; 
and  the  Landtag,  whose  powers  are  fully  as  broad  as 
usual,  is  composed  of  the  head  of  the  princely  line  of 
Reuss-Kostritz,  of  three  members  chosen  by  the  highest 
tax-payers,  and  of  twelve  more  elected  directly  and  by 
secret  ballot  by  all  other  men  twenty-six  years  old  who 
pay  a  small  tax.1  Its  term  is  three  years,  and  it  must 
be  summoned  at  least  once  during  that  period  to  vote 
the  triennial  budget.  It  chooses  an  Ausschuss  to  rep- 
resent it  between  the  sessions. 

The  constitution  of  Reuss-Greiz 2  was  made  in  1867, 
and  cannot  be  amended  without  a  two  thirds 

.Reuss™ 

vote   of   the   Landtag,   and  the    presence   of  Greiz. 

i  pi  i  a        •  i        (Area,  122 

three   quarters  ot   the  members.     As  in  the  sq.  m. :  pop., 

^  .  62,754.) 

other  Reuss,  all  the  men  of  the  princely  fam- 
ily are  named  Henry ;  the  numbers,  however,  running 
from  one  to  a  hundred  and  then  beginning  again. 
The  Prince  carries  on  the  administration  not  through 
ministers,  but  by  the  ancient  method  of  a  government 
board,  whose  members  act  together,  and  are  not  at  the 
head  of  separate  departments.3 

The  Landtag,  whose  term  is  six  years,  one  half  being 
renewed  every  three  years,  contains  twelve   members. 

1  The  three-class  system  does  not  apply  to  the  election  of  the  commu- 
nal councils,  but  half  the  members  of  those  bodies  must  own  land. 

2  Liebmann,  Reuss  alterer  Linie,  in  Marquardsen. 

3  His  acts  must,  however,  be  countersigned. 


364  THE  tWO   MECKLENBURGS. 

Of  these,  three  are  appointed  by  the  Prince,  two  are 
chosen  directly  by  the  great  landowners,  three  are 
elected  indirectly  by  secret  ballot  by  all  the  tax-payers 
of  the  cities,  and  the  remaining  four  are  returned  in 
the  same  way  by  the  rural  districts.  The  powers  of 
this  body  are  decidedly  limited,  for  it  has  no  initiative, 
but  only  a  right  to  request  legislation ;  and  in  regard 
to  the  budget,  which  is  voted  for  three  years  at  a  time, 
the  estimates  proposed  by  the  government  can  be  re- 
jected only  by  a  two  thirds  vote,  so  that  the  crown  has 
only  to  obtain  the  support  of  two  members  in  addition 
to  its  own  appointees  in  order  to  pass  any  budget  it 
pleases.1 

The  duchies  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  and  Mecklen- 
Meckien-  burg-Strelitz  have  been  placed  at  the  end  of 
Sohwerin.  the  ^s^  °^  monarchical  states,  because,  unlike 
sq.m.';5pop5,  the  rest,  their  organization  remains  distinctly 
feudal  and  unaffected  by  modern  constitu- 
burg-  tional  ideas.2     They  are   subject  to   different 

Strelitz.  iii  i  *,.... 

(Area,  i,i3i   grand  dukes,  but  then1  institutions  are  mter- 

sq.  m.  ;  pop.,    °  ....  ., 

97,978.)  laced  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  impossible  to 
describe  them  separately.  It  would,  in  fact,  puzzle 
a  political  philosopher  to  say  whether,  before  their 
nationality  became  merged  in  that  of  Germany,  they 
were  two  nations  or  one ;  for  although  the  treaty  of 
1701  declares  each  Grand  Duke  independent  and 
sovereign  in  his  own  territory,  there  is  a  common  Land- 
tag, a  common  court  of  appeals,  and  several  other  com- 
mon institutions  protected  by  the  fundamental  laws. 

1  Even  if  the  budget  is  rejected,  the  crown  can  continue  to  collect  the 
taxes  for  another  year. 

2  Busing,  in  Marquardsen. 


THE  GRAND  DUKES  AND  THE  LANDTAG.    365 

The  constitution  is  not  embodied  in  any  single  in- 
strument, but  rests  upon  the  "  Union "  of  1523,  the 
"  Reversales  "  of  1555,  1572,  and  1621,  and  the  com- 
pacts of  1755  and  1817,  the  most  important  of  all  these 
being  the  Vergleich  of  1755.  The  organization  created 
by  these  documents  is  in  its  main  traits  as  follows  :  — 

The  executive  power  in  each  duchy  is  exercised  by 
the  Grand  Duke,  except  that  the  administration  of  a 
few  matters  is  committed  to  joint  officials  acting  in 
behalf  of  both  states.  For  legislation,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  is  a  common  Landtag,  which  can  be 
summoned  to  meet  only  by  the  Grand  Duke  of  Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin,  but  must  be  called  together  by  him 
at  least  once  a  year.  Either  monarch,  after  giving 
notice  to  the  other,  may  submit  measures  to  it,  and  as 
a  rule  the  two  governments  agree  on  the  bills  to  be 
presented. 

The  Landtag  is  strictly  an  assembly  of  estates,  based 
on  the  tenure  of  land.  These  estates  are  the  Mitter- 
schaft,  or  owners  of  knights'  fees,  a*ll  of  whom,  nearly 
eight  hundred  in  number,  have  a  right  to  sit,  although 
few  of  them  actually  attend ; 1  and  the  Lanclschaft,  or 
municipal  authorities  of  the  cities,  which  appear  in  the 
persons   of  deputies   commissioned  by  the  city  magis- 

1  Only  a  little  more  than  sixty  of  these  belong  to  Strelitz,  and  the  rest 
to  Schwerin.  The  exceeding  disparity  in  the  numbers  from  the  two 
duchies  is  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  principality  of  Ratzeburg, 
which  forms  a  considerable  part  of  Strelitz,  is  not  included  in  the  terri- 
tory to  which  the  constitution  applies,  and  is  not  represented  in  the 
Landtag.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  cities  of  Wismar  and  Ncustre- 
litz.  The  connection  of  Ratzeburg  with  Strelitz,  which  is  more  than  a 
mere  personal  union  under  the  same  crown,  is  one  of  the  many  anomalies 
to  be  found  in  these  duchies. 


366  THE  TWO  MECKLENBURGS. 

trates.1  In  several  of  the  cities,  however,  the  burgo- 
master is  ex  officio  the  deputy  ;  and  as  that  officer  is 
usually  appointed  by  the  crown,  these  cities  have  in 
reality  no  control  over  their  representatives. 

The  process  of  legislation  is  based  upon  the  medi- 
seval  idea  that  laws  are  made  by  the  crown  with  the 
consent  of  the  persons  whose  rights  are  directly 
affected;  and  hence  the  laws  are  divided  into  three 
classes  :  first,  those  which  concern  exclusively  the  ducal 
officials,  or  apply  only  to  the  domains  of  the  crown,  — 
a  district  comprising  about  two  thirds  of  the  territory 
in  each  duchy.  In  regard  to  these,  the  power  of  the 
crown  is  absolute.  Second,  those  which  affect  the 
rights  or  privileges  of  the  estates  or  their  members, 
including  laws  that  extend  the  revenues  of  the  crown 
beyond  the  regalia  major  a.  For  these  the  consent  of 
the  Landtag  is  required.2  Third,  those  which  do  not 
directly  affect  the  rights   or  privileges  of  the  estates, 

1  Including  the  seaport  Rostock,  there  are  forty-eight  of  these  cities, 
of  which  seven  lie  in  Strelitz. 

2  Each  new  law  is  in  effect  a  contract  proposed  by  the  crown  and 
assented  to  by  the  Landtag.  The  communications  between  the  govern- 
ment and  the  estates  are  entirely  in  writing  as  the  ministers  do  not 
appear  in  the  Landtag,  the  procedure  being  as  follows  :  the  crown  sends 
a  message  proposing  a  measure  to  the  Landtag,  which  thereupon  votes  a 
declaration  or  memorial  containing,  in  fact,  an  answer,  accepting,  reject- 
ing, or  modifying  the  measure.  If  the  crown  is  satisfied,  it  enacts  the 
law  as  amended.  If  not,  it  answers  the  memorial  in  a  rescript;  and  this 
process  is  repeated  until  an  agreement  is  reached,  or  it  is  evident  that  an 
accord  is  impossible.  The  debates  seem  to  be  conducted  without  the 
slightest  idea  of  order,  every  one  speaking  whenever  he  pleases  and  as 
long  as  he  likes,  so  that  in  times  of  excitement  as  many  as  twenty  orators 
have  been  known  to  address  the  house  at  one  time.  For  a  humorous 
account  of  the  procedure,  see  Bib.  Univ.  et  Revue  Suisse,  May,  1895,  pp. 
396-400. 


LEGISLATION  AND   FINANCE.  367 

and  do  not  fall  within  the  first  category.  About  these 
the  Landtag  must  be  consulted,  but  its  consent  is  not 
necessary.  The  principle  that  the  consent  of  the 
persons  directly  interested  is  alone  required  for  legis- 
lation is,  indeed,  carried  farther  than  this;  for  if  a 
measure  affects  only  one  estate  or  one  district,  or  even, 
as  it  seems,  one  city,  the  consent  of  the  representatives 
of  that  estate,  district,  or  city  is  enough,  —  a  survival 
in  complete  form  of  the  political  ideas  of  the  thirteenth 
century.  The  estates  sit  as  a  single  chamber,  each 
Ritter  and  each  city  having  one  vote,  and  as  a  rule  the 
majority  decides ;  but  in  order  to  protect  the  cities 
from  being  swamped  by  the  far  more  numerous  Ritter, 
it  is  provided  that  either  estate  may  demand  the  Itio  in 
partes,  that  is,  a  separate  vote  by  each  estate.1 

The  financial  system  of  the  duchies  is  extremely 
complex,  for  the  revenues  are  of  three  kinds,  which 
are  kept  distinct  and  managed  quite  separately.  The 
receipts  from  the  regalia  majora,  and  the  taxes  raised 
on  the  crown  domains,  forming  decidedly  the  largest 
source  of  income,  are  entirely  under  the  control  of  the 
crown  in  each  duchy.  Then  there  are  certain  funds 
and  permanent  taxes  managed  for  both  duchies  in 
common  by  officials  appointed  by  the  Landtag.  This 
is  the  smallest  source  of  income,  and  the  proceeds 
appear  to  be  used  to  defray  part  of  the  interest  on  the 

1  There  are  Konvokationstage  and  Deputationstage;  that  is,  assemblies  of 
estates  for  a  single  duchy  or  district,  whose  functions  extend  to  matters 
that  do  not  concern  the  whole  Landtag.  They  can  be  summoned  by 
either  of  the  Grand  Dukes,  but  in  fact  this  is  not  often  done.  The 
estates  elect  an  Engere  Ausschuss,  which  represents  them  when  they  are 
not  in  session,  and  has  charge  of  certain  funds. 


368  HAMBURG,   BREMEN,   AND   LUBECK. 

public  debt.  Finally,  the  balance  of  expenses  is  covered 
by  taxes  voted  by  the  common  legislature,  but  adminis- 
tered in  each  duchy  by  a  separate  board  appointed  partly 
by  the  Grand  Duke  and  partly  by  the  joint  Landtag. 

The  political  organization  of  the  Mecklenburgs  has 
a  peculiar  interest,  because  it  is  a  survival  of  mediaeval 
institutions  which  has  retained  its  vitality  to  the  pres- 
ent day.  It  is  a  fragment  of  the  thirteenth  century 
projected  into  the  nineteenth.  The  absence  of  repre- 
sentative assemblies  in  these  duchies  has  been  a  sore 
grievance  to  the  German  Liberals,  who  have  more 
than  once  carried  through  the  Reichstag  proposals  to 
amend  the  imperial  constitution  so  as  to  require  every 
State  to  have  a  legislative  chamber  elected  by  the 
people.  The  Bundesrath,  however,  has  always  rejected 
the  proposals.  This  might  lead  one  to  suppose  that 
the  objection  to  change  came  from  the  governments 
of  the  duchies ;  but  such  is  not  the  case,  for  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  has  on  several  occa- 
sions tried  to  establish  a  representative  chamber,  and 
in  every  case  his  efforts  have  been  frustrated  by  the 
refusal  of  the  Ritterschaft  to  surrender  its  privileges. 

The  governments  of  the  three  Hanse  cities  have  all 
„    ,  gone  through  the  same  process  of  evolution, 

Hamburg-.        o  ©  x  ' 

(Area,i  58      f r0m  their  former  patrician  condition ;  and  they 

sq.  m.  ;  pop.,  -T  •> 

SSen  are  now  so  mucu  alike  that  it  is  enough  to 
m^r;epop9,sq'  describe  the  political  organization  of  Ham- 
L&tck!  burg,  an(i  point  out  in  the  notes  the  chief 
sq^m.'^pop.,  points  of  difference  to  be  found  in  the  other 
two.1     The  present  constitution  of  Hamburg 

1  Wolffson,  Hamburg j  Sievers,  Bremen;  and  Klugmann,  Lilbeck,  in 
Marquardsen. 


THE  SENATE.  369 

was  made  in  1860,  and  revised  in  1879.1  Amend- 
ments require  a  three  quarters  vote  in  each  of  the  two 
political  organs  of  the  state,  the  Senate  and  the  Bur- 
gerschaft.2 

The  executive  power  is  vested  in  the  Senate,  which 
occupies,  in  fact,  a  position  analogous  to  that  of  the 
monarch  in  the  other  German  States,  subject,  however, 
to  the  important  limitation  that  it  cannot  dissolve  the 
Biirgerschaft.  It  appoints  the  officials,  has  the  usual 
right  of  the  crown  to  issue  ordinances  to  complete  the 
laws,  appoints  the  delegate  to  the  Bundesrath,  and 
gives  him  his  instructions.  It  chooses  every  year  from 
its  members  a  burgomaster,  but  this  officer  only  presides 
over  the  body,  and  is  in  no  sense  the  head  of  the  ad- 
ministration. On  the  contrary,  the  executive  work  is 
divided  among  the  senators,  one  or  more  of  whom  are 
placed  at  the  head  of  each  of  the  nine  departments. 
The  Senate  consists  of  eighteen  members,  of  whom 
nine  must  be  learned  in  the  law,  and  seven  must  have 
been  merchants.3  They  are  chosen  for  life,  are  paid, 
and  are  obliged  to  accept  the  office,  but  are  permitted 
to  resign  after  they  have  served  six  years,  or  have 
attained  the  age  of  seventy.4  The  method  of  election 
is  peculiar,  for  when  a  vacancy  occurs,  the  Senate 
chooses  four  of  its  members  to  serve  on  a  nominating 

1  Those  of  Bremen  and  Liibeck  were  made  in  1854  and  1851  respec- 
tively, and  both  were  slightly  modified  in  1875. 

2  In  Bremen  an  affirmative  vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the  members  in 
each  body  is  enough. 

8  In  Bremen  ten  of  the  eighteen  must  be  learned  in  the  law,  and  five 
must  be  merchants.     In  Liibeck  the  Senate  consists  of  fourteen  members. 
*  In  Bremen,  service  is  not  compulsory. 

VOL.   I. 


370  HAMBURG,  BREMEN,   AND   LUBECK. 

committee,  and  the  Burgerschaft  does  the  same. 
These  eight  men  draw  up  a  list  of  four  candidates, 
from  whom  the  Senate  selects  two,  and  one  of  the  two 
is  then  elected  senator  by  the  Burgerschaft,  —  a  pro- 
cedure which,  as  Wolffson  points  out,  practically 
enables  the  Senate  to  control  the  election.1 

The  Burgerschaft  is  a  representative  assembly  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty  members,  elected  in  three  categories 
by  direct  vote  and  secret  ballot.  The  first  category 
consists  of  eighty  members,  chosen  in  forty  districts  by 
all  the  citizens  who  pay  a  tax  on  an  income  of  six 
hundred  marks.  The  second  contains  forty  members, 
chosen  in  twenty  districts  by  the  landowners;  the 
third,  forty  members  chosen  at  large  by  all  men  who 
are  or  have  been  judges,  officials,  or  members  of  cham- 
bers of  commerce  or  trade.2  The  service  is  unpaid,  and 
as  a  rule  compulsory.  The  term  is  six  years,  one  half 
of  the  members  being  renewed  every  three  years ; 3  but 
the  sessions  are  not  fixed  by  law,  for  the  body  meets 

1  In  Bremen,  on  the  other  hand,  the  controlling  power  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  Burgerschaft;  for  that  body  is  divided  by  lot  into  five  sections,  each 
of  which  nominates  three  candidates,  and  chooses  one  elector.  These 
five  electors,  together  with  an  equal  number  chosen  by  the  Senate,  select 
three  of  the  fifteen  candidates,  from  whom  the  Burgerschaft  elects  the 
Senator.  In  Liibeck  all  the  senators  and  an  equal  number  of  men 
chosen  by  the  Burgerschaft  meet  to  elect  the  new  senator. 

2  The  Biirgerschaft  in  Bremen  consists  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  mem- 
bers, of  whom  fourteen  are  elected  by  the  university  graduates,  forty-two 
by  the  merchants,  manufacturers,  and  tradesmen,  twenty-two  by  the 
artisans  and  craftsmen,  forty-four  by  the  other  inhabitants  of  the  city, 
and  twenty-eight  by  the  residents  of  the  suburbs,  some  of  them  on  a 
property  qualification.  In  Liibeck,  the  body  contains  one  hundred  and 
twenty  members,  elected  by  all  the  citizens  in  ten  districts. 

8  In  Liibeck  one  third  of  the  members  are  renewed  every  two  years. 


THE  BURGERSCHAFT.  371 

whenever  it  sees  fit,  and  except  in  the  summer  sits 
almost  every  week. 

All  laws,  treaties,  and  financial  matters  require  the 
consent  both  of  the  Senate  and  the  Biirgerschaft,1 
and  each  body  has  the  right  of  initiative.2  The  Biirger- 
schaft  also  takes  an  indirect  part  in  the  administration, 
for  there  are  attached  to  most  of  the  executive  de- 
partments deputations  or  commissions,  composed  of 
senators  and  of  unpaid  members  chosen  for  a  term 
of  years  by  the  Burgerschaft,  and  these  bodies  have 
powers  that  are  partly  executive  and  partly  advisory.3 
The  Burgerschaft  elects,  moreover,  an  Ausschuss,  in- 
trusted with  the  duty  of  watching  over  the  execution 
of  the  laws ;  but  owing  to  the  frequency  of  the  meet- 
ings of  the  representative  assembly  itself,  this  com- 
mittee does  not  appear  to  have  much  importance.4 

In  Hamburg  the  governments  of  the  city  and  the 
state  are  now  identical,5  except  that  the  suburban  com- 
munes still  retain  a  certain  amount  of  local  self-gov- 
ernment.     Both    Hamburg  and  Bremen   had  a  right 

1  In  case  of  disagreement,  either  body  can  demand  a  joint  committee, 
which  has  an  absolute  power  of  decision,  but  this  strange  procedure  has 
never  been  used.  The  Senate  can  appoint  commissioners  to  attend  the 
sittings  of  the  Biirgerschaft,  but  rarely  does  so,  although  it  is  thought 
that  a  free  use  of  the  power  might  prevent  needless  waste  of  time. 

2  In  Liibeck,  at  least,  the  Biirgerschaft  makes  little  use  of  this  right. 

3  Of  Bremen,  Dr.  Sievers  remarks  that  there  is  no  hierarchical  bu- 
reaucracy, but  that  the  various  deputations  are  prevented  from  pursuing 
inconsistent  policies  by  close  personal  relations,  and  by  referring  all 
important  matters  to  the  Senate  and  Biirgerschaft. 

4  In  Liibeck  this  body  is  much  more  important,  for  it  considers  all  the 
measures  to  be  submitted  to  the  Burgerschaft  by  the  Senate,  and  chooses 
the  members  of  various  commissions. 

5  This  is  not  quite  true  of  Bremen,  and  still  less  of  Liibeck. 


372  HAMBURG,   BREMEN,   AND   LUBECK. 

under  the  constitution  of  Germany  to  remain  free  ports 
outside  the  customs  union ;  but,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  when  treating  of  the  Empire,  both  cities  have 
surrendered  this  privilege,  save  as  regards  a  strip  of 
ground  along  the  quays. 

Like  some  other  German  States,  the  three  Hanse 
cities  have  combined  for  the  better  administration  of 
justice.  By  a  treaty,  renewed  for  ten  years  at  a  time, 
there  is  a  common  court  of  appeal  which  now  sits  at 
Hamburg,  the  presidents  being  appointed  by  concurrent 
action  of  the  three  Senates,  and  the  other  judges  by 
each  State  in  proportion  to  the  shares  in  which  the 
expenses  are  borne. 

The  political  organization  of  Hamburg,  with  the 
carefully  selected  body  of  life  senators  at  its  head, 
produces  a  continuity  of  tradition  and  a  watchful  care 
for  the  future,  which  insures  prudence,  economy,  and 
foresight.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  all 
three  of  the  deputies  to  the  Reichstag  from  the  city 
are  Social  Democrats  —  a  clear  indication  in  Germany 
of  political  discontent  among  the  working-classes  — 
seems  to  show  that  the  system  does  not  satisfy  a  large 
section  of  the  community.  In  short,  the  government 
of  Hamburg  has  the  same  merits  and  defects  that  are 
found  in  the  other  great  cities  of  the  country. 

When  the  French  provinces  west  of  the  Rhine  were 

ceded  to  Germany  in  1871,  after  the  war  with 

Lorraine.1      France,  thev  were  placed  bv  the  force  of  cir- 

(Area,  5,600  \  r  J 

sq.m.  ;pop.,   cumstances  in  an  anomalous  and  unfortunate 

1,603,5C(5.) 

position.     The  violent  objection  of  the  inhab- 

1  Leoni,  Elsass-Lotkringen,  in  Marquardsen. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE.  373 

itants  to  the  annexation,  and  their  consequent  hostility 
to  the  Empire,  forbade  any  plan  for  creating  a  new 
State  with  the  autonomy  and  the  privileges  of  the  other 
members  of  the  Confederation.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  proposal  to  incorporate  the  provinces  with  any  exist- 
ing State  would  have  aroused  instant  jealousy ;  nor  could 
any  State,  except  Prussia,  have  annexed  them  without  se- 
rious danger  to  its  own  internal  tranquillity.  The  only 
possible  course,  therefore,  was  to  treat  the  country  as  a 
dependency  of  the  Empire,  under  the  direct  control  of 
the  imperial  authorities.  With  this  object  the  act  of 
June  9,  1871,  gave  the  executive  power  to  the  Em- 
peror, reserving  the  legislative  for  the  Bundesrath  and 
the  Reichstag.  In  response,  however,  to  a  demand  for 
self-government,  an  imperial  decree  of  October,  1874, 
created  a  Landesausschuss,  with  advisory  powers, 
and  in  1877  a  statute  was  passed  providing  that  laws 
for  Alsace-Lorraine  might  be  enacted  by  the  Emperor 
without  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag,  if  the  Bundes- 
rath and  the  Landesausschuss  agreed  upon  them.1 
Finally,  on  July  4,  1879,  another  statute  enlarged  the 
Landesausschuss,  gave  it  a  right  to  originate  legisla- 
tion, and  authorized  the  appointment  of  a  Statthalter 
to  exercise  the  powers  previously  confided  to  the  im- 
perial Chancellor.  At  present,  therefore,  the  executive 
power  is  vested  in  the  Emperor,  who  acts  through  the 
Statthalter,  while  the  laws  are  made  by  him  with  the 
consent  of  the  Bundesrath  and  the  Landesausschuss. 
They  may,  however,  still  be  made  at  any  time  by  the 

1  For  the  power  of  the  Emperor  to  make  ordinances,  see  the  act  of 
June  25,  1873. 


374  ALSACE-LORRAINE. 

Bundesrath  and  Reichstag,  which  are  thus  enabled  to 
disregard  local  opinion  entirely  if  they  please.1 

The  Statthalter  is  appointed  and  removed  at  pleasure 
by  the  Emperor,  to  whom  he  is  directly  subordinate. 
He  is,  in  fact,  the  minister  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  and 
as  such  he  countersigns  the  acts  of  the  crown.  He 
governs  by  means  of  a  cabinet,  composed  of  a  secretary 
of  state  and  four  heads  of  departments;  and,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  French  traditions,  he  is  assisted  by  a 
council  of  state  with  merely  advisory  powers. 

The  Landesausschuss,  which  must  be  summoned 
every  year,  is  composed  of  fifty-eight  members,  of 
whom  thirty-four  are  chosen  by  the  elected  provincial 
councils  of  Upper  Alsace,  Lower  Alsace,  and  Lorraine ; 
four  by  the  municipal  councils  of  each  of  the  four 
largest  cities ;  and  the  remaining  twenty  by  electors 
chosen  by  the  councils  of  the  rural  communes.  Con- 
trary to  the  usual  sensible  practice  in  Europe,  the 
members  must  be  residents  of  the  districts  they  repre- 
sent, and  those  who  are  chosen  directly  must  also  be 
members  of  the  council  by  which  they  are  elected.  The 
deputies  are  chosen  for  three  years,  but  they  are  not 
all  elected  at  the  same  time  except  when  the  body  is 
dissolved  by  the  Emperor. 

In  the  local  matters  the  old  French  system  has  been 
in  the  main  preserved,  all  the  executive  officials  being 
appointed  by  the  government,  and  the  local  councils 

1  Any  change  in  the  fundamental  laws  or  the  statutes  passed  by  the 
Reichstag  must  be  made  in  this  way  ;  when  any  other  laws  are  so  made 
they  require  the  sanction  of  the  Emperor,  as  a  part  of  the  ordinal  legis- 
lation of  the  province. 


ALSACE-LORRAINE.  375 

being  elected  by  universal  suffrage.1  In  regard  to  the 
central  officials,  on  the  other  hand,  the  German  law 
has  been  introduced  which  protects  them  from  arbitrary 
removal. 

The  provinces  participate  to  some  extent  in  the 
government  of  the  Empire,  for  they  elect  fifteen  repre- 
sentatives to  the  Reichstag,  and  since  1879  the  Statt- 
halter  has  been  authorized  to  send  delegates  to  the 
Bundesrath,  but  as  envoys  so  appointed  would  be 
under  the  control  of  the  Emperor,  and  hence  for  prac- 
tical purposes  additional  Prussian  delegates,  they  have 
merely  been  given  a  right  to  speak  without  votes. 

The  motives  for  annexing  Alsace-Lorraine  were 
chiefly  military,  but  there  was  also  no  little  talk  about 
restoring  the  long-lost  brothers  to  the  German  family. 
The  brothers,  however,  although  for  the  most  part 
German  by  race  and  language,  cried  piteously  at  the 
thought  of  being  united  to  the  Fatherland,  and  the 
government  has  been  obliged  to  use  its  utmost  energies 
in  trying  to  reconcile  them  to  their  lot.  How  far  these 
efforts  have  succeeded  it  is  difficult  to  say.  The 
French  writers  declare  that  nothing  has  been  accom- 
plished in  changing  the  sentiments  of  the  people,  while 
the  Germans  insist  that  if  the  result  has  not  been  quite 
satisfactory,  the  progress  has  been  very  considerable. 
A  recent  English  observer,  who  may  be  supposed  to  be 
impartial,  is  of  opinion  that  at  bottom  the  popular  sen- 
timent has  undergone  little  change,  and  attributes  this 
to  the  fact  that  although  the  Germans  have  ruled  the 

1  The  French  system  of  administrative  justice  has  also  been  preserved 
with  some  modifications. 


376  THE  GERMAN   STATES. 

land  well  and  kindly,  they  have  shown  towards  the 
people  a  lack  of  confidence  and  sympathy,  while  the  offi- 
cials, who  are  mostly  Prussians,  have  been  domineering, 
and  used  their  arbitrary  powers  in  a  despotic  spirit.1 
Blum,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  recent  history  of  the 
German  Empire,2  says  that  the  mild  government  of  the 
first  Statthalter,  General  von  Manteufel,  was  a  failure, 
but  that  since  1885,  the  more  severe  policy  of  his  suc- 
cessor, Prince  Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst  (the  present 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire),  has  borne  better  fruit.  In 
favor  of  this  view,  it  must  be  observed  that  candidates 
friendly  to  the  Empire  won  in  1890  four,  and  in  1893 
five,  out  of  the  fifteen  seats  in  the  Reichstag,  a  result 
that  is,  however,  perhaps  due  less  to  any  direct  effect 
on  the  natives  than  to  the  large  emigration  of  French 
sympathizers,  whose  places  have  been  taken  by  Ger- 
mans from  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine. 

This  brief  survey  of  the  governments  of  the  smaller 
States  is  enough  to  show  the  great  vitality  of  the 
monarchical  principle  throughout  Germany ;  for  al- 
though the  representatives  of  the  people  exert  every- 
where, except  in  Mecklenburg,  a  certain  influence  on 
public  affairs,  the  guiding  and  controlling  force  is 
always  vested  in  the  Prince.  Moreover,  democracy 
does  not  appear  to  be  gaining  ground.  During  the 
last  twenty  years  the  German  constitutions  have  under- 
gone few  changes,  and  the  diets  have  shown  little 
inclination  and  still  less  ability  to  curtail  the  preroga- 
tives of  the  crown.     One  reason  for  this  is,  of  course, 

1  Henry  W.  Wolff,  West.  Rev.,  Dec,  1890. 

2  Das  Deutsche  Reich  zur  Zeit  Bismarcks,  pp.  637-57. 


VITALITY  OF  MONARCHY.  377 

the  prevailing  faith  in  the  monarchical  form  of  govern- 
ment. Another  is  the  peculiar  character  of  the  Con- 
federation, which  has  deprived  the  States  of  most  of 
their  legislative  power,  but  left  their  executive  func- 
tions almost  intact,  and  hence  has  diminished  the 
authority  of  the  diets  far  more  than  that  of  the  princes. 
Still  a  third  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  subdivision  of 
parties,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 


7   3  Co     4 


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